IN THE MATTER OF REGISTRANT R.H. (ML-0210-0009, HUNTERDON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED)

RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0880-17T1
IN THE MATTER OF
REGISTRANT R.H.
___________________________
Argued October 29, 2018 – Decided November 26, 2018
Before Judges Messano, Gooden Brown, and Rose.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Hunterdon County, Docket No. ML-0210-
0009.
Jeffrey L. Weinstein, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the
cause for appellant (Anthony P. Kearns, III, Hunterdon
County Prosecutor, attorney; Jeffrey L. Weinstein, on
the brief).
James H. Maynard argued the cause for respondent
(Maynard Law Office, LLC, attorneys; James H.
Maynard, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
By leave granted, the State appeals from the September 15, 2017 Law
Division order granting R.H.'s motion to terminate and remove all Megan's Law
obligations, requirements, and disabilities pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(f), which
provides that
[e]xcept as provided in [N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(g)], a person
required to register under [Megan's Law] may make
application to the Superior Court . . . to terminate the
obligation upon proof that the person has not committed
an offense within [fifteen] years following conviction
or release from a correctional facility for any term of
imprisonment imposed, whichever is later, and is not
likely to pose a threat to the safety of others.
We affirm.
By way of background, on January 25, 1999, R.H. pled guilty to first-
degree aggravated sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(2)(b), second-degree
sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(3)(b), and second-degree endangering the
welfare of a child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a). The charges stemmed from R.H., then
a school teacher, having sexual contact with a sixteen-year-old female student
over the course of a year. On May 7, 1999, R.H. was sentenced to an aggregate
term of five years' imprisonment,1 community supervision for life, N.J.S.A.
2C:43-6.4(a), and ordered to comply with the requirements of Megan's Law,
1
Pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement, R.H. was sentenced to a term one
degree lower on the aggravated sexual assault charge in accordance with
N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f)(2).
A-0880-17T1
2
N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(a). Since his release from prison in 2002, R.H. has not been
convicted of any new offenses.
R.H. filed a motion to terminate his obligation to register under Megan's
Law pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(f), and terminate his community supervision
for life sentence pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4(c). In support, R.H. certified
that he had remained offense free since his release, had been married for forty-
five years, had maintained stable employment until his retirement a few years
prior, and did not use illicit drugs or drink alcohol. R.H. also submitted a
psychosexual evaluation and actuarial risk assessment report prepared by James
R. Reynolds, Ph.D., opining that R.H. was not likely to commit another sexual
offense and did not pose a risk of harm to others in the community.
While the State did not oppose the termination of R.H.'s community
supervision for life sentence, the State objected to the termination of his Megan's
Law obligations, asserting that he was statutorily barred from seeking
termination pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(g), which makes the lifetime
registration requirements "permanent [and] irrevocable" for certain of fenders.
In re State ex rel. C.K., 233 N.J. 44, 66 (2018). Enacted on January 8, 2002,
and effective immediately, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(g) provides in pertinent part:
A person required to register under [Megan's Law] who
has been convicted of . . . more than one sex offense as
A-0880-17T1
3
defined in [N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(b)]2 or who has been
convicted of . . . aggravated sexual assault pursuant to
subsection [(a)] of [N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2] . . . is not eligible
under [N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(f)] to make application to the
Superior Court . . . to terminate the registration
obligation.
According to the State, although R.H.'s convictions predated the enactment,
under Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 25 (1995), retroactive application of Megan's
Law is not barred by ex post facto challenges because the statute is not penal ,
but rather a regulatory provision designed to protect the public.
Following oral argument, on September 15, 2017, the trial court granted
R.H.'s motion. In a comprehensive written decision, the court acknowledged
that "Megan's Law is a civil regulatory registration requirement," and
determined that "retroactive application of N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(g) should be
evaluated under the standard used to determine retroactive application of civi l
statutes, articulated in Phillips v. Curiale[,128 N.J. 608 (1992)]." Under that
analysis, the court concluded that "without direction from the legislature as to
their explicit or implicit intent regarding retroactive application of N.J.S.A.
2C:7-2(g)[,] retroactive application is inappropriate." Moreover, according to
2
Sex offenses defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(b) include a conviction for
"aggravated sexual assault; sexual assault; . . . [and] endangering the welfare of
a child by engaging in sexual conduct[,] which would impair or debauch the
morals of the child pursuant to subsection [(a)] of [N.J.S.A.] 2C:24-4."
A-0880-17T1
4
the court, "retroactive application . . . is still inappropriate because it would
interfere with [the] [r]egistrant's vested rights and create manifest injustice."
