STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. TYREEN H. WALKER (10-12-0754, CUMBERLAND COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED)

RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4745-15T2
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
TYREEN H. WALKER, a/k/a
TYRENE WALKER,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________________
Submitted July 3, 2018 – Decided August 14, 2018
Before Judges O'Connor and Moynihan.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Cumberland County, Indictment
No. 10-12-0754.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney
for appellant (Lee March Grayson, Designated
Counsel, on the brief).
Jennifer Webb-McRae, Cumberland County
Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Kim L.
Barfield, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and
on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Tyreen H. Walker appeals from the denial of his
petition for post-conviction relief (PCR), arguing:
POINT I
THE PCR COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE DEFENDANT'S
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF WITHOUT
AFFORDING HIM AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING TO FULLY
ADDRESS HIS CONTENTION THAT DEFENSE COUNSEL
IN THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ADEQUATELY
EXPLAIN THE RAMIFICATIONS OF THE PLEA
AGREEMENT, WHICH SUBJECTED HIM TO PAROLE
SUPERVISION FOR LIFE.
POINT II
THE PCR COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
IMPOSITION OF A SPECIAL SENTENCE OF PAROLE
SUPERVISION FOR LIFE [PSL] ON THE DEFENDANT
WAS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
We are unpersuaded by either argument and affirm.
Absent an evidentiary hearing, our review of the facts found
and the factual inferences drawn by the PCR court from the record
is de novo. State v. Blake, 444 N.J. Super. 285, 294 (App. Div.).
Likewise, we review de novo the PCR court's legal conclusions.
Ibid.
To establish a PCR claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
a defendant must satisfy the test formulated in Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), and adopted by our Supreme
Court in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987), by showing "that
counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning
as the 'counsel' guaranteed . . . by the Sixth Amendment," Fritz,
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105 N.J. at 52 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687), and by
proving he suffered prejudice due to counsel's deficient
performance, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 691-92. Defendant must
show by a "reasonable probability" that the deficient performance
affected the outcome. Fritz, 105 N.J. at 58. In cases such as
this, following the entry of a guilty plea, defendant must
establish there was a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's errors, he would have rejected the plea offer and gone
to trial. State v. DiFrisco, 137 N.J. 434, 457 (1994); see also
State v. O'Donnell, 435 N.J. Super. 351, 371 (App. Div. 2014)
(holding a defendant "must convince the court that a decision to
reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the
circumstances" (quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372
(2010))).
During the plea colloquy the assistant prosecutor, in
defendant's presence, recited the plea offer:
It was in exchange for a [g]uilty [p]lea to
[c]ount 1 of the [i]ndictment, as charged,
second-degree sexual assault[, N.J.S.A.
2C:14-2(c)(4)].
The State would recommend, I think, to a
second-degree, but treating it as a third-
degree for sentencing purposes. That we would
recommend a four-year [s]tate [p]rison term,
with Megan's Law, parole supervision for life,
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and [an evaluation at the Adult Diagnostic and
Treatment Center].[1]
Defense counsel confirmed that those were the accepted terms,
adding, "I've spoken with [defendant]. He understands he has a
right to a trial; but, he understands this to be in his best
interest, and we are prepared to proceed at this point." Defendant
later acknowledged under oath that the agreement was in his best
interest.
Defendant was sworn and, after indicating he understood that
he was waiving a plethora of rights individually recited by Judge
Benjamin C. Telsey, admitted he had an opportunity to review the
plea forms with his counsel; his counsel was available to answer
any questions about the forms; the circled answers were defendant's
truthful responses to the posed questions; and he signed and
initialed the forms. The plea forms explain in detail, in five
sub-questions, the ramifications of PSL; defendant answered yes
to each question asking if he understood those details. After
denying that he was under the influence of "any drugs, medication,
alcohol, or anything else that would affect [his] ability to
understand [what was] going on" during the plea, defendant stated
he heard the terms of the recommended sentence that were placed
1
The plea agreement provided that count two of the indictment
charging second-degree sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(c)(1),
would be dismissed.
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on the record. He understood he was to receive a four-year "flat"
sentence and repeatedly denied having any questions about the
sentence.
Judge Telsey continued his thorough review of the plea terms,
engaging defendant in the following PSL-related colloquy:
THE COURT: Do you . . . understand that you'll
be subject to parole supervision for life?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: Which means that you'll be
supervised by parole for at least 15 years,
as if you were on parole?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: And that could be very strict
conditions as part of that supervision.
