SANDRA WOYTAS, ETC. VS. GREENWOOD TREE EXPERTS, INC. (C-000001-16 AND P-2257-2014, MORRIS COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

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APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
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SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1029-16T1
SANDRA WOYTAS, Administratrix
of the Estate of TIMOTHY G.
WOYTAS, deceased; and SANDRA
WOYTAS, individually,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
GREENWOOD TREE EXPERTS, INC.,
GREENWOOD LAWN SERVICES, INC.,
GREENWOOD CONTINUITY TRUST,
JOHN R. WOYTAS, III, RAYMOND J.
WOYTAS, DAVID W. DUBEE, ROBERT
W. DUBEE, WHIPPANY FIRE
DEPARTMENT (a/k/a Township of
Hanover Fire District #2) and
LINCOLN NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Defendants,
and
CHRISTINA WOYTAS, individually
and as guardian for T.M. WOYTAS,
C.T. WOYTAS and J.T. WOYTAS,
Defendant-Respondent.
________________________________________
Argued May 1, 2018 – Decided July 13, 2018
Before Judges Hoffman, Gilson and Mitterhoff.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Morris County, Docket Nos.
C-000001-16 and P-2257-2014.
Bonnie C. Frost argued the cause for appellant
(Einhorn, Harris, Ascher, Barbarito & Frost,
PC, attorneys; Bonnie C. Frost, of counsel and
on the briefs; Gary R. Botwinick and Matheu
D. Nunn, on the briefs).
Lauren F. Iannaccone argued the cause for
respondent (Connell Foley, LLP, attorneys;
Thomas J. O'Leary, of counsel and on the
brief; Lauren F. Iannaccone, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Plaintiff Sandra Woytas, surviving widow of Timothy Woytas
(decedent) and the administrator of his estate, appeals from an
August 30, 2016 Chancery Division order granting summary judgment
to defendant Christina Woytas,1 decedent's ex-wife, individually
and on behalf of her and decedent's three children. We review the
court's summary judgment disposition de novo, considering whether
the evidence, "when viewed in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party, [is] sufficient to permit a rational factfinder
to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving
party." Manahawkin Convalescent v. O'Neill, 217 N.J. 99, 115
(2014) (quoting Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J.
520, 540 (1995)). Following our review of the record, and in
1
For ease of reference, and intending no disrespect, we refer to
the defendants by their first names.
2 A-1029-16T1
light of applicable law, we are convinced the court correctly
granted summary judgment in favor of Christina and her children,
and affirm.
I
Christina and decedent divorced in February 2013. Their dual
judgment of divorce incorporated their marital separation
agreement (MSA), which required decedent maintain $750,000 in life
insurance naming their three children as beneficiaries, and
$400,000 in life insurance naming Christina as beneficiary. The
MSA also included a handwritten, initialed provision stating: "In
the event either party fails to maintain the life
insurance . . . such party's estate shall be liable for any
outstanding obligations owed under this agreement." The MSA
further obligated decedent pay Christina alimony of $60,000 per
year for twelve years, and $1551 monthly in child support "until
such time as one of the children [is] emancipated."
In accordance with the MSA, decedent obtained a $750,000 life
insurance policy from Symetra Life Insurance Company (Symetra),
naming his children as equal beneficiaries and Christina as
trustee. Also pursuant to the MSA, decedent secured a $100,000
life insurance policy with Symetra, naming Christina as
beneficiary. Decedent also continued to maintain a pre-existing
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$300,000 life insurance policy that named Christina as
beneficiary.
Decedent subsequently married plaintiff. After their
marriage, he obtained a $500,000 life insurance policy from AIG
naming plaintiff as beneficiary. Plaintiff alleges decedent
secured that policy to support her and her two children from a
prior marriage because she lost her right to lifetime alimony when
she married him.
Decedent committed suicide in August 2014. He died intestate,
and in September 2014, the Morris County Surrogate appointed
plaintiff as administrator of decedent's estate.
Christina received $300,000 from the life insurance policy
that predated the MSA; however, Symetra refused to pay the $100,000
and $750,000 policies based on two-year suicide exclusions.
Instead, they returned decedent's paid premiums plus interest to
Christina and the children. AIG similarly refused payment on the
$500,000 policy naming plaintiff as beneficiary.
Christina asserted a personal claim against decedent's
estate for $100,000, and as guardian on behalf of the children,
she asserted a separate claim for $750,000, representing the unpaid
life insurance owed under the MSA. Defendant John Woytas,
decedent's father, asserted a claim totaling $58,800 for unpaid
portions of a promissory note and a personal loan he made to
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decedent.2 Plaintiff asserted a $500,000 claim for the unpaid
life insurance policy naming her as beneficiary.
