STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. PAUL D. DOBRZYNSKI (09-12-3937 AND 13-08-2513, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4931-17T1
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
PAUL D. DOBRZYNSKI,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________________
Submitted September 19, 2019 – Decided September 26, 2019
Before Judges Suter and DeAlmeida.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Camden County, Indictment Nos. 09-12-3937
and 13-08-2513.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Michele A. Adubato, Designated Counsel,
on the brief).
Mary Eva Colalillo, Camden County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Maura Murphy Sullivan,
Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Paul Dobrzynski appeals from the March 19, 2018 order of the
Law Division denying his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an
evidentiary hearing. We affirm.
I.
The following facts are derived from the record. Defendant had a dispute
with his mother, with whom he lived, and threatened to burn down their
residence. As a result of that incident, defendant pled guilty to third-degree
terroristic threats. On March 26, 2010, the court sentenced defendant to three
years of probation.
On December 29, 2012, while still on probation, defendant had an
altercation with his mother and David Smith, a tenant at their residence, during
which defendant extinguished the pilot light on the gas stove, turned all of the
knobs to the "on" position, and sprayed himself, his mother, and Smith with
lighter fluid. He attempted to ignite a fire by tossing lit matches at his mother,
saying "I'm going to kill us all." Defendant had been drinking alcohol prior to
the dispute.
A grand jury indicted defendant, charging him with: (1) two counts of
first-degree attempted murder, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3 and N.J.S.A. 2C:5-
1; (2) two counts of second-degree attempted aggravated arson, contrary to
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N.J.S.A. 2C:17-1(a)(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1; and (3) two counts of third-degree
terroristic threats, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a) and/or (b).
Defendant filed a motion pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966), to suppress his statements to police. The initial hearing on the motion
was adjourned to permit counsel to obtain defendant's medical records from the
day of the incident. Counsel's prior attempt to obtain the records was
unsuccessful because defendant misidentified the hospital at which he had been
treated. On the adjourned date, defendant's counsel reported that his efforts to
obtain the medical records again had been unsuccessful. The court denied
defendant's motion, finding he voluntarily waived his Miranda rights.
After the suppression motion, but prior to the start of trial, counsel
obtained defendant's medical records. The records indicated defendant had a
blood alcohol content of 0.087% on the night of the incident.
The parties reached a plea agreement after jury selection. Defendant
entered a guilty plea to one count of first-degree attempted murder. During the
plea colloquy, defendant stated that he was pleased with the legal services he
received and acknowledged his attorney answered all of his questions regarding
the plea. He admitted he attempted to evict Smith, resulting in an argument
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during which he "spilled" lighter fluid on Smith and "attempted to light that
lighter fluid in order to take his life by burning him[.]"
On the day of sentencing, however, defendant moved to withdraw his plea,
arguing his admission to attempting to kill Smith was not true. Defendant's
counsel declined to advance arguments in support of the motion because
defendant intended to file a claim against him alleging ineffective assistance of
counsel. After permitting defendant to argue, the court denied the motion .
The court found aggravating factors: one, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(1)("[t]he
nature and circumstances of the offense, and the role of the actor therein,
including whether or not it was committed in an especially heinous, cruel, or
depraved manner"); three, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3)("[t]he risk that the defendant
will commit another offense"); six, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(6)("[t]he extent of the
defendant's prior criminal record and the seriousness of the offenses of which
he has been convicted"); and nine, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9)("[t]he need for
deterring the defendant and others from violating the law"). The court found no
mitigating factors.
After determining that the aggravating factors clearly and convincingly
outweighed any other consideration, the court sentenced defendant in
accordance with the plea agreement to a ten-year sentence, subject to an eighty-
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five-percent period of parole ineligibility, pursuant to the No Early Release Act,
N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. The court assessed appropriate fees and penalties and
dismissed the remaining counts of the indictment. The court determined
defendant's attempted murder conviction constituted a violation of probation
and, as per the agreement, sentenced defendant to a five-year sentence to run
concurrent with the attempted murder sentence.
An excessive sentencing panel of this court issued an order affirming
defendant's sentence. State v. Dobrzynski, No. A-2021-15 (App. Div. June 6,
2016). However, we remanded the matter for reconsideration of defendant's
motion to withdraw his guilty plea in light of counsel's decision not to advance
arguments in support of the motion. On remand, the court again denied
defendant's motion. No appeal was taken.
In his PCR petition, defendant alleges his trial counsel was ineffective
because he failed: (1) to conduct an adequate investigation; (2) obtain
defendant's medical records prior to the Miranda hearing; (3) keep defendant
apprised of developments; and (4) raise mitigating factors at sentencing.
The judge who presided at defendant's guilty plea allocution and
sentencing heard his PCR petition. In an oral opinion issued on March 19, 2018,
the court found defendant did not establish a prima facie claim for PCR and
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raised no issues of fact warranting an evidentiary hearing. The court found
defendant's counsel exercised reasonable, professional judgment in preparing
for trial and kept defendant apprised of developments. In addition, the court
concluded defendant failed to establish earlier discovery of his medical records
would have affected the outcome of the suppression motion, defendant's
decision to enter a guilty plea, or his sentence. Finally, the court concluded
counsel's failure to raise mitigating factors at sentencing did not affect
defendant's sentence because no mitigating factors applied to defendant.
