New Jersey Election Law Enforcement Commission v. Joseph Divincenzo and Jorge Martinez (Office of Administrative Law)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1596-15T3
NEW JERSEY ELECTION LAW
ENFORCEMENT COMMISSION,
APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION
Petitioner-Appellant,
April 25, 2016
v.
APPELLATE DIVISION
JOSEPH DIVINCENZO and
JORGE MARTINEZ,
Respondents-Respondents.
________________________________________________________________
Argued March 1, 2016 – Decided April 25, 2016
Before Judges Espinosa, Rothstadt and Currier.
On appeal from the Office of Administrative
Law.
Edwin R. Matthews argued the cause for
appellant (Bourne, Noll & Kenyon, attorneys;
Mr. Matthews, on the brief).
Angelo J. Genova argued the cause for
respondents (Genova Burns LLC, attorneys; Mr.
Genova, of counsel; Celia S. Bosco, Brett M.
Pugach and Kevin R. Miller, on the brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
ESPINOSA, J.A.D.
The New Jersey Election Law Enforcement Commission (ELEC or
the Commission) was created as an independent agency, N.J.S.A.
19:44A-5, charged with the duty to enforce violations of the New
Jersey Campaign Contributions and Expenditures Reporting Act,
N.J.S.A. 19:44A-1 to -47 (the Act). The Legislature specified
that the Commission shall consist of four members appointed by the
Governor to staggered terms and that "[n]o more than two members
shall belong to the same political party." N.J.S.A. 19:44A-5.
One of the members of the Commission died in November 2011; a
second died in August 2015. Neither vacancy has been filled to
date. The issues in this case arise from the failure to fill
these vacancies.
An administrative law judge (ALJ) dismissed a complaint
issued by ELEC against respondents on the ground that ELEC lacked
jurisdiction to act because the ALJ concluded ELEC did not have a
quorum of members required to issue a complaint. Pursuant to
N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(c), ELEC had forty-five days in which to adopt,
reject or modify the ALJ's decision and was permitted to extend
that time for one forty-five day period before the ALJ's decision
was deemed adopted as the agency's final decision. As a result
of an amendment to N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(c) that became effective
March 18, 2014, ELEC could not obtain any further extensions
without the consent of the respondents. As the forty-five day
extension period was drawing to a close, ELEC sought emergent
relief, asking this court to toll the remainder of that period.
We granted ELEC leave to file an emergent motion, tolled the forty-
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five day period pending this decision and have held oral argument
on the motion. For the following reasons, we deny ELEC's motion
for emergent relief and vacate our prior order tolling the forty-
five day period.1
I.
In July 2011, the Commission consisted of four members:
Chairman Ronald J. DeFilipis, Vice Chairman Walter Timpone, Amos
Saunders and Lawrence Weiss.2 As required by N.J.S.A. 19:44A-5,
two of the members were Democrats and two were Republicans. All
four members of the Commission voted to conduct a formal
investigation into purported violations of the Act by respondents
Joseph DiVincenzo, a Democratic candidate, and his campaign
treasurer, Jorge Martinez, during the 2010 general election for
County Executive of Essex County and prior to the 2014 primary
election.
In January 2013, the Commission authorized the issuance of a
complaint against respondents. In the time that had passed since
the authorization of the investigation, Weiss died and Timpone
recused himself. As a result, the complaint was authorized by two
1
The Attorney General declined our invitation to participate in
this matter.
2
The facts, which are largely undisputed, are derived from the
pleadings, the written opinion of the trial court judge and the
ALJ, and the submissions of counsel.
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members of the Commission, DeFilipis and Saunders, who were both
Republicans. The complaint was issued approximately nine months
later in September 2013.
The Commission is authorized to initiate penalty proceedings
pursuant to N.J.S.A. 19:44A-22 and N.J.S.A. 19:44A-41.3 Once the
Commission elects to undertake a penalty proceeding under either
statute, the respondent is afforded the opportunity for a hearing
pursuant to the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA), N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 to -15 and the Uniform Administrative
Procedure Rules, N.J.A.C. 1:1-1.1 to -21.6. N.J.A.C. 19:25-17.1.