In January 2016, plaintiff, individually and as
administrator, filed a verified complaint in the Probate Part,
asserting claims against: 1) Greenwood Tree Experts, Inc. and
Greenwood Lawn Services, Inc., two corporations in which decedent
owned equal one-third shares with defendants Raymond Woytas, his
brother, and David Dubee, his cousin; and 2) Greenwood Continuity
Trust, a trust established in a buy-sell agreement (collectively,
Greenwood defendants). Plaintiff sought payment into the estate
for decedent's share of the business and payments owed. Plaintiff
eventually settled all claims against the Greenwood defendants for
$550,000.
In June 2016, Christina filed a motion for summary judgment
seeking, in relevant part, an order declaring decedent breached
the MSA by committing suicide, and that the children's claim for
$750,000 and her claim for $100,000 had priority over all other
claims against the estate. She also sought to prevent plaintiff
from receiving a statutory commission as administrator, claiming
plaintiff breached her fiduciary duties.
2
We previously granted defendant leave to supplement the record
to reflect that John Woytas later released all claims against the
estate after the entry of the order under review; as a result, he
did not participate in this appeal.
5 A-1029-16T1
Before the court decided Christina's summary judgment motion,
plaintiff, as administrator, filed a verified complaint seeking a
judgment declaring the estate insolvent because it lacked
sufficient assets to pay decedent's debts. She filed an accounting
indicating the estate had $573,593.33 in assets, including:
$550,000 from a settlement with the Greenwood defendants;
$20,749.25 from decedent's length-of-service award program with
the Whippany Fire Department; and $2844.08 from an account decedent
had with a stock broker.3 The accounting listed $126,626.86 in
administration expenses, leaving $446,966.47 available for
distribution to the estate's claimants. Because the claims against
the estate totaled $1,408,800, the accounting proposed paying each
claim proportionately at 31.7 cents on the dollar.
Following oral argument on Christina's motion for summary
judgment, the court issued a written opinion and accompanying
orders partially granting and partially denying that motion.4 The
judge found that by committing suicide, decedent failed to maintain
3
The accounting also listed two assets that passed outside of
the estate — a $285,205.56 payment from decedent's individual
retirement account, which plaintiff received, and the $300,000 in
life insurance benefits, which Christina received.
4
The judge initially granted Christina's motion to prohibit
plaintiff from receiving a statutory commission as administrator
of decedent's estate; however, the court later granted plaintiff's
motion for reconsideration, and awarded her a $23,075 commission.
6 A-1029-16T1
the required life insurance, and therefore breached the MSA. He
also found the claims of Christina and the children against the
estate had priority over all other claims. Lastly, the judge
found the children were entitled to the full $750,000 amount of
the life insurance policy, as specified in the MSA; however,
because the estate was insolvent, the children received
approximately $454,467 — the entire corpus of the estate after
accounting for various fees and expenses.
On October 28, 2016, the court entered an order directing the
Surrogate to disburse funds for decedent's two younger children
to Christina as trustee.5
II
On appeal, plaintiff first argues the court erred when it
determined decedent's suicide was a breach of the MSA and summary
judgment was not appropriate because there exists a disputed issue
of material fact. We disagree.
The question of whether suicide constitutes a breach of an
MSA is an issue of first impression in New Jersey. Relying on
persuasive authority, the trial court held decedent was obligated
to maintain life insurance, and by committing suicide, he breached
5
The oldest child had already withdrawn her portion of the funds,
after turning eighteen.
7 A-1029-16T1
that obligation. In arriving at that decision, the court relied
on Tintocalis v. Tintocalis, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 655, 658-59 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1993).
The facts of Tintocalis are analogous to the instant action
and concern California's counterpart to N.J.S.A. 2A:34-25, which
permits the court to order a spouse "to maintain life insurance
for the protection of the former spouse . . . or the children of
the marriage . . . in the event of the payer
spouse's . . . death." Tintocalis, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 656. In
Tintocalis, the court ordered the decedent to "'immediately
secure' and 'maintain'" life insurance and name his ex-wife as the
policy's beneficiary. Id. at 657. The decedent complied in
securing the life insurance; however, he committed suicide
fourteen months later, thus invalidating the policy. Ibid. The
ex-wife asserted a claim against the decedent's estate for the
value of the policy, arguing the decedent breached the court's
order by committing suicide. Ibid. The court agreed, holding the
decedent "took some steps to maintain the policy by paying the
premiums but he thereafter defeated the policy by committing
suicide. [The decedent's] actions cannot reasonably be equated
with 'maintaining' the policy." Id. at 658.
