STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. DAVID BAKER (13-02-0100, PASSAIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-5307-15T3
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
DAVID BAKER,
Defendant-Appellant.
__________________________
Submitted October 4, 2018 – Decided November 21, 2018
Before Judges O'Connor and Whipple.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Passaic County, Indictment No. 13-02-0100.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Rochelle Watson, Assistant Deputy Public
Defender, of counsel and on the brief).
Camelia M. Valdes, Passaic County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Marc A. Festa, Senior
Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant David Baker appeals from an April 28, 2016 judgment of
conviction following a bench trial for second-degree death by auto, N.J.S.A.
2C:11-5a, and driving while intoxicated, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50. We affirm.
At around 10 p.m. on August 25, 2012, two eyewitnesses saw a truck
driven by defendant make a left turn at an intersection and strike a pedestrian.
An officer responded to the scene, identified defendant as the driver of the truck,
smelled alcohol on his breath, and believed him to be intoxicated after
conducting field sobriety tests. At police headquarters, an Alcotest was
administered and the test revealed defendant had a .28 blood alcohol content.
The next day, defendant confessed to hitting the victim with his truck. The
victim succumbed to her injuries and died on August 27, 2012.
Defendant was indicted for second-degree death by auto and received
summonses for driving while intoxicated and driving with an open alcoholic
beverage.1 In a pre-trial hearing on September 29, 2015, defense counsel told
the court defendant wanted to testify in order to advance a misidentification
defense, despite counsel's advice to present a different defense. Acknowledging
his client's right to choose whether to testify, defense counsel advised his client
to seek a bench trial because defendant wanted to present legally inconsistent
1
This open container charge was dismissed at sentencing.
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defenses. Defense counsel made it clear to the trial court this was not his
preferred strategy but still planned to zealously advocate on his client's behalf.
In responding to the trial judge raising the fact that defense counsel did not want
defendant to testify, defense counsel stated:
[I]t’s been our advice to Mr. Baker to proceed strictly
on the—on the issue of recklessness and not on the
issue of identification. . . . Mr. Baker . . . strongly feels
that he wants the issue of identification, and he feels,
strongly feels that he wants the opportunity to explain
in testimony why it was not him that stuck this woman
. . . . And he has the right to that, and even though it
was not my advice to him to proceed in that manner, I
am his attorney and so I will advocate zealously on his
behalf regardless of whatever ultimate choice he makes.
And that includes if he’s going to take the witness
stand. But either way, for him to—for him to have that
defense, which is specifically it was not me, an
identification defense, the only witness that we have is
Mr. Baker.
On October 1, 2015, at defendant’s hearing to waive his jury trial, the trial
judge questioned defendant and found him to be “cogent, rational, unpressured,
relaxed, knowing and voluntary in-his-actions.” Defendant stated he sought a
bench trial in part due to his intention to raise alternative arguments, both that
he was not the driver that struck the victim, and he was not reckless in hitting
the victim with his vehicle. A bench trial proceeded to conclusion wherein the
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judge heard testimony from the two eyewitnesses, the arresting officers and the
medical examiner.
Defendant testified over two days. Defendant testified he only took
responsibility previously in order to coax the police into revealing "their lies."
He testified he stopped in front of a woman lying on the road, walked over to
her and saw that she was injured, and then ran back to his car to call 9-1-1, while
one of the witnesses in the car behind him came running, using racially charged
language. Defendant additionally testified he saw the eyewitnesses who
testified against him exit a Jeep, already in the intersection when he arrived,
which then drove off before the police arrived. Defendant denied performing a
field sobriety test, claimed he only breathed into the Alcotest machine once, in
contrast to the two breath samples the machine recorded, and that his signature
on the Alcotest form was forged.
On November 2, 2015, when announcing his verdict, the trial judge stated:
Indeed, [defendant asserting that it was an accident]
was an otherwise viable defense that is incurably
undermined by his alternate, untenable version of
events that bleeds into and infects the credibility of his
subsequent self-serving statements as to lack of
intoxication and/or recklessness.
The trial judge referred to defendant's revised version of events as "fantastical,
conspiratorial, and finally, regrettable." Additionally, he characterized
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defendant’s argument as maintaining "a fantastical conspiratorial take on this
whole incident." However, the trial judge specified:
Mr. Baker's initial formal statement is found to be
credible for several reasons: It was given with minimal
time available to contrive an elaborate defense of the
kind Mr. Baker set forth years afterward with the
benefit of discovery . . . .
Finding defendant's testimony not credible, the trial judge found
defendant guilty of second-degree vehicular homicide pursuant to N.J.S.A.
