DCPP VS. A.J.B. AND A.A., IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF A.G.B. (FG-07-0237-17, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) (CONSOLIDATED)

RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NOS. A-5269-17T4
A-5270-17T4
NEW JERSEY DIVISION
OF CHILD PROTECTION
AND PERMANENCY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
A.J.B. and A.A.,
Defendants-Appellants.
____________________________
IN THE MATTER OF THE
GUARDIANSHIP OF A.G.B.,
a Minor.
_____________________________
Submitted September 9, 2019 – Decided September 23, 2019
Before Judges Sumners and Geiger.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Essex County, Docket
No. FG-07-0237-17.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant A.J.B. (Robyn A. Veasey, Deputy Public
Defender, of counsel; Patricia A. Nicholas, Assistant
Deputy Public Defender, on the briefs).
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant A.A. (John A. Salois, Designated Counsel, on
the briefs).
Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for
respondent (Jason Wade Rockwell, Assistant Attorney
General, of counsel; Lisa Doreen Cerasia, Deputy
Attorney General, on the brief).
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian,
attorney for minor (David Ben Valentin, Assistant
Deputy Public Defender, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
A.A. (Anna)1 and A.J.B. (Allen) appeal from an order terminating their
parental rights to their daughter A.G.B. (Alexis), born October 7, 2016. For the
reasons that follow, we reject the parents' respective contentions that the
Division of Child Protection and Permanency (Division) failed to meet its
statutory burden under each prong of the best interests test, codified at N.J.S.A.
30:4C-15.1(a), by clear and convincing evidence.
1
We use pseudonyms for the children and parents to protect their privacy and
for ease of reference.
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2
I.
In reviewing a decision by a trial court to terminate parental rights, we
give "deference to family court[s'] fact[-]finding" because of "the family courts'
special jurisdiction and expertise in family matters[.]" Cesare v. Cesare, 154
N.J. 394, 413 (1998). The judge's findings of fact are not disturbed unless they
are "so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant
and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice." Id. at 412(quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv'rs Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)).
"[T]he conclusions that logically flow from those findings of fact are, likewise,
entitled to deferential consideration upon appellate review." N.J. Div. of Youth
& Family Servs. v. R.L., 388 N.J. Super. 81, 89 (App. Div. 2006).
Following a five-day trial, Judge Nora J. Grimbergen carefully reviewed
the evidence presented, and thereafter concluded that the Division had met, by
clear and convincing evidence, all of the legal requirements for a judgment of
guardianship. Her thirty-seven page written decision tracks the statutory
requirements of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a), accords with In re Guardianship of
K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337 (1999), In re Guardianship of DMH, 161 N.J. 365 (1999),
and N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420 (2012), and is
supported by substantial and credible evidence in the record. We therefore
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3
affirm substantially for the reasons the judge expressed in her comprehensive
and well-reasoned opinion. 2 We add the following remarks as to the application
of each prong of the best interests test to Anna and Allen.
A. Prongs One and Two
As to prong one, the Division must prove that "[t]he child's safety, health,
or development has been or will continue to be endangered by the parental
relationship[.]" N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(1). "[T]he relevant inquiry focuses on
the cumulative effect, over time, of harms arising from the home life provided
by the parent." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 289
(2007).
"Serious and lasting emotional or psychological harm to children as the
result of the action or inaction of their biological parents can constitute injury
sufficient to authorize the termination of parental rights." In re Guardianship of
K.L.F., 129 N.J. 32, 44 (1992) (citing In re Guardianship of J.C., 129 N.J. 1, 18
(1992)). As a result, "courts must consider the potential psychological damage
that may result from reunification[,] as the 'potential return of a child to a parent
2
At the end of the trial, the Law Guardian changed his position and was against
the termination of parental rights. Before us, however, the Law Guardian
supports the court's termination of parental rights and does not explain why he
changed his position since the conclusion of the trial.
A-5269-17T4
4
may be so injurious that it would bar such an alternative.'" N.J. Div. of Youth
& Family Servs. v. L.J.D., 428 N.J. Super. 451, 480-81 (App. Div. 2012)
(quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.W., 103 N.J. 591, 605 (1986)).
