ST. PAUL'S OUTREACH, INC. VS. BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT OF THE TOWNSHIP OF SOUTH ORANGE VILLAGE (L-1183-16, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (CONSOLIDATED)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NOS. A-0264-17T1
A-0339-17T1
ST. PAUL'S OUTREACH, INC.,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT OF
THE TOWNSHIP OF SOUTH
ORANGE VILLAGE and THE
TOWNSHIP OF SOUTH ORANGE
VILLAGE,
Defendants-Appellants.
Argued November 13, 2018 – Decided January 28, 2019
Before Judges Gooden Brown and Rose.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Essex County, Docket No. L-1183-16.
Patrick J. Dwyer argued the cause for appellant Board
of Adjustment of the Township of South Orange
Village (Nusbaum, Stein, Goldstein, Bronstein & Kron,
attorneys; Patrick J. Dwyer, on the briefs).
Michael J. Martelo argued the cause for appellant
Township of South Orange Village (Post, Polak,
Goodsell & Strauchler, PA, attorneys; Steven C.
Rother, of counsel; Michael J. Martelo, on the briefs).
Elaine S. Berkenwald argued the cause for respondent
(Lavin & Associates, PC, attorneys; Elaine S.
Berkenwald, on the briefs).
PER CURIAM
These two appeals, calendared back-to-back and consolidated for
purposes of our opinion, arise out of an action in lieu of prerogative writs filed
by plaintiff St. Paul's Outreach, Inc. against defendants Board of Adjustment of
the Township of South Orange Village (Board) and the Township of South
Orange Village (Township). The Law Division nullified the Board's denial of a
conditional use variance that plaintiff sought for its residential property pursuant
to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d)(3) (d(3) variance). Having concluded plaintiff's
presentation to the Board was incomplete and thereby prevented the Board from
properly considering the imposition of reasonable conditions to grant the
variance, we vacate the Law Division's order and remand to the Board for a
limited rehearing.
A-0264-17T1
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I.
Because we conclude the trial court erred in its analysis, we commence
our review with a discussion of the relevant legal principles to give context to
the trial court's decision and the Board's denial of plaintiff's applicati on.
"Our standard of review for the grant or denial of a variance is the same
as that applied by the Law Division." Advance at Branchburg II, LLC v.
Branchburg Twp. Bd. of Adjustment, 433 N.J. Super. 247, 252 (App. Div. 2013).
Specifically, "when a party challenges a zoning board's decision through an
action in lieu of prerogative writs, the zoning board's decision is entitled to
deference." Kane Props., LLC v. City of Hoboken, 214 N.J. 199, 229 (2013).
We grant zoning boards "wide latitude in the exercise of delegated discretion"
due to "their peculiar knowledge of local conditions[.]" Price v. Himeji, LLC,
214 N.J. 263, 284 (2013) (quoting Kramer v. Bd. of Adjustment, 45 N.J. 268,
296 (1965)); see also Sica v. Bd. of Adjustment of Wall, 127 N.J. 152, 167
(1992).
Accordingly, we presume a board's factual determinations to be valid, and
we will only reverse if its decision is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.
Kane Props., 214 N.J. at 229. That decision must be made on the basis of the
record before the board, Kramer, 45 N.J. at 289, and "not on the basis of a trial
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de novo, by affidavit or otherwise, before the Law Division." Antonelli v.
Planning Bd. of Waldwick, 79 N.J. Super. 433, 441 (App. Div. 1963). Matters
outside the record of proceedings before the board may not be considered by the
court. See Adams v. DelMonte, 309 N.J. Super. 572, 583 (App. Div. 1998).
The scope of judicial review is limited "to determin[ing] whether the board
could reasonably have reached its decision." Davis Enters. v. Karpf, 105 N.J.
476, 485 (1987). Therefore, a court generally "will not substitute its judgment
for that of a board 'even when it is doubtful about the wisdom of the action.'"
Cell South of N.J., Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of W. Windsor Twp., 172
N.J. 75, 81 (2002); see also Smart SMR of N.Y., Inc. v. Fair Lawn Bd. of
Adjustment, 152 N.J. 309, 327 (1998). "[C]ourts ordinarily should not disturb
the discretionary decisions of local boards that are supported by substantial
evidence in the record and reflect a correct application of the relevant principles
of land use law." Lang v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of N. Caldwell, 160 N.J.