We are persuaded by the Tintocalis court's reasoning and
agree with the court's holding that "[t]he order to 'maintain'
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life insurance carries the obligation not to do anything [that]
would interfere with the benefits being paid thereunder." Id. at
657. We are further guided by our Supreme Court's explanation of
the purpose of N.J.S.A. 2A:34-25's life insurance provision, which
is to ensure a sufficient fund for the payor spouse's support
obligation should he or she die before fulfilling that
responsibility. Jacobitti v. Jacobitti, 135 N.J. 571, 581-82
(1994). With these principles in mind, we hold decedent breached
the MSA when, by committing suicide, he failed to maintain the
requisite life insurance policies. To hold otherwise would permit
decedent to evade his support obligations, contrary to the
Legislature's intent in enacting N.J.S.A. 2A:34-25.
Moreover, we reject plaintiff's argument that decedent's
intent in committing suicide has bearing on our disposition.
Decedent failed to comply with the plain language of the MSA.
Accordingly, as per the MSA, decedent's estate remains liable for
that failure.
III
We next consider plaintiff's claim that the court erred by
finding that under the MSA, the children were entitled to the
entire $750,000 face value of the life insurance policy from
decedent's estate. Plaintiff contends the court awarded the
children a windfall because $750,000 exceeds the maximum amount
9 A-1029-16T1
of child support decedent would have paid had he lived until all
three children were emancipated.
A spousal agreement is viewed with "a predisposition in favor
of its validity and enforceability." Petersen v. Petersen, 85
N.J. 638, 642 (1981); see also Quinn v. Quinn, 225 N.J. 34, 44-45
(2016) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)
("Therefore, fair and definitive arrangements arrived at by mutual
consent should not be unnecessarily or lightly disturbed."). There
is no legal or equitable basis to reform the parties' MSA absent
"unconscionability, fraud, or overreaching in the negotiations"
of the MSA. N.H. v. H.H., 418 N.J. Super. 262, 282 (App. Div.
2011) (citation omitted). A marital agreement is enforceable in
equity, and the language of the MSA controls so long as it is fair
and just. Id. at 279-80 (citing Eaton v. Grau, 368 N.J. Super.
215, 224 (App. Div. 2004)).
In the instant matter, the terms of the MSA expressly provide
that decedent "shall . . . obtain a life insurance policy with a
face value of $750,000 naming each child as a beneficiary in an
equal amount and naming the Wife as the trustee of this policy.
As each child is emancipated, the face value of this policy may
be reduced . . . ." The MSA also provided decedent would pay the
children's medical insurance, and contribute to their medical
expenses, extracurricular activities, cell phone bills, and
10 A-1029-16T1
college expenses. Thus, based on the plain language of the MSA,
decedent was required to maintain a life insurance policy to
comprehensively support his children, which includes more than
merely child support payments, but also medical and college
expenses.
Accordingly, we reject plaintiff's argument that, at most,
the children are only entitled to the cumulation of decedent's
monthly child support obligation. Decedent committed suicide
prior to any of his children's emancipation. The terms of the MSA
dictate the children are entitled to the benefits of a $750,000
life insurance policy. Awarding the children less than that amount
would impermissibly rewrite the MSA. Thus, plaintiff's argument
lacks persuasion, and in so holding, we need not address
defendants' claims regarding plaintiff's alleged waiver of the
argument.
IV
Lastly, plaintiff contends the court erred in finding the
children's claims against the estate were entitled to priority
over her claim; to wit, she argues the court impermissibly
categorized future child support payments as a judgment, thereby
elevating them above unsecured creditors. Plaintiff's argument
lacks persuasion.
11 A-1029-16T1
The existence of a court order establishing a life insurance
obligation gives it priority over a subsequent contractual
arrangement made by a decedent. See Della Terza v. Estate of
Della Terza, 276 N.J. Super. 46, 49 (App. Div. 1994). A parent
obligated to maintain life insurance for the support of a child
cannot effectively terminate that obligation by disregarding or
taking an action inconsistent with that commitment. See Prudential
Ins. Co. of Am. v. Prashker, 201 N.J. Super. 553, 557 (1985) ("[A]n
insured by reliance on standard insurance law is not able to
frustrate a judgment of a court.").
Furthermore, the Chancery Division's Probate Part is a court
of equity. In re Estate of Stockdale, 196 N.J. 275, 304 (2008).
"Applying principles of fairness and justice, a judge sitting in
a court of equity has a broad range of discretion to fashion the
appropriate remedy in order to vindicate a wrong consistent
with . . . principles of fairness, justice, and the law."
Kingsdorf v. Kingsdorf, 351 N.J. Super. 144, 157 (App. Div. 2002)
(quoting Graziano v. Grant, 326 N.J. Super. 328, 342 (App. Div.