Respondents filed an answer and a request for a hearing. As a
result, the matter was transferred to the Office of Administrative
Law (OAL) as a contested case pursuant to N.J.S.A. 52:14B-2.
N.J.S.A. 19:44A-22 states:
b. Upon receiving evidence of any
violation of this section, the Election Law
Enforcement Commission shall have power to
hold, or to cause to be held under the
provisions of subsection d. of this section,
hearings upon such violation and, upon finding
any person to have committed such a violation,
to assess such penalty, . . . as it deems
proper under the circumstances. . . .
. . . .
d. The commission may designate a hearing
officer to hear complaints of violations of
this act. Such hearing officer shall take
3
The complaint is not included in the record before us so it is
unclear under which statute the complaint was issued.
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testimony, compile a record and make factual
findings, and shall submit the same to the
commission, which shall have power to assess
penalties . . . . The commission shall review
the record and findings of the hearing
officer, but it may also seek such additional
testimony as it deems necessary. The
commission's determination shall be by
majority vote of the entire authorized
membership thereof.
[(Emphasis added).]
N.J.S.A. 19:44A-41 contains virtually identical provisions:
b. Upon receiving evidence of any
violation of sections 4, 6, 9, 10 or 19 of
this act,[4] the Election Law Enforcement
Commission shall have power to hold, or to
cause to be held under the provisions of
subsection d. of this section, hearings upon
such violation and, upon finding any person
to have committed such a violation, to assess
such penalty, . . . as it deems proper under
the circumstances . . . .
. . . .
d. The commission may designate a
hearing officer to hear complaints of
violations of this act. Such hearing officer
shall take testimony, compile a record and
make factual findings, and shall submit the
same to the commission, which shall have power
to assess penalties . . . . The commission
shall review the record and findings of the
hearing officer, but it may also seek such
4
The cited sections of the Act pertain to: contribution
limitations, N.J.S.A. 19:44A-29; N.J.S.A. 19:44A-31, repealed by
L. 1980, c. 74, § 20; maintenance of separate bank accounts for
other funds and disposition of contributions of political
committees, N.J.S.A. 19:44A-34; expenditures from the fund for
election campaign expenses and return of unexpended funds,
N.J.S.A. 19:44A-35; and borrowing of funds by candidates, N.J.S.A.
19:44A-44.
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additional testimony as it deems necessary.
The commission's determination shall be by
majority vote of the entire authorized
membership thereof.
[(Emphasis added).]
Respondents filed a motion for summary decision pursuant to
N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5. The ALJ issued an initial decision on September
16, 2015, dismissing the Commission's complaint on the ground that
the Commission lacked the requisite quorum to issue the complaint
and therefore lacked jurisdiction to do so. The ALJ cited
"[s]ubsection d.," which he described as "address[ing] the process
for hearings in matters where the Commission has seen fit to render
charges against an alleged violator."
As quoted above,5 that paragraph permits the Commission to
designate a hearing officer to hear complaints of violations, and
authorizes the hearing officer to make factual findings based upon
the record that are submitted to the Commission for its review.
The paragraph closes with the actions required of the Commission
after the hearing officer has made his finding: "The commission
shall review the record and findings of the hearing officer, but
it may also seek such additional testimony as it deems necessary.
The commission's determination shall be by majority vote of the
5
The ALJ did not specify whether he was referring to N.J.S.A.
19:44A-22 or N.J.S.A. 19:44A-41. However, the language he quotes
is from the latter statute.
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entire authorized membership thereof." N.J.S.A. 19:44A-41(d)
(emphasis added). The ALJ reasoned the "determination" that
required "a majority vote of the entire authorized membership" of
the Commission was not limited to the Commission's determination
regarding the existence of a violation and appropriate penalty.
Instead, the ALJ interpreted "determination" to include all "the
other 'determinations' made by the Commission in relation to the
enforcement process, including the hearing process itself."