"The absence of physical abuse or neglect is not conclusive." A.W., 103
N.J. at 605 (quoting In re Guardianship of R., 155 N.J. Super. 186, 194 (App.
Div. 1977)). "A parent's withdrawal of . . . solicitude, nurture, and care for an
extended period of time is in itself a harm that endangers the health and
development of the child." DMH, 161 N.J. at 379. "Courts need not wait to act
until a child is actually irreparably impaired by parental inattention or neglect."
Id. at 383.
As to prong two, the Division must prove that "[t]he parent is unwilling
or unable to eliminate the harm facing the child[ren] or is unable or unwilling to
provide a safe and stable home . . . and the delay of permanent placement will
add to the harm." N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(2). That harm may include evidence
that separating the children from their resource parents "would cause serious and
enduring emotional or psychological harm." Ibid.
The Division can establish the second prong by proving that a "child will
suffer substantially from a lack of stability and a permanent placement[,] and
from the disruption of" a bond with the resource parents. K.H.O., 161 N.J. at
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5
363. Because they are related, evidence supporting the first prong may also
support the second prong "as part of the comprehensive basis for determining
the best interests of the child." DMH, 161 N.J. at 379.
1. Anna
Following Alexis's birth at University Hospital in October 2016, the
Division received a referral from the hospital that her mother Anna admitted to
smoking marijuana before learning she was pregnant but claimed she stopped
thereafter. Anna also revealed that she was unemployed and homeless. She was
sleeping in the living room of a friend's home and wanted to move because there
were "crack bottles in the hallway."
This was not the first time the Division had been involved with Anna. The
agency had contact with her when she was a child because she was in group
homes, crisis units, and residential facilities. In November 2011, when she was
an adult, the Division received a referral that she was smoking marijuana while
caring for her children T.B., born November 8, 2007, and K.B., born July 7,
2011. Eventually, in June 2015, Anna's failure to maintain contact with the
Division, her long-term unemployment, unstable housing situation, and inability
to remedy her substance abuse problem resulted in the termination of her
parental rights to T.B., K. B., and J.B., her son who was born in September 2013.
A-5269-17T4
6
Two days after the Division received the hospital's referral, it obtained
custody of Alexis and after her release from the hospital she was placed with a
licensed resource parent J.L. (Jane), with whom she remains today. The
Division subsequently provided Anna substance abuse treatment, visitation,
parenting skills training, safe-house services, domestic violence education, and
psychotherapy to facilitate reunification. Anna, however, failed to complete her
substance abuse treatment (having numerous positive drug screens), and was
non-complaint with visitation and parenting skills training.
At the time of the guardianship trial, Anna was residing at a rooming
house with boarded-up windows that did not permit children. She stated she
was employed, but did not provide proof of employment.
Dr. Mark Singer, Ed.D., conducted psychological and bonding evaluations
of Anna. He opined that Anna was not a viable parenting option for Alexis and
considering the "length of time she has had to make improvements in her life
. . . [she] is not likely to become a viable parenting option . . . in the foreseeable
future." Dr. Singer also expressed concern with Anna's history of homelessness,
substance abuse, failure to cooperate with the Division, and termination of her
parental rights to her three older children. In particular, he noted Anna had been
A-5269-17T4
7
unable to remedy her substance abuse, despite having participated in multiple
programs, or to parent her older children.
In her decision, Judge Grimbergen recognized that, despite the prior
termination of her parental rights to her three older children, Anna continued her
pattern of unstable housing, substance abuse and noncompliance with services.
The judge determined the Division had offered services to Anna, which she was
unwilling to meaningfully participate in or benefit from. She was also unable
to maintain stable housing. Even if Anna were to comply with Dialectical
Behavior Therapy (DBT) due to her complex trauma, as suggested by her
psychological and bonding expert, Dr. Aida Ismael Lennon, Psy.D., the judge
reasoned it was a lengthy process that would further delay Alexis's need for
permanency in the uncertain hope that Anna would eventually stabilize.
Consequently, the judge found there was clear and convincing evidence that
Anna's behavior threatened Alexis's safety, health, and development, and
because her behavior would continue, it was not in Alexis's best interests if
reunification occurred.
