WILLIAM COLEMAN VS. ANGELA COLEMAN (FM-17-0090-06, SALEM COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0765-18T3
WILLIAM COLEMAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ANGELA COLEMAN,
Defendant-Respondent.
_________________________
Submitted September 11, 2019 - Decided September 27, 2019
Before Judges Koblitz, Gooden Brown, and Mawla.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Salem County, Docket
No. FM-17-0090-06.
William Coleman, appellant pro se.
Respondent has not filed a brief.
PER CURIAM
Plaintiff William Coleman appeals from August 3 and October 5, 2018
post-judgment orders, which denied his request for reimbursement of retirement
funds he paid to defendant Angela Coleman pursuant to a December 9, 2016
order. We affirm.
We take the following facts from the record. The parties married in 1992,
and divorced in 2007. The judgment of divorce incorporated a property
settlement agreement (PSA), which stated: "The marital portion of plaintiff's
pension shall be divided on a [fifty-fifty] basis between [plaintiff] and
[defendant] by way of QDRO 1." Because plaintiff was employed by the federal
government, his benefits were payable under the Federal Employees Retirement
System (FERS) and distributable via a QDRO-like instrument called a court
order acceptable for processing (COAP).
Plaintiff retired on January 31, 2016. The court entered the COAP on
October 13, 2016. Paragraph seven of the COAP states:
Member is receiving retirement benefits under
the [p]lan based on employment with the United States
Government. The United States Office of Personnel
Management [(OPM)] is directed to pay [f]ormer
[s]pouse's benefit directly to [f]ormer [s]pouse. The
[f]ormer [s]pouse is entitled to 21.5% of [m]ember's
self-only monthly annuity payable under the Federal
Employees Retirement Security System by reason of
[m]ember's retirement.
Paragraph twelve of the COAP provided as follows:
1
Qualified Domestic Relations Order.
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Constructive Receipt: In the event that any
benefits that are assigned to [f]ormer [s]pouse pursuant
to the terms of this [o]rder are inadvertently paid to
member, [m]ember shall immediately reimburse the
[f]ormer [s]pouse to the extent that he has received such
benefit payments and shall forthwith pay such amount
so received directly to the [f]ormer [s]pouse within
ten . . . days of receipt.
Despite being entered a year beforehand, the COAP was implemented in
October 2017,2 twenty months after plaintiff began receiving his retirement
benefits. Defendant filed a motion to compel plaintiff to reimburse the funds
distributed to him prior to entry of the COAP, representing her 21.5% share
under the PSA. The court granted her motion and entered an order dated
December 9, 2016. Plaintiff did not seek reconsideration or appeal from this
order and failed to comply with it.
Defendant filed a second motion to enforce litigant's rights seeking
reimbursement of $18,337.87, representing the sum due for the time period
between plaintiff's retirement and entry of the COAP. Plaintiff opposed the
motion and advised the court he administratively appealed OPM's ruling
regarding the distribution of the pension fund, specifically the decision to
include his FERS supplement in the pension distribution. In an order dated
2
Defendant began receiving her share of the retirement payments in November
2017.
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August 3, 2018, the court denied plaintiff's request to stay its decision pending
a decision from OPM, noting plaintiff's claim on the proper distribution of his
pension was a separate matter. The court granted defendant's motion for
reimbursement, requiring plaintiff to pay defendant within ninety days.
Plaintiff sought reconsideration of the August 2018 order. He argued the
trial judge misunderstood the COAP and the December 2016 order enforcing it.
Specifically, he claimed the plain language of the COAP meant defendant's right
to receive her share of the retirement benefits began with OPM's receipt of the
COAP, regardless of the fact plaintiff was receiving benefits for twenty months
beforehand. He pointed the judge to correspondence from an OPM paralegal
advising defendant she would receive $874.62, representing the net retirement
benefit between OPM's receipt of the COAP in October 2017, and the
commencement of payment in November 2017.
The judge denied the motion for reconsideration, stating:
The [c]ourt understands [p]laintiff's argument and
concedes that there may have [been] a legitimate
argument to be made as to the previous interpretation.
However, this argument should have been presented
after issuance of the December 9, 2016 order, in a
motion for reconsideration or on appeal. The
timeframes for reconsideration and or appeal of the
December 9, 2016 [o]rder have long since passed.
