TAPPAN GOLD DRIVE RANGE, INC. VS. SHEN JONG (JOSEPH) LIANG (L-4401-16, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4675-17T1
TAPPAN GOLD DRIVE RANGE,
INC.,1 and MYUNG S. KOH,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
v.
SHEN JONG (JOSEPH) LIANG,
Defendant,
and
GRACE LIANG, a/k/a YIN-YUN
LIANG, his wife,
Defendant-Appellant.
_____________________________
Submitted December 11, 2019 – Decided December 18, 2019
Before Judges Haas and Mayer.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Bergen County, Docket No. L-4401-16.
1
The correct name of the corporate plaintiff is Tappan Golf Drive Range, Inc.
(Tappan Golf).
Victoria Moruzzi Brown, attorney for appellant.
Kim & Bae, PC, attorneys for respondent (Andrew C.
Miller, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Yin-Yun (Grace) Liang appeals from a May 18, 2018 final
judgment in favor of plaintiffs Tappan Golf and Myung S. Koh. The judgment
was entered as a lien in the amount of $729,613.60 against property in
Englewood Cliffs owned by defendant. We affirm.
The parties are familiar with the lengthy litigation history preceding the
entry of judgment against defendant. We briefly summarize the relevant facts.
Plaintiffs commenced an action in New York against a company owned by
defendant's husband, Shen Jong (Joseph) Liang.2 In 2008, plaintiffs obtained a
judgment against Joseph's company for failure to return a security deposit. In
seeking to collect on that judgment, in 2010, plaintiffs filed another action in
New York. In plaintiffs' second action, the New York court entered a December
11, 2015 judgment for $1,064,676.67, holding Joseph personally liable for the
judgment against his company.
2
We refer to Joseph Liang by his first name because defendant shares the same
last name. No disrespect is intended.
A-4675-17T1
2
To avoid payment of plaintiffs' New York judgment, in May 2012,
defendant sold a home in Alpine, owned jointly by defendant and Joseph, for
$1,725,000. Defendant retained the proceeds realized from the sale of the
Alpine home, except for the sum of $200,000 which was retained by Joseph.
Defendant deposited $513,393.33 that she received from the sale of the Alpine
home. Defendant then used that money to purchase a home in Englewood Cliffs.
In 2016, plaintiffs filed an action in New Jersey against defendant and
Joseph, alleging fraudulent conveyance of the Alpine home and seeking to attach
a lien against the Englewood Cliffs property.
Judge Christine A. Farrington conducted a bench trial on May 9, 2018.
The judge heard testimony from defendant, her husband, Joseph, and Koh and
considered documents submitted as evidence at trial. Judge Farrington issued a
comprehensive twenty-three page written decision entering judgment for
plaintiffs and permitting the attachment of a lien against the Englewood Cliffs
property in the amount of $729,613.60. Judge Farrington made detailed factual
findings, as well as credibility determinations, in support of her decision. Based
on the testimony and documentary evidence, Judge Farrington found the transfer
of the Alpine home was fraudulent and intended to hide Joseph's assets from
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plaintiffs to avoid payment of the New York judgment. We affirm for the cogent
reasons stated by Judge Farrington.
We add only the following comments. Our scope of review after a bench
trial is limited. Final determinations of a trial court "premised on the testimony
of witnesses and written evidence at a bench trial" are deferentially reviewed.
D'Agostino v. Maldonado, 216 N.J. 168, 182 (2013). "Findings by the trial
judge are considered binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial
and credible evidence." Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv'rs Ins. Co. of Am., 65
N.J. 474, 484 (1974). "[W]e do not disturb the factual findings and legal
conclusions of the trial judge unless we are convinced that they are so manifestly
unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably
credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice[.]" Seidman v. Clifton
Sav. Bank, S.L.A., 205 N.J. 150, 169 (2011) (second alteration in original)
(quoting In re Tr. Created By Agreement Dated Dec. 20, 1961, 194 N.J. 276,
284 (2008)).
Having reviewed the record, Judge Farrington's conclusions are
adequately supported by substantial and credible evidence in the record. We
defer to her credibility determinations as Judge Farrington had the opportunity
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to see and hear the witnesses. Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015) (quoting
Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 412 (1998)).
For the first time on appeal, defendant asserts plaintiffs' claim is barred
by the statute of limitations in N.J.S.A. 25:2-31. We note issues not raised
before the trial court will generally not be considered on appeal, unless the issue
concerns the jurisdiction of the court or matters of significant public interest. R.
2:6-2; Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973). Defendant
satisfies neither exception to warrant our review of her newly asserted
contention. Further, defendant waived the statute of limitations defense by
failing to timely assert such a defense. See Williams v. Bell Tel. Labs., Inc.,
132 N.J. 109, 119-20 (1993).
N.J.S.A. 25:2-25 identifies circumstances to support setting aside a
fraudulent transfer. Judge Farrington found Joseph fraudulently transferred his
assets to defendant despite Joseph's obligation to pay plaintiffs' judgment.
N.J.S.A. 25:2-25 applies not just to debtors, such as Joseph, but to debtors' assets
that are transferred fraudulently, subjecting the transferees, defendant here, to
claims against them. See Nat'l Westminster Bank N.J. v. Anders Eng'g Inc., 289
N.J. Super. 602, 606-09 (App. Div. 1996).
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The remainder of defendant's arguments are without sufficient merit to
warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
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