JANE DOE, ETC. VS. CITY OF TRENTON (L-1813-17, MERCER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED)

RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-5943-17T2
JANE DOE, individually, and as
Executor of the Estate of decedent,
and THE ESTATE OF DECEDENT,1
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
CITY OF TRENTON, and DWAYNE
HARRIS, in his capacity as Municipal
Clerk and Custodian of Government
Records,
Defendants-Respondents.
________________________________
Argued September 9, 2019 – Decided October 7, 2019
Before Judges Fasciale, Rothstadt and Moynihan.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Mercer County, Docket No. L-1813-17.
Frank Guaracini, III, argued the cause for appellants
(Blaney & Karavan, PC, attorneys; Frank Guaracini,
III, of counsel and on the briefs).
1
We have used a fictitious name in the caption in order to protect the identity
of the parties involved.
Donald A. Klein argued the cause for respondents
(Weiner Law Group LLP, attorneys; Donald A. Klein,
of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
This appeal addresses one of three separate but related civil actions. The
first is this lawsuit, in which plaintiffs made their request for documents under
OPRA and the common law (the OPRA action). The second is a tort action filed
by a separate party, (the separate party action). And the third is a tort action
filed by plaintiffs (the torts action). In the torts action, plaintiffs received –
under a consent protective order – the requested documents.
Jane Doe, individually and as Executor of the Estate of decedent, and the
Estate of decedent (collectively plaintiffs) appeal from three orders. Two of the
orders, dated January 5, 2018 and May 3, 2018, denied plaintiffs access to
records under the Open Public Records Act (OPRA), N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 to -13,
and the common law. The third order, dated August 10, 2018, denied
reconsideration. The OPRA judge entered the orders and rendered thorough
opinions, with which we substantially agree. We affirm.
A-5943-17T2
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I.
In July 2017, plaintiffs requested the documentation from the City of
Trenton and the City's clerk (collectively defendants). They sought records
regarding a 2016 internal affairs police investigation into decedent's conduct.
On August 22, 2017, defendants issued a letter denying plaintiffs' request
for the records. In part, the letter explained that personnel records are exempt
from production under OPRA. Plaintiffs filed this action, and the OPRA judge
entered an order to show cause (OTSC) directing defendants to appear and show
cause as to why judgment should not be entered granting plaintiffs access to the
records and awarding attorney's fees.
Following oral argument, the judge rendered an oral opinion denying
plaintiffs' OPRA request, but reserving judgment on plaintiffs' common law
contentions. The judge "noted the difficulty of assessing [p]laintiffs' [c]ommon
[l]aw right of access claim without first reviewing the records responsive to
[p]laintiff's request[.]" The judge ordered defendants to submit a Vaughn2 index
and the internal investigation file for an in-camera review.
2
Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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Defendants complied and advised the judge that the City of Trenton would
be willing to produce the entire investigation file in the torts action. Thereafter,
plaintiffs' counsel notified the judge that, in the torts action, the judge in that
case ordered the production of the file to plaintiffs under a consent protective
order, which plaintiffs sought to lift.
After conducting an in-camera review of the records, the OPRA judge
denied plaintiffs' request for access to the internal investigation records under
OPRA and the common law, dismissed plaintiffs' complaint, and rendered a
comprehensive oral opinion. In denying the request, the judge balanced the
parties' interests and emphasized that plaintiffs successfully obtained the records
in the torts action.
Plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration. The judge in the tort action
filed by plaintiffs partially lifted the consent protective order, thereby giving
plaintiffs and counsel the right to use solely the "information contained in the
City of Trenton Internal Affairs investigation file" on plaintiffs' motion for
reconsideration. In another comprehensive opinion, the OPRA judge denied
plaintiffs' motion and balanced plaintiffs' interest against law enforcement's
interest in keeping internal affairs investigations confidential.
A-5943-17T2
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On appeal, plaintiffs argue:
POINT [I]
DEFENDANTS VIOLATED N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5(i) BY
ISSUING AN UNTIMELY DENIAL.
POINT [II]
DEFENDANTS VIOLATED N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5 BY
IMPROPERLY DENYING PLAINTIFF[S] ACCESS
TO GOVERNMENT RECORDS UNDER THE
PERSONNEL RECORDS EXEMPTION.
POINT [III]
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE PRECLUDED
DEFENDANTS FROM ARGUING THAT THE
RECORDS WERE CONFIDENTIAL PURSUANT TO
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR
INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY AND PROCEDURE.
POINT [IV]
DEFENDANTS FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE
REDACTION METHODOLOGY OF N.J.S.A. 47:1A-
5, AND THEREFORE, DEFENDANTS VIOLATED
OPRA.
POINT [V]
THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE DECISION
OF THE TRIAL COURT AND GRANT
PLAINTIFF[S] ATTORNEY'S FEES AS A
PREVAILING PARTY IN THIS LITIGATION.
A-5943-17T2
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POINT [VI]
THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE TRIAL
COURT'S DECISION AND GRANT PLAINTIFF[S]
ACCESS TO THE INV[E]STIGATION FILE
PURSUANT TO THE COMMON LAW RIGHT TO
ACCESS PUBLIC RECORDS.
II.
"We review de novo the issue of whether access to public records under
OPRA and the manner of its effectuation are warranted." Drinker Biddle &
Reath LLP v. N.J. Dep't of Law & Pub. Safety, 421 N.J. Super. 489, 497 (App.
Div. 2011) (quoting MAG Entm't, LLC v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverage Control,
375 N.J. Super. 534, 543 (App. Div. 2005)). But, we are required to "defer to a
judge's factual findings in a non-jury matter when those findings are supported
by adequate, substantial and credible evidence." Kas Oriental Rugs, Inc. v.
Ellman, 394 N.J. Super. 278, 284 (App. Div. 2007) (citing Rova Farms Resort,
Inc. v. Inv'rs Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 483-84 (1974)).
We reject plaintiffs' contention that defendants violated OPRA by issuing
an untimely response to their request for access to the internal investigation
records.
New Jersey's "Legislature enacted OPRA with the purpose of
'maximiz[ing] public knowledge about public affairs in order to ensure an
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informed citizenry and to minimize the evils inherent in a secluded process.'"
Drinker Biddle, 421 N.J. Super. at 497 (alteration in original) (quoting Mason
v. City of Hoboken, 196 N.J. 51, 64 (2008)). "However, 'the right to disclosure
is not unlimited, because . . . OPRA itself makes plain that the "public's right
of access [is] not absolute." That conclusion rests on the fact that OPRA
exempts numerous categories of documents and information from disclosure.'"
Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting Educ. Law Ctr. v. N.J. Dep't of Educ., 198
N.J. 274, 284 (2009)). A person who is denied access to government records
may challenge the denial in Superior Court. N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6. As to the
timeliness of a response, N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5(i) provides in pertinent part:
Unless a shorter time period is otherwise provided by
statute, regulation, or executive order, a custodian of a
government record shall grant access to a government
record or deny a request for access to a government
record as soon as possible, but not later than seven
business days after receiving the request, provided that
the record is currently available and not in storage or
archived. In the event a custodian fails to respond
within seven business days after receiving a request, the
failure to respond shall be deemed a denial of the
request[.]
Here, plaintiffs assert that defendants responded by letter dated August 22, 2017,
which would be beyond the seven business days following plaintiffs' request.
A-5943-17T2
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Defendants argue that they responded on July 18, 2017, well within the
statutorily mandated seven days.
Defendants submitted the certification of a clerk, who works in the office
of the Municipal Clerk and Custodian of Records for the City of Trenton and
assists with the processing of record requests and responses. The clerk certified
that plaintiffs' request was received on July 14, 2017, but the request was
wrongly dated July 17. The clerk further certified that the request stated that
email was the preferred delivery method and provided an email address. The
clerk responded to the request by emailing the identified email address on July
18, 2017. The email from the clerk denying plaintiffs' request was attached to
the clerk's certification, and the date on the email was July 18, 2017, at 12:17
p.m. In Jane Doe's affidavit, she denied receiving the email and certified that
she searched her email account and could not find the email.
