IN THE MATTER OF OWNERSHIP OF 1969 CHEVROLET CORVETTE (L-2110-16, OCEAN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1121-16T4
IN THE MATTER OF
OWNERSHIP OF 1969
CHEVROLET CORVETTE
____________________________
Argued December 6, 2017 – Decided July 18, 2018
Before Judges Fuentes, Koblitz and Manahan.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Ocean County, Docket No. L-2110-
16.
Arthur J. Timins argued the cause for
appellant Richard Black.
Respondents have not filed a brief.
PER CURIAM
Sanford Roth filed a verified complaint seeking a judicial
declaration of ownership of a 1969 Chevy Corvette. Roth exchanged
a 1980 Corvette with 104,262 miles for the 1969 Corvette with
51,304 miles. The Bill of Sale executed by Raymond Biaza as the
seller and Roth as the buyer indicated that these vehicles had a
monetary value of $1000 for sales tax purposes.
In this appeal, Richard Black argues the trial judge erred when
he found Biaza was the owner of the 1969 Corvette. Black owned a
car body shop from 1977 until December 2014. Biaza worked for
Black during this time period as a paint foreman. Judge Robert
Brenner conducted a bench trial in which both Biaza and Black
testified. Judge Brenner made the following factual findings
based on the testimony of these two witnesses.
Black acquired title to the 1969 Chevy Corvette on June 25,
1991. Although title to the car remained in Black's name, he gave
Biaza possession of the vehicle and allowed him to use it freely
during this twenty-five-year period because Biaza made clear that
he would quit his job as paint foreman if Black demanded the return
of the car. On two different occasions, Black and his son demanded
that Biaza return the car. However, Biaza refused to return the
car and told Black that if he pressed the issue, he would quit his
job. Black acquiesced to this arrangement because he valued
Biaza's skills as a painter.
As framed by Judge Brenner, the dispositive legal question
is: when did Biaza acquire ownership of the 1969 Corvette by
adverse possession? Stated differently, was Black barred from
claiming an ownership interest in the car at a point in time beyond
the six-year statute of limitations to commence an action for
replevin? See N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1. Relying on O'Keeffe v. Snyder,
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83 N.J. 478 (1980), Judge Brenner held that the focus of the
analysis is on Black's conduct as the title holder of the car.
The merit of Black's claim of ownership depended on what actions
he took to recover possession of the car from Biaza during these
twenty-five years. In addressing this issue, Judge Brenner found:
The testimony before this [c]ourt is
clear and there is a consensus that Mr. Biaza
had possession of this vehicle for 25 years
and during that 25-year period[,] although Mr.
Black apparently asked for [the vehicle] back
several times Mr. Biaza told him, "No. I'll
quit." And notwithstanding the fact Mr. Black
never took any action to seek legal recovery
of his vehicle specifically by filing a
replevin action if he couldn't get . . . back
possession of his vehicle . . . .
"To establish title by adverse possession to chattels, the
rule of law has been that the possession must be hostile, actual,
visible, exclusive, and continuous." O'Keeffe, 83 N.J. at 494.
With this legal principle in mind, Judge Brenner held:
So it is my finding today that at the
time that Mr. Biaza sold the vehicle to Mr.
Roth[,] that he was the titled owner of that
vehicle because Mr. Black failed to take any
action within a six-year Statute of
Limitations during the time that [Black] knew
or should have known that someone other than
himself had the vehicle, and he knew the
entire time, the 25 years.
Our review of a trial judge's decision in the context of a
bench trial in which the judge also acted as the factfinder "is
limited to whether there is 'substantial, credible evidence to
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support the court's findings.'" Zaman v. Felton, 219 N.J. 199,
215 (2014) (quoting In re Civil Commitment of J.M.B., 197 N.J.
563, 597 (2009)). We are also bound to defer "to those findings
of the trial judge which are substantially influenced by [the
trial judge's] opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and have
the 'feel' of the case, which we do not enjoy upon appellate
review." State ex rel. D.M., 451 N.J. Super. 415, 424 (App. Div.
2017) (quoting State ex rel. S.B., 333 N.J. Super. 236, 241 (App.
Div. 2000)).
Judge Brenner's factual findings are supported by the
testimonial evidence presented by the parties. Any factual
inconsistencies in the witnesses' testimony are matters left to
Judge Brenner's discretion as the factfinder. Based on his factual
findings, Judge Brenner properly applied the Court's holding in
O'Keeffe to conclude Biaza had legal title of the 1969 Corvette
at the time he sold it to Roth.
Affirmed.
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