2C:11-5, after inferring the recklessness required from defendant's intoxication.
On April 28, 2016, after finding aggravating factors three, six, and nine
applicable, see N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1, the trial judge sentenced defendant to a term
of ten years subject to an eighty-five percent parole ineligibility period, along
with $1,505 in restitution, and one year suspended driver's license, in a ddition
to accompanying fees. This appeal followed.
Defendant raises the following issues on appeal:
Point I:
DEFENDANT WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE
COUNSEL WHEN HIS ATTORNEY (1) ABDICATED HIS DUTY
TO MAKE CRITICAL STRATEGIC DECISIONS; AND (2)
PREEMPTIVELY AND REPEATEDLY DECLARED TO THE
TRIAL JUDGE, WHILE REQUESTING A BENCH TRIAL, THAT
DEFENDANT'S MISIDENTIFICATION DEFENSE WAS
SPECIOUS AND AGAINST COUNSEL'S ADVICE.
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Point II:
BECAUSE THE SENTENCING PROCEDURE WAS RIFE WITH
ERROR, DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO A RESENTENCING.
A. The Trial Judge's Personal Belief That Defendant's Trial Defense
and Testimony Were "Conspiratorial" and "Fantastical" Pervaded
the Sentencing Decision.
B. The Judge Placed Undue Weight On Defendant's Prior Criminal
Record Failing To Give Adequate Consideration To The Severity
Of The Offense.
C. The Court's Indignation At Defendant's Trial Defense And Its
Disparaging Remarks About Defendant's Constitution Seriously
Undermined Any Confidence That The Sentence Was Imposed
Impartially.
"Assessing I[nneffective] A[ssistance of] C[ounsel] claims involves
matters of fact, but the ultimate determination is one of law and . . . 'a trial court's
interpretations of law and the legal consequences that flow from established
facts are not entitled to any special deference.'" State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391,
419 (2004) (quoting Manalapan Realty, LP v. Twp. Committee, 140 N.J. 366,
378 (1995)).
"Our courts have expressed a general policy against entertaining
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims on direct appeal because such claims
involve allegations and evidence that lie outside the trial record." State v.
Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 460 (1992). But we acknowledge a "defendant should
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not be required to wait until post-conviction relief to raise the issue [if] the trial
record discloses the facts essential to his ineffective assistance claim." State v.
Allah, 170 N.J. 269, 285 (2002).
Defendant alleges trial counsel abdicated his role as counsel by failing to
investigate potential defenses, manage the trial and decide which defenses to
raise. Having reviewed the record, we conclude it does not disclose facts
essential to defendant's ineffective assistance claim. Defendant assails strategic
decisions and discussions between himself and defense counsel that occurred
outside of the courtroom, the contents of which are not in the record. Due to the
insufficiency of the record, and the preference for hearing ineffective assistance
claims on PCR rather than through direct appeal, we decline to hear defendant's
ineffective assistance claim.
We next consider defendant's challenge to his sentencing. Based on our
review of the record, we affirm the sentence imposed by the trial judge.
We review the imposition of sentence under an abuse of discretion
standard. In re Hendrickson, No. A-12-17, slip op. at 18 (N.J. Sept. 18, 2018).
"[W]e will always require that an exercise of discretion be based upon findings
of fact that are grounded in competent, reasonably credible evidence." State v.
Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 363 (1984).
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Defendant asserts bias because the trial judge called his testimony
"conspiratorial" and "fantastical." The trial judge used these words twice, once
when evaluating defendant's testimony during the bench trial and the other in
assessing aggravating factor three, the risk of reoffending. The first comment
was when the trial judge was acting as a fact finder and determined defendant's
testimony was not credible. The second comment was when the trial judge was
considering whether defendant posed a risk of recidivism, stating defendant's
"failure to come to terms with his conduct, not his lack of remorse, but failure
to come to terms with his conduct that makes this Court highly concerned that
he's likely to repeat it." We discern no abuse of the court's discretion in the
court's findings or rationale.
Defendant next argues the trial judge overweighed his criminal record in
assessing aggravating factors three, six, and nine. The trial judge noted
defendant's substance abuse history, emphasized this was defendant's second
driving-while-intoxicated offense, and listed a litany of defendant's traffic
offenses. Moreover, the trial judge viewed the fact defendant's violent past was
behind him to be a mitigating factor. Considering the nature of defendant's
current conviction, we discern no abuse of the court's discretion for weighing
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defendant's criminal history, particularly his driving offenses and we reject
defendant's charge the trial judge was biased.
Affirmed.
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