The court explained that because "there existed the possibility for termination
of those obligations under N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(f)" when R.H. "was convicted and
Megan's Law obligations imposed," R.H. had "a vested right . . . protected by
the standard articulated in Phillips v. Curiale." Further, "retroactive application
of N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(g) would create a manifest injustice as it would impose a life
time registration requirement on [R.H.] without consideration of his low risk of
reoffending." The court entered a conforming order and this appeal followed.
On appeal, the State raises the following points for our consideration:
POINT I
APPLYING N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(G) TO REGISTRANTS
WHO, LIKE R.H., WERE NOT ELIGIBLE FOR
MEGAN'S LAW TERMINATION WHEN
SUBSECTION G WAS PASSED IS NOT A
RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF THE STATUTE.
POINT II
EVEN UNDER A "CIVIL" BASED
RETROACTIVITY ANALYSIS, SUBSECTION G
APPLIES TO R.H.
In In re Registrant G.A., 455 N.J. Super. 515, 522 (App. Div. 2018), we
rejected similar arguments and concluded that the retroactive application of
A-0880-17T1
5
subsection (g) to those convicted of sex offenses prior to its effective date in
2002 was not the intent of the Legislature and would, in any event, be manifestly
unfair if applied to such offenders. Initially, we rejected the State's argument
that N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(g) was not applied retroactively to R.H. and others like him
because R.H. sought termination fifteen years after N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(g) was
enacted. We observed that "[a] law is retrospective if it 'appl[ies] to events
occurring before its enactment' or 'if it changes the legal consequences of acts
completed before its effective date.'" G.A., 455 N.J. Super. at 529 (alterations
in original) (quoting Riley v. Parole Bd., 219 N.J. 270, 285 (2014); and Miller
v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 430 (1987)). Here, like in G.A., the Legislature's
adoption of subsection (g) changed the legal consequences of the guilty plea
R.H. entered prior to its enactment, at a time when R.H. "faced the prospect of
presumptive lifetime registration, but . . . retained the possibility of relief
pursuant to subsection (f), . . . thereby changing the legal consequences" of
R.H.'s convictions entered years earlier. Ibid.
We also rejected the State's argument that "the Legislature implied its
intention to make subsection [(g)] retroactive by the plain language of the
statute," and to hold otherwise "would be contrary to the public safety purpose
underlying the amendment and Megan's Law itself." We stated:
A-0880-17T1
6
This argument ignores the fact that the Legislature
believed Megan's Law, as originally enacted in 1994,
fully satisfied its public safety objectives, even though
it permitted potential relief from registration pursuant
to subsection (f).
Moreover, the legislative history of subsection (g)
supports no such assertion. The sponsor and committee
statements in both the Assembly and the Senate make
clear that subsection (g) was enacted to meet the
requirements of the now repealed Wetterling Act and to
insure continued federal funding.
. . . . [T]he Legislature's stated purpose for enacting
subsection (g)—securing federal funding by complying
with federal law—was fully served without retroactive
application of the new statute.
In short, there is little to suggest the Legislature
intended subsection (g) apply retroactively to those
who were "convicted or released" prior to 2002.
[Id. at 533-34 (citations omitted).]
Based on our conclusion, we determined that there was no need to decide
whether retroactive application of subsection (g) "would result in
unconstitutional interference with 'vested rights' or a 'manifest injustice.'" Id. at
534 (quoting Johnson v. Roselle EZ Quick LLC, 226 N.J. 370, 394 (2016); and
Nobrega v. Edison Glen Assocs., 167 N.J. 520, 537 (2001)). However, for the
sake of completeness, we determined registrants, like R.H.,
had no vested right to relief from their registration
obligations. As originally enacted, Megan's Law
A-0880-17T1
7
presumed they would be subject to lifetime registration;
subsection (f) provided conditional relief contingent
not only upon [their] own conduct, but also upon their
ability to persuade a judge they no longer posed a threat
to public safety. More importantly, "[t]here can be no
vested right in the continued existence of a statute . . .
which precludes its change or repeal."
However, at the time of their guilty pleas, [the
registrants] could reasonably rely upon the possibility
of relief from lifetime registration. The retroactive
application of subsection (g) does not modify a remedy
but eliminates an incentive integral to Megan's Law
remedial purpose by denying certain registrants any
relief from the obligations inherent in lifetime
registration, along with the attendant opprobrium and
potential criminal liability. Weighing that against the
public's interest in the safety of the community, which
was adequately served by subsection (f) prior to the
passage of subsection (g), we conclude retroactive
application of subsection (g) . . . would be manifestly
unjust.
[Id. at 535 (second and third alterations in original)
(quoting Phillips, 128 N.J. at 620).]
We reach the same conclusion here. In light of our decision, we need not address
R.H.'s alternative arguments.
Affirmed.
A-0880-17T1
8