Following oral argument, the OPRA judge noted the conflicting
certifications of plaintiff and the clerk, but concluded that both certifications
were acceptable. We conclude the record supports the judge's finding that the
clerk responded on July 18 via email. Moreover, and as the judge noted, the
timeliness of the response is moot because plaintiffs have no OPRA right to the
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documents. But even assuming defendants did not timely reply, according to
N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5(i), the failure to respond is a denial.
Plaintiffs also contend that defendants violated OPRA because they based
their denial on the "personnel files" exemption under N.J.S.A. 47:1A-10, which
plaintiffs maintain was "an inappropriate basis for a denial." N.J.S.A. 47:1A-
5(g) provides that "[i]f the custodian is unable to comply with a request for
access, the custodian shall indicate the specific basis therefor on the request
form and promptly return it to the requestor." And N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6 states in
pertinent part, "[t]he public agency shall have the burden of proving that the
denial of access is authorized by law." Further, N.J.S.A. 47:1A-10 provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of [OPRA] or any other
law to the contrary, the personnel or pension records of
any individual in the possession of a public agency,
including but not limited to records relating to any
grievance filed by or against an individual, shall not be
considered a government record and shall not be made
available for public access[.]
Here, the judge concluded that although the reference to the personnel
files exemption was erroneous, under the circumstances, it did not invalidate
defendants' response. The judge noted that "as counsel for [the City] pointed
out, the denial [letter] did reference the Internal Affairs records, and that is the
primary basis for the denial here[.]"
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Likewise, we also conclude that defendants adequately provided a basis
for the denial of plaintiffs' request – that it was an internal affairs record.
According to N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5(g), a custodian must indicate the "specific basis"
for denying the request for access. Here, defendants did so – it stated that the
records were internal affairs and not subject to disclosure.
Moreover, plaintiffs rely on Rivera v. Borough of Roselle Park Custodian
of Records, GRC Complaint No. 2007-224 (Nov. 19, 2008) and Blaustein v.
Lakewood Police Dep't Custodian of Records, GRC Complaint No. 2011-102
(June 26, 2012) for the proposition that the personnel exemption does not apply
to deny a requestor access to internal affairs investigation records under OPRA.
Plaintiffs note that in Rivera, the Government Records Council (GRC) stated
that "[a] custodian cannot congruously assert both the personnel records
exemption and the confidentiality provisions of [the Attorney General's Internal
Affairs Policy & Procedure (IAPP)] to deny access[.]" Rivera, GRC Complaint
No. 2007-224. However, the GRC also said that the custodian "correctly
abandoned" her reliance on the personnel exemption, pursuant to N.J.S.A.
47:1A-10. Ibid. And, the GRC ultimately concluded that the custodian lawfully
denied the complainant access to the requested records:
Because the [police department] complied with the
provisions of N.J.S.A. 40A:14-181 by promulgating
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policy consistent with the Attorney General's [IAPP],
and because that statute is a law that contains
provisions not abrogated by OPRA pursuant to N.J.S.A.
47:1A-9(a) [sic], the confidentiality provisions of the
IAPP governing Index reports within the Police
Department's policy restricts public access to the
requested records.
[Ibid.]
Plaintiffs argue that in Blaustein, the GRC stated that "internal affairs
records are not considered personnel files pursuant to the Attorney General's
[IAPP]." But, in Blaustein, the GRC held that even though the exemptions cited
by the custodian – the ongoing internal investigation and personnel files
exemptions – were not applicable, the records were exempt as internal affairs
investigation records under the Attorney General's IAPP. Blaustein, GRC
Complaint No. 2011-102. The GRC concluded that the requested records were
"exempt from access pursuant to the Attorney General's [IAPP], which classifies
these records as confidential[,] and O'Shea v. [Twp.] of W. Milford, 410 N.J.
Super. 371 (App. Div. 2009), which clothes the Attorney General's Policy with
the force of law for police entities." Ibid.
The same situation applies here – the requested documents are internal
affairs investigation records, and they are confidential and exempt from
disclosure under the Attorney General's IAPP. Even though the custodian here
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also cited N.J.S.A. 47:1A-10, the personnel files exemption, as a reason for
denying the request, the August 22 letter correctly explained that the records
were internal affairs records.
