IN THE MATTER OF M.E. (P-248239, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3405-17T3
IN THE MATTER OF M.E.,
an Alleged Incapacitated Person.
____________________________
Submitted May 28, 2019 – Decided June 5, 2019
Before Judges Haas and Susswein.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Middlesex County, Docket No. P-
248239.
M.A.E., appellant pro se.
Hanlon Niemann & Wright, PC, attorneys for
respondent M.L. (Kimberlie A. Fiero, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
In this guardianship matter, appellant M.A.E. appeals from the Probate
Part's February 20, 2018 order appointing his sister M.L. as the guardian of the
person and estate of their mother, M.E., who was ninety-eight years old and
incapacitated due to illness. Unfortunately, M.E. passed away on April 28,
2018, approximately three weeks after M.A.E. filed this appeal.
As set forth in paragraph thirteen of the February 20 order, M.E.'s death
terminated the guardianship. Therefore, the issues raised in the appeal are now
moot. "Mootness is a threshold justiciability determination rooted in the notion
that judicial power is to be exercised only when a party is immediately
threatened with harm." Betancourt v. Trinitas Hosp., 415 N.J. Super. 301, 311
(App. Div. 2010). "An issue is 'moot' when the decision sought in a matter ,
when rendered, can have no practical effect on the existing controversy."
Greenfield v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 382 N.J. Super. 254, 257-58 (App. Div. 2006)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting N.Y. Susquehanna & W. Ry. Corp.
v. State Dep't of Treasury, Div. of Taxation, 6 N.J. Tax 575, 582 (Tax Ct. 1984)).
Here, the guardianship has been terminated as a result of M.E.'s death.
Thus, resolution of the issues presented by M.A.E.'s challenges to that
appointment is no longer necessary. Consequently, we dismiss the appeal as
moot.
In so ruling, we are mindful that we earlier denied M.L.'s motion to
dismiss the appeal as moot, stating at that time that the appeal was "not moot
because the order under review granted fees" to M.L.'s attorney in connecti on
with the filing of the guardianship motion. However, we have now had the
benefit of the parties' merits briefs, which make clear that it was M.E.'s estate,
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rather than M.A.E., that was responsible for the payment of these fees. Thus,
we are now satisfied that the appeal is moot as to all issues presented, including
the award of counsel fees.
However, even if this issue was not moot, we conclude that M.A.E.'s
argument that the fees were excessive is meritless. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). Attorney
"fee determinations by trial courts will be disturbed only on the rarest of
occasions, and then only because of a clear abuse of discretion." Packard-
Bamberger & Co. v. Collier, 167 N.J. 427, 444 (2001) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Rendine v. Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292, 317 (1995)). Contrary to
M.A.E.'s contention, the fees sought by M.L.'s attorney were fully documented
in the attorney's detailed certification of services. Under these circumstances,
we discern no basis for disturbing the court's award requiring M.E.'s estate to
reimburse the attorney for her reasonable fees and costs.
All other points raised on appeal by M.A.E. lack sufficient merit to
warrant further discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Dismissed.
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