This appeal followed. Defendant raises the following argument:
POINT I
THE POST-CONVICTION RELIEF COURT ERRED
IN DENYING THE DEFENDANT'S PETITION FOR
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF WITHOUT
AFFORDING HIM AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING
TO FULLY ADDRESS HIS CONTENTION THAT HE
FAILED TO RECEIVE ADEQUATE LEGAL
REPRESENTATION FROM PLEA COUNSEL.
A. LEGAL PRINCIPLES.
B. FAILURE OF PLEA COUNSEL TO CONDUCT
AN ADEQUATE INVESTIGATION.
C. FAILURE TO REVIEW CASE WITH
DEFENDANT AND TO KEEP HIM FULLY
INFORMED OF STATUS OF THE CASE.
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D. FAILURE OF TRIAL COUNSEL TO
ADEQUATELY REPRESENT DEFENDANT AT
SENTENCING.
E. FAILURE OF PCR COURT TO CONDUCT AN
EVIDENTIARY HEARING.
II.
"Post-conviction relief is New Jersey's analogue to the federal writ of
habeas corpus." State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 459 (1992). Under Rule 3:22-
2(a), a defendant is entitled to post-conviction relief if there was a "[s]ubstantial
denial in the conviction proceedings of defendant's rights under the Constitution
of the United States or the Constitution or laws of the State of New Jersey[.]"
"A petitioner must establish the right to such relief by a preponderance of the
credible evidence." Preciose, 129 N.J. at 459. "To sustain that burden, specific
facts" that "provide the court with an adequate basis on which to rest its
decision" must be articulated. State v. Mitchell, 126 N.J. 565, 579 (1992).
A hearing on a PCR petition is required only when: (1) a defendant
establishes a prima facie case in support of PCR; (2) the court determines that
there are disputed issues of material fact that cannot be resolved by review of
the existing record; and (3) the court determines that an evidentiary hearing is
required to resolve the claims asserted. State v Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 354 (2013)
(citing R. 3:22-10(b)). "A prima facie case is established when a defendant
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demonstrates 'a reasonable likelihood that his or her claim, viewing the facts
alleged in the light most favorable to the defendant, will ultimately succeed on
the merits.'" Id. at 355 (quoting R. 3:22-10(b)).
We review the legal conclusions of a PCR court de novo. State v. Harris,
181 N.J. 391, 419 (2004). Where an evidentiary hearing has not been held, it is
within our authority "to conduct a de novo review of both the factual findings
and legal conclusions of the PCR court[.]" Id. at 421. We review a judge's
decision to deny a PCR petition without an evidentiary hearing for abuse of
discretion. Preciose, 129 N.J. at 462.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I,
Paragraph 10 of the New Jersey Constitution guarantee criminal defendants the
right to the effective assistance of counsel. State v. O'Neil, 219 N.J. 598, 610
(2014) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984); State v.
Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987)). To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel, the defendant must meet the two-part test established by Strickland
and adopted by our Supreme Court in Fritz. 466 U.S. at 687; 105 N.J. at 58.
Under Strickland, a defendant first must show that his or her attorney
made errors "so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel'
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." 466 U.S. at 687. Counsel's
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performance is deficient if it "[falls] below an objective standard of
reasonableness." Id. at 688.
A defendant also must show that counsel's "deficient performance
prejudiced the defense." Id. at 687. A defendant must establish that "there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of
the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694. "A reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome"
of the trial. Ibid.
"[A] court need not determine whether counsel's performance was
deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of
the alleged deficiencies." Id. at 697; State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 261 (1997).
"If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of
sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be
followed." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.
Having carefully reviewed defendant's arguments in light of the record
and applicable legal principles, we affirm the March 19, 2018 order for the
reasons stated in the judge's oral opinion. We add the following comments.
The record contains no evidence supporting defendant's claim that his
counsel did not adequately investigate his defense or spend sufficient time
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consulting him. Nor did defendant explain how additional investigation or
consultation would have affected his decision to accept a plea agreement that
resulted in what the trial court found to be a favorable sentence, given the nature
of the charges and defendant's extensive criminal record.
In addition, defendant did not establish how production of his medical
records after the suppression hearing, but before the start of trial, affected the
outcome of the suppression hearing, defendant's decision to accept the plea
agreement, or his sentence. The medical records indicate only defendant's blood
alcohol level on the night of the incident. An intoxication defense, however,
involves a number of additional factors:
[S]ome of the factors pertinent to the determination of
intoxication sufficient to satisfy the test of "prostration
of faculties" – a shorthand expression used here to
indicate a condition of intoxication that renders the
actor incapable of purposeful or knowing conduct – are
the following: the quantity of intoxicant consumed, the
period of time involved, the actor's conduct as
perceived by others (what he said, how he said it, how
he appeared, how he acted, how his coordination or lack
thereof manifested itself), any odor of alcohol or other
intoxicating substance, the results of any tests to
determine blood-alcohol content, and the actor's ability
to recall significant events.
[State v. Cameron, 104 N.J. 42, 56 (1986).]
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Defendant was in possession of the medical records when he elected to
enter a guilty plea. If he believed that those limited records supported an
intoxication defense to the charges he faced, he could have proceeded to trial or
attempted to negotiate a more favorable plea agreement. We also agree with the
trial court's conclusion that defendant's medical records would not likely have
changed the outcome of defendant's suppression motion. Defendant offered no
support for his argument that the records would have resulted in the suppression
of the incriminating statements recorded by police. Finally, the trial court, when
reviewing the PCR petition, reviewed the statutory mitigating factors and found
none applied to defendant. That conclusion was well supported by the record.
Affirmed.
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