Plaintiffs next argue that defendants violated OPRA by failing to comply
with statutory redaction requirements. In support of their argument, plaintiffs
rely on N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5(g), which states in pertinent part:
If the custodian of a government record asserts that part
of a particular record is exempt from public access
pursuant to [OPRA] as amended and supplemented, the
custodian shall delete or excise from a copy of the
record that portion which the custodian asserts is
exempt from access and shall promptly permit access to
the remainder of the record.
Plaintiffs assert that defendants violated this statute and made a "blanket denial
of access . . . without complying with the applicable redaction methodology[.]"
Plaintiffs' reliance is misplaced. The part of the statute that plaintiffs cite
relates to when a custodian asserts that part of a record is exempt. In that case,
the custodian must delete or redact the part of the record that is exempt and
provide the remainder. But, here, the City clerk did not assert that part of the
records were exempt; rather, the clerk said that all of the internal investigation
records were exempt.
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Plaintiffs also contend that they are entitled to attorney's fees. In pertinent
part, N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6 provides, "[i]f it is determined that access has been
improperly denied, the court or agency head shall order that access be allowed.
A requestor who prevails in any proceeding shall be entitled to a reasonable
attorney's fee." That is, "[i]f the court determines that the custodian
unjustifiably denied access to the record in question, he or she is entitled to a
'reasonable attorney's fee.'" New Jerseyans for a Death Penalty Moratorium v.
N.J. Dep't of Corr., 185 N.J. 137, 153 (2005) (quoting N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6).
"Without that fee-shifting provision, 'the ordinary citizen would be waging a
quixotic battle against a public entity vested with almost inexhaustible
resources. By making the custodian of the government record responsible for
the payment of counsel fees to a prevailing requestor, the Legislature intended
to even the fight.'" Ibid. (quoting Courier News v. Hunterdon Cty. Prosecutor's
Office, 378 N.J. Super. 539, 546 (App. Div. 2005)).
Here, plaintiffs were not improperly denied access to the requested
records. The judge did not find that defendants violated OPRA or that plaintiffs
were entitled to access the requested records under OPRA. The judge correctly
stated, "[o]bviously, if nothing's turned over, there's no counsel fee. If it's turned
over, I've already found that there's no basis under OPRA to turn over these
A-5943-17T2
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documents, so I don't think that this is a case that lends itself to a counsel fee
for those reasons."
III.
We now turn to plaintiffs' common law right to access arguments. Like
the determination of an OPRA request, this court reviews the determination
regarding the common law right of access de novo. N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc.
v. Bergen Cty. Prosecutor's Office, 447 N.J. Super. 182, 194 (App. Div. 2016).
At common law, a citizen has "an enforceable right to require custodians
of public records to make them available for reasonable inspection and
examination." Irval Realty Inc. v. Bd. of Pub. Util. Comm'rs, 61 N.J. 366, 372
(1972). The threshold question under the common law right to access is whether
the requested records are "public records." O'Shea v. Twp. of W. Milford, 410
N.J. Super. 371, 386-87 (App. Div. 2009). OPRA explicitly provides no limit
to "the common law right of access to a government record, including criminal
investigatory records of a law enforcement agency." N.J.S.A. 47:1A-8.
"Indeed, historically, '[t]he common law makes a much broader class of
documents available than [OPRA], but on a qualified basis.'" O'Shea, 410 N.J.
Super. at 386 (alterations in original) (quoting Daily Journal v. Police Dep't of
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Vineland, 351 N.J. Super. 110, 122 (App. Div. 2002)). Here, there is no dispute
that the requested records are public records.
After this threshold determination has been made, "a requestor is governed
by a two-prong test." O'Shea, 410 N.J. Super. at 387. First, the requestor "must
'establish an interest in the subject matter of the material;'" and, second, "the
requestor's right to access 'must be balanced against the State's interest in
preventing disclosure.'" Ibid. (quoting Mason, 196 N.J. at 67-68).
Defendants do not dispute the judge's determination that plaintiffs have
an interest in the requested records. The judge found that plaintiff had an
interest both in her own capacity as the decedent's widow and in her capacity as
the executor of the estate. The judge stated that plaintiffs' interest was in
"developing facts to see if she had a claim against the [c]ity[,] the police
department, [or] any other defendants[.]"