Applying this interpretation, the ALJ concluded the Commission
"did not have the required quorum to initiate the complaint" and
that, as a result, the complaint was void ab initio.
The ALJ's decision was, of course, merely a recommendation
to the Commission. N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(c) governs the process that
culminates in a final administrative agency decision:
The head of the agency, upon a review of
the record submitted by the administrative law
judge, shall adopt, reject or modify the
recommended report and decision no later than
45 days after receipt of such
recommendations. . . . Unless the head of the
agency modifies or rejects the report within
such period, the decision of the
administrative law judge shall be deemed
adopted as the final decision of the head of
the agency. The recommended report and
decision shall be a part of the record in the
case. For good cause shown, upon
certification by the director and the agency
head, the time limits established herein may
be subject to a single extension of not more
than 45 days. Any additional extension of
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time shall be subject to, and contingent upon,
the unanimous agreement of the parties.
[(Emphasis added).]
Under usual circumstances, the ALJ's decision would be
subject to review by ELEC, which has the unquestionable authority
to reject the ALJ's decision that it lacked jurisdiction to issue
the complaint. See N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(c). At that point, ELEC's
final decision would be subject to review by this court. N.J.S.A.
52:14B-12.
However, the circumstances here did not allow for the usual
course of events. One month before the ALJ's initial decision,
Commissioner Saunders died. Therefore, there were only two members
of the Commission at the time the ALJ rendered his initial
decision: Commissioner DeFillipis and Commissioner Timpone, who
had recused himself. In September 2015, Commissioner Timpone
withdrew his recusal to join Commissioner DeFillipis in seeking
the single forty-five day extension permitted by N.J.S.A. 52:14B-
10(c). Commissioner Timpone recused himself again in October
2015.
With the vacancies on the Commission unfilled, Commissioner
DeFillipis was the only acting member of the Commission available
to modify or reject the ALJ decision. ELEC concedes it could not
convene or take action based upon the participation of one
Commissioner. Respondents did not consent to a second extension
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of time to permit ELEC to modify or reject the ALJ decision. As
a result, the ALJ's initial decision would be "deemed adopted" as
the agency's final decision at the expiration of the initial forty-
five day extension period.
On December 2, 2015, ELEC filed an order to show cause and
verified complaint in the Law Division, seeking an additional
extension of time "for a period of 45 days after the governor
nominates and the state senate confirms persons to fill the two
vacancies on the Commission." Respondents filed a motion to
dismiss the verified complaint. The trial judge transferred the
matter to the Appellate Division. Immediately thereafter, ELEC
filed an application for emergent relief from this court, seeking
a stay of the deemed-adopted provision, which we granted, pending
disposition.6
II.
Neither party has asked us to decide the merits of the issue
central to the ALJ's decision, i.e., whether ELEC lacked
jurisdiction to issue a complaint because it was authorized by two
of the three members at the time. Similarly, we have not been
asked to consider whether longstanding inaction in failing to fill
6
Respondents argue the procedure followed to bring this matter
before us was defective; that ELEC should have filed a motion for
leave to appeal from the ALJ's decision. We find no disqualifying
defect in the procedure that brought this matter before us.
9
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the vacancies is tantamount to action that strips an agency of its
statutory authority and obligations. See In re Plan for the
Abolition of the Council on Affordable Hous., 214 N.J. 444, 449
(2013). Our decision is limited to a consideration of whether a
stay of the deemed-adopted provision is warranted pending
appointment of two new commissioners under the analysis set forth
in Crowe v. De Gioia, 90 N.J. 126 (1982).
ELEC argues it is entitled to a stay to maintain the status
quo in this matter, which has significant public importance. It
contends the Crowe criteria are satisfied because its claim rests
upon settled law and has a reasonable probability of success on
the merits; it will suffer irreparable harm if relief is not
granted; and a balance of the equities clearly demonstrates the
hardship to the Commission outweighs any hardship to respondents.
Respondents take a contrary position and further argue that this
matter presents a non-justiciable political question.7
ELEC describes its request for relief as a "stay . . . of a
matter before the Commission because the Commission lacks the
ability to consider the initial decision of the ALJ and act
pursuant to [its] statutory obligation." It contends the Crowe
7
We need not address the political question argument in light of
our disposition.