41, 58-59 (1999). The Board's conclusions of law, however, are subject to de
novo review. Nuckel v. Borough of Little Ferry Planning Bd., 208 N.J. 95, 102
(2011).
The burden is on the challenging party to demonstrate that the board's
decision was arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. New Brunswick Cellular
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Tel. Co. v. Borough of S. Plainfield Bd. of Adjustment, 160 N.J. 1, 14 (1999).
We give even greater deference to a planning board's decision to deny a variance.
Nextel of N.Y., Inc. v. Borough of Englewood Cliffs Bd. of Adjustment, 361
N.J. Super. 22, 38 (App. Div. 2003) (citing Northeast Towers, Inc. v. Zoning
Bd. of Adjustment of W. Paterson, 327 N.J. Super. 476, 494 (App. Div. 2000));
Med. Ctr. at Princeton v. Twp. of Princeton Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 343 N.J.
Super. 177, 199 (App. Div. 2001). "That heavier burden requires the proponent
of the denied variance to prove that the evidence before the board was
'overwhelmingly in favor of the applicant.'" Nextel, 361 N.J. Super. at 38(quoting Northeast Towers, 327 N.J. Super. at 494).
Pertinent to this appeal, the basic principles governing a conditional use
variance are set forth in N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d), which grants a board of
adjustment the power to "[i]n particular cases for special reasons, grant a
variance to allow departure from [zoning] regulations . . . to permit: . . . (3)
deviation from a specification or standard . . . pertaining solely to a con ditional
use." As our Supreme Court observed in Coventry Square, Inc. v. Westwood
Zoning Board of Adjustment, 138 N.J. 285, 287 (1994), "A variance for a
deviation from a condition allows the applicant to engage in a conditional use
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despite the applicant's failure to meet one or more of the conditions: It is not the
use but the non-compliance with the conditions that violates the ordinance."
However,
No variance or other relief may be granted . . . including
a variance or other relief involving an inherently
beneficial use, without a showing that such variance or
other relief can be granted without substantial
detriment to the public good and will not substantially
impair the intent and the purpose of the zone plan and
zoning ordinance.
[N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d).]
These statutory provisions embody what are routinely referred to as the positive
and negative criteria that must be shown by an applicant to secure a use variance.
Smart SMR,152 N.J. at 323; Scholastic Bus Co. v. Zoning Bd. of Fair Lawn,
326 N.J. Super. 49, 56 (App. Div. 1999).
As explained by the Court in Sica:
The statute requires proof of both positive and negative
criteria. Under the positive criteria, the applicant must
establish "special reasons" for the grant of the variance.
The negative criteria require proof that the variance
"can be granted without substantial detriment to the
public good" and that it "will not substantially impair
the intent and the purpose of the zone plan and zoning
ordinance."
[127 N.J. at 156.]
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Where, as defendants acknowledge here, the proposed use is inherently
beneficial or "serves the public good," the positive criteria element is satisfied.
Saddle Brook Realty v. Twp. of Saddle Brook Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 388
N.J. Super. 67, 76 (App. Div. 2006); House of Fire Christian Church v. Zoning
Bd. of Adjustment of Clifton, 379 N.J. Super. 526, 535 (App. Div. 2005)
(recognizing use of a church or house of worship "is an inherently beneficial use
of the land"). "[A]s an 'inherently beneficial' use, the burden of proof of an
applicant for a use variance is 'significantly lessened' with respect to both the
positive and negative criteria." Salt & Light Co. v. Willingboro Twp. Zoning
Bd. of Adjustments, 423 N.J. Super. 282, 287 (App. Div. 2011) (quoting Smart
SMR, 152 N.J. at 323). An inherently beneficial use is presumed to satisfy the
positive criteria, and it need not satisfy an "enhanced quality of proof" for the
negative criteria, as set forth in Medici v. BPR Co., 107 N.J. 1, 21-24 (1987).
Salt & Light Co., 423 N.J. Super. at 287; see also TSI E. Brunswick, LLC v.
Zoning Board of Adjustment of E. Brunswick, 215 N.J. 26, 43 (2013) (relaxing
the standard of proof for the negative criteria in an application for a conditional
use variance).
Despite the less demanding standard of proof, a proposed variance for an
inherently beneficial use is not automatically granted. Sica, 127 N.J. at 165-66.
