STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. CARLOS R. BELAUNDE (16-03-0219, PASSAIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED)

RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4976-17T3
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
CARLOS R. BELAUNDE,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Submitted October 30, 2019 - Decided December 2, 2019
Before Judges Koblitz and Whipple.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Passaic County, Indictment No.16-03-0219.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Zachary Gilbert Markarian, Assistant
Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the briefs).
Camelia M. Valdes, Passaic County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Christopher W. Hsieh, Chief
Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Carlos Belaunde appeals from his March 9, 2018 judgment of
conviction after entering a negotiated guilty plea to second-degree attempted
aggravated sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1 and N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(7). He was
sentenced to eight years of imprisonment, subject to an eighty-five percent period of
parole ineligibility pursuant to the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2.
Defendant argues on appeal that his confession should have been suppressed. After
careful review of the record, we disagree and affirm.
I. Factual background.
On July 15, 2014, the victim's mother reported to the Paterson Police
Department that three days before, L.F., her twenty-year-old, non-verbal
daughter who suffered from cerebral palsy and severe developmental delays,
was sexually assaulted. She said defendant, the mother's then-boyfriend who
had been living with them for four and a half years, was seen naked lying in
L.F.'s bed. She told the police that the eyewitness, her friend who was staying
with them, saw the two together. The mother took L.F. to Saint Joseph's hospital
in Paterson, where a sexual assault examination kit was conducted.
The police found defendant on July 22, 2014, where he was staying with
his former wife and sons. Detective David Posada and his partner, Detective
Pauline Nassimos, arrived in plain clothes with their badges displayed around
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their necks. Defendant voluntarily agreed to accompany the detectives to the
prosecutor's office. He was neither charged, nor handcuffed. During the
roughly twenty-minute drive to the prosecutor's office, the detectives did not
talk with defendant about the allegations.
After arriving at the prosecutor's office, defendant was left alone in a
locked interview room for about five minutes while Posada went to activate the
recording equipment. Posada described defendant's demeanor as "very calm."
Posada reentered the interview room and, upon determining that defendant
preferred the interview be conducted in Spanish, handed defendant the Passaic
County Prosecutor's Office Spanish Miranda1 waiver form. While defendant
followed along, Posada read the form aloud in Spanish. After reading each right,
he asked defendant whether he understood it. Defendant indicated each time
that he did understand. After reading all the rights, Posada and defendant
engaged in the following colloquy, translated from Spanish:
DET: Understanding these rights, are you willing to give
up your rights and speak with me?
CB: Honestly I really don't know what this is about.
DET: Okay so you can understand I cannot speak to you
about anything until we go over this document and you
want to talk to me understanding what your rights are. So
1
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966)
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it is your decision but before I can speak to you I have to
go over these rights and make sure you understand what
your rights are and then if you want you, you can talk to
me.
CB: Oh, oh okay.
DET: Okay so I'm going to repeat it, understanding these
rights, are you willing to give up your rights and speak
with me?
CB: But during anytime can I[,] I um.
DET: Stop talking?
CB: Of course and talk to an attorney about this? Of
course.
DET: Of course, of course number [six] says, if you decide
to speak with now without a lawyer present you still have
the right to stop speaking with me at any time.
Defendant then orally waived his Miranda rights and agreed to talk.
When Posada asked defendant what happened on July 12, 2014, defendant
explained that he came home drunk around 7 or 8 a.m. He woke around 9:30
a.m. to go to the bathroom and somehow ended up in L.F.'s room. Defendant
explained that instead of making a left to go to the bathroom, he made a right
and entered the second bedroom, belonging to L.F. He was shirtless and had
pulled his boxers halfway down his legs. Defendant first asserted the eyewitness
saw L.F. awake and sitting in a chair while he was standing by the bed. When
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defendant said nothing else happened, Posada accused him of lying. Posada
explained that he had already spoken to other witnesses and knew what
happened, but wanted to give defendant the opportunity to tell the truth .
Defendant then admitted to lying in bed with L.F while his boxers were
halfway down his legs and L.F. was in her pajamas wearing shorts. Defendant
was lying on his side with L.F. facing him and their heads touching. The
eyewitness was passing by L.F.'s bedroom when she noticed defendant and
yelled at him to leave. Defendant once again asserted that nothing else
happened. Posada told defendant that he still did not believe him, and defendant
should confess to him because the detective was his "best friend at this moment."
Defendant eventually admitted to hugging L.F. Defendant explained that
he and L.F. were facing each other and his penis was touching her left leg while
he was moving his body as they hugged. The eyewitness came into the room
moments later and yelled at defendant to leave. Defendant explained that it was
"good luck" the eyewitness entered when she did because "he would have done
something else."
Posada left the interview room and upon returning, he told defendant that
his supervisor and the prosecutors believed defendant was lying. At one point,
Posada asked defendant whether he was a man of God. Defendant continued to
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say he did not do anything else. This one hour and thirty-three minutes interview
was video-recorded and later transcribed and translated into English.
Defendant raises the following issues on appeal:
POINT I: BELAUNDE'S STATEMENT WAS
TAKEN IN VIOLATION OF HIS RIGHT AGAINST
SELF-INCRIMINATION, WAS INVOLUNTARY,
AND WAS UNRELIABLE. THE TRIAL COURT
ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS
HIS STATEMENT.
A. BELAUNDE DID NOT KNOWINGLY AND
VOLUNTARILY WAIVE HIS RIGHTS BECAUSE
DETECTIVE POSADA HASTILY PRESENTED THE
MIRANDA WARNINGS AND, IN RESPONSE TO
BELAUNDE'S REQUESTS FOR CLARIFICATION,
CHARACTERIZED WAIVER AS A MERE
BUREAUCRATIC FORMALITY.
B. BELAUNDE'S STATEMENTS MADE
FOLLOWING DETECTIVE POSADA'S
REPETITIVE AND BELLIGERENT QUESTIONING,
WHICH CONTRADICTED THE MIRANDA
RIGHTS, MUST BE SUPPRESSED BECAUSE THEY
WERE NOT VOLUNTARY AND ARE NOT
RELIABLE.
II. Legal standards.
We defer to a trial court's factual findings as to the voluntariness of a
defendant's Miranda waiver and "consider whether those findings are 'supported
by sufficient credible evidence in the record.'" State v. Tillery, 238 N.J. 293,
314 (2019) (quoting State v. S.S., 229 N.J. 360, 374 (2017)). To ensure a
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defendant's constitutional rights are protected, we "should engage in a 'searching
and critical' review of the record." State v. Hreha, 217 N.J. 368, 381-82 (2014)
(quoting State v. Pickles, 46 N.J. 542, 577 (1966)). That review "does not
generally involve 'an independent assessment of the evidence.'" Id. at 384
(quoting State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 471 (1999)). "[A] trial court's findings
should be disturbed only if they are so clearly mistaken 'that the interests of
justice demand intervention and correction.'" State v. A.M., 237 N.J. 384, 395-
96 (2019) (quoting State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 244 (2007)). In contrast, a trial
court's legal conclusions should be reviewed de novo. Tillery, 238 N.J. at 314.
"[T]he right against self-incrimination . . . [is] 'guaranteed by the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and [New Jersey's] common law, now
embodied in statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-19, and evidence rule, N.J.R.E. 503.'" Id. at
315 (quoting State v. Nyhammer, 197 N.J. 383, 399 (2009)). To preserve
constitutional guarantees, a suspect subject to a custodial interrogation must be
advised of these rights prior to the interview. Ibid.III. Defendant's waiver.
Defendant argues that the State failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt
that defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. While Posada
handed defendant a written copy of the rights in Spanish and read the rights aloud to
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defendant in Spanish, defendant complains that the rights were read to him only once
and he held the form for only two minutes before Posada took it from him.
Furthermore, defendant did not sign the Miranda form, which had no signature line.
"The essential purpose of Miranda is to empower a person—subject to
custodial interrogation within a police-dominated atmosphere—with knowledge of
his basic constitutional rights so that he can exercise, according to his free will, the
right against self-incrimination or waive that right and answer questions."
Nyhammer, 197 N.J. at 406. When an individual waives Miranda rights, "the State
must 'prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the suspect's waiver was knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary in light of all the circumstances.'" Tillery, 238 N.J. at 316
(quoting State v. Presha, 163 N.J. 304, 313 (2000)). A person's Miranda waiver need
not be explicitly stated nor be in writing to be effective. Ibid.; State v. Warmbrun,
277 N.J. Super. 51, 62 (App. Div. 1994).
"[A] knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver is determined by the totality
of the circumstances surrounding the custodial interrogation based on the fact-based
assessments of the trial court." A.M. 237 N.J. at 398. "Where the prosecution
shows that a Miranda warning was given and that it was understood by the accused,
an accused's uncoerced statement establishes an implied waiver of the right to remain
silent." Tillery, 238 N.J. at 316 (quoting Berghuis v. Thomas, 560 U.S. 370, 384
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(2010)). To determine the validity of the waiver, a court considers "the suspect's
age, education and intelligence, advice as to constitutional rights, length of
detention, whether the questioning was repeated and prolonged in nature and
whether physical punishment or mental exhaustion was involved." A.M., 237 N.J.
at 398 (quoting State v. Miller, 76 N.J. 392, 402 (1978)). However, "a valid waiver
does not require that an individual be informed of all information 'useful' in making
his [or her] decision.'" Nyhammer, 197 N.J. at 407 (quoting Colorado v. Spring, 479
U.S. 564, 576 (1987)).
In applying the above principals, the motion court found that the State
established beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. Our Supreme Court has directed that "[t]o
eliminate questions about a suspect's understanding, the entire Miranda form
should be read aloud to a suspect being interrogated, or the suspect should be
asked to read the entire form aloud." A.M., 237 N.J. at 400.