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: Do you understand if you violate a
condition of parole supervision for life, you
could be -- your parole could be revoked and
you could be sentenced to prison for 12 to 18
months for each revocation?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: And, that if you violate a
condition of parole supervision for life, and
you're indicted and convicted, you could
receive a sentence of up to 18 months?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
Defendant's counsel, at the conclusion of the judge's
questioning, asked defendant, "All the things the [j]udge just
discussed with you, you and I went over in detail, did we not?"
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Defendant answered, "Yes." Counsel continued, "You understand
everything?" Defendant answered affirmatively and denied having
any questions for counsel, confirming his answer to the same
question in the plea form.
Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel contentions
that: he had significant cognitive deficiencies; he did not
understand that he was pleading to a second-degree sexual assault,
to be treated as a third-degree crime for purposes of sentencing
– not third-degree endangering the welfare of a child; and his
counsel did not explain the ramifications of PSL are belied by the
record. Notwithstanding his contention that the Adult Diagnostic
and Treatment Center's pre-sentence evaluation may corroborate
that his cognitive difficulties impacted his ability to understand
the plea agreement, he gave no indication he had any difficulty
understanding the plea forms, Judge Telsey's questions, or the
terms of the agreement, including PSL. Defendant's bald-faced
assertions do not establish a prima facie case of ineffective
assistance of counsel. See State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super.
154, 170 (App. Div. 1999).
Nor do these assertions establish grounds for an evidentiary
hearing which should be held only if a defendant presents "a prima
facie case in support of post-conviction relief." R. 3:22-10(b);
State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 462 (1992). In order to establish
6 A-4745-15T2
a prima facie case, defendant must demonstrate "the reasonable
likelihood of succeeding under the test set forth in Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)." Preciose, 129 N.J. at
463. Merely raising a claim for post-conviction relief does not
entitle a defendant to an evidentiary hearing. Cummings, 321 N.J.
Super. at 170. Contradicting his prior sworn statements without
explanation do not create a genuine issue of fact warranting an
evidentiary hearing. Blake, 444 N.J. Super. at 299.
Post-conviction relief applications are not fishing
expeditions. State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 270 (1997) (noting
"that PCR 'is not a device for investigating possible claims, but
a means for vindicating actual claims'" (quoting People v.
Gonzales, 800 P.2d 1159, 1206 (Cal. 1990))). Defendant may not
utilize an evidentiary hearing to explore his bald-faced PCR
claims. See id. at 157-58.
The record supports Judge Telsey's finding at the conclusion
of the plea hearing that defendant answered the questions on the
plea form after reviewing same with his counsel and voluntarily
entered into the plea agreement with full understanding of the
sentence and the PSL requirements.
We further determine there is no reasonable probability that,
but for counsel's errors, defendant would have rejected the plea
offer and gone to trial. He freely admitted he had sexual
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intercourse with a fifteen year-old when he was nineteen, a second-
degree crime for which defendant faced a maximum ten-year State
prison term. Inasmuch as defendant's belief that the victim was
eighteen was not a viable defense, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-5(c),2 it is not
reasonably probable that he would have rejected a four-year
sentence and gone to trial. As we noted, he admitted the agreement
was in his best interest.
Judge Robert G. Malestein correctly denied defendant's
petition.
We determine defendant's argument that PSL "is an
unconstitutional violation of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and due
process and fundamental fairness doctrine inherent in the New
Jersey Constitution," equating PSL with a continued "custodial
sentence, despite having been granted the benefit of parole" to
be without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in this written
opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). We add only the following observations.
Defendant argues: "By treating all PSL infractions as parole
violations instead of crimes, which must be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt, . . . he is being denied due process . . . and
2
The statute provides: "It shall be no defense to a prosecution
for a crime under this chapter that the actor believed the victim
to be above the age stated for the offense, even if such a mistaken
belief was reasonable."
8 A-4745-15T2
. . . the fundamental fairness doctrine has been violated"; and
"[t]he loss of liberty resulting from a parole revocation has been
construed 'as a serious deprivation that requires due process.'"
We agree with Judge Malestein's well-written opinion that those
issues are not ripe for constitutional review because defendant
has not been charged with a PSL violation. We also note a defendant
charged with a criminal offense for violating a PSL condition,
N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4(d), enjoys the full panoply of rights afforded
any person accused of a crime. Further, a defendant subject to
parole revocation is entitled to the rights mandated by N.J.S.A.
30:4-123.62 and -123.63, which include a hearing. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-
6.4(b). And contrary to defendant's averment that the prospect
of release from PSL "has been virtually eliminated," N.J.S.A.
2C:43-6.4(c) – as he recognized in his merits brief – provides a
pathway for eventual release from PSL supervision.
Affirmed.
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