A-0264-17T1
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In Sica, the Court outlined the evaluative process to determine whether the
proposed inherently beneficial use satisfies the negative criteria:
First, the board should identify the public interest at
stake.
Second, the [b]oard should identify the detrimental
effect that will ensue from the grant of the variance.
Third, in some situations, the local board may reduce
the detrimental effect by imposing reasonable
conditions on the use.
Fourth, the [b]oard should then weigh the positive and
negative criteria and determine whether, on balance, the
grant of the variance would cause a substantial
detriment to the public good.
[Ibid.]
"This balancing, '[w]hile properly making it more difficult for municipalities to
exclude inherently beneficial uses . . . permits such exclusion when the negative
impact of the use is significant.'" Id. at 166 (alterations in original) (quoting
Baptist Home of S. Jersey v. Borough of Riverton, 201 N.J. Super. 226, 247
(Law Div. 1984)).
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II.
Applying those legal standards here, we turn to the pertinent facts
presented to the Board.
Plaintiff is a national organization affiliated with the Roman Catholic
Church. In September 2014, plaintiff purchased property known as lot 12, block
601 on the Township's tax map. The property is located in the Township's RA-
60 residential zoning district, which permits single-family homes, public
buildings and public schools. Places of worship are permitted conditional uses
within the district. The neighborhood is characterized as "historic."
The subject property is an irregularly-shaped lot, slightly more than one
acre in size, and is surrounded by twenty-two1 single-family homes. A two-
story dwelling is situated in the center of the lot. The dwelling contains fourteen
bedrooms and a twenty-four seat chapel. Plaintiff's immediate predecessor,
Salesian Society, Inc. (Salesian), added the chapel and ten bedrooms in
November 1991. Salesian, a vocational organization affiliated with the Roman
Catholic Church, used the property for worship, formation and occasional
1
The record is unclear regarding the exact number of homes surrounding the
subject property. In its merits brief and resolution, the Board states there are
twenty-two surrounding homes, whereas the Township's merits brief indicates
there are nineteen surrounding homes. Plaintiff's brief does not mention the
number of surrounding homes.
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weekend retreats. During the early 1990s, approximately ten seminarians lived
at the property, but at the time plaintiff purchased the lot in 2014 only a few
priests were in residence.
The dwelling's side and rear setbacks do not conform to the Township's
requirements for a conditional use variance for religious use. In particular, the
minimum requirement for the side yard setback is 30.3 feet while the existing
side yards are 24.8 and 29.2 feet; and the minimum requirement for the rear yard
setback is 89.7 2 feet while the existing rear yard setback is 84 feet. Despite these
deficiencies, the Township's then zoning officer issued building permits and a
certificate of occupancy to Salesian for the chapel and additional bedrooms,
without requiring Salesian to apply for a d(3) variance.
2
The Board maintains the minimum requirement is 179.4 feet pursuant to the
Township's ordinance that requires doubling of the rear setback when a
conditional variance is sought for religious use. § 92-210(D) (codifying
conditional uses for "[c]hurches, synagogues, religious buildings and nonprofit
schools."). However, that section of the ordinance applies when "such use [is]
located in the B-1 and B-2 [z]ones[,]" which permit two-family dwellings. Here,
the property is located in the "RA-60" residential zone, which is comprised of
single-family dwellings. It is unclear from the record how the Board determined
the doubling requirement here. Indeed, the Board's proofs are conflicting in this
regard. For example, an April 2, 2015 memorandum of the Board's planner
indicated the rear setback "shall be two times . . . the rear yard requirement for
the zone[,]" but specifically listed the requirement as "89.7 feet[,]" i.e., the rear
setback was not doubled to 179.4 feet.
A-0264-17T1
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Plaintiff seeks to use the property for "residential religious" purposes. In
particular, local male undergraduate students, who are interested in expanding
their Catholic faith with the potential to pursue vocations in the church, reside
in the home. Residents participate in Bible study and prayer on the premises.
Non-resident missionaries drive to the property weekly to participate in prayer.
In addition, plaintiff holds bi-monthly formation meetings, attended by
approximately thirty-five to forty people, on Monday nights from 8:30 p.m. to
10:00 p.m. Plaintiff's administrative activities are also conducted on the
premises. The nature and extent of those activities were not fully developed in
the record before the Board.
