DCPP VS. J.L. AND L.Y., IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF M.Y. (FG-15-0030-18, OCEAN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED)

RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1497-18T2
NEW JERSEY DIVISION
OF CHILD PROTECTION
AND PERMANENCY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
J.L.,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
L.Y.,
Defendant.
_____________________________
IN THE MATTER OF THE
GUARDIANSHIP OF M.Y.,
a Minor.
_____________________________
Submitted October 15, 2019 – Decided November 7, 2019
Before Judges Sumners and Geiger.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Ocean County, Docket
No. FG-15-0030-18.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Robyn A. Veasey, Deputy Public Defender,
of counsel; Mark Edward Kleiman, Designated
Counsel, on the briefs).
Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for
respondent (Jane C. Schuster, Assistant Attorney
General, of counsel; Nicole T. Laferriere, Deputy
Attorney General, on the brief).
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian,
attorney for minor (Todd S. Wilson, Designated
Counsel, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant J.L.1 appeals from a Family Part judgment of guardianship
terminating her parental rights of her now three-year-old daughter, M.Y.
(Maya), following a three-day guardianship trial. 2 Maya is currently placed with
her paternal grandmother, N.G. (Nia).
1
We use initials and pseudonyms to protect the identity of the child. See R.
1:38-3(d)(12).
2
Defendant L.Y. is Maya's father. He voluntarily surrendered his parental
rights on October 4, 2018. He has not appealed the trial court's decision or
participated in this appeal.
A-1497-18T2
2
Plaintiff New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency's (the
Division) court-approved plan is for Maya's paternal grandmother to adopt her.
Maya's Law Guardian supports that plan, and joins the Division in urging that
we affirm the trial court's decision.
For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court's determination that
the Division met its burden of proof with respect to the first two prongs of the
termination of parental rights statute, N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a). We remand with
respect to prongs three and four of the statute, to:
(1) develop the trial record with more clarity as to
whether [the] resource parent unequivocally,
unambiguously, and unconditionally wishes to adopt
the child[] in her care, regardless of the potential
alternative of Kinship Legal Guardianship ("KLG");
and (2) obtain explicit findings by the trial court
addressing KLG as it relates to the feasibility of
adoption.
[N.J. Div. of Child Prot. and Permanency v. M.M., 459
N.J. Super. 246, 252 (App. Div. 2019).]
In all other respects, we uphold the trial court's fully supported and well-
reasoned decision.
I.
We need not detail the record extensively in this opinion. We summarize
only the salient facts pertinent to our discussion.
A-1497-18T2
3
Maya was born prematurely at thirty-one weeks gestation on August 22,
2016, and remained hospitalized for one month. Three days later, the Division
received a referral from Monmouth Medical Center expressing concerns that
J.L. tested positive for marijuana.
On September 1, 2016, J.L. again, along with L.Y., tested positive for
marijuana. The Division opened a case for services and supervision, and
required both parents to attend substance abuse evaluations. The Division also
learned of J.L. and L.Y.'s history of marijuana use, L.Y.'s probation and criminal
history, and that L.Y. was homeless. Neither parent completed the initial
recommended substance abuse treatment.
On September 23, 2016, the hospital released Maya to J.L.; they went to
J.L.'s parents' home where J.L. resided at the time. Approximately four days
later, Maya returned to the hospital for over a week due to poor feeding,
lethargy, and a respiratory infection.
In early November 2016, the Division received two calls from the
maternal grandparents expressing their concern for Maya's well-being after J.L.
moved out with Maya. In response to the second call, Division workers visited
J.L. and L.Y. at a motel they were staying at with Maya. Due to concerns of
suspected domestic violence and marijuana use in Maya's presence, the Division
A-1497-18T2
4
workers transported the family to a local Division office. After unsuccessfully
attempting to implement a safety protection plan, the Division workers
conducted an emergency removal of Maya on November 9, 2016, and
transported her to a resource home, placing her with Lisa Studer-Haywood. Five
days later, the Division filed a complaint for custody, which the court granted
that same day. The court ordered J.L. and L.Y. to submit random urine
screenings and attend updated substance abuse evaluations. The Division
arranged visits for both parents. After attending her first visit on December 1,
2016, J.L. reported she moved to California with L.Y. to "start over." The
Division was not able to locate either parent for three months. Meanwhile, in
January 2017, Studer-Haywood sought early intervention for Maya due to
developmental concerns.
In February 2017, J.L. appeared at a court hearing concerning Maya 's
custody. Thereafter, the Division arranged visitation, which J.L. consistently
attended. Beginning in April 2017, Nia began supervising visits on weekends
(at the time, Nia was moving back and forth between New Jersey and Florida).
During that time, J.L. completed an outpatient substance abuse program and
produced negative urine screens until July 2017, when she again tested positive
A-1497-18T2
5
for marijuana. Meanwhile, the Division learned L.Y. was extradited from
California to New Jersey, where he remained incarcerated until August 2017.
On May 24, 2017, Lori Lessin, Ph.D., conducted a psychological
evaluation of J.L. Dr. Lessin noted J.L. "presented as immature and self-
absorbed, and there was no indication that she is currently able to prioritize her
daughter's needs over her own." Dr. Lessin recommended substance abuse
treatment, individual counseling, supervised visitation, and development of a
long-term housing plan.
In September 2017, J.L. was discharged from treatment and counseling
for noncompliance. On October 20, 2017, the court accepted the Division 's
permanency plan for Maya—termination of parental rights followed by
adoption. In November 2017, the Division filed a complaint for guardianship
of Maya.
On May 3, 2018, Dr. Lessin re-evaluated J.L. and conducted a bonding
evaluation between J.L. and Maya. In July 2018, J.L. completed a substance
abuse program, but subsequently tested positive for marijuana during the months
leading up to the guardianship trial.
A-1497-18T2
6
In sum, Maya has been placed with a resource parent since she was
seventy-nine days old. Of those first seventy-nine days, she was hospitalized
for forty-one days. The guardianship trial commenced in October 2018.
On the first day of trial, the court accepted L.Y.'s surrