Rutgers University Student Assembly (Rusa) v. Middlesex County Board of Elections

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2383-13T3
RUTGERS UNIVERSITY STUDENT
ASSEMBLY (RUSA), MATTHEW CODEIRO,
JOHN CONNELLY, GABRIELA AGATA
GRYZBOWSKI, BETH ROSE BRESLAW,
EDWARD JAMES VASCONCELOS III,
APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION
BON-JIN KUN, ANNALEE SWITEK,
LATINO LEADERSHIP ALLIANCE OF NEW November 19, 2014
JERSEY (LLANJ), NEW JERSEY CITIZEN
ACTION (NJCA), and the AMERICAN APPELLATE DIVISION
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF NEW
JERSEY (ACLU-NJ),
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
MIDDLESEX COUNTY BOARD OF
ELECTIONS and DANIEL FRANKEL,
COMMISSIONER OF REGISTRATIONS
OF MIDDLESEX COUNTY,
Defendants-Respondents.
___________________________________
Argued: November 5, 2014 – Decided: November 19, 2014
Before Judges Koblitz, Haas and Higbee.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Middlesex County, Docket
No. C-85-11.
Frank Askin and Renee Steinhagen argued the
cause for appellants (Rutgers Constitutional
Litigation Clinic, American Civil Liberties
Union of New Jersey Foundation, and
Appleseed Public Interest Law Center,
attorneys; Mr. Askin, Edward Barocas, and
Ms. Steinhagen, on the briefs).
George N. Cohen, Deputy Attorney General,
argued the cause for respondents (John J.
Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney;
Donna Kelly, Assistant Attorney General; of
counsel; Mr. Cohen, on the brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HAAS, J.A.D.
In this case of first impression, plaintiffs appeal from
the December 11, 2013 order of the Chancery Division, granting
defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissing
plaintiffs' complaint challenging the constitutionality of
N.J.S.A. 19:31-6.3b, which requires all eligible persons to
register to vote no later than twenty-one days prior to an
election. Plaintiffs also appeal the denial of their motion for
summary judgment. Because the trial court did not make adequate
findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning defendants'
justification for maintaining the twenty-one-day advance
registration requirement in the face of the evidence submitted
by plaintiffs that the requirement is no longer necessary to
protect the integrity of the electoral process, we are
constrained to reverse both decisions and remand for further
proceedings.
2 A-2383-13T3
I.
A.
As background, it is helpful to begin with the requirements
New Jersey citizens must meet in order to vote in elections.
Under our State Constitution:
Every citizen of the United States, of
the age of 18 years, who shall have been a
resident of this State and of the county in
which he claims his vote 30 days, next
before the election, shall be entitled to
vote for all officers that now are or
hereafter may be elective by the people, and
upon all questions which may be submitted to
a vote of the people[.]
[N.J. Const. art. II, § 1, ¶3(a).]
N.J.S.A. 19:31-1 provides that "[no] person shall be
permitted to vote at any election unless such person shall have
been registered in the manner" provided by law. In pertinent
part, the statute at issue in this appeal, N.J.S.A. 19:31-6.3b,
states:
Any person entitled to register to vote
may register as a voter in the election
district in which that person resides at any
time prior to the 21st day preceding any
election by completing a registration form
. . . and submitting the form to the
commissioner of registration of the county
wherein the person resides or alternatively,
in the case of a registration form provided
by the employees or agents of a public
agency or a voter registration agency, . . .
to those employees or agents or to the
Attorney General.
3 A-2383-13T3
An eligible person may register to vote in person or by
mail. N.J.S.A. 19:31-6. Blank registration forms are available
to be downloaded from the internet. "A registration form
postmarked, stamped or otherwise marked as having been received
from the registration applicant, on or before the 21st day
preceding any election shall be deemed timely." N.J.S.A. 19:31-
6.3b.
Individuals may register to vote at numerous governmental
offices, and registration forms are available in English and a
variety of other languages. All 565 municipal clerks and the
twenty-one county commissioners of registration are required to
provide individuals with voter registration applications and
information. N.J.S.A. 19:31-6.
"Public agencies"1 must also accept voter registration
applications. N.J.S.A. 19:31-6.3. In addition, many other
governmental entities2 are designated as "voter registration
1
"Public agencies" include any office or commercial
establishment where New Jersey license or permits are issued;
offices of the State Division of Workers' Compensation; offices
of the Division of Employment Services and the Division of
Unemployment and Temporary Disability Insurance; offices of the
Division of Taxation; county, regional, joint or other free
public libraries; and public institutions of higher education
that receive financial assistance or grants form State funds.
N.J.S.A. 19:31-6.3a.
2
For example: Motor Vehicle Commission offices; any agency
providing public assistance, including all county welfare
(continued)
4 A-2383-13T3
agencies" and are required to engage in active voter
registration activity, which includes displaying voter
registration information and providing registration application
forms to citizens. N.J.S.A. 19:31-6.11b. Individuals can also
obtain forms through voter registration drives conducted by
candidates, political parties, and non-partisan groups.
N.J.A.C. 13:17-1.4.
In addition, whenever an individual completes a provisional
ballot affirmation statement at a polling place on the day of an
election, the provisional ballot will be considered the voter
registration for any person later determined to be unregistered
at the time he or she submitted the provisional ballot.
N.J.S.A. 19:53C-1b. This procedure ensures that these
individuals are registered to vote in future elections.
Over the years, the State has dramatically changed the
manner in which voter registration records are received and
maintained. Paper election records, once stored only at the
county level, have given way to a computerized "Statewide voter
registration system" (SVRS) maintained by the Secretary of
(continued)
agencies and boards of social services; any agency providing
assistance to individuals with disabilities; and all recruitment
offices for the Armed Forces of the United States are designated
as "voter registration agencies" and are required to provide
registration information and forms to potential voters.
N.J.S.A. 19:31-6.11a.
5 A-2383-13T3
State. N.J.S.A. 19:31-31a.3 The SVRS is "the official State
repository for voter registration information for every legally
registered voter in this State, and . . . serve[s] as the
official voter registration system for the conduct of all
elections in the State." Ibid.
Using the SVRS, local election officials are able to easily
upload and verify a potential voter's identifying information by
cross-referencing that information against other databases, such
as those maintained by the Motor Vehicle Commission and the
federal Social Security Administration. Thus, election
officials are able to determine whether an individual is
registered anywhere in the State, and have access to that
person's voting history.
New Jersey's SVRS specifically protects against ineligible
ballots being cast in elections. For example, the record
indicates that "[w]hen a voter moves from one . . . county to
another and changes their registration to accord with their new
residence, the previous county of registration is made aware of
the move 'instantaneously' via the . . . SVRS." The SVRS also
"detects registration applications by persons registered
elsewhere in the State and enables officials to delete the prior
3
The development of the SVRS was required by § 303 of the
federal "Help America Vote Act of 2002", 42 U.S.C. § 15483.
6 A-2383-13T3
registration to avoid duplication." The SVRS even performs an
"overnight duplication check" with Department of Corrections and
State Parole Board records, and also flags individuals who have
died in other states or abroad and whose information is not
otherwise available in New Jersey's vital statistic records.4
An individual, who appears at a polling place to vote on
election day but whose name is not in the poll book, may be
permitted to complete a provisional ballot. Within no more than
twenty-four hours after receiving the provisional ballot, the
SVRS is able to determine whether the person is an eligible,
registered voter. If so, the individual's provisional ballot is
counted in the election.5
B.
Turning to the present case, plaintiffs are four voluntary
associations involved in voter canvassing and registration
activities, their present or former presidents, and five current
4
The SVRS also generates a registration acknowledgment card,
which is sent to the new voter. If the card is returned
undeliverable, a new notice is sent to the person at the same
address. If it is again undeliverable, then the person is
recorded as "inactive" in the SVRS, which requires the
individual to produce identification if he or she appears at the
polls to vote or submits a write-in ballot.
5
As previously noted, if the individual is not eligible to vote,
his or her provisional ballot is treated as the individual's
registration for future elections. N.J.S.A. 19:53C-1b.
7 A-2383-13T3
or former college students.6 In their complaint, plaintiffs
asserted that "New Jersey's 21-day advance-registration
requirement, embodied in N.J.S.A. 19:31-6, severely burdens the
right to vote of thousands of New Jersey residents . . . [and]
prevents otherwise eligible citizens from casting a ballot and
having their ballot count." Defendants Middlesex County Board
of Elections and the Commissioner of Registrations of Middlesex
County filed an answer to the complaint. After the completion
of discovery, plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment and
defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, which the
judge treated as a motion for summary judgment. See R. 4-6-2.
In their motion papers, plaintiffs argued that only a
system of permitting voters to register on the same day as an
6
At all relevant times, the students attended college in
Middlesex County. Four of the five students claimed they
registered to vote at least twenty-one days prior to an
election, either at a campus registration drive or from their
home. However, when they arrived at their polling place, their
names were not in the poll book. Three of the students
completed provisional ballots, which were later deemed invalid.
However, those ballots served as their registration for future
elections. The fourth student was not permitted to vote by
provisional ballot and failed to timely register for the next
election. The fifth student stated she timely registered to
vote in her home municipality, but sprained her ankle and was
unable to travel home from college to vote. She did not seek to
obtain a mail-in ballot and instead sought to vote by
provisional ballot in the municipality where the college was
located. That ballot was deemed invalid, but it served as the
student's registration in that municipality for future
elections.
8 A-2383-13T3
election is constitutional and that pre-election day
registration requirements violate an individual's constitutional
right to vote.7 Because the right to vote is fundamental,
plaintiffs asserted the trial court should apply a strict
scrutiny test in determining the constitutionality of the
statute and that the statute could only be upheld if defendants
were able to demonstrate that a compelling State interest
justified the advance registration requirement.
However, the real linchpin of plaintiffs' complaint was
their claim that, even if a less stringent, balancing test were
applied to analyze the constitutionality of the statute, the
burden on their right to vote, even if slight, still outweighed
defendants' asserted interest in maintaining the advance
registration requirement. Defendants contended advance
registration was needed "to prevent voter fraud and ensure
public confidence in the integrity of the electoral process."
7
As of the date of the trial court's decision, eight states,
Idaho (Idaho Code Ann. §34-408A (2014)), Iowa (Iowa Code §48A.7A
(2013)), Maine (Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 21-A, §122(4) (2014)),
Minnesota (Minn. Stat. §201.061(Subd. 3) (2014)), Montana (Mont.
Code Ann. §13-2-304(1)(a) (2013)), New Hampshire (N.H. Rev.
Stat. Ann. §654:7-9 (2014)), Wisconsin (Wis. Stat. §6.55(2012)), and Wyoming (Wyo. Stat. Ann. §22-3-104 (2014)),
together with the District of Columbia (D.C. Code §1-
1001.07(g)(5) (2014)), had implemented election day voter
registration programs. Following the decision, Connecticut
initiated election day registration. (Conn. Gen. Stat. §9-19j
(2014)).
9 A-2383-13T3
However, plaintiffs submitted deposition testimony from election
officials, public agency and expert reports, stipulations, and
other data seeking to demonstrate that, because of the SVRS,
there was no longer any possibility of voter fraud in New
Jersey. Through their motion submissions, plaintiffs also
presented evidence they asserted showed that the SVRS could be
easily configured to permit election day registration without
any significant cost to the State, and while still preserving
public confidence in the electoral process.
Plaintiffs proposed that, if an unregistered person
appeared at a polling place on election day to vote, that person
could complete a provisional ballot. Defendants could then use
the SVRS to confirm the individual's identity and verify that
the individual was not registered to vote in any other location
and did not, in fact, already vote. Just as is currently done
when a person submits a provisional ballot, this process would
take no more than twenty-four hours to complete. If the
individual was found qualified to vote, the provisional ballot
would be counted as soon as the SVRS review process was
completed. The accepted ballot would also be treated as the
individual's registration for that, and future, elections.
Our review of the record indicates that defendants did not
present any certifications or documents addressing plaintiffs'
10 A-2383-13T3
factual claims. However, before the trial court, defendants
described New Jersey's SVRS as "second to none." Since the
initiation of the SVRS, defendants were "only aware of two
instances of voter fraud in the past eight years, both of which
involve[d] people who voted from their business address and not
for voter impersonation. . . . [T]here have been no instances of
citizens voting under false identities in [the county involved
in this case] since 2008." Defendants also "agree[d] that the
SVRS system has the capacity to be altered to accommodate a
voter registration deadline different than the 21-day
requirement" imposed by N.J.S.A. 19:31-6.3b. Nevertheless,
defendants argued that, because the burden of registering
twenty-one days in advance of an election was minimal,
plaintiffs' constitutional claim lacked merit.
