THOMAS PALLOTTA VS. UNITED AIRLINES (DIVISION OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4959-16T2
THOMAS PALLOTTA,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
UNITED AIRLINES,
Respondent-Respondent.
____________________________
Submitted April 11, 2018 – Decided June 20, 2018
Before Judges Currier and Geiger.
On appeal from the New Jersey Department of
Labor and Workforce Development, Division of
Workers' Compensation, Claim Petition No.
2014-25491.
Martin Melody, LLC, attorneys for appellant
(Eugene J. Melody and Nancy S. Martin, of
counsel and on the briefs).
Braff Harris Sukoneck & Maloof, attorneys for
respondent (Daniel A. Lynn, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
In this workers' compensation case, petitioner Thomas
Pallotta appeals from the counsel fee award in the June 13, 2017
order approving settlement. Because the workers' compensation
judge refused to place her reasons on the record as required under
Rule 1:7-4(a), we vacate the order and remand for further
proceedings.
Petitioner sustained injuries while at work and filed a claim
for workers compensation benefits. After three years of
litigation, the parties reached a resolution and appeared in court
on June 13, 2017 for judicial approval of the settlement. At the
close of the proceeding, petitioner's counsel noted the counsel
fee award was 15% and not the maximum 20% fee authorized under
N.J.S.A. 34:15-64. The following colloquy ensued:
COUNSEL: Your Honor, is there a reduction in
counsel fee in this case?
THE JUDGE: Yes.
COUNSEL: Why?
THE JUDGE: You can appeal me.
COUNSEL: Can I be heard on that?
THE JUDGE: You can appeal me.
Thereafter, the judge left the bench.
On appeal, petitioner argues that the judge erred in reducing
the counsel fee award without providing any reasons, findings, or
justifications on the record or in a written opinion.
"The factual findings of the compensation court are entitled
to substantial deference." Ramos v. M & F Fashions, Inc., 154
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N.J. 583, 594 (1998). In reviewing the decision of a workers'
compensation judge, this court
must "limit[] its inquiry solely to whether
the findings . . . could reasonably have been
reached on sufficient credible evidence
present in the record, considering the proofs
as a whole, with due regard to the opportunity
of one who heard the witnesses to judge of
their credibility and with due regard to his
expertise."
[Ibid. (quoting Bradley v. Henry Townsend
Moving & Storage Co., 78 N.J. 532, 534
(1979)).]
Rule 1:7-4(a) states that a trial judge "shall, by an opinion
or memorandum decision, either written or oral, find the facts and
state [his or her] conclusions of law thereon in all actions tried
without a jury." "The rule requires specific findings of fact
and conclusions of law." Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court
Rules, cmt. 1 on R. 1:7-4 (2018). As noted by our Supreme Court,
[b]ecause it is fundamental to the fairness
of the proceedings and serves as a necessary
predicate to meaningful review . . . "a trial
court must analyze the [relevant] factors in
determining an award of reasonable counsel
fees and then must state its reasons on the
record for awarding a particular fee."
[R.M. v. Supreme Court of N.J., 190 N.J. 1,
12 (2007) (alteration in original) (quoting
Furst v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 182 N.J. 1,
21 (2004)).]
Here, the compensation judge failed to explain her reasons
for the attorney fee award and refused to do so even after
3 A-4959-16T2
requested by counsel. Instead, she directed counsel to "appeal
[her]." We discern no basis for the court's antagonistic reaction.
All parties are entitled to the reasons for a court's decision.
Therefore, we vacate the portion of the settlement regarding the
fee award and remand to the compensation court to make findings
of fact and conclusions of law consistent with Rule 1:7-4(a).1
Reversed, vacated, and remanded. We do not retain
jurisdiction.
1
The judge presented a letter after appeal to this court pursuant
to Rule 2:5-1(b), stating that the petitioner was awarded a 15%
counsel fee, which was entirely within her discretion and
reasonable under the circumstances. No reasons were given for the
reduction of the commonly awarded 20% fee.
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