L.S. VS. F.H. (FD-09-1326-14, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED)

RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0829-16T3
L.S.,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
F.H.,
Defendant-Appellant.
_____________________________
Submitted December 11, 2017 – Decided June 13, 2018
Before Judges Sabatino, Ostrer and Whipple.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Hudson County,
Docket No. FD-09-1326-14.
Toni Ann Russo, attorney for appellant.
Bonilla Law Offices, LLC, attorneys for
respondent (Meghan K. Gulczynski, of counsel
and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant F.H. appeals from May 6, 2016 and October 11, 2016
orders of the Family Part related to custody, parenting time, and
support for her child with plaintiff L.S. For the reasons
enunciated by Family Part Judge Mirtha Ospina, we affirm.
F.H. and L.S. had a son, who was born in November 2013. In
January 2014, L.S., a resident of Connecticut, filed a pro se
complaint seeking to establish paternity and requesting joint
legal custody of the child. F.H. cross-moved for child support,
sole custody, "reasonable" visitation, and an order preventing
L.S. from taking the child out of New Jersey because he was a
"careless driver." In March 2014, the court ordered a paternity
test and held the other issues in abeyance until the results were
confirmed.
In April 2014, L.S. filed an amended complaint, seeking
parenting time and requesting that his last name be added to the
child's.
After oral arguments in May 2014, and based on the results
of the paternity test, the court ordered L.S.'s name be added to
the child's birth certificate as his father, and the child's
surname be a combination of both parents' names. It also ordered
joint legal custody, with F.H. having residential custody,
parenting time for L.S. every Saturday from 10:00 a.m. to 5:00
p.m., and shared holidays. Child support was set at $29 a week,
plus fifteen percent of medical bills over $250, for which F.H.
needed to submit documentation prior to reimbursement.
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In November 2014, L.S. moved to enforce parenting time and
sought to change the location for pick-ups and drop-offs to a
police station. L.S. asserted that after his first visit at F.H.'s
house, she accused him of domestic abuse and sexual assault, and
because he could not make bail on the sexual assault charge, he
was incarcerated for nearly six months. The domestic violence
complaint was dismissed after trial, and the grand jury, in the
criminal case, entered a no-bill. When L.S. was released, he
sought to reestablish his parenting time, but he received no
response from F.H., which caused him to miss scheduled visits and
holiday time.
The court heard oral argument in March 2015 and ordered three
weeks of supervised visitation given L.S.'s lengthy absence from
the young child's life due to incarceration. The other issues
were held in abeyance.
In April 2015, the parties returned to court, where the judge
continued the supervised visitation because L.S. interacted with
the child in a loving and positive manner. The judge ordered
visitation to continue every Saturday from 10:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.
and ordered the parties to attend mediation.
After mediation, the parties agreed parenting time would
gradually increase to overnight time and child support was set at
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$75 per week, among other things. On May 6, 2015, the court
incorporated the agreement into an order.
In March 2016, F.H. filed another domestic violence complaint
against L.S., and a temporary restraining order was entered.
However, in April after a trial, the court vacated the temporary
restraining order and dismissed the complaint.
On April 4, 2016, L.S. moved to enforce and expand parenting
time. He argued the agreement provided he could seek to increase
parenting time; however, when he sought to have the child overnight
on alternating weekends, F.H. initially agreed, but she stopped
all parenting time and communication when he asked her to reduce
the arrangement to writing. L.S. requested make-up parenting time
and a set schedule for holidays. He also sought to enforce the
prior name-change order, claiming that F.H. refused to use the
child's legal name. He further requested counsel fees for the
enforcement action.
In response, on April 8, 2016, F.H. moved for "full custody",
modification of parenting time, pick-ups and drop-offs to be at
the West District Police Station in New Jersey, and to enforce and
increase L.S.'s obligation to pay a portion of the child's medical
expenses. She claimed L.S. had been negligent while the child was
in his care because the child returned with bruises, he failed to
properly dress the child, which contributed to the child's asthma
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condition, and he brought the child to the Bronx Center where he
had gotten hurt and sick. She contended they had agreed exchanges
would occur at her home due to an undisclosed "medical condition,"
but he had reneged. She requested the exchanges take place in New
Jersey because she was unable to drive for long periods because
of medical reasons, her work hours had increased, and she was
caring for an older child.
