STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. MICHAEL D. OLIVER (15-05-0277, SALEM COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED)

RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1719-16T4
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
MICHAEL D. OLIVER, a/k/a
MICHAEL DAY, and
WAYNE FRENCH,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________________________
Argued October 23, 2018 – Decided November 2, 2018
Before Judges Fisher and Firko.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Salem County, Indictment No. 15-05-0277.
Marcia H. Blum, Assistant Deputy Public Defender,
argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora,
Public Defender, attorney; Marcia H. Blum, of counsel
and on the briefs).
Adam D. Klein, Deputy Attorney General, argued the
cause for respondent (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney
General, attorney; Adam D. Klein, of counsel and on
the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Michael D. Oliver was originally indicted in Salem County for
murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3; aggravated manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a);
endangering the welfare of children, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a); and aggravated
assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1) by a grand jury. He entered a conditional guilty
plea to first-degree aggravated manslaughter, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-
4(a)(2). Pursuant to the plea agreement, he was sentenced to a twenty-year term
of imprisonment, subject to the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-
7.2. Judge Benjamin C. Telsey also imposed a five-year period of post-release
parole supervision, requisite fines, and penalties. Defendant raises the following
points for our consideration on appeal:
POINT I
THE INDICTMENT FOR SERIOUS[]BODILY[]
INJURY MURDER MUST BE DISMISSED
BECAUSE: 1) THE PROSECUTOR GAVE THE
JURY AN INCORRECT DEFINITION OF THE
ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF SERIOUS BODILY
INJURY AND 2) THE STATE FAILED TO PRESENT
PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANT
COMMITTED SERIOUS[]BODILY[]INJURY
MURDER.
1. Incorrect definition of serious bodily injury murder.
2. Failure to present prima facie evidence of SBI
murder.
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POINT II
DEFENDANT'S STATEMENT MUST BE
SUPPRESSED BECAUSE THE MIRANDA FORM
THE POLICE USED TO ADVISE HIM OF HIS
RIGHTS WAS INACCURATE AND MISLEADING
AND PRECLUDED A KNOWING, VOLUNTARY,
AND INTELLIGENT WAIVER OF HIS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.
We have considered these arguments in light of the record and applicable
legal standards and affirm.
I.
The following facts are derived from the record. Defendant was
babysitting the victim, four-year old L.P.,1 and three other children, in December
2014 in Penns Grove. After finding L.P. unresponsive and being unable to
contact her mother, defendant called 911 for an ambulance. The dispatcher
asked him several questions, including, "how old is she?", "what's going on?",
and "what happened?" Defendant responded that he did not have "time to
answer all of that" and was instructed by the dispatcher to perform
cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR), which he attempted until the paramedics
and police arrived. After L.P. was transported to the hospital, Detective James
1
We use initials to protect the identities of the victim and juveniles involved in
these proceedings. R. 1:38-3(d).
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Gillespie of the Salem County Prosecutor's Office went to the apartment and
questioned defendant about what happened. Gillespie recorded the conversation
on his cell phone because defendant was "talking to me very fast, providing . . .
a lot of information at once." Miranda2 warnings were not given because
Gillespie did not consider defendant a suspect at that point in time since
information was being gathered. According to defendant, while he and two of
the children were cleaning the apartment, L.P. was in a bedroom with M.D. He
heard a "thump," but "didn't pay no mind" because he thought they were playing.
When he entered the room, he saw L.P. lying on the floor and told her to "stop
playing" and "get the fuck up" or he would make her "assume the position, or
put [her] on the floor." He picked up her limp body and carried her to the living
room. Defendant claimed he was "trying to get this little fucker to breathe" and
"thought she was dead."
At 11:00 p.m. that evening, Gillespie drove defendant to the police station
where he was read his Miranda rights and signed a Miranda card advising him
of his rights even though he was not then considered a suspect. Prior to the
interview, the child died. Defendant provided a more detailed account to the
detectives about what happened that day and he described his relationship with
2
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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the children. He described how he "normally just beat up the kids" in order to
play with them. On the day in question, the children were jumping on the bed
and "got a little too rowdy" so he put them to bed. He stated L.P., who was
"spoiled" and a "bully", was on the floor, and he thought she was "playing
possum." Her eyes were open. He shouted, "All right, stop fucking playing.