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criteria should be analyzed within the context of "maintaining the
status quo until the Commission is in a position to act."
To be entitled to a stay, ELEC must present clear and
convincing evidence, Brown v. City of Paterson, 424 N.J. Super.
176, 183 (App. Div. 2012), of each of the following factors:
(1) relief is needed to prevent irreparable
harm; (2) the applicant's claim rests on
settled law and has a reasonable probability
of succeeding on the merits; and (3) balancing
the relative hardships to the parties reveals
that greater harm would occur if a stay is not
granted than if it were.
[Garden State Equal. v. Dow, 216 N.J. 314, 320
(2013) (citation omitted); see Crowe, supra,
90 N.J. at 132-34.]
A case that "presents an issue of significant public importance"
requires the court to "consider the public interest in addition
to the traditional Crowe factors." Dow, supra, 216 N.J. at 321
(citation omitted). When the injunction sought "is merely designed
to preserve the status quo," the court "may place less emphasis
on a particular Crowe factor if another greatly requires the
issuance of a remedy." Brown, supra, 424 N.J. Super. at 183
(citation omitted).
A.
This matter is one of significant public interest for two
reasons.
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First, the public has a substantial interest in the
enforcement of the Act. The Legislature declared the State has
"a compelling interest in preventing the actuality or appearance
of corruption and in protecting public confidence in democratic
institutions" that was served by requiring candidates to comply
with "limitations, prohibitions and requirements on campaign
contributions and the disclosure of the sources and amounts of
contributions and expenditures." N.J.S.A. 19:44A-2.1(d), (e).
The Act implemented the legislative goal "to ventilate the
political process by identifying and monitoring the source and
flow of money intended to influence the electoral process."
Markwardt v. New Beginnings, 304 N.J. Super. 522, 541 (App. Div.
1997); see also N.J.S.A. 19:44A-2.
ELEC was created to be an independent agency charged with
"the duty . . . to enforce the provisions of this act [and] to
conduct hearings with regard to possible violations and to impose
penalties." N.J.S.A. 19:44A-6(b). The Legislature granted ELEC
the authority to "perform such duties as are necessary to implement
the provisions" of the Act and its enforcement responsibilities,
which included but were not limited to those enumerated in N.J.S.A.
19:44A-6(b). The Commission is authorized "to initiate a civil
action in any court of competent jurisdiction for the purpose of
enforcing compliance with the provisions of this act or enjoining
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violations thereof or recovery of any penalty prescribed by this
act." Ibid. N.J.S.A. 19:44A-6(b) also "empower[s]" ELEC to
"[h]old public hearings, investigate allegations of any violations
of this act, and issue subpenas for the production of documents
and the attendance of witnesses." N.J.S.A. 19:44A-6(b)(9).8 If
the ALJ's initial decision is the final word in this case, it
threatens the ability of the Commission to discharge its duties.
Second, the circumstances here pit two clearly enunciated
legislative objectives against each other: the primacy of an
administrative agency to render the final decision in a contested
case (which is subject to appellate review), and the importance
of precluding unnecessary delay in rendering such a decision by
curtailing the extensions an agency may seek to adopt, modify or
reject an ALJ's initial decision before it is deemed adopted.
N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(c).
On January 17, 2014, the Legislature approved an amendment
to N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(c), which took effect on March 18, 2014,
resulting in the statute's current language. Prior to the 2014
amendment, N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(c) provided that "[f]or good cause
8
Other enumerated delegations of authority include: the
promulgation of regulations; ascertaining whether candidates have
complied with requirements; referring possible criminal violations
to appropriate prosecuting authorities, N.J.S.A. 19:44A-6(b)7,
(10); and rendering advisory opinions through the Commission's
legal counsel. N.J.S.A. 19:44A-6(f).
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shown . . . the time limits established herein may be subject to
extension." N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(c) (2001), amended by N.J.S.A.