1999)). An MSA incorporated "into a divorce decree . . . if found
to be fair and just . . . is specifically enforceable in equity."
N.H., 418 N.J. Super. at 279-80 (quoting Eaton, 368 N.J. Super.
at 224).
12 A-1029-16T1
The State has recognized an important "interest in assuring
continued support for unemancipated children, even after the death
of a parent." Della Terza, 276 N.J. Super. at 49 (citing Grotsky
v. Grotsky, 58 N.J. 354, 361 (1971)). "A person who is required
to be named as the beneficiary of life insurance under a divorce
decree has a vested equitable interest in such life insurance."
Konczyk v. Konczyk, 367 N.J. Super. 551, 561 (App. Div. 2003).
Moreover, N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.23b(a) provides:
A judgment for child support entered pursuant
to . . . [N.J.S.A.] 2A:17-56.23a . . . and
docketed with the Clerk of the Superior Court
shall be a lien against the net proceeds of
any settlement negotiated prior or subsequent
to the filing of a lawsuit, civil judgment,
civil arbitration award, inheritance or
workers' compensation award. The lien shall
have priority over all other levies and
garnishments against the net proceeds of any
settlement negotiated prior or subsequent to
the filing of a lawsuit, civil judgment, civil
arbitration award, inheritance or workers'
compensation award unless otherwise provided
by the Superior Court, Chancery Division,
Family Part. . . . The lien shall stay the
distribution of the net proceeds to the
prevailing party or beneficiary until the
child support judgment is satisfied.
N.J.S.A. 3B:22-2 states that when the assets of an estate are
insufficient to satisfy all claims against it, creditors should
be paid in the following order:
a. Reasonable funeral expenses;
b. Cost and expenses of administration;
13 A-1029-16T1
c. Debts for the reasonable value of
services rendered to the decedent by the
Office of the Public Guardian for Elderly
Adults;
d. Debts and taxes with preference under
federal law or the laws of this State;
e. Reasonable medical and hospital expenses
of the last illness of the decedent,
including compensation of persons
attending him [or her];
f. Judgments entered against the decedent
according to the priorities of their
entries respectively; [and]
g. All other claims.
The statute further provides, "no preference shall be given in the
payment of any claim over any other claim of the same class, and
a claim due and payable shall not be entitled to a preference over
claims not due." N.J.S.A. 3B:22-2.
Plaintiff misconstrues the court's priority analysis. She
claims the court granted Christina and the children a "post-death"
judgment for future child support, and then used that judgment as
a basis for finding they were entitled to priority under N.J.S.A.
3B:22-2(f). The court, however, did not use the judgment it
entered in favor of the children to find they were entitled to
priority. Rather, it found the MSA's requirement that decedent
maintain life insurance for his children's benefit, which was
incorporated into the dual judgment of divorce, constituted a
14 A-1029-16T1
child support order, and decedent breached that order when he
failed to maintain the required life insurance by committing
suicide.
We agree with the Chancery judge, and hold the children's
claims against the estate have priority.6 The MSA — incorporated
into the final judgment of divorce — clearly indicates decedent
and Christina intended for the children to receive $750,000 in
life insurance proceeds for support in the event of decedent's
death. Decedent's suicide precluded payment of those proceeds;
yet, the MSA specified that decedent's estate was liable for his
life insurance obligations. In contrast, plaintiff contends
decedent made her an oral promise to maintain life insurance that
named her as beneficiary because she lost her right to permanent
alimony when she married decedent. Unlike decedent's obligations
under the MSA, this promise was not reduced to a judgment.
Accordingly, the MSA clearly establishes the children's
equitable interest in the proceeds of the life insurance policy,
and basic principles of equity mandate that their claims in the
estate have priority over all other creditors. See DeCeglia v.
6
Because our analysis diverges from the Chancery judge, we note
that "we review orders and not, strictly speaking, reasons that
support them. . . . [A] correct result, even if predicated on an
erroneous basis in fact or in law, will not be overturned on
appeal." El-Sioufi v. St. Peter's Univ. Hosp., 382 N.J. Super.
145, 169 (App. Div. 2005).
15 A-1029-16T1
Estate of Colletti, 265 N.J. Super. 128, 140 (App. Div. 1993)
(quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Bunt, 754 P.2d 993, 998 (Wash.
1988)) ("[C]laims for child support . . . are not equivalent to
the claims of 'creditors' . . . . [Rather, t]he basis for child
support is the natural obligation of a parent to support his or
her children; the validity of [the] claim does not depend upon
either contract or judgment.").
Affirmed.
16 A-1029-16T1