On April 25, 2016, F.H. filed another motion, seeking an
increase in child support and a cessation of overnight visits
until the child could speak due to the stress the visits allegedly
caused him. She claimed L.S. refused to follow the visitation
orders and did not show up, canceled, and did not bring the child
back to her.
L.S. argued there was no change of circumstances justifying
modification of custody and denied harming the child. He objected
to being tasked with all of the driving for parenting time, and
was willing to pay his share of medical expenses, but he claimed
F.H. never provided proof of the expenses.
On May 6, 2016, the Family Part judge heard oral arguments
and sworn testimony by the parties. The parties had resumed their
romantic relationship in November 2015 and L.S.'s attorney
represented when they broke up in January 2016, F.H. started making
parenting time difficult for L.S. L.S. claimed F.H. had called
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the Division of Child Protection and Permanency (the Division)
numerous times about L.S., and each time, the Division determined
the allegations were unfounded. F.H. admitted she involved the
Division once.
The court refused to change the custody arrangement, finding
F.H. had not shown a substantial change of circumstances and noting
that changing custody was a "last remedy" if other options were
unsuccessful. The judge ordered sixteen make-up parenting days
for L.S., stating she did not believe the child was "conveniently
ill for [sixteen] times" as F.H. had alleged. The court denied
F.H.'s request to have all exchanges occur in New Jersey but
allowed her to send someone in her stead if she were unable to
drive. The judge ordered F.H. to pay $2,687.50 towards L.S.'s
counsel fees, finding the enforcement action was necessitated by
her refusal to allow parenting time and she had the ability to pay
1
counsel fees. The judge signed an order the same day.
On May 31, 2016, F.H. moved for reconsideration. In addition,
she made new claims for temporary sole legal and physical custody
and supervised parenting time pending L.S.'s completion of a
psychological evaluation, anger management class, and parenting
skills course. She again requested that all pick-ups and drop-
1
A second order was signed to correct a typographical error on
May 10, 2016.
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offs be in New Jersey. She also asked the court to hold L.S. in
contempt for failing to return the child on a previous date, and
for counsel fees. F.H. certified that her "debilitating back
condition" prevented her from driving more than forty-five minutes
and the trips to Connecticut interfered with her other son's
activities. She alleged L.S.'s "violent, aggressive, and
irresponsible" behavior was a threat to the child as the child
often returned with "bumps, bruises, cuts, scrapes, and
scratches." She also asked for an increase in child support,
claiming L.S. was making more money, her income had stayed the
same, and she now had to travel to Connecticut.
L.S. denied his income had increased, stating instead he was
deprived of income while incarcerated as a result of F.H.'s
unfounded allegations. He argued that she failed to show a change
in circumstances, either to change custody or increase child
support. He requested additional counsel fees and sought a
transfer of custody to him given F.H.'s constant interference with
his visitation rights.
On October 11, 2016, the Family Part judge denied the motion
for reconsideration, finding F.H. raised no issues the court
previously failed to address and no substantial change in
circumstances warranting a change of custody or an increase in
child support. Instead, the judge found F.H. in violation of the
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previous order to pay L.S.'s counsel fees and the order requiring
the use of the father's last name, and was not submitting medical
bills to L.S. prior to requesting reimbursement. The judge found
that F.H. "want[ed] to relitigate this over, and over, and over
again, wasting not only clearly [L.S.'s] time and making him have
to seek counsel and for counsel fees, but wasting the Court's time
on the same issues that have been litigated ad nauseam." The
judge denied F.H.'s motion for reconsideration with prejudice,
telling her she could not "make another application" for the same
relief. She awarded counsel fees of $3,675 to L.S., because the
reconsideration motion was "a waste of time, was in fact, made in
bad faith, and more importantly, . . . I'm awarding [counsel fees]
under the enforcement application." The judge told F.H. if she
continued to disobey court orders and interfere with L.S.'s
custody, the judge would consider transferring custody to him. An
order was signed the same day.
On October 20, 2016, F.H.'s emergent application to stay the
October 11, 2016 order was denied. The next day, F.H.'s request
to file an emergent motion in the Appellate Division was also
denied.
This appeal followed. F.H. appeals from the May 6, 2016
order denying F.H.'s application for change in custody and
enforcing L.S.'s parenting time, and from the October 11, 2016
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order denying reconsideration. In her appeal, she raises ten
points, which essentially amount to four assertions: The Family
Part judge erred by (1) denying her request for sole custody and
to modify parenting time without a plenary hearing; (2) increasing
L.S.'s parenting time without a showing of changed circumstances;
(3) awarding counsel fees to L.S.; and (4) denying her motion for
reconsideration. We will address these issues in turn. All other
arguments are either moot or without merit.
I.
F.H. argues the Family Part judge erred in denying her
applications for sole custody and to decrease L.S.'s parenting
time, as she showed a prima facie case of changed circumstances
sufficient to warrant a plenary hearing. She claims changed
circumstances were shown cumulatively because L.S. "failed to
appreciate [the child's] medical issues and dress [him]
appropriately to avoid asthma attacks," he exposed the child to
"an environment where he has gotten sick," the child suffered
bruises while in L.S.'s care, and he was "inconsistent" with
parenting time.
Due to "the special jurisdiction and expertise of the family
court," we defer to factual determinations made by the trial court
as long as they are "supported by adequate, substantial, and
credible evidence in the record." Milne v. Goldenberg, 428 N.J.
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Super. 184, 197 (App. Div. 2012) (citing Cesare v. Cesare, 154
N.J. 394, 413 (1998)). We will not disturb the fact-findings of
the trial judge unless "they are so manifestly unsupported by or
inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible
evidence as to offend the interest of justice." Abouzahr v.
Matera-Abouzahr, 361 N.J. Super. 135, 151 (App. Div. 2003) (quoting
Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv'rs Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474,
484 (1974)). "[D]eference is especially appropriate 'when the
evidence is largely testimonial and involves questions of
credibility.'" MacKinnon v. MacKinnon, 191 N.J. 240, 254 (2007)
(quoting Cesare, 154 N.J. at 412). Absent compelling
circumstances, the Appellate Division may not substitute its
judgment for that of the trial court, which has become familiar
with the case. Schwartz v. Schwartz, 68 N.J. Super. 223, 232
(App. Div. 1961).
"In custody cases, it is well settled that the court's primary
consideration is the best interests of the children." Hand v.
Hand, 391 N.J. Super. 102, 105 (App. Div. 2007) (citation omitted).
A party seeking to modify custody or parenting time must
demonstrate changed circumstances that affect the welfare of the
child. Ibid.; Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 157 (1980); Abouzahr,
361 N.J. Super. at 152. Once the moving party makes a prima facie
showing of changed circumstances, only then is the moving party
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entitled to "a plenary hearing as to disputed material facts
regarding the child's best interests, and whether those best
interests are served by modification of the existing custody
order." Faucett v. Vasquez, 411 N.J. Super. 108, 111 (App. Div.
2009).
The judge found F.H. did not show a substantial change of
circumstances sufficient to change custody, and there was no
"reason to deprive the father of any more . . . parenting time."
Our review of the record demonstrates the evidence supports the
judge's decision.
F.H. claimed the child was "bruised" when he returned from
seeing his father; she reported her allegations to the Division,
which found they had no merit. Similarly, although F.H. claimed
L.S. put the child in situations where he got sick, these were
simply general claims that L.S. failed to provide appropriate
care. Her allegations were supported only by her own
certifications and testimony, and given her repeated false
accusations against L.S. and attempts to deprive him of parenting
time, the court did not find her to be credible.
We do not find the court's determination was in error. Given
that F.H. did not meet the changed circumstances threshold, the
judge was not obliged to hold a best-interests plenary hearing on
either motion.
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II.
Next, F.H. argues the judge erred by substantially increasing
L.S.'s parenting time and ordering her to drive to Connecticut
because prior to a change in parenting time, L.S. was required to
show changed circumstances and the court was then obliged to hold
a plenary hearing to determine if a change was in the best
interests of the child. We disagree.
The May 2015 consent agreement, regarding custody and
parenting time, stated the parties "agreed to an incremental
parenting time arrangement which will gradually increase contact"
between L.S. and the child "as well as gradually incorporating
overnight [p]arenting [t]ime between the child and his [f]ather
in the [f]ather's house." Starting in August 2015 and continuing
through October 2015, L.S. was to have one overnight a month in
addition to his weekly visit, and F.H. agreed to transport the
child to and from Connecticut on the overnight weekend visit. For
November and December 2015 and January 2016, L.S. was to have two
single overnights on alternating weekends. This schedule was "the
minimum amount of parenting time"; the parents could, by mutual
consent, increase or modify the agreement as needed.
