STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. VICTOR PUELLO (08-01-0057, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3577-16T1
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
VICTOR PUELLO,
Defendant-Appellant.
___________________________
Submitted August 21, 2018 – Decided September 5, 2018
Before Judges Sumners and Gilson.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Union County, Accusation No. 08-
01-0057.
Vincent J. Sanzone, Jr., attorney for
appellant.
Michael A. Monahan, Acting Union County
Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Izabella
M. Wozniak, Special Deputy Attorney General/
Acting Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and
on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Victor Puello appeals from a March 31, 2017 order
denying his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an
evidentiary hearing. We affirm because defendant's petition was
time-barred under Rule 3:22-12(a)(1) and otherwise lacked merit.
I.
In November 2007, defendant was arrested and charged with
second-degree possession of cocaine with intent to distribute
within 500 feet of public housing, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.1a, and several
other illegal drug offenses. Defendant was also charged with
related motor vehicle violations.
In January 2008, defendant pled guilty to third-degree
possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-
5(b)(3). On his plea form, "N/A" was circled in response to
question seventeen, which asked if defendant understood that if
he was not a United States citizen, he could be deported by virtue
of his guilty plea. During his plea colloquy, however, the judge
asked defendant whether he was a United States citizen, defendant
responded that he was not, and the judge informed defendant that
because he was not a United States citizen his guilty plea could
affect whether defendant could stay in the United States.
Specifically, the following exchange took place between the judge
and defendant:
THE COURT: And are you a citizen of the United
States?
DEFENDANT: No.
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THE COURT: Do you understand that by pleading
guilty to a charge while you are a non-citizen
that it could have some effect on your
continued residence in this country?
DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: And you're still willing to go
ahead with these charges and this plea?
DEFENDANT: Yes.
The judge then asked defendant whether he had enough time to
speak with his lawyer, whether his lawyer had answered any
questions he had, and whether he was satisfied with his lawyer's
advice and services. Defendant responded "yes" to each question.
The specific exchange was as follows:
THE COURT: And have you had enough time to
speak with your lawyer?
DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: She has explained the plea,
advised you of your rights, and answered any
questions you might have had to your
satisfaction?
DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: And are you satisfied with the
advice and services she is providing on your
behalf?
DEFENDANT: Yes.
After defendant admitted he possessed ten bags of cocaine
with the intent to distribute, and after defendant explained that
he understood what he was doing in pleading guilty and was doing
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so knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, the judge accepted
his guilty plea.
In April 2008, defendant was sentenced. In accordance with
his plea agreement, defendant was sentenced to three years of
probation with the condition that he spend 120 days in jail.
Defendant was also required to forfeit $50,420 that had been seized
from him when he was arrested. Defendant did not file a direct
appeal.
In 2016, defendant was arrested by federal Immigration and
Customs Enforcement agents, and proceedings to remove him from the
United States were commenced. Shortly thereafter, on May 27,
2016, defendant, who was represented by a lawyer, filed a petition
for PCR. In his petition, defendant claimed his plea counsel had
been ineffective because counsel had "affirmatively told"
defendant that his "plea would not result in [his] deportation."1
Defendant also asserted that although the judge taking his guilty
plea had raised his immigration status, his plea was not knowing
and voluntary because the court had failed to adequately explain
the immigration consequences of his guilty plea. Defendant then
contended that had he been aware of the immigration consequences
1
Defendant's claims were set forth in his brief. Defendant then
certified that he had read his counsel's brief and the facts in
the brief were "true and accurate[.]"
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of his guilty plea, he "would have likely engaged an immigration
lawyer to assist" him and "he would have been unlikely to accept
a plea that included deportation as a consequence."
The PCR court heard oral arguments on March 16, 2017. On
March 31, 2017, the court entered an order denying defendant's PCR
petition, and explained the reasons for its rulings in an opinion
read into the record. The PCR court found that, before pleading
guilty, the judge taking the plea had informed defendant of the
immigration consequences of his plea. Thus, the PCR court reasoned
that any inaccurate advice by plea counsel had been corrected by
the judge and that before defendant plead guilty, he understood
the potential immigration consequences of his guilty plea. The
PCR court also found that defendant's guilty plea was made
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently, and there was no basis
to allow defendant to withdraw his plea.
II.
On this appeal, defendant makes one argument contending that
the PCR court erred when it denied his petition because he was
never advised of the immigration consequences of his plea by his
plea counsel. Specifically, defendant articulates his argument
as follows:
The Trial Court Committed Reversible Error by
Holding that the Court Cured the Error Made
by Plea Counsel By Not Advising the Defendant
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that He Would be Deported by Virtue of His
Plea.
We reject defendant's argument because his petition is time-barred
and because, even if the petition was considered on its merits,
he has failed to show any prejudice.