52:14B-10(c) (2013). The amendment sought to "eliminate the
provision authorizing the unlimited extension of th[e] 45-day time
period, and provide, instead, for a single extension of no more
than 45 days for good cause shown." 2012 Legis. Bill Hist. N.J.
A.B. 1521 (2014). In 2015, the Legislature amended N.J.A.C. 1:1-
18.8(e) to reflect the legislative intent behind the amendment to
N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(c). See 46 N.J.R. 2299(a) ("N.J.A.C. 1:1-
18.8(e) and (f) [we]re proposed for amendment to comply with recent
legislative changes . . . . [and] amendments to N.J.A.C. 1:1-
18.8(e) add that any additional requests for extensions are
contingent upon consent of the parties. . . .").
Before the amendment, our courts considered the action or
inaction of the agency in determining whether the deemed-adopted
provision should be applied. In King v. N.J. Racing Commission,
103 N.J. 412 (1986), the Court observed the "'deemed-approved'
provision of N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(c) should be invoked" when an
administrative agency acted "in bad faith, or with inexcusable
negligence, or gross indifference, or simply [took] no
action . . . 'to adopt, reject or modify'" the ALJ's
recommendation within the 45-day period. Id. at 421. The Court
found it inappropriate to apply the deemed-adopted provision when
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the agency had not failed to act in a timely fashion and to do so
would thwart an agency's regulatory responsibilities. Id. at 423-
24. As amended, the statute does not provide a safe harbor for
an agency that is unable to act within the prescribed period
through no fault of its own.
However, the potential for conflict between the statutory
provisions existed and was recognized even before the 2014
amendment to N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(c). In King, supra, 103 N.J. at
421, our Supreme Court discussed the contest that existed between
agency efficiency and agency responsibility. "[W]hile the OAL is
possessed of significant authority in the actual conduct of
administrative hearings in contested cases on behalf of
administrative agencies, the agency itself retains the exclusive
right ultimately to decide these cases." Id. at 420; see also,
In re Kallen, 92 N.J. 14, 20 (1983); N.J. Dep't of the Pub.
Advocate v. N.J. Bd. of Pub. Utils., 189 N.J. Super. 491, 505
(App. Div. 1983).
The deemed-adopted provision was "intended to thwart undue
delay in agency action," King, supra, 103 N.J. at 419, but not to
supplant the agency's regulatory responsibilities. Id. at 423-
24. Thus, pre-amendment precedent limited application of the
deemed-adopted provision to "reserve[e] [the] decisional authority
in administrative agencies," In re Appeal of Certain Sections of
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Unif. Admin. Procedure Rules, 90 N.J. 85, 91 (1982), while still
promoting efficiency and protecting against agency bad faith or
inexcusable negligence. Infinity Outdoor, Inc. v. Del. & Raritan
Canal Comm'n, 388 N.J. Super. 278, 286-87 (App. Div. 2006).
Although the amendment to N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(c) sharply
limited the agency's ability to obtain multiple extensions of time
in which to act, the amendment does not reflect a decision by the
Legislature to up-end the allocation of responsibilities. Still,
the amendment eliminates any consideration of whether the failure
to act within the prescribed time period is due to circumstances
beyond the agency's control. It is up to the Legislature to
clarify if this is a matter of unintended consequences.
B.
In considering the public importance of this controversy, we
also note that the ALJ's reasoning was not unassailable. See Dow,
supra, 216 N.J. at 320 ("To evaluate an application for a stay,
this Court in essence considers the soundness of the trial court's
ruling and the effect of a stay on the parties and the public.").
Under the common law quorum rule, "a majority of all the
members of a municipal governing body constitute[s] a quorum; and
in the event of a vacancy a quorum consists of a majority of the
remaining members." Ross v. Miller, 115 N.J.L. 61-63 (1935); see
also Matawan Reg'l Teachers Ass'n v. Matawan-Aberdeen Reg'l Sch.
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Dist. Bd. of Educ., 223 N.J. Super. 504, 507 (App. Div. 1988) ("At
common law, a majority of a public body constitutes a quorum.").