Anna contends she did not harm Alexis and the record does not establish
the Division demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that she did so as
required by the first prong. She maintains the State failed to satisfy its obligation
A-5269-17T4
8
to provide her with "[e]mergency maintenance service" including "the provision
of food, clothing, shelter, furniture, appliances and similar necessities, needed
by a client in a crisis, and not available elsewhere." N.J.A.C. 10:133-1.3. She
further maintains the Division's removal of Alexis was improperly based on the
prior termination of her parental rights to her three older children.
Based on the judge's credibility findings, there is clear and convincing
evidence to support the judge's finding that Anna's parental relationship would
harm Alexis based on Anna's history of being unable to provide a safe home that
would enable her to properly nurture and care for her daughter. Given that
Anna's parental rights with her three older children were terminated prior to
Alexis's birth, Anna was made fully aware of what she needed to do to be
reunited with Alexis. Nevertheless, she was unable to get her life together, and
because the Division established that she lacked the capacity or willingness to
properly parent Alexis, we conclude the judge properly considered the prior
termination of Anna's parental rights with respect to her three older children .
2. Allen
Shortly after the Division filed for guardianship of Alexis in August 2017,
Allen was charged with robbery and incarcerated at Essex County Correctional
Facility (ECCF). He remained incarcerated at the time of the trial.
A-5269-17T4
9
A Division caseworker met with Allen several times at ECCF offering him
services, but he said he did not need them. Allen was provided with visitation
while incarcerated at ECCF. He was appropriate with Alexis during visits and
even though Alexis frequently cried, she eventually would warm up to Allen.
Prior to his incarceration, Allen had followed through with Division arranged
visits in October 2016 through December 2016, but had not seen Alexis until
July 2017 just before he became incarcerated.
During a psychological evaluation with Dr. Singer at ECCF, Allen refused
to describe his relationship with Alexis or Anna, and refused to discuss his
substance abuse history. Allen did admit to having been arrested "a lot." He
had no idea of his release date from ECCF and could not articulate his post-
release plans or any plan for parenting Alexis. Dr. Singer thus opined that Allen
was not in a position to parent and was unlikely to become a viable parenting
option for Alexis within the foreseeable future. Dr. Singer found his lack of any
articulable plan for himself or Alexis upon his release "highly problematic." Dr.
Singer determined that Alexis viewed Allen as a "source of anxiety," not
security.
In assessing prongs one and two, Judge Grimbergen determined Allen was
unfit to parent based upon his refusal to: provide any information to the Division
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10
and Dr. Singer; accept the services offered by the Division; engage in consistent
visitation; maintain contact with the Division prior to his incarceration; and
provide a plan for Alexis. As with Anna, the judge decided that Alexis's
permanency should not be further delayed "in the hope" that Allen would
stabilize in the future.
Allen argues the judge used his incarceration as the sole factor to
terminate his rights, without the requisite broad inquiry into its impact and
relationship to the four prongs of the test. In re Adoption of Children by L.A.S.,
134 N.J. 127, 137-38 (1993). He claims the Division presented no evidence
related to whether his incarceration would be detrimental to the parent-child
relationship, or that the Division proved he abused and neglected Alexis. Ibid.See L.A.S., 134 N.J. at 137-38. He further contends the entire guardianship
proceeding was about the prior terminations of Anna's parental rights because
the judge's analysis of him was "clearly an afterthought to [Anna]." Allen
concedes he did not want to participate in services with the Division unless
housing was offered, but claims he continued to visit Alexis.
We agree with Allen that incarceration is probative of abandonment but
does not justify termination as a matter of law. Id. at 137. "[I]ncarceration
alone—without particularized evidence of how a parent's incarceration affects
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11
each prong of the [best interests of the child] standard—is an insufficient basis
for terminating parental rights." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Services v. R.G.,
217 N.J. 527, 556 (2014). Thus, when determining whether incarceration
constitutes abandonment, courts should consider the "nature of the contact
between parent and child before and after incarceration, the efforts made by the
parent to maintain contact with the child following imprisonment, and the
attempts during incarceration to undertake as much responsibility for the child's
welfare as possible." L.A.S., 134 N.J. at 138.