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I.
On appeal, plaintiff repeats the argument OPM informed defendant she
was not owed any retroactive sums prior to October 2017. He claims defendant
and her attorney defrauded the court into believing she was owed money for the
twenty-month period since his retirement and OPM's receipt of the COAP. He
argues OPM had discretion to determine when defendant would receive her
share of the pension, and the trial court improperly overruled a federal entity.
"The scope of appellate review of a trial court's fact-finding function is
limited. The general rule is that findings by the trial court are binding on appeal
when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence." Cesare v. Cesare,
154 N.J. 394, 411 (1998) (citation omitted). The "court must give due
recognition to the wide discretion which our law rightly affords to the trial
judges," and disturb such determinations only where the court abused its
discretion. Larbig v. Larbig, 384 N.J. Super. 17, 21, 23 (App. Div. 2006)
(quoting Martindell v. Martindell, 21 N.J. 341, 355 (1956)). Appellate courts
reverse only if there is "'a denial of justice' because the family court's
'conclusions are . . . "clearly mistaken" or "wide of the mark."'" Parish v. Parish,
412 N.J. Super. 39, 48 (App. Div. 2010) (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Family
Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 104 (2008)).
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"This court does not accord the same deference to a trial judge's legal
determinations. . . . Rather, all legal issues are reviewed de novo." Ricci v.
Ricci, 448 N.J. Super. 546, 565 (App. Div. 2017) (citations omitted).
Furthermore, "where there is a denial of a motion for reconsideration [pursuant
to Rule 4:49-2], the standard . . . is 'abuse of discretion.'" Cummings v. Bahr,
295 N.J. Super. 374, 389 (App. Div. 1996) (citation omitted).
Plaintiff's arguments lack merit. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We affirm for the
reasons set forth in the motion judge's decisions. Plaintiff did not appeal from
the December 9, 2016 order and is out of time to challenge the court ordered
reimbursement to defendant. The judge did not abuse her discretion.
Notwithstanding plaintiff's failure to seek appellate review, we also add
the following comments.
"[A]n agreement that resolves a matrimonial dispute is
no less a contract than an agreement to resolve a
business dispute." Quinn v. Quinn, 225 N.J. 34, 45
(2016) (citations omitted). According to those
principles, we must "discern and implement the
common intention of the parties." Ibid. Therefore, our
role when interpreting marital settlement agreements is
to "consider what is 'written in the context of the
circumstances' at the time of drafting and to apply 'a
rational meaning in keeping with the expressed general
purpose.'" Sachau v. Sachau, 206 N.J. 1, 5-6 (2011)
(quoting Atl. N. Airlines, Inc. v. Schwimmer, 12 N.J.
293, 302 (1953)). In doing so, "the words of an
agreement are given their 'ordinary' meaning."
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Flanigan v. Munson, 175 N.J. 597, 606 (2003) (quoting
Shadow Lake Vill. Condo. Ass'n v. Zampella, 238 N.J.
Super. 132, 139 (App. Div. 1990)). Therefore, where
the parties' intent "is plain and the language is clear and
unambiguous, a court must enforce the agreement as
written, unless doing so would lead to an absurd result."
Quinn, 225 N.J. at 45.
[Woytas v. Greenwood Tree Experts, Inc., 237 N.J.
501, 511-12 (2019).]
The COAP fulfilled the terms of the PSA. The plain language of both
documents required an equitable distribution of the value of the marital portion
of the pension. We previously stated the coverture formula effectuates a
division of the value of a pension. Panetta v. Panetta, 370 N.J. Super. 486, 494-
95 (App. Div. 2004). The PSA and the COAP did not eschew a coverture
formula.
Furthermore, in addition to a Family Part judge's duty to assure the
equitable enforcement of agreements, the law imposes a duty of fairness on the
parties. Fattore v. Fattore, 458 N.J. Super. 75, 88 (App. Div. 2019). Had the
judge endorsed plaintiff's opportunistic reading of the communication from
OPM regarding defendant's entitlement to a retroactive payment, she would have
deprived defendant of twenty months of equitable distribution from a marital
asset and allowed plaintiff to unjustly enrich himself by retaining defendant's
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share. Therefore, regardless of the untimely nature of plaintiff's challenge to the
reimbursement, the result he sought was not achievable as a matter of law.
Affirmed.
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