In King, supra, 103 N.J. at 418, our Supreme Court addressed
statutory quorum language mirroring the common law quorum rule,
finding:
[I]t is not relevant whether a member is
physically absent, is disqualified because of
interest, bias, or prejudice, or other good
cause, or voluntarily recuses herself or
himself. A member who is disqualified from
participating in a particular matter may not
be counted in determining the presence of a
legal quorum.
[Ibid. (emphasis added).]
Thus, under the common law quorum rule, any position left vacant,
either by death or recusal due to conflict of interest, is not
counted to determine what the legal quorum is.
The common law rule applies absent a "pertinent statute to
the contrary." King v. N.J. Racing Comm'n, 205 N.J. Super. 411,
415 (App. Div. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 103 N.J. 412 (1986).
See Hainesport Twp. v. Burlington Cnty. Bd. of Taxation, 25 N.J.
Tax 138, 147 (Tax 2009) (discussing statutes requiring a "majority
of all the members" as "evidenc[ing] a legislative intent to modify
the common law rule"); see also 1991 Formal Op. Att'y Gen. N.J.
No. 3 (May 7, 1991) ("Laws which define a quorum as a majority or
larger percentage of 'all the members' or of 'the authorized
membership,' or words to that effect, must . . . be read as
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requiring a fixed number of members which remains constant despite
any vacancies.").
The last sentence of subsection (d) states: "The commission's
determination shall be by majority vote of the entire authorized
membership thereof." It is undisputed that this language
constitutes a departure from the common law quorum requirement and
requires "three votes of the entire authorized membership of four."
Therefore, any "determination" to which that language applies must
be by a vote of at least three of the four commissioners. The
issue before the ALJ was what actions of the Commission are subject
to that requirement.
The "determination" that must be made by a "majority vote of
the entire authorized membership" of the Commission is not defined
in the Act. See N.J.S.A. 19:44A-3. However, the definitions for
"contested case" and "administrative adjudication" or
"adjudication" contained in the APA provide insight into the
Legislature's usage of the term. Those definitions, in pertinent
part, are:
"Administrative adjudication" or
"adjudication" includes any and every final
determination, decision or order made or
rendered in any contested case.
"Contested case" means a proceeding . . . in
which the legal rights, duties, obligations,
privileges, benefits or other legal relations
of specific parties are required by
constitutional right or by statute to be
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determined by an agency by decisions,
determinations, or orders, addressed to them
or disposing of their interests, after
opportunity for an agency hearing . . . .
[N.J.S.A. 52:14B-2(b)-(c).9]
Clearly, there are a number of steps in the enforcement
process that precede determinations that a violation has occurred
and the appropriate penalty. The Act does not explicitly state
what number of commissioners must vote in favor of any of the
actions enumerated in N.J.S.A. 19:44A-6 before the Commission may
proceed. This omission stands in sharp contrast to statutes that
specify the quorum necessary for any action of an agency. See,
e.g., N.J.S.A. 5:5-29 ("[A] majority of the [New Jersey Racing]
[C]ommission shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of any
business, for the performance of any duty, or for the exercise of
any power of the commission."). Similarly, both N.J.S.A. 19:44A-
22 and N.J.S.A. 19:44A-41 provide a procedure for hearing evidence
of violations. They are silent as to the number of commissioners
required to decide to hear such evidence. Both statutes only
establish a requirement for the number of commissioners necessary
for a "determination" following a review of the record. See
N.J.S.A. 19:44A-22(d); N.J.S.A. 19:44A-41(d).
9
There are two versions of this section, the latter being
operative as of July 1, 2014. However, the definitions of these
terms remain unchanged.
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A reasonable inference can be drawn that the "determination"
that requires authorization by a "majority vote of the entire
authorized membership" pertains to final decisions and not to the
preliminary steps ELEC must take to consider evidence of
violations.10 See Higgins v. Pascack Valley Hosp., 158 N.J. 404,
419 (1999) ("When 'the Legislature has carefully employed a term
in one place and excluded it in another, it should not be implied
where excluded.'" (citation omitted)). The ALJ's conclusion to the
contrary is therefore subject to legitimate debate, if not outright
rejection.