Beginning in February 2016, the agreement stipulated the
parents would work out a parenting time schedule "to include more
single overnights, alternating (two night) weekend overnights
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and/or mid-week parenting time" either through consent or
mediation. In L.S.'s April 2016 application, he claimed F.H.
refused to reduce a schedule to writing. In accordance with the
consent agreement, the judge ordered L.S.'s parenting time to
increase to every other weekend, Friday to Sunday.
F.H. acknowledges the parenting consent agreement, yet argues
L.S. did not show the existing parenting time agreement entered
on May 1, 2015 was no longer in the best interest of the child.
However, because the parties were bound by the consent agreement,
which contemplated an increase in parenting time, L.S. was not
required to show changed circumstances. He only sought court
intervention to enforce the agreement when F.H. refused to
formalize an increased parenting schedule, as contemplated by the
agreement.
III.
Next, F.H. argues the Family Part abused its discretion by
ordering her to pay L.S.'s counsel fees first on May 6, 2016, and
again on October 11, 2016, because she did not consider certain
factors under Rule 5:3-5(c). "An award of counsel fees is only
disturbed upon a clear abuse of discretion," and will be disturbed
only on the rarest of occasions. J.E.V. v. K.V., 426 N.J. Super.
475, 492 (App. Div. 2012) (quoting City of Englewood v. Exxon
Mobil Corp., 406 N.J. Super. 110, 123 (App. Div. 2009)). Thus,
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we defer to the court's determinations unless they plainly lack
evidentiary support, are contrary to the record, or are based on
a misapplication or disregard of the law. Tannen v. Tannen, 416
N.J. Super. 248, 280-81 (App. Div. 2010).
Rule 4:42-9(a)(1) states "[n]o fee for legal services shall
be allowed . . . except [i]n a family action . . . pursuant to
Rule 5:3-5(c)." Rule 5:3-5(c) says that in determining the amount
of the fee award, the court should consider:
(1) the financial circumstances of the
parties; (2) the ability of the parties to pay
their own fees or to contribute to the fees
of the other party; (3) the reasonableness and
good faith of the positions advanced by the
parties both during and prior to trial; (4)
the extent of the fees incurred by both
parties; (5) any fees previously awarded; (6)
the amount of fees previously paid to counsel
by each party; (7) the results obtained; (8)
the degree to which fees were incurred to
enforce existing orders or to compel
discovery; and (9) any other factor bearing
on the fairness of an award.
In granting L.S.'s counsel fee request, the judge considered
the certification of his attorney, including her qualifications.
She noted that F.H. had the ability to pay, and that L.S.'s motion
was to enforce missed parenting time, and for that reason, she
imposed counsel fees. The judge considered the actions brought
by both parties, concluding the only part of F.H.'s motion that
was for enforcement regarded L.S.'s alleged non-payment of medical
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bills, and found F.H. had not properly presented the bills for
payment. The results obtained were not favorable to F.H. and were
favorable to L.S. Moreover, L.S.'s motion to enforce his parenting
time rights was necessitated by F.H.'s lack of cooperation.
The judge also noted, based on documented paystubs, F.H.
earned $148,000 per year, and at least $102,000 in 2015. The
child support worksheet, which the court prepared in setting L.S.'s
child support obligation in May 2014, shows F.H. had a yearly
gross income of $111,644, while L.S. had a yearly gross income of
$16,016. Where one party has substantial income and the other
does not, "[t]hat disparity alone would suggest some entitlement
. . . to a fee allowance." Lavene v. Lavene, 148 N.J. Super. 267,
277 (App. Div. 1977).
While F.H. asserts the judge erred in not considering fees
previously awarded, there were none. She also complains the judge
did not consider fees previously paid. F.H. represented herself
at this hearing, and although she claims she owed her former
counsel money, she provides no evidence supporting this in the
record. As such, any error in not considering these factors was
harmless.
On October 11, 2016, the judge again granted counsel fees to
L.S. under the enforcement application. F.H. now argues that the
judge did not consider the relevant factors under Rule 5:3-5 and
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Rule 4:42-9.
The judge concluded under Rule 5:3-7(a), the court can impose
economic sanctions when a party has violated an order regarding
custody or parenting time. Additionally, she found the fees sought
were reasonable, and F.H. acted in bad faith and wasted the court's
time by not only seeking reconsideration, but adding new and
meritless requests for relief.
The judge noted the motion for reconsideration was a mere re-
litigation of issues previously been fully addressed. Moreover,
F.H. made no payment towards the counsel fees initially ordered
in May 2016, and failed to abide by multiple orders with respect
to the child's name. Considering the record as a whole, we do not
find this award of fees was an abuse of discretion.