Allen's incarceration is certainly probative of his inability to prevent
further harm to his daughter, and is also probative of his unwillingness to care
for her. That said, it was not the sole factor relied upon by the judge to find that
the Division satisfied prongs one and two.
Since the beginning of the litigation, Allen refused to provide any
information about himself or his address. He refused to engage in services, did
not maintain contact with the Division, did not visit Alexis from December 2016
to August 2017, and did not participate in any court hearings. While
incarcerated Allen refused services offered by the Division and did not
cooperate with Dr. Singer's psychological evaluation. Moreover, Allen had no
definitive plans that were indicative of his ability to create a stable household.
A-5269-17T4
12
Allen is correct that most of the guardianship trial involved Anna's conduct.
This, however, is because the Division had significantly more dealings with her
than with Allen, who refused to cooperate with the Division. Under these
circumstances, it is speculative at best to expect Allen to improve his lifestyle
in such a way that he would be able to properly parent his daughter and remedy
the harm facing her in the long term.
B. Prong Three
As to prong three, the Division is required to make "reasonable efforts to provide
services to help the parent correct the circumstances which led to the child's
placement outside the home[,] and the court [will] consider[] alternatives to
termination of parental rights[.]" N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(3). This prong
"contemplates efforts that focus on reunification of the parent with the child and
assistance to the parent to correct and overcome those circumstances that
necessitated the placement of the child into foster care." K.H.O., 161 N.J. at
354. "Reasonable efforts" include, but are not limited to:
(1) consultation and cooperation with the parent in
developing a plan for appropriate services;
(2) providing services that have been agreed upon, to
the family, in order to further the goal of family
reunification;
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13
(3) informing the parent at appropriate intervals of the
child's progress, development, and health; and
(4) facilitating appropriate visitation.
[N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(c).]
"Whether particular services are necessary in order to comply with the
[reasonable] efforts requirement must . . . be decided with reference to the
circumstances of the individual case before the court[.]" DMH, 161 N.J. at 390.
The Division
must encourage, foster and maintain the bond between
the parent and child as a basis for the reunification of
the family. [It] must promote and assist in visitation
and keep the parent informed of the child's progress in
foster care. [It] should also inform the parent of the
necessary or appropriate measures he or she should
pursue in order to continue and strengthen that
relationship and, eventually, to become an effective
caretaker and regain custody of his or her children.
[Id. at 390 (citing N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(c)).]
A court is required to consider alternatives to the termination of parental
rights. N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(3). "[A]ssessment of relatives is part of the
Division's obligation to consult and cooperate with the parent in developing a
plan for appropriate services that reinforce the family structure." N.J. Div. of
Youth & Family Servs. v. K.L.W., 419 N.J. Super. 568, 583 (App. Div. 2011).
The Division must assess each interested relative and, if it determines the
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14
relative is unable or unwilling to care for the child, inform them of its reasons
for a denial of placement. N.J.S.A. 30:4C-12.1(a)-(b).
"It is the policy of [the Division] to place, whenever possible, children
with relatives when those children are removed from the custody of their
parents." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. K.F., 353 N.J. Super. 623, 636
(App. Div. 2002). "The Division's statutory obligation does not permit willful
blindness and inexplicable delay in assessing and approving or disapproving a
relative known to the Division[.]" K.L.W., 419 N.J. Super. at 582. It cannot
ignore relatives "based upon an arbitrary, preordained preference for the foster
placement" and "must perform a reasonable investigation of . . . relatives that is
fair, but also sensitive to the passage of time and the child's critical need for
finality and permanency." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. J.S., 433 N.J.
Super. 69, 87 (App. Div. 2013).
1. Anna
As mentioned above, the Division offered a multitude of services and
programs to Anna to address her individualized needs to obtain reunification
with Alexis but she either failed to participate in the services or successfully
complete the programs.