Defendant was provided a copy of the Miranda warnings in Spanish and was
told by Posada to follow along the form while he read defendant the warnings. The
record does not support a finding that defendant's will was overborne. Posada
explained that while he could not speak about anything regarding the allegation until
defendant indicated he understood his Miranda rights, defendant could at any time
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during the interview stop talking and speak to an attorney. When defendant did not
understand Posada's question, defendant felt comfortable asking for a clarification.
Defendant orally waived his Miranda rights and chose to proceed with the interview.
Posada did not initially inform defendant why he was being interviewed.
When no charges have been filed prior to a custodial interrogation, our Supreme
Court has explained that they "are not aware of any case in any jurisdiction that
commands that a person be informed of his suspect status in addition to his Miranda
warnings." Nyhammer, 197 N.J. at 406. "In the typical case, explicit knowledge of
one's status as a suspect will not be important for Miranda purposes." Id. at 407.
While, the failure to be informed may be considered in the totality of circumstances,
"Miranda warnings themselves strongly suggest, if not scream out, that a person is a
suspect." Nyhammer, 197 N.J. at 407. Defendant was not charged criminally until
after the interview.
Furthermore, a signed waiver is not required. Warmbrun, 277 N.J. Super. at
62. The motion court found that defendant did not have difficulty communicating
with Posada after factoring in defendant's age, intelligence, and demeanor during the
interview. The court's finding that defendant waived his rights is based on
substantial credible evidence in the record and does not warrant reversal.
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Defendant also argues his statement was involuntary. "There is substantial
overlap between the factors that govern a court's determination of whether a Miranda
waiver is valid and the factors that a court considers in its separate assessment of the
voluntariness of a confession." Tillery, 238 N.J. at 316-17. Once again, "the
suspect's age, education and intelligence, advice as to constitutional rights, length of
detention, whether the questioning was repeated and prolonged in nature and
whether physical punishment or mental exhaustion was involved" should be
considered. A.M., 237 N.J. at 398 (quoting Miller, 76 N.J. at 402)). These factors
"should be assessed qualitatively, not quantitatively, and the presence of even one
of those factors may permit the conclusion that a confession was involuntary." Id.
at 384.
The motion court found that defendant's "statement was given voluntarily
beyond a reasonable doubt." Having "viewed [the video recording of the] interview,
and looking at the nature of the interrogation, the defendant's age, . . . his
understanding of these rights, [and] the length of the detention which was about an
hour and a half," the motion court determined that, under the totality of the
circumstances, defendant was not subject to undue coercion, despite some repeated
questioning.
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Defendant argues that Posada's use of the Reid technique2 was "a coercive
interrogation method." Posada did not testify that he employed the Reid technique,
but rather said he was familiar with it. No case supports the contention that using
the Reid technique renders an adult's confession inadmissible. A suspect will have
a "natural reluctance . . . to admit to the commission of a crime and furnish details."
Miller, 76 N.J. at 403. Therefore, "an interrogating officer . . . [may] dissipate this
reluctance and persuade the person to talk . . . as long as the will of the suspect is
not overborne." Ibid. Recognizing that the "[q]uestioning of a suspect almost
necessarily involves the use of psychological factors," our Supreme Court held that
"appealing to a person's sense of decency and urging him to tell the truth for his own
sake are applications of psychological principals," that are permissible. Id. at 405.
Likewise, "[t]he fact that the police lie to a suspect does not, by itself, render a
confession involuntary." Galloway, 133 N.J. at 655.
2
"Interrogators trained in the Reid technique employ positive and negative
incentives to induce a confession." State ex rel. A.W., 212 N.J. 114, 148 (2012).
"On the one hand, the interrogator confronts the suspect with accusations of
guilt, assertions that may be bolstered by evidence, real or manufactured, and
refuses to accept alibis and denials. On the other hand, the interrogator offers
sympathy and moral justification, introducing 'themes' that minimize the crime
and lead suspects to see confession as an expedited means of escape." Ibid.(quoting Saul M. Kassin et. al., Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and
Recommendations, 34 Law & Hum. Behav. 3, 7 (2010)).
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Posada repeatedly told defendant that he did not believe him and that by lying,
defendant was not helping himself. In particular, he said:
Look Mr. Belaunde this is your opportunity to . . . tell the
truth, this is your opportunity to write a good ending to this
story. Look at yourself inside will you be able . . . to live
with yourself lying to me? And leaving from here saying
that nothing happened? Will you be able to live with that?
So tell me what happen[ed] without shame because I am
not here to judge you sir. I am here to understand what
happened. That is why I, they call me an investigator not
a judge[.] I am not here to judge. I am here to understand
and through me, I can explain[,] I can tell people your
story okay.
Posada also used defendant's religious beliefs to obtain a statement.
Defendant notes that in State v. L.H., 239 N.J. 22, 48 (2019), our Supreme
Court explained that under the totality of the circumstances, "by falsely asserting or
suggesting that a suspect's words will be used in his favor and not against him in
court," the police contradicted the Miranda warnings. Here, Posada's methods did
not contradict or undermined defendant's Miranda rights. The motion court did not
err in finding that, under the totality of the circumstances, defendant's statement was
voluntary.
Affirmed.
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