After conducting oral argument, the trial judge denied
plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, and granted defendants'
motion to dismiss the complaint. In a very brief written
opinion accompanying the order, the judge observed that "all
eligible voters are subject to the same voter registration
requirements" and plaintiffs were not "treated differently than
other similarly situated persons as a result of the twenty-one
day registration requirement of" N.J.S.A. 19:31-6.3b.
Therefore, the judge rejected plaintiffs' contention that the
11 A-2383-13T3
statute should be subjected to a "strict scrutiny" standard in
determining its constitutionality.
Rather, the judge held that the "balancing test"
established by the United States Supreme Court in Burdick v.
Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433-34, 112 S. Ct. 2059, 2063, 119 L. Ed.
2d 245, 253 (1992) should be applied. Under the Burdick test,
the judge stated that "the character and magnitude of the
asserted injury [to plaintiffs must] be weighed against the
State's interest in burdening its citizen's right to vote."
In applying this test, the judge first found the "burden to
register to vote, if any, to be minimal" under New Jersey's
twenty-one-day advance registration requirement because "[t]here
are numerous opportunities to register and the process is
completed in a matter of minutes." However, the judge did not
complete, or even discuss, the second part of the Burdick
balancing test. Instead, the judge merely stated, "[a]s the
[c]ourt has determined the burden on the right to vote to be
minimal, the State need not establish a compelling interest."
The judge made no findings concerning the voluminous proofs
submitted by plaintiffs in support of their claim that, even if
the burden imposed upon them by the statute was "minimal," it
still outweighed defendants' stated interest for continuing to
impose that burden. The judge also made no findings concerning
12 A-2383-13T3
whether defendants had proven their asserted justification for
continuing the twenty-one-day advance registration requirement.
This appeal followed.
II.
On appeal, plaintiffs argue that, in granting summary
judgment to defendants, the trial judge "erred in not applying
strict scrutiny as the legal standard of review." They also
assert that, even if the balancing test set forth in Burdick,
supra, should have been applied to determine the
constitutionality of N.J.S.A. 19:31-6.3b, the balance should
have been struck in their favor.
Our review of a ruling on summary judgment is de novo,
applying the same legal standard as the trial court. Nicholas
v. Mynster, 213 N.J. 463, 477-78 (2013). Summary judgment is
appropriate where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact challenged and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law." R. 4:46-
2(c).
When determining whether there is a genuine issue of
material fact, the court must consider "whether the competent
evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most
13 A-2383-13T3
favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a
rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in
favor of the non-moving party." Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co.
of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995). The trial judge's obligation
to fully explain his or her ruling on a motion for summary
judgment is clear:
In support of an order granting summary
judgment, a judge is required to detail the
findings of fact and conclusions of law in a
written or oral opinion. R. 1:7-4(a); R.
4:46-2(c). A motion judge is obligated "to
set forth factual findings and correlate
them to legal conclusions. Those findings
and conclusions must then be measured
against the standards set forth in [Brill,
supra, 142 N.J. at 540]." Great Atl. & Pac.
Tea Co. v. Checchio, 335 N.J. Super. 495,
498 (App. Div. 2000). Neither the parties
nor the appellate court is "well-served by
an opinion devoid of analysis . . . ."
Ibid.[Allstate Ins. Co. v. Fisher, 408 N.J.
Super. 289, 299-300 (App. Div. 2009).]
Here, the parties disputed whether the constitutionality of
N.J.S.A. 19:31-6.3b should be determined by applying a strict
scrutiny test or the more flexible, balancing test addressed in
Burdick, supra. Plaintiffs contend, and defendants concede,
that the right to vote is fundamental. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356, 370, 6 S. Ct. 1064, 1071, 30 L. Ed. 220, 226 (1886).
As the trial judge explained, "[i]t is undisputed that New
14 A-2383-13T3
Jersey attaches paramount importance to an individual's right to
vote."