Although plaintiffs obtained the records in the torts action under a consent
protective order, they now want unbridled access to the records so that they can
publish that information. Plaintiffs allege that the records show, among other
things, that the investigation was conducted "half-heartedly."
But the OPRA judge recognized that the judge in plaintiffs' tort case
addressed plaintiffs' request to access the same records and plaintiffs' interest in
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those records. The OPRA judge properly recognized that plaintiffs accessed the
requested documents under the consent protective order that adequately
protected both parties' interests.
Next, once a requestor has established an interest in the records, which
plaintiffs have done here, the requestor's right to access must be balanced against
the State's interest in preventing disclosure. O'Shea, 410 N.J. Super. at 387. Our
Supreme Court has established pertinent factors to consider when balancing the
interests:
(1) the extent to which disclosure will impede agency
functions by discouraging citizens from providing
information to the government; (2) the effect disclosure
may have upon persons who have given such
information, and whether they did so in reliance that
their identities would not be disclosed; (3) the extent to
which agency self-evaluation, program improvement,
or other decision[]making will be chilled by disclosure;
(4) the degree to which the information sought includes
factual data as opposed to evaluative reports of
policymakers; (5) whether any findings of public
misconduct have been insufficiently corrected by
remedial measures instituted by the investigative
agency; and (6) whether any agency disciplinary or
investigatory proceedings have arisen that may
circumscribe the individual's asserted need for the
materials.
[Loigman v. Kimmelman, 102 N.J. 98, 113 (1986).]
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These factors are not exclusive, and the court may consider "any other relevant
factors" when conducting the balancing test. Ibid.
We have already addressed plaintiffs' interest. Defendants have an
interest in maintaining confidential internal affairs records. Similar to the AG
Guidelines, the internal affairs policy states that "[t]he progress of internal
affairs investigations and all supporting materials are considered confidential
information." The policy further provides, "[t]he contents of the internal
investigation case files will be retained in the Internal Affairs Unit and clearly
marked as confidential."
As to the first two Loigman factors, plaintiffs argue that disclosure of the
records will not impede agency functions because the investigation is closed.
Plaintiffs also argue that the production of the records will not have an effect on
any persons who gave information in furtherance of the investigation. Plaintiffs
note that the separate party filed a civil action in Superior Court, thereby making
their identity and allegations public.
In rendering an oral decision in the OPRA case, the judge acknowledged
that "the fact that [the separate party] made [the information] public would
suggest then that there is less reason to keep it confidential to encourage [the
A-5943-17T2
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separate party] to come forward." However, the judge continued, saying that
"the [c]ourt [could not] only stop there" because
there is the general interest in regard to Internal Affairs
proceedings generally that are done by the police and
how sensitive they can be, that the [c]ourt has to
acknowledge that disclosure generally of complaints
made to Internal Affairs and identifying the individual
could discourage other citizens from providing
information to the government.
The judge properly considered the State's general interest in keeping internal
affairs records confidential.
As for the third Loigman factor – "the extent to which agency self-
evaluation, program improvement, or other decision[]making will be chilled by
disclosure" – plaintiffs assert incorrectly that disclosure of the records will result
in a higher level of accountability within the police department. Ibid. The judge
determined that this factor was not at issue because the requested records were
an investigation into the separate party's allegations, not an investigation into
alleged leaks by the internal affairs unit.
The fourth Loigman factor considers "the degree to which the information
sought includes factual data as opposed to evaluative reports of policymakers."
Ibid. The judge stated that "much of the material may be factual data, but it [is]
of an investigatory nature[.]" The judge also noted that some of the information
A-5943-17T2
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included in the records was related to the separate party's forensic medical
examination, which would be protected. Plaintiffs argue that the information
contained in the records (which they obtained in the torts action) is nevertheless
unavailable by any other source. But, here, this factor still weighs in favor of
nondisclosure because the information contained in the records is mostly
investigatory, and much of the information, such as the separate party's medical
examination, is sensitive and confidential.
As for the fifth and sixth Loigman factors, which consider any public
misconduct or agency disciplinary or investigatory proceedings, the judge noted,
again, that the records requested by plaintiffs relate to the investigation into the
decedent. That is, the records were not an investigation into the police
department's conduct in investigating the decedent.