Prior to purchasing the property, plaintiff asked the Salesians to apply for
a variance. The Salesians denied the request claiming, "[W]e[ ha]ve been here
[twenty]-somewhat years, we[ ha]ve never done that, it[ i]s going to raise more
questions . . . ." Soon after plaintiff purchased the property, plaintiff applied to
the Board for a d(3) variance and a design waiver for driveway width. In her
cover letter enclosing the application, plaintiff's counsel acknowledged the non -
conforming side and rear setbacks on the property, but stated that the
deficiencies were "truly minimal." The application indicated there would be
"[n]o change to [the] property. The use is similar to the previous [owner's] use
A-0264-17T1
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as a religious residence with a private chapel for prayer and worship and bible
study." Notably, plaintiff's application did not seek relief for a pre-existing non-
conforming use. See N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d)(2). Neither plaintiff's application
nor its public notice disclosed that plaintiff intended to use the property for
administrative offices. Instead, plaintiff's public notice provided, in pertinent
part:
The application proposes a residence for Catholic
missionaries with programs to further the religious
mission of St. Paul's Outreach; creating a faith-filled
environment, instructing college students in prayer,
bible studies, evangelizing, and preparing students in
the renewal of authentic Catholic life. . . . The proposal
requires a conditional use variance for side and rear
yard setbacks along with such variances and/or waivers
that presently exist or that may be necessary for the
development including parking. The proposal includes
the use of an existing chapel as well [as] residential use.
The Board heard plaintiff's application on three non-consecutive days
between April 7, 2015 and June 1, 2015. Plaintiff presented the testimony of
two experts: Joseph Staigar, a licensed professional traffic engineer; and
Kathryn Gregory, a licensed professional planner. Senior Mission Director Ed
Moccia, Mission Leader Joseph Buganski, and Brother Judge LaSota also
testified on plaintiff's behalf. Numerous local residents attended the hearings as
objectors and questioned plaintiff's witnesses. The Board did not call any
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witnesses, but John Lopos, a local resident represented by counsel, and Gordon
Gemma, his licensed professional planner, testified in opposition to the
application. The Board also considered documentary evidence, including the
expert reports of applicant and the objectors, and memoranda and comments of
the Board's planner, Heyer, Gruel and Associates.
At the conclusion of its meeting on October 6, 2015, the Board voted to
deny plaintiff's application. Prior to the issuance of the Board's written
resolution, plaintiff's counsel submitted a request for reconsideration of the
Board's decision. Plaintiff argued that the Board failed to consider "any
conditions that would ameliorate any adverse impact."
Specifically, although plaintiff was willing to relocate its large formation
meetings to Seton Hall University (SHU), plaintiff maintained its "[h]ousehold
[p]rogram requires that [its] missionaries have staff meetings, prayer, and rooms
for administrative work at the residence." Because many of the missionaries are
not SHU students, the "smaller group meetings [could not] be hosted at [SHU]."
Further, plaintiff's religious mission "is to inculcate religious values in a home
setting." Plaintiff claimed "[t]he Board's denial deprives . . . it[s] right to free
expression of religion."
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During its January 1, 2016 meeting, the Board summarily denied
plaintiff's application for reconsideration. Thereafter, the Board memorialized
its findings and decision in a sixteen-page resolution. The resolution
summarized the testimony of the witnesses, the arguments of counsel and the
objectors, and set forth the Board's findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Importantly, the Board referenced the testimony of plaintiff's witnesses
regarding the proposed use of the property. The Board recognized plaintiff's
"four core elements" in paragraph 24 of its resolution:
(i) The residential element whereby participants share
a house and commit to living together and following
Roman Catholic teachings, sharing chores, sharing
expenses, praying each morning, eating dinner together
at least twice per week and undertaking Bible study;
(ii) the faith formation program where twice per month
groups of between [thirty-five to forty] non-resident
students meet at the house on Monday evenings from
8:30 p.m. to 10:00 p.m.;
(iii) A "Fan Into Flame" religious retreat which occurs
annually offsite; and
(iv) The School of Evangelization which occurs offsite.
Notably, the Board referenced the lack of testimony regarding plaintiff's "use
[of] the residence as an administrative office for [its] statewide activities." The
Board described the "[t]estimony on this use []as both vague and scant."
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Further, the Board analyzed the issuance of a d(3) variance pursuant to the
Sica test, finding:
29. In this case [plaintiff] proposes a
religious/residential use which furthers religious
freedom, an important public interest. However, the
detriments to the neighborhood and zone plan would be
more than substantial. During the hearing [plaintiff]'s
attorney referred to [plaintiff's] website. The Board
takes administrative notice that the website identifies
the house as the "New Jersey Mission Center." A
"Mission Center" is defined in [plaintiff]'s literature as
"an operational hub that establishes and supports
[plaintiff's] [c]hapters within a geographic region."
([Plaintiff's] 2014 Annual Report) [Plaintiff]
acknowledged that the uses to occur on the site were
more than the residential program for residents. The
uses also included faith formation meetings on Monday
evenings which included non-residents and could result
in [thirty-five to forty] people at the house. On Monday
mornings the resident [m]issionary meets with seven
non-resident [m]issionaries in the chapel. Reference
was made to use of the house as administrative offices
for [plaintiff], however, exact details of such use were
never provided. As [plaintiff]'s New Jersey Mission
Center[,] it can be expected that additional
administrative office uses would occur. Each of these
gatherings would bring pedestrian and vehicular traffic
to the site which already has an existing problem with
cars parking in the front yard in violation of the
Ordinance. Applicant did not propose to provide
additional parking in the rear stating that it believed it
was not a suitable location. Whether parking in the rear
yard could be configured and buffered in a manner not
entirely inconsistent with the double rear yard setback
requirement is unknown as it was not part of the
application.
A-0264-17T1
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30. . . . In [plaintiff's request for reconsideration it]
agreed to the following conditions: (i) no church
service open to the general public and [plaintiff] agrees
not to use the site for a homeless shelter, house for
abused women and/or soup kitchen; (ii) the number of
residents with cars would be limited to the number of
parking spaces; (iii) no large meetings starting after 10
p.m. on weekdays; and (iv) [plaintiff would] plant
[thirty-two] trees along the perimeter of the property
. . . . The Board notes that previously during the hearing
[plaintiff] had agreed to limit the number of residents
at the premises, but that limitation was withdrawn.
31. On balance, the Board finds that the conditions
proposed are insufficient to overcome the substantial
detriments caused by the proposed use. The property is
located in a residential zone where religious uses are
permitted but only if they meet certain conditions. In
this case[, plaintiff] proposes to locate its New Jersey
Mission Center in the midst of a residential
neighborhood on a lot which does not meet the setback
requirements, especially for the rear yard, or have
sufficient parking. There is an existing parking
shortfall with [four] spaces existing. Applicant
proposes to provide [eleven] parking spaces by using
the two car garage (which is currently filled with
belongings and not used for parking) and widening the
driveway to provide additional parking along its sides.
Two more spaces would be carved out to the right side
of the driveway in a cutout. The Ordinance does not
allow widening the driveway or parking in the front
yard. [Plaintiff] never fully detailed the extent of its
administrative office use at the site but headquartering
[plaintiff]'s New Jersey offices in this home will attract
even more visitors and parking. The Board finds that
on balance the detriments outweigh the benefits of the
use at this location.
[Emphasis added.]
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Thereafter, plaintiff filed a four-count complaint in lieu of prerogative
writs in the Law Division against both defendants, alleging the Board: (1) acted
arbitrarily, capriciously and unreasonably; (2) failed to balance the positive and
negative criteria for the variance; (3) was estopped from denying its use of a
chapel by issuing permits and certificates of occupancy to Salesian; and
(4) violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc to 2000cc-5.
Following a hearing on August 22, 2017, the trial court issued a terse oral
decision, reversing the Board's decision and granting plaintiff's application f or
a d(3) variance, without imposing any conditions on plaintiff's use of the
property. In doing so, the court granted relief under all of plaintiff's causes of
action.
Specifically, in addressing the Sica factors, the court recognized plaintiff
"is a religious organization, which obviously is a positive good." Finding there
was "no difference" between the prior use of the property by the Salesians and
the current use by plaintiff, the court did not find a detrimental effect in granting
the variance. The court further determined plaintiff's proposed driveway
expansion for additional parking spaces would not have a detrimental effect,
referencing Staigar's "unrefuted" opinion that traffic would not be materially
A-0264-17T1
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affected. Notably, the court found reasonable conditions on the use were
unnecessary "as long as the use continues to the use that it[ has] been up to this
point."