III.
Giving due consideration to the public importance of this
matter, we turn to review the application of the Crowe factors
here. Supra, 90 N.J. at 132-34.
A.
Because there is only one commissioner available to review
the ALJ's decision in light of the deaths of the other
commissioners and the recusal of Commissioner Timpone, it is
undisputed that ELEC cannot act. ELEC argues it will suffer
irreparable harm if the stay is not granted because it will be
10
We note that Commissioner Timpone withdrew his recusal to permit
him to join the other commissioner in seeking the initial extension
of the forty-five day period pursuant to N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(c).
No argument has been presented that the action, undertaken by two
commissioners, was unauthorized.
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deprived of its statutory right to "adopt, reject or modify" the
ALJ's decision. N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10. ELEC also contends the
public's confidence in the integrity of the election law
enforcement process will be eroded if a decision is accorded
finality through "a flawed process that prevented an appropriate
review of an initial OAL decision" by either the Commission or
this court.
Respondents counter that ELEC cannot make the requisite
showing of immediate and irreparable harm. They note that the
amendment to N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(c) in 2014 was plainly intended
to limit an agency's previously unfettered ability to obtain serial
extensions that unnecessarily delayed a final decision. They
argue that the "harm" identified by ELEC is merely the operation
of the clear language of N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(c), a result
contemplated by the Legislature in enacting the amendment.
The claim of immediate and irreparable harm to ELEC requires
consideration of whether the operation of the deemed-adopted
provision here precludes ELEC from taking further action regarding
possible violations of the Act by respondents.
First, there does not appear to be an immediate threat that
enforcement action will be precluded by the applicable statute of
limitations. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1.2(a), "any civil action
commenced by the State shall be commenced within ten years next
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after the cause of action shall have accrued."11 Because the
violations at issue arise from the 2010 and 2014 elections, it is
reasonable to infer that the action will not be extinguished in
its entirety in the near future or before the vacancies on the
Commission are filled. Although we offer no opinion as to the
application of res judicata, we note that the ALJ's decision was
that the complaint was void ab initio and was not an adjudication
on the merits. See Watkins v. Resorts Int'l Hotel & Casino, 124
N.J. 398, 415-16 (1991); R. 4:37-2(d).
In addition, an administrative agency has the inherent power
to reconsider its own final decision. See, e.g., In re Trantino,
89 N.J. 347, 364 (1982); Mastro v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Emps.' Ret.
Sys., 266 N.J. Super. 445, 452 (App. Div. 1993). In Mastro, supra,
266 N.J. Super. at 452, we pondered whether an agency had the
authority to reconsider a final decision that has resulted from
the automatic adoption of an ALJ's initial decision. We observed,
"if an agency is denied the power to reconsider even a manifestly
erroneous decision deemed approved pursuant to N.J.S.A. 52:14B-
10(c), the agency could be thwarted in the performance of its
regulatory responsibilities." Ibid. (citation omitted). And,
we noted that if the agency lacked such power, "it is arguable
11
ELEC agrees that a ten-year statute of limitations applies.
Respondents do not agree.
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that the agency should be allowed to appeal to this court to seek
reversal of a manifestly erroneous decision." Ibid. n.1.
Finally, we note that, pursuant to the doctrine of necessity,
a commissioner's voluntary disqualification need not pose an
insuperable obstacle to the Commission's ability to act. The rule
of necessity "allow[s] a governing body member who has a conflict
to participate in a vote, where a quorum would otherwise not be
available." Mt. Hill, LLC v. Middletown Twp., 353 N.J. Super. 57,
61 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 175 N.J. 78 (2002); see also
Wyzykowski v. Rizas, 132 N.J. 509, 528 (1993); Cranberry Lake
Quarry Co. v. Johnson, 95 N.J. Super. 495, 550-51 (App. Div.)