After balancing all of the factors and in light of the in-camera review, the
judge concluded that the State's interest in preventing disclosure and
maintaining confidentiality outweighed plaintiffs' right to access the records.
The judge concluded,
[I]t's really the broad general need for confidentiality of
these Internal Affairs documents versus the interest of
[Jane Doe]. . . .
And to me most critically and in the case that
she's filed . . . against the City of Trenton and other
A-5943-17T2
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entities, [the judge in that tort case] has already issued
the release of the documents under a protective order.
....
[W]hen you balance the interest, the fact that [Jane
Doe] is now entitled to the records under civil discovery
pursuant to a protective order, diminishes very much
her need to have them under the common law.
We similarly conclude that when balancing all of the factors and considering all
of the circumstances, the State's interest in maintaining confidential internal
affairs records outweigh plaintiffs' interests, especially because plaintiffs have
access to the records under the consent protective order.
IV.
Lastly, plaintiffs appeal the OPRA judge's order denying their motion for
reconsideration, but they do not specifically address the issue in their merits
brief. Plaintiffs do not specifically address why the judge's decision is
purportedly an abuse of discretion. Nevertheless, we address the issue.
We review a trial judge's denial of reconsideration only for abuse of
discretion. Granata v. Broderick, 446 N.J. Super. 449, 468 (App. Div. 2016),
aff'd, 231 N.J. 135 (2017). Reconsideration is "a matter within the sound
discretion of the [c]ourt, to be exercised in the interest of justice [.]" Palombi v.
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Palombi, 414 N.J. Super. 274, 288 (App. Div. 2010) (quoting D'Atria v. D'Atria,
242 N.J. Super. 392, 401 (Ch. Div. 1990)).
Governed by Rule 4:49-2, reconsideration is appropriate for a "narrow
corridor" of cases in which either the court's decision was made upon a "palpably
incorrect or irrational basis," or where "it is obvious that the [c]ourt either did
not consider, or failed to appreciate the significance of probative, competent
evidence." Fusco v. Bd. of Educ. of Newark, 349 N.J. Super. 455, 462 (App.
Div. 2002) (quoting D'Atria, 242 N.J. Super. at 401). In determining whether
such an abuse has taken place, a reviewing court should be mindful that a party
must not utilize "reconsideration merely because of dissatisfaction with a
decision of the [c]ourt." Capital Fin. Co. of Delaware Valley v. Asterbadi, 398
N.J. Super. 299, 310 (App. Div. 2008) (alteration in original) (quoting D'Atria,
242 N.J. Super. at 401).
Following oral argument, the judge denied plaintiffs' motion for
reconsideration and stated:
And again, since she has the documents, even
subject to [the consent] protective order, what we were
talking about here was the ability to publicize them.
And when . . . you are looking at the ability to publicize
in terms of the balancing, I think certainly at this point
when there's still a chance that that litigation will
continue and she . . . will have that opportunity and to
ask in that context as the case goes on to make certain
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things public, the judge there certainly has a much
broader picture than I have here. And just weighing the
common law balancing, even looking at it again in light
of what she claims, she wants to go public with her
version . . . claiming that it was a bad investigation,
well, that's before [the judge in plaintiffs' tort case].
And [the judge in that case has] kept the documents
under the . . . protective order.
....
And so it's not that [Jane Doe] doesn't have the
particularized interest, but the main one was the ability
to pursue her rights in civil court. That's been
vindicated by the release of the documents to her on the
protective order, and her right to go public with her
version based upon her analysis of what the documents
were . . . does not outweigh the need of law enforcement
to keep . . . the investigation file confidential.
We conclude the OPRA judge did not commit an abuse of discretion in
denying plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration. Plaintiffs simply reiterated their
arguments made earlier. The OPRA judge again noted the balancing between
the State's interest and plaintiffs' interest in publishing the information from the
records, and the judge concluded that plaintiffs' interest did not outweigh the
need to keep internal investigations confidential. Plaintiffs cannot utilize
reconsideration because they are dissatisfied with the judge's decision . See
Asterbadi, 398 N.J. Super. at 310.
Affirmed.
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