Further, the trial court determined the Board was estopped from denying
the d(3) variance based on Salesian's prior use. Citing Eltrym Euneva, LLC v.
Keansburg Planning Board of Adjustment, 407 N.J. Super. 432 (Law. Div.
2008), the court observed the "defendant [in Euneva] was estopped from
denying the plaintiff the right to [non-]conforming residential use, based on the
prior issu[ance] of a [c]ertificate of [o]ccupancy." The court then determined
Euneva "falls clearly on the four corners of this case, and clearly the application
should be granted on the estoppel c[ount]." Specifically,
[It has] not been disputed that prior building permits
were issued . . . and that a prior [c]ertificate of
[o]ccupancy was issued by the [Township]. It may
have been [twenty-five] plus years ago, however the
[Township] stuck with [its] decision previously,
whether in fact the inspector clearly [did not] pick up
on the fact that the side yard setbacks and the front and
rear setbacks were not appropriate this [c]ourt finds [it
is] of no moment. [The Township] waived that
particular issue, and it was never pursued until this
particular application occurred. And clearly I find it
arbitrary and capricious and unreasonable that in fact
[twenty-five] plus years later, all of [a] sudden they
found that the requests should be denied based upon a
minor issue with regard to the setbacks. So this [c]ourt
does not find that the argument is persuasive.
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Finally, without making findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial
court initially determined plaintiff did not meet its burden of proof under its
RLUIPA count, then determined the issue was moot because the court granted
plaintiff's application under the first three counts of its complaint. Nonetheless,
the court again reversed course and determined it "d[id not] find a compelling
government interest here." This appeal followed.
On appeal, defendants primarily contend the trial court erred because the
Board's denial of plaintiff's d(3) application was adequately supported by its
factual findings; plaintiff failed to establish good faith reliance on Salesian's
prior use of the property; and the Board's decision did not substantially burden
plaintiff's religious freedom and, as such, did not violate RLUIPA. They also
contend plaintiff failed to fully disclose the nature and extent of its
administrative functions. In sum, defendants seek reversal of the trial court's
decision and order. In the alternative, they claim a remand to the Board is
necessary to further clarify how the property will be utilized.
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III.
Adhering to our limited scope of review, we conclude the trial court
inexplicitly substituted its judgment in reversing the Board's decision. Cell
South, 172 N.J. at 81.
Initially, we consider the trial court's determination that the Board's
decision was arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable in failing to properly assess
the Sica factors. Our review of the record reveals that the Board was hampered
by an incomplete and unclear presentation of plaintiff's use of the property and
ameliorating conditions. Without a fully-developed record regarding plaintiff's
use and conditions, the trial court incorrectly determined there was "no
detriment" here. Indeed, the Board recognized those deficiencies in the
concluding paragraph of its resolution:
37. Whether an alternate proposal for an administrative
office use with (i) a more fully detailed description of
the proposed limited administrative office use
including the number of persons involved, the type and
extent of administrative activities, and the necessity of
this use on-site, (ii) the exact number and location of
parking spaces, the number of residents with cars, and
the anticipated parking demand for such proposed use,
(iii) a more detailed landscape buffering plan, and (iv)
addressing drainage concerns raised during the hearing,
would be acceptable is not before the Board at this time
and is undecided.
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We agree and accordingly, we vacate the court's order pertaining to counts
one and two of plaintiff's complaint and remand to the Board to conduct a
rehearing to consider any uses and conditions that were not fully detailed during
the hearings. In doing so, we also recognize that some of those uses and
conditions were raised during plaintiff's presentation at the hearing and in its
reconsideration application. Moreover, the objectors posed specific questions
regarding the use of the property as plaintiff's New Jersey Mission Center.
Plaintiff sought to clarify and supplement the conditions that could be imposed
on its use, but the Board opted not to consider those suggestions. We conclude
the Board erred in declining to consider that new information, and that a remand
is necessary for this limited purpose. Additionally on remand, defendants
should determine the applicability of the doubling provision set forth in § 92 -
210(D) to plaintiff's d(3) application, and that section's significance, if any, to
conditions that could alleviate the negative criteria.