(holding the doctrine of necessity "has been traditionally applied
to situations where disqualification of a person acting in a
judicial capacity would prevent consideration of a matter which
must necessarily be disposed of"), certif. denied, 50 N.J. 300
(1967); Gunthner v. Planning Bd. of Borough of Bay Head, 335 N.J.
Super. 452, 462 (Law Div. 2000).
We recognize the viability of these options is unsettled;
that their effectiveness in alleviating the harm claimed is
uncertain and that further litigation may be pursued. Our purpose
in discussing them is merely to assess ELEC's claim it will suffer
immediate and irreparable harm. The fact that alternatives may
face legal challenges does not render them unavailable or subject
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ELEC to immediate and irreparable harm if its preferred remedy is
denied.
B.
ELEC argues the issue of whether its claim is based on settled
law and has a reasonable probability of success pertains not to
the merits of the ALJ's decision, but rather, to whether the OAL
had the authority to consider the motion brought by respondents
and decide a jurisdictional issue. ELEC contends it is the
exclusive province of this court to decide the jurisdictional
issue and that the application of the "deemed-adopted" provision
here transforms the ALJ's initial decision into a virtually
unreviewable final decision. Respondents argue there is no legal
support for ELEC's premise that the ALJ may not dismiss a complaint
on jurisdictional grounds.12
Respondents challenged the issuance of the complaint by
filing a motion for summary disposition pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1:1-
12.5(a), which permits a party to move for summary decision "upon
all or any of the substantive issues in a contested case." The
subject matter of these motions is not limited by either statute
or regulation. ELEC has not provided any legal authority to
12
Respondents also argue that ELEC has raised the jurisdictional
issue for the first time before us. A review of the record shows
otherwise.
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support the conclusion that the ALJ lacked authority to dismiss
the complaint on jurisdictional grounds.
C.
Addressing the balancing of hardships, ELEC contends the
hardship claimed by respondents is "at best illusory if not
nonexistent" and far outweighed by the hardship it will suffer if
the stay is not granted. In addition to expressing concern that
efforts to pursue alternatives will be hampered by legal
challenges, ELEC states it suffers substantial harm as a result
of the considerable delay resulting from the referral of the matter
to the OAL as a contested case and the anticipated delay until its
vacancies are filled.
Respondents argue they are entitled to a final disposition,
that they have been highly prejudiced by ELEC's actions and that
the prejudice would be exacerbated if ELEC's request for an open-
ended extension of time were granted. Within the context of a
speedy trial violation, it has been suggested "that every
unresolved case carries with it some measure of anxiety" because
the accused "lives under a cloud of anxiety, suspicion, and often
hostility." State v. Cahill, 213 N.J. 253, 275 (2013) (citations
omitted). The harm caused by unresolved allegations here is real
and not illusory. Respondent DiVincenzo is an elected official
actively involved in public life. If unresolved indefinitely, the
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complaint creates a cloud over the integrity of his campaign
finances, including future campaigns.
In summary, the legal argument ELEC relies upon – that the
ALJ lacked authority to decide a jurisdictional issue — is not
rooted in settled law and has not been shown to have a reasonable
probability of success on the merits. Although ELEC expresses
concern that the availability of alternative avenues for pursuing
its investigation is uncertain, the fact that its efforts may be
the subject of further litigation does not, alone, render them
futile. We therefore conclude ELEC has failed to show by clear
and convincing evidence that it will suffer irreparable harm if
the indefinite stay requested is not granted. ELEC advances a
legitimate concern that the public's confidence in the integrity
of the political process may be compromised when its enforcement
efforts are hobbled by the actions and inaction of other branches
of government. However, the public — and respondents — also have
an interest in having such enforcement efforts resolved in a
reasonable, and not unlimited, period of time, rather than have
unproven allegations of wrongdoing endure. We therefore conclude
that, even in light of the public interests here, the balance of
hardships does not support ELEC's motion for a stay that tolls the
forty-five day extension period until such time as its roster of
commissioners is filled.
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The motion for a stay is denied and the order tolling the
forty-five day period before the ALJ's recommendation is deemed
adopted is vacated.
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