IV.
Lastly, F.H. asserts the judge erred in denying her motion
for reconsideration. The decision on whether to deny a motion for
reconsideration rests squarely in the discretion of the trial
court. Marinelli v. Mitts & Merrill, 303 N.J. Super. 61, 77 (App.
Div. 1997) (citation omitted). A motion for reconsideration should
be granted only under the narrow circumstances "in which either
(1) the [c]ourt has expressed its decision based upon a palpably
incorrect or irrational basis, or (2) it is obvious that the
[c]ourt either did not consider, or failed to appreciate the
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significance of probative, competent evidence." Fusco v. Bd. of
Educ. of City of Newark, 349 N.J. Super. 455, 462 (App. Div. 2002)
(citations omitted).
First, F.H. argues the judge did not consider the significance
of her medical issues and how they would impact the parenting time
arrangements with L.S. However, during the May 6, 2016 hearing,
in response to F.H.'s assertion that because of documented back
problems, she could not make the drive to and from Connecticut as
she was ordered, the judge stated, "[y]ou can make arrangements
to have your child picked up if you so choose." As such, the
judge clearly considered the impact that a back condition would
have on the parenting time arrangement.
Next, F.H. contends the trial judge did not properly consider
the changed circumstances demonstrated by L.S.'s inability to
provide adequate care to the child. However, in support of her
application for sole custody, F.H. only repeated her earlier claims
that the child was not safe in L.S.'s care, and points to nothing
the judge explicitly overlooked in making her decision. A motion
seeking reconsideration of a prior order is governed by Rule 4:49-
2, which requires the movant to "state with specificity the basis
on which [the motion] is made, including a statement of the matters
or controlling decision which counsel believes the court has
overlooked or as to which it has erred . . . ."
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F.H. also contends the judge did not consider changes in
L.S.'s income when denying her motion for reconsideration
regarding child support arrangements. The judge denied an increase
to L.S.'s child support obligation, finding no changed
circumstances. We cannot say this determination was in error.
As a preliminary matter, school expenses, food, and clothing
are included in the Child Support Guidelines, and under Rule 5:6B,
child support orders are subject to an automatic cost-of-living
adjustment every two years, from the last date the support order
was entered or modified. See Burns v. Edwards, 367 N.J. Super.
29, 34 (App. Div. 2004). Furthermore, under the May 2014 order,
medical expenses were an issue separate from child support, and
even as such, F.H. provided no new information supporting an
increase in L.S.'s obligation towards these expenses.
F.H. also asserts it was an error for the trial court to not
consider her unsupported assertions that L.S. was underreporting
his income, and such assertions warranted a plenary hearing. When
applying for a modification of child support, the moving party
"shall append copies of the movant's current case information
statement and that movant's case information statement previously
executed or filed in connection with the order, judgment or
agreement sought to be modified." R. 5:5-4(a). "When the record
presented to the court in support of a motion is deficient on its
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face to satisfy such requirements, oral argument does not afford
litigants an opportunity to cure such evidentiary deficiencies."
Palombi v. Palombi, 414 N.J. Super. 274, 286 (App. Div. 2010).
F.H. did not comply with this requirement, and thus, it was within
the trial court's discretion to deny her request. See Gonzalez-
Posse v. Ricciardulli, 410 N.J. Super. 340, 351 (App. Div. 2009)
(no further inquiry was necessary where there was no proof that
defendant was concealing his income, "nor proof that his lifestyle
was so disparate compared to his reported income").
F.H.'s motion to reconsider the May 6, 2016 award of counsel
fees puts forth no new arguments or evidence in which she contends
the trial court failed to consider.
Reconsideration "is not appropriate merely because a litigant
is dissatisfied with a decision of the court or wishes to reargue
a motion . . . ." Palombi, 414 N.J. Super. at 288. "[T]he
magnitude of the error cited must be a game-changer for
reconsideration to be appropriate." Id. at 289. "Said another
way, a litigant must initially demonstrate that the Court acted
in an arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable manner, before the
Court should engage in the actual reconsideration process." Ibid.(quoting D'Atria v. D'Atria, 242 N.J. Super. 392, 401 (Ch. Div.
1990)) (emphasis added by Palombi court).
F.H. has not demonstrated the court acted in an arbitrary,
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capricious, or unreasonable manner in denying her motion for
reconsideration, and we cannot say the judge erred.
All additional arguments introduced by defendants are without
sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R.
2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
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