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As for considering alternatives to termination of parental rights, the
Division considered options that proved to be futile. E.B., Anna's sister's
adoptive parent offered to serve as a resource parent for Alexis, but her license
had been revoked. E.B. did not appeal the ruling. Anna offered a relative, P.H.,3
who lived in Baltimore, as a potential placement. Yet, Anna did not provide
P.H.'s phone number or address, therefore the Division was unable to locate or
assess her.
Allen's adult son, A.D., was offered to take custody of Alexis but was
ruled out by the Division because he only wanted to babysit. He did not appeal
the ruling. Allen's former girlfriend K.E. made an interstate application but was
ruled out because she was not a United States citizen.
The judge found the proofs were clear and convincing that the Division
made "reasonable efforts to help [Anna] . . . correct the circumstances that led
to [Alexis's] removal including psychological evaluations, domestic violence
liaison, substance abuse assessment and treatment, visitation, and case plans.
However, [she] continued to make no meaningful effort to engage in services."
The judge noted that the services to facilitate Alexis's reunification were
provided to Anna even though the Division did not have to do so "based on her
3
Her relationship to Anna is not in the record.
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prior termination of parental rights to her older children." The judge also found
Dr. Lennon's opinion that Anna should have been allowed to revive DBT was
not credible because it was speculative to conclude that the therapy would give
Anna the ability to complete the necessary services to make her a fit parent.
Further, the judge held there were no available options to place Alexis with a
relative as the proposed relatives were ruled out.
Anna contends the Division failed to offer the proper services to address
her specific needs to promote reunification. She asserts the quick dismissal
given to her family members, violated her right to reunification and therefore
could not satisfy the N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(3) requirement that alternatives to
termination be considered. We disagree.
We conclude that substantial credible evidence exists to support the
judge's findings that the Division made reasonable efforts to provide services to
help Anna correct the circumstances that led to termination of her parental rights
to Alexis. In addition, the record clearly supports the judge's determination that
there were no alternatives to termination of parental rights, such as placement
with relatives.
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2. Allen
As with Anna, the Division offered services to Allen to address his
individualized needs to obtain reunification but he refused to cooperate.
Moreover, as mentioned, the Division considered placing Alexis with relatives
to avoid termination of parental rights. Accordingly, the judge found there was
no basis for finding that the Division neglected its responsibility to offer services
to Allen.
Allen argues he did not "adamantly say" he would not participate in
services. He admits, though, that he did reiterate time and again that he would
not participate in services unless the Division helped him with independent
housing, which was supposedly the reason Alexis was removed from his and
Anna's care. Allen contends he offered two relatives for placement, but the
judge failed to consider alternatives to termination of parental rights. Allen
asserts his ex-girlfriend was a citizen and contacted the Division to inform it
that she was just waiting for the paperwork and still wanted to be a resource
parent for Alexis.
We discern no reason to disagree with the judge's finding that the Division
satisfied prong three as to Allen. There is no merit to his contentions that he did
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not refuse services and there were reasonable alternatives to termination of
parental rights.
C. Prong Four
Under prong four, the Division must demonstrate by clear and convincing
evidence that "[t]ermination of parental rights will not do more harm than good."
N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(4). The prong focuses on the important consideration
of a child's need for permanency. M.M., 189 N.J. at 281. "The question to be
addressed under that prong is whether, after considering and balancing the two
relationships, the child will suffer a greater harm from the termination of ties
with her natural parents than from the permanent disruption of her relationship
with her foster parents." K.H.O., 161 N.J. at 355. In order to weigh any
potential harm from terminating parental rights against a child's separation from
his or her foster parents, a court must consider expert testimony on the strength
of each relationship. J.C., 129 N.J. at 25. "[W]here it is shown that the bond
with foster parents is strong and, in comparison, the bond with the natural parent
is not as strong, that evidence will satisfy . . . N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(4)."
K.H.O., 161 N.J. at 363.
Alexis has lived with Jane since her release from the hospital, almost two
years before the guardianship trial, and knows no other caretaker. Dr. Singer
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conducted bonding evaluations between Alexis and Anna, Alexis and Allen, and
Alexis and Jane. He concluded that while Alexis has developed a meaningful
relationship with Anna, the data suggests that Anna lacks the emotional and
physical resources to mitigate such harm. Dr. Singer further stated that the data
did not suggest that a loss of the relationship with Anna would result in
significant and enduring harm, but in actuality, the harm experienced through
the loss of the relationship between Alexis and Jane would be more intense and
more significant than the loss of the relationship between Anna and Alexis.
