KAREN E. LOCKER VS. BOARD OF REVIEW (BOARD OF REVIEW, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3052-17T4
KAREN E. LOCKER,
Appellant,
v.
BOARD OF REVIEW,
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, and
SOUTH JERSEY BEHAVIORAL
HEALTH RESOURCES, INC.,
Respondents.
_____________________________
Submitted October 16, 2019 – Decided November 25, 2019
Before Judges Fisher and Gilson.
On appeal from the Board of Review, Department of
Labor, Docket No. 137,633.
Karen E. Locker, appellant pro se.
Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for
respondent Board of Review (Donna Sue Arons,
Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Rimma
Razhba, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
Obermayer Rebmann Maxwell & Hippel LLP,
attorneys for respondent South Jersey Behavioral
Health Resources, Inc. (Charles L. Shute, Jr., on the
brief).
PER CURIAM
Karen Locker appeals from a final agency decision by the Board of
Review (Board), which found that she was not eligible for unemployment
benefits because she left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to
work. N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a). We affirm.
Locker was employed by South Jersey Behavioral Health Resources, Inc.
(the Employer) as a community support coordinator. She worked for the
Employer for approximately nine months, from February 2017 until e arly
October 2017. On October 6, 2017, Locker resigned from work.
Shortly thereafter Locker filed for unemployment benefits, claiming she
had been subject to a hostile work environment. She was initially found eligible
for benefits, but her Employer appealed, contending that Locker had voluntarily
resigned without giving notice. A telephonic hearing was conducted before the
Appellate Tribunal (Tribunal), and Locker and the human resources manager of
the Employer testified.
Locker testified that throughout her employment, her immediate
supervisor acted inappropriately and unprofessionally towards her. She first
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complained of that conduct to her Employer on September 15, 2017. On that
day, Locker had met with her supervisor and during that meeting the supervisor
had repeatedly screamed at Locker and acted in an intimidating manner towards
her. Immediately following the meeting, Locker filed a grievance with her
Employer.
That same day, a representative of human resources and the Employer's
chief executive officer met with Locker and the supervisor. Locker was
informed that her supervisor had been told that her behavior was unacceptable
and she was not to retaliate against Locker.
Locker went on to testify that following the September 15, 2017 meeting,
the supervisor engaged in "passive aggressive" behavior towards her by telling
other employees not to share information with her. The supervisor also assigned
Locker more work than she could do and, when Locker questioned her ability to
complete all the work, the supervisor told Locker to engage in "unethical"
conduct.
After the September 15, 2017 meeting Locker did not notify her Employer
of the supervisor's behavior until she submitted her resignation on October 6,
2017. On that date, Locker met with the manager of human resources and
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informed her she was resigning effective immediately. The manager asked
Locker to confirm her resignation in writing, which Locker did.
The manager of human resources confirmed that the first time Locker
complained about her supervisor's conduct was on September 15, 2017. The
manager also testified that Locker next complained on the day that she resigned
and, therefore, the Employer had no opportunity to address the situation.
Finally, the manager testified that when Locker resigned she was not being asked
to leave work and, if she had chosen, she could have stayed and continued to
work for the Employer.
Based on that testimony, the Tribunal found that Locker had filed a
grievance on September 15, 2017, and that was the first time that Locker
complained of her supervisor's conduct. The Tribunal also found that after
September 15, 2017, Locker did not notify the employer of any further incidents
with her supervisor until she resigned on October 6, 2017. Accordingly, the
Tribunal found that Locker did not give the Employer an opportunity to
eliminate or address any alleged inappropriate conduct that occurred after
September 15, 2017. Based on those findings, the Tribunal concluded that
Locker had left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the work.
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Therefore, the Tribunal reversed the initial decision granting Locker
unemployment benefits.
Locker administratively appealed, but the Board affirmed the Tribunal's
decision. In its written decision, the Board found that Locker had initially
"discussed her dissatisfaction with her supervisor's demeanor with [h]uman
[r]esources," but "there is no evidence that the conditions were so severe as to
give [Locker] good cause for quitting work."
Locker now appeals to us and contends that no reasonable person could
have tolerated the conduct of the supervisor and, therefore, she left work with
good cause attributable to her work. Given our limited scope of review, we
discern no basis to reverse the decision of the Board.
An agency's decision should not be disturbed on appeal unless it is shown
to be arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. Brady v. Bd. of Review, 152 N.J.
197, 210 (1997) (citing In re Warren, 117 N.J. 295, 296 (1989)). We "'can
intervene only in those rare circumstances in which an agency action is clearly
inconsistent with its statutory mission or with other [s]tate policy.'" Ibid.
(quoting George Harms Constr. Co. v. N.J. Tpk. Auth., 137 N.J. 8, 27 (1994)).
Furthermore, "'[i]n reviewing the factual findings made in an unemployment
compensation proceeding, the test is not whether an appellate court would come
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to the same conclusion if the original determination was its to make, but rather
whether the fact finder could reasonably so conclude upon the proofs.'" Ibid.
(alteration in original) (quoting Charatan v. Bd. of Review, 200 N.J. Super. 74,
79 (App. Div. 1985)). In sum, our scope of review is confined to determining
"whether the agency's decision offend[ed] the State or Federal Constitution[s]";
whether such action violated legislative policies; "whether the record
contain[ed] substantial evidence to support" the agency's factual findings; and
whether the agency, in applying "legislative policies to the facts, . . . clearly
erred in reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably have been made . . . ."
Id. at 210-11 (quoting George Harms Constr., 137 N.J. at 27).
The relevant statute provides that an individual shall be disqualified from
receiving benefits if "the individual has left work voluntarily without good cause
attributable to such work, . . . ." N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a). "While the statute does
not define 'good cause,' . . . courts have construed the statute to mean 'cause
sufficient to justify an employee's voluntarily leaving the ranks of the employed
and joining the ranks of the unemployed.'" Domenico v. Bd. of Review, 192
N.J. Super. 284, 287 (App. Div. 1983) (citations omitted) (quoting Condo v. Bd.
of Review, 158 N.J. Super. 172, 174 (App. Div. 1978)).
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The test for determining whether an employee's decision to leave work
constitutes "good cause" is one of "'ordinary common sense and prudence'
. . . ." Brady, 152 N.J. at 214 (quoting Zielenski v. Bd. of Review, 85 N.J. Super.
46, 52 (App. Div. 1964)). The employee's decision to quit "'must be compelled
by real, substantial and reasonable circumstances not imaginary, trifling and
whimsical ones.'" Ibid. (quoting Domenico, 192 N.J. Super. at 288). "A
claimant has the 'responsibility to do whatever is necessary and reasonable in
order to remain employed.'" Ibid. (citation omitted) (quoting Heulitt v. Bd. of
Review, 300 N.J. Super. 407, 414 (App. Div. 1997)).
Applying these well-established standards, we discern no basis to disturb
the determinations made by the Board. Locker complains of the unprofessional
conduct of her supervisor. She first brought that conduct to the attention of her
Employer on September 15, 2017. The Tribunal found that the Employer
appropriately addressed the situation at that time. Thereafter, Locker did not
complain again until the day she resigned from work. The Tribunal therefore
found that Locker did not give her Employer any time to address the situation
further. The Board adopted those findings and those findings are based o n
substantial credible evidence in the record.
Affirmed.
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