Rule 3:22-12(a)(1) precludes PCR petitions filed more than
five years after entry of a judgment of conviction unless the
delay was "due to defendant's excusable neglect and . . . there
is reasonable probability that if the defendant's factual
assertions were found to be true, enforcement of the time bar
would result in a fundamental injustice." Our Supreme Court has
stated that "[t]he time bar should be relaxed only 'under
exceptional circumstances' because '[as] time passes, justice
becomes more elusive and the necessity for preserving finality and
certainty of judgment increases.'" State v. Goodwin, 173 N.J.
583, 594 (2002) (quoting State v. Afanador, 151 N.J. 41, 52
(1997)). Moreover, we have recently held that when a first PCR
petition is filed more than five years after the date of entry of
the judgment of conviction, the PCR court should examine the
timeliness of the petition and defendant must submit competent
evidence to satisfy the standards for relaxing the rule's time
restrictions. State v. Brown, ___ N.J. Super. ___, ___ (App. Div.
2018) (slip op. at 13-14).
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The PCR court here did not address the timeliness of
defendant's petition. We, however, can affirm the denial of the
petition on this alternative ground because the issue was briefed
by the parties and the facts are not in dispute. See State v.
Williams, 444 N.J. Super. 603, 617 (App. Div. 2016) ("It is well-
established that a reviewing court can affirm a decision on
different grounds than those authorities offered by the court
being reviewed."); see also R. 2:10-5; AAA Mid-Atlantic Ins. of
N.J. v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 336 N.J. Super. 71, 78
(App. Div. 2000).
To establish "excusable neglect," a defendant must
demonstrate "more than simply . . . a plausible explanation for a
failure to file a timely PCR petition." State v. Norman, 405 N.J.
Super. 149, 159 (App. Div. 2009). Factors to be considered include
"the extent and cause of the delay, the prejudice to the State,
and the importance of the [defendant's] claim in determining
whether there has been an 'injustice' sufficient to relax the time
limits." Afanador, 151 N.J. at 52 (citation omitted).
Here, defendant was sentenced on April 11, 2008. His petition
for PCR, however, was filed eight years later on May 27, 2016.
Defendant argues that there was excusable neglect for the late
filing because he did not learn of his counsel's mis-advice until
he was detained by immigration authorities in 2016. Ignorance of
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the law, however, does not establish excusable neglect. See State
v. Brewster, 429 N.J. Super. 387, 400-01 (App. Div. 2013) (stating
that defendant's twelve-year delay in filing a petition for PCR
regarding deportation consequences showed neither excusable
neglect nor fundamental injustice.)
Significantly, at defendant's plea hearing, the judge taking
his plea informed defendant that if he pled guilty, his plea could
impact his continued residency in the United States. Before us,
defendant argues that the judge's reference to residency as opposed
to deportation or removal did not adequately inform defendant of
the immigration consequences. The judge's questioning of
defendant before his plea, however, establishes that defendant was
advised of the possible immigration consequences. He was also
asked if he wanted more time to explore those consequences or to
consider any other factor before pleading guilty. Defendant
clearly stated that he did not need more time. Consequently, any
argument that defendant relied on the alleged mis-advice of his
plea counsel is rebutted by the actual record.
Defendant has also failed to demonstrate a reasonable
probability that enforcement of the time bar would result in a
fundamental injustice. Nowhere in defendant's certification does
he allege that he was innocent. Instead, the record established
that defendant gave a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent guilty
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plea. In pleading guilty, defendant admitted that he possessed
cocaine with the intent to distribute. There was nothing vague
or equivocal regarding defendant's guilty plea.
Moreover, even if we were to consider defendant's petition
on its merits, defendant cannot satisfy the grounds for PCR relief.
To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
defendant must satisfy a two-part test: (1) "counsel made errors
so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel'
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment[,]" and (2) "the
deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42,
58-59 (1987). Here, defendant can show no prejudice. Defendant
claims that his counsel was ineffective by mis-advising him that
he would not be deported as a result of his guilty plea. As
already noted, the judge taking the guilty plea corrected any mis-
advice by informing defendant that there were possible immigration
consequences to his guilty plea.
When defendant pled guilty in 2008, there was no requirement
that defense counsel review a defendant's immigration status with
defendant. Instead, at that time, defense counsel was only
ineffective if he or she provided inaccurate information
concerning the immigration consequences of a plea. See Chaidez
v. United States, 568 U.S. 342, 357-58 (2013); Padilla v. Kentucky,
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559 U.S. 356, 386 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring); State v. Nunez-
Valdez, 200 N.J. 129, 143 (2009). Here, any alleged mis-advice
by plea counsel was corrected by the plea judge and, therefore,
defendant can show no prejudice.
There was also no showing that required an evidentiary hearing
on defendant's PCR petition. A defendant is entitled to an
evidentiary hearing on a PCR petition if he or she establishes a
prima facie case in support of the petition. R. 3:22-10(b). As
defendant cannot show prejudice, there was no requirement that a
hearing be conducted.
Finally, defendant has not argued on this appeal that he is
entitled to withdraw his guilty plea. Indeed, he has not
established any of the factors that are required for the withdrawal
of a guilty plea. See State v. Slater, 198 N.J. 145, 157-58
(2009).
Affirmed.
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