He opined that Alexis viewed Allen as a source of anxiety as she cried
when Allen took the child away from the Division's staff. Dr. Singer opined that
Alexis would not experience severe and enduring harm from the termination of
her relationship with her biological parents. As for Jane, Dr. Singer opined that
she is Alexis's psychological parent and that Alexis would suffer harm if
separated from Jane, which Allen would not be able to mitigate. Although Jane
wanted to adopt Alexis, she would permit contact between Alexis and both birth
parents, even though Allen was incarcerated.
Anna's bonding expert, Dr. Lennon conducted bonding evaluations of
Anna and Alexis, and Jane and Alexis. Dr. Lennon concluded that Anna had a
more positive relationship with Alexis than Jane. She believed Alexis was not
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"strongly" attached to either Anna or Jane. She further opined that Alexis was
comfortable with Anna and Anna was "very loving" toward Alexis. According
to Dr. Lennon, Alexis was comfortable with Jane, but Jane was not as engaged
as Anna was with Alexis. Dr. Lennon concluded that "[t]he court might want to
reconsider pursuing the termination of [Anna's] parental rights and allow her an
opportunity to engage in appropriate services."
Judge Grimbergen found that "[b]ased upon Dr. Singer's expert opinion
and competent evidence in the record," there was clear and convincing evidence
"that terminating [Anna and Allen's] parental rights to [Alexis] would not do
more harm than good." She found that Dr. Lennon's conclusion that Jane's
attachment to Alexis was "weak" was not supported by "any competent evidence
or explanation." The judge recognized Alexis was young, but found the
evidence shows that Anna "lacks the resources to provide stability to" Alexis.
As for Allen, there was no expert opinion contradicting Dr. Singer's assessment
that he would not be "a viable parenting option for [Alexis] within the
foreseeable future."
1. Anna
Anna stresses that she was denied the chance to bond with Alexis since
she was removed from her at birth. She contends the judge imposed a higher
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standard on her than required under N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a). She asserts the
correct legal analysis must compare a child's future with a parent and one
without a parent. K.L.W., 419 N.J. Super. at 575. She contends "all doubts are
to be resolved against [the] destruction" of the parent-child relationships in this
family. In re Adoption of Children, 96 N.J. Super. 415, 425 (App. Div. 1967).
She further asserts the judge's assessment of the proceeding required an
appreciation of the litigation's circumstances and the impediments "orchestrated
by [the Division] that caused the foster[] [parent's] relationship to damage
Anna's relationship with [Alexis]."
We conclude the record supports the judge's determination that the
Division proved by clear and convincing evidence that terminating Anna's
parental rights would not do more harm than good to Alexis. We see no error
in the judge's reasoning to credit Dr. Singer's opinion that Anna would not be
able to mitigate the harm if Alexis was removed from Jane's custody, which
conflicted with Dr. Lennon's opinion.
2. Allen
Allen asserts the termination of his parental rights was premature. He
contends the Law Guardian began the trial supporting termination of parental
rights but after listening to all the evidence, including Dr. Singer and Dr.
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Lennon, changed his position and told the court he was no longer supporting
termination of parental rights. Allen admits that while it is true Dr. Singer did
not feel he was a viable parenting option for Alexis and that she has not come
to see him as a significant parenting figure in her life, he stresses his plan for
Alexis was not to be with him, but for her to either be with his family or Anna.
We are unpersuaded.
Allen's reliance on Anna or a family member to have custody of Alexis
evades the uncontroverted opinion by Dr. Singer that termination of his parental
rights to Alexis would not do more harm than good. Thus, we see no error in
the judge's reasoning to credit Dr. Singer's opinion that Allen would not be able
to mitigate the harm if Alexis was removed from Jane's custody. It is obvious
to us that terminating Allen's parental rights would do no harm and, in fact, was
good for Alexis.
In sum, we conclude the termination of Anna and Allen's parental rights
was in Alexis's best interests.
Affirmed.
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