Due to the critical importance of the constitutional right
to vote, plaintiffs argue that a strict scrutiny analysis must
be employed to determine the constitutionality of N.J.S.A.
19:31-6.3b. In support of their contention, plaintiffs
primarily rely upon Worden v. Mercer County Bd. of Elections, 61
N.J. 325 (1972). In that case, election officials told a group
of college students they had not lived long enough in the
municipality where their school was located and that they could
only register to vote in their home towns. Id. at 327-30.
In finding that this requirement, which effectively barred
the students from voting while attending college, was
unconstitutional, our Supreme Court applied "the compelling
state interest test in its broadest aspects, not only for
compliance with the Federal Constitution but also for purposes
of [the] State Constitution and legislation[.]" Id. at 346.
Under this strict scrutiny test, a restriction on registering
and voting of the type involved in Worden, which prevented the
students from voting under any circumstances, would be stricken
"unless a compelling state interest to justify the restriction
is shown." Ibid. (citing Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342,
92 S. Ct. 995, 1003, 31 L. Ed. 2d 274, 284 (1972)) (holding that
15 A-2383-13T3
a twelve-month durational residency requirement was
unconstitutional because the state failed to demonstrate that
the requirement was needed to "promote a compelling governmental
interest").
However, in Burdick, supra, the United States Supreme Court
noted that "government must play an active role in structuring
elections" and, accordingly, "[e]lection laws will invariably
impose some burden upon individual voters." Burdick, supra, 504
U.S. at 433, 112 S. Ct. at 2063, 119 L. Ed. 2d at 253.
Therefore, the Court ruled that a strict scrutiny test was not
always necessary or appropriate. Ibid. Instead, the Court held
that, when the burden imposed by an election law is minor, a
more flexible test for determining the constitutionality of the
requirement should be used:
A court considering a challenge to a state
election law must weigh the character and
magnitude of the asserted injury to the
rights protected by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to
vindicate against the precise interests put
forward by the State as justifications for
the burden imposed by its rule, taking into
consideration the extent to which those
interests make it necessary to burden the
plaintiff's rights.
Under this standard, the rigorousness
of our inquiry into the propriety of a state
election law depends upon the extent to
which a challenged regulation burdens First
and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Thus, as
we have recognized when those rights are
16 A-2383-13T3
subjected to severe restrictions, the
regulation must be narrowly drawn to advance
a state interest of compelling importance.
But when a state election law provision
imposes only reasonable, nondiscriminatory
restrictions upon the First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights of voters, the State's
important regulatory interests are generally
sufficient to justify the restrictions.
[Burdick, supra, 504 U.S. at 433-434, 112 S.
Ct. at 2063, 119 L. Ed. 2d at 253-54(citations and internal quotation marks
omitted).]
In this case, the trial judge found that the Burdick
balancing test was the appropriate method for determining the
constitutionality of N.J.S.A. 19:31-6.3b. For purposes of this
appeal, we assume, without ruling, that the application of this
test was proper.
The judge applied the first part of the Burdick test and
considered the character and magnitude of injury allegedly
suffered by plaintiffs as the result of the twenty-one-day
advance registration requirement. The judge found "the burden
to register to vote, if any, to be minimal." The judge did not
address any of the evidence plaintiffs presented on this issue
and, instead, simply found that because college students are
familiar with the need to meet deadlines for registering for
classes, it was not onerous to require them to meet similar
deadlines to register to vote before an election.
17 A-2383-13T3
Under Burdick, the judge was next required to balance the
"minimal" burden imposed upon plaintiffs by N.J.S.A. 19:31-6.3b
against defendants' proffered justification for imposing the
burden. Defendants asserted that N.J.S.A. 19:31-6.3b advanced
the State's interest in preventing voter fraud and ensuring
public confidence in the integrity of the electoral process.
However, the judge made no findings as to whether this stated
purpose was advanced by the twenty-one-day advance registration
requirement or whether there was any evidence in the record to
support defendants' claim that this requirement was necessary to
prevent voter fraud.
Moreover, plaintiffs submitted reams of evidence, including
certifications, reports, and deposition transcripts, in support
of their contention that New Jersey's SVRS has eliminated voter
fraud as a valid concern, and explaining why it was no longer
necessary to have an advance registration requirement in order
to ensure the integrity of the electoral process. The judge did
not discuss any of this evidence in her brief written opinion.
In short, the judge failed to undertake the second part of the
Burdick analysis.
Defendants' citation to two federal district court cases,
Diaz v. Cobb, 541 F. Supp. 2d 1319 (S.D. Fla. 2008), and Acorn
v. Bysiewicz, 413 F. Supp. 2d 119 (D. Conn. 2005), supports the
18 A-2383-13T3
need for state election officials to submit evidence concerning
their asserted interest in maintaining an advance registration
requirement when faced with a challenge to the constitutionality
of such a statutory provision. In Diaz, supra, the District
Court of the Southern District of Florida applied the Burdick
balancing test, and upheld that state's twenty-nine-day advance
registration requirement. Diaz, supra, 541 F. Supp. 2d at 1333.
The court found that this requirement did not severely burden
"the ability of Floridians to register to vote." Id. at 1335.
On the other side of the Burdick equation, however, Florida
presented a plethora of evidence and testimony that supported
its claim that the advance registration deadline served a
legitimate state interest given the limited technical capacity
of Florida's registration system at the time that case was
decided. Id. at 1335-40. Thus, the court found that Florida
had met its burden of proving it had a valid interest in
maintaining the advance registration requirement and that this
interest outweighed the burden placed on the plaintiffs by this
requirement. Id. at 1340.
Similarly, in Acorn, supra, the court upheld Connecticut's
seven-day advance registration deadline. Acorn, supra, 413 F.
Supp. 2d at 149. With regard to the first half of the Burdick
balancing test, the court found that "requiring citizens to take
19 A-2383-13T3
one or two minutes of their time to register to vote seven days
before a general election cannot reasonably be characterized as
a severe burden on the right to vote." Id. at 123. Moving to
the second part of the test, Connecticut presented evidence to
the court that its voter registration system was not fully
functioning at that time and, therefore, a very brief advance
registration requirement was needed. Id. at 130-31, 149-54.
Under these circumstances, the court held that Connecticut had
met its burden of establishing that it had an interest in
maintaining its requirement and that this interest outweighed
the slight burden imposed upon plaintiffs.8 Id. at 123-24.
Unlike in Diaz and Acorn, here it is not clear what
evidence, if any, defendants presented in support of their
contention that advance registration is still necessary.
Moreover, the trial judge did not discuss plaintiffs' proofs or
make findings concerning whether the facts plaintiffs drew from
those proofs were undisputed or whether a trial was necessary to
resolve any disputes of material fact. The judge also failed to
explain why defendants' interest in the advance registration
requirement outweighed the burden imposed on plaintiffs' right
8
Notably, once Connecticut fully implemented its voter
registration system, it initiated an election day registration
program. (Conn. Gen. Stat. §9-19j (2014)).
20 A-2383-13T3
to vote. Therefore, we are unable to fulfill our appellate
function.
Finally, defendants argue that, rather than seeking
judicial review of N.J.S.A. 19:31-6.3b, plaintiffs should
approach the Legislature to seek the implementation of election
day registration. This argument misses the point. As our
Supreme Court recently held, the statutes crafted by the
Legislature "must be made within a constitutional framework and
it is the obligation of the judicial branch to insist that that
framework be respected and observed." DePascale v. State, 211
N.J. 40, 63 (2012).
Thus, the trial judge was obligated to determine the
constitutionality of N.J.S.A. 19:31-6.3b. In doing so, however,
the judge was further obligated by Rule 1:7-4(a) to make
detailed findings of fact supported by the record, and
conclusions of law drawn from those facts. Our Supreme Court
has expounded on this essential obligation:
Failure to perform that duty constitutes a
disservice to the litigants, the attorneys
and the appellate court. Naked conclusions
do not satisfy the purpose of [Rule] 1:7-4.
Rather, the trial court must state clearly
its factual findings and correlate them with
the relevant legal conclusions.
[Curtis v. Finneran, 83 N.J. 563, 569-70
(1980) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted).]
21 A-2383-13T3
Because the trial judge failed to provide the findings of fact
and conclusions of law required by Rule 1:7-4(a), the order
granting defendants' motion for summary judgment, denying
plaintiffs' motion, and dismissing the complaint must be
reversed.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
22 A-2383-13T3