Turning to count three of plaintiff's complaint, the court's decision, in
large part, was based on the mistaken belief that the property was a pre-existing
non-conforming use. However, in its application for a d(3) variance, plaintiff
did not seek relief as a pre-existing non-conforming use, as candidly
acknowledged by plaintiff's counsel during her summation to the Board: "I [a]m
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not asking you to find under section 68 3 that this was a prior non-conforming
use." Accordingly, this issue was not before the Board, and the trial court erred
in reversing the Board on that basis.
In its decision, the court also credited plaintiff's estoppel argument, which
was not raised before the Board. That analysis was similarly improper. See
Kramer, 45 N.J. at 289; Adams, 309 N.J. Super. at 583.
Moreover, estoppel is invoked against a municipality "only in very
compelling circumstances, where the interests of justice, morality and common
fairness dictate that course." Maltese v. Twp. of N. Brunswick, 353 N.J. Super.
226, 244-45 (App. Div. 2002). In essence, a municipality can be estopped if
"the circumstances involve reliance on a good faith act of an administrative
official, within the ambit of that official duty, which constitutes an erroneous
and debatable interpretation of an ordinance." Scardigli v. Borough of
Haddonfield Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 300 N.J. Super. 314, 319-20 (App. Div.
1997). Good faith reliance by the party claiming estoppel is necessary. Grasso
v. Borough of Spring Lake Heights, 375 N.J. Super. 41, 47-48 (App. Div. 2004)
(recognizing that although it is rarely invoked, estoppel may be enforced if a
property owner makes "substantial expenditures in good faith reliance on a
3
N.J.S.A. 40:55D-68.
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permit that was issued because of a municipal official's erroneous . . .
interpretation of the zoning ordinance").
We are not persuaded by the trial court's reliance on Euneva to support its
decision that the Board was estopped from denying the variances requested here.
In Euneva, the Law Division determined the defendant borough was estopped
from enforcing an ordinance against the plaintiff, who built an addition to their
home, where the borough's building inspector failed to recognize a deficiency
in a side yard setback. 407 N.J. Super. at 445-46. In finding the plaintiff
reasonably relied on the building inspector's mistake, the court found the
plaintiff relied on the borough's documents when deciding to purchase the
property, and that the plaintiff sought multiple permits requiring borough
inspections during the renovation process. Id. at 445. The borough's inspectors
even commented that they were impressed with the improvements. Ibid.
Conversely, here, the trial court did not determine plaintiff reasonably
relied on the issuance of building permits to Salesian. Indeed, prior to
purchasing the property, plaintiff specifically requested that Salesian obtain a
variance, presumably recognizing the setbacks were non-conforming. Further,
by the time Salesian sold the property to plaintiff, its use was markedly different
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from its past use, limited to a few priests residing at the premises. Accordingly,
we find the Board was not estopped from denying the variance.
Finally, we consider plaintiff's fourth cause of action. RLUIPA sets forth
the factors to be considered when determining whether the implementation or
enforcement of a land use regulation imposes a substantial burden on the
exercise of religion:
No government shall impose or implement a land use
regulation in a manner that imposes a substantial
burden on the religious exercise of a person, including
a religious assembly or institution, unless the
government demonstrates that imposition of the burden
on that person, assembly, or institution –
(A) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental
interest; and
(B) is the least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling governmental interest.
[42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1).]
To demonstrate a violation of the RLUIPA, a plaintiff must make a prima
facie showing that the land use regulation imposed a substantial burden on
religious exercise. See House of Fire, 379 N.J. Super. at 544-47. When that
burden is met, the burden shifts to the local government to demonstrate that the
land use regulation furthers a compelling governmental interest and is the least
restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. Id. at 545.
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In this action in lieu of prerogative writs, presumably, the parties did not
engage in discovery nor seek a plenary hearing. R. 4:67-5. Nonetheless, the
trial court summarily concluded defendants violated RLUIPA, without engaging
in any meaningful analysis under the statute or governing case law. We decline
to do so here, where plaintiff's application will be reconsidered by the Board.
See House of Fire, 379 N.J. Super. at 547.
In sum, the trial court's oral opinion contained no analysis of whether the
Board's conclusions were supported by the record, and did not attempt to relate
the facts as found by the Board or to establish why those facts were unsupported
by the record. We are therefore satisfied, after carefully reviewing the record,
that the trial court essentially, and mistakenly, replaced the Board's judgment
with its own. See Northeast Towers, 327 N.J. Super. at 495-96.
Reversed and remanded to the Board for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
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