Get up, it's time for bed."
Without provocation, defendant claimed during this interview that he was
anxious about a prior incident that occurred in Camden years ago with his former
girlfriend as to who was going to babysit a child. Because he thought "probation
or something like that" would be imposed, defendant said, "Fuck it, I did it," and
he served five years in prison for that crime. Before ending the interview,
defendant asked Gillespie about L.P. but was not informed of her demise.
The same day, Gillespie spoke to one of the children, five-year old N.D.,
who described how defendant punished the children when they misbehaved.
With regard to L.P., defendant would make her "be on the floor and put her feet
up" six inches from the ground. N.D. further said L.P. "was bad" because she
kicked defendant. When she was unable to maintain her feet six inches above
the floor, defendant punched her nine times in her lower abdomen while she
cried, as re-enacted by N.D., who also stated that L.P. cried throughout.
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The medical examiner, Dr. Gerald Feigin, conducted an autopsy of L.P.
the next day and determined that she died as a result of "blunt force trauma to
the abdomen," and that the manner of her death was homicide. That same day,
defendant was arrested, handcuffed, and transported to the police station.
Before reading defendant his Miranda rights, Gillespie told him, "Now, same
thing as yesterday; . . . before I talk to you about anything, I've just got to go
through this here with you. I just have to read you your rights; all right?" His
Miranda rights were explained to him and defendant responded "yes" when
asked if he understood them. Gillespie and Sergeant Elliot Hernandez asked
defendant to recount the previous night's events. He did so and claimed he did
not punch or "play fight" with the children that night. He did not deny being the
only adult present. After initially protesting, defendant also retold the story
about the previous child neglect arrest. L.P.'s autopsy results were shared with
defendant, who could not offer an explanation as to the bruises found on her
back. His response was, "I'm telling you, I don't know nothing about no bruises,"
and admitted that a bruise occurs by "somebody hitting you." Defendant became
agitated and said, "it's going to go back to me going to jail," and requested
counsel. He was charged with murder.
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At the plea hearing, defendant admitted that he acted recklessly and with
an extreme indifference to the value of human life.
II.
We review arguments raised for the first time on appeal under a plain error
standard. Under this standard, we disregard an error unless it was "clearly
capable of producing an unjust result." R. 2:10-2; State v. Daniels, 182 N.J. 80,
95 (2004); State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 337 (1971). One of the reasons that we
deal differently with claims of error, which could have but were not raised at
trial, from those timely challenged is because "[i]t may be fair to infer from the
failure to object below that in the context of the trial the error was actually of
no moment." Macon, 57 N.J. at 333.
In preserving his right to appeal the denial of the motion to dismiss the
indictment, defendant contends that the State did not present evidence of a
knowing or purposeful state of mind to the grand jury. Now on appeal, for the
first time, he argues "serious bodily injury" was not correctly defined by the
State to the grand jury, and that the "purposely and knowingly" element of
murder was based upon N.D.'s statement to the police, which is insufficient.
Subject to certain exceptions not applicable here, criminal homicide
constitutes murder when the defendant "purposely" or "knowingly" causes the
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death of the victim or commits serious bodily injury that results in death. See
N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) (regarding purposeful conduct), -3(a)(2) (regarding
knowing conduct); State v. Cruz, 163 N.J. 403, 417-18 (2000); see also State v.
Galicia, 210 N.J. 364, 377-78 (2012). He essentially maintains that no
reasonable fact-finder could have concluded that he possessed the mens rea to
commit murder. We disagree.
The grand jury was read relevant portions of the indictment, as well as the
definitions for knowing or purposeful serious bodily injury murder. Prior to
eliciting testimony, the assistant prosecutor read the following relevant portion
of the indictment to the grand jury:
The Grand Jurors of the State of New Jersey for the
County of Salem, upon their oaths, indicate that on
December 3, 2014, in Penns Grove, Salem County,
[defendant] purposely or knowingly did inflict serious
bodily injury upon [the child victim] which resulted in
the death of [the child victim], contrary to 2C:11-
3(a)(2).
The elements of knowing or purposeful serious bodily injury murder were
read to the grand jurors as follows:
Now I will read for you the mental intents that are found
in 2C:2-2, which are referenced in 2C:11-3. Purposely,
let me just make a notation here, is defined, "a person
acts purposely with respect to the nature of his conduct
or a result thereof, it is – if it is his conscious objection
or object to engage in conduct of that nature, or to cause
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such a result. A person acts purposely with respect to
attendant circumstances if he is aware of the existence
of such circumstances, or he believes or hopes that they
exist. With purpose, designed, with design or
equivalent terms have the same meaning.["]
Knowingly, a person acts knowingly with respect to the
nature of his conduct or the attendant circumstances if
he is aware that his conduct is of that nature, or that
such circumstances exist or he is aware of a high
probability of their existence. A person acts knowingly
with respect to a result of his conduct if he is aware that
it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such
a result, knowing, with knowledge or equivalent terms
have the same meaning.
The assistant prosecutor also defined serious bodily injury for the grand
jury by stating, "[s]erious bodily injury is defined under 2C:11-1[, as] '[b]odily
injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious
permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any
bodily member or organ.'"
The grand jury heard testimony from Gillespie that defendant was the only
adult home with four children; he made L.P. lay down on the floor with her
ankles raised and punched her "hard" nine times in her lower abdomen; and that
the autopsy report concluded that the cause of death was blunt force abdominal
trauma. Gillespie further testified that the manner of death was homicide.
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We are mindful of the State's persuasive argument here that defendant's
serious bodily injury contention was not encompassed by his conditional guilty
plea. Nonetheless, we still reject defendant's argument. Our standard of review
in examining the trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss the indictment is
limited, and will be reversed only for an abuse of discretion. State v. Saavedra,
222 N.J. 39, 55-56 (2015). An indictment should be dismissed "only on the
clearest and plainest ground; and only when the indictment is manifestly
deficient or palpably defective." State v. Twiggs, 233 N.J. 513, 531-32 (2018).
Grand jury proceedings are presumed valid, and defendant has the burden to
prove prosecutorial error. State v. Francis, 191 N.J. 571, 586 (2007); see also
State v. Triestman, 416 N.J. Super. 195, 204 (App. Div. 2017). The grand jury
is simply an accusatory body and determines probable cause, or a prima facie
case. State v. Hogan, 144 N.J. 216, 235 (1996).
In denying the motion to dismiss the indictment, Judge Telsey aptly found:
That is a fact issue; and, the [c]ourt has to at least look
at what was presented to the jury, the [g]rand [j]ury that
is, to see if there's at least a prima facie showing of facts
for the jury to draw that conclusion.
When I look at the allegations that were presented to
the jury in this particular case, the defendant gave a
statement or reaction to the victim being found
unresponsive on the bedroom floor, was, "I'm going to
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fuck you up, or make you assume the position, or put
you on the floor. Shit like that."
The State provided the defendant's reaction to police
questioning, where the defendant indicated that he
agreed with detectives that the victim was [], "spoiled
and a brat."
Further, N.A. indicated that the defendant would punish
the children by - - he'd babysit, by making them lay on
the floor, with their feet up in the air. When the child's
feet fell to the ground, the defendant would punch the
child in the stomach, hard sometimes, making the
children cry.
Based upon the evidence alone, there appears to be
prima facie evidence as to the mental state of the
defendant; and, it would be up for the [g]rand [j]ury in
this particular case, to make a determination as to
whether or not the State has met its - - has established
probable cause of knowing or purposeful.
And [the jury] will be instructed . . . at the time of trial,
[and] they'll have to decide, beyond a reasonable doubt,
where[]as the [g]rand [j]ury only has to decide . . .
whether or not there is probable cause, . . . and, I'm
reading from the charge[:]
"The nature of the purpose or knowledge with which
the defendant acted toward the victim, is a question of
fact for you, the jury, to decide. Purpose and
knowledge are conditions of the mind, which cannot be
seen, and can only be determined by inferences from
conduct, words, or acts.["]
"It is not necessary for the State to produce a witness,
or witnesses, who could testify that the defendant
stated, for example, that his purpose was to cause death
A-1719-16T4
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or serious bodily injury resulting in death, or that he
knew that his conduct would cause death or serious
bodily injury resulting in death.["]
"It is within your power to find that proof of purpose or
knowledge has been furnished," here, beyond a
reasonable doubt, which doesn't apply to the [g]rand
[jury]. "By inferences which may arise from the nature
of the acts and the surrounding circumstances.["]
"Such things, as the place where the acts occurred, the
weapon used, if any, the location, number and nature of
wounds inflicted; and, all that was done or said by the
defendant pr[e]ceeding, connected with, and
immediately succeeding the events leading to the death
of the victim, are among the circumstances to be
considered."
And, those facts, that the jury charge references are just
those facts that were presented to the [g]rand [j]ury, so
the [c]ourt - - so the [g]rand [j]ury had the information
for it to make the necessary determination as to whether
or not the State met its initial burden for the [g]rand
[jury] proceedings, as to whether purposeful or
knowing conduct was that on the part of the defendant.
So, based upon the facts that were presented to the
[g]rand [j]ury, the [c]ourt is satisfied that the [g]rand
[j]ury had sufficient information to draw the
conclusion, that the State was able to meet its burden of
proof as to the mens [rea] of the defendant in this
particular case.
We find no reversible error here.
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III.
Defendant now challenges the constitutionality of the Carneys Point
police department's Miranda warning form on two grounds: (1) the form does
not ask if defendant "stand[s] on his right to remain silent, and presumes he
abandoned it," and (2) the form asks if defendant acknowledges his rights but
not if he waives his rights, arguing that the acknowledgment constitutes a
waiver. Even if the warnings were properly given, defendant argues his
December 4, 2014 statement should be suppressed. We disagree.
"The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the
waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently." Miranda, 384 U.S. at
444-45; see also State v. Messino, 378 N.J. Super. 559, 576 (App. Div. 2005).
The burden is on the State to prove defendant was informed of these rights and
"knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived [these] right[s]" beyond a
reasonable doubt. State v. Nyhammer, 197 N.J. 383, 400-01 (2009); see also
State v. Presha, 163 N.J. 304, 313 (2000).
Here, Carneys Point Miranda form read as follows:
You have the right to remain silent and refuse to answer
any questions. Anything you say may be used against
you in a court of law. You have the right to consult
with an attorney at any time and have him or her present
before or during questioning. If you cannot afford an
attorney, one will be provided, if you so desire, prior to
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any questioning. And the decision to waive your rights
is not final. You may withdraw your waiver whenever
you wish, either before or during questioning.
Gillespie read the waiver line as "[a]nd the decision to waive your rights
is not final." Defendant asserts that the form presumes he abandoned his rights.
However, when read as a whole, the inference is that defendant could have
withdrawn the waiver at any time. There is nothing misleading. Gillespie and
Hernandez video-recorded defendant's statement, and Gillespie read defendant
his rights a second time. At the suppression hearing, defendant's counsel argued
that his motion should be granted because defendant did not comprehend wh at
the word "waive" meant: he was under the influence of marijuana; was stressed
out; and had cognitive limitations. The State is only obligated to inform a
defendant of Miranda warnings and show that he or she understood those rights.
Nyhammer, 197 N.J. at 400. A "ritualistic formula" is unnecessary. Messino,
378 N.J. Super. at 577.
Under the totality of the circumstances, we find no reversible error here.
At the hearing, Judge Telsey observed defendant's demeanor and listened to his
recorded statement. The judge found that "at the commencement of the
statement obtained, the officer read to him his rights [. . .] and defendant
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acknowledged, 'yes,' when he said he was willing to waive those rights, and
signed the card, indicating that he acknowledge[d] receiving those rights."
With respect to his alleged impairment, Judge Telsey found he "never saw
. . . where a question was asked where the answer was unresponsive, which
would lead [him] to believe [defendant] was under the influence, that he wasn't
understanding what was going on, or that he didn't even understand the words
that were going on."
We agree that defendant voluntarily waived his Miranda rights and find
no reversible error as to denial of the suppression motion. We are also satisfied
that there was sufficient basis to support the trial court's exercise of discretion
and we find no basis to vacate defendant's plea.
To the extent we have not addressed defendant's remaining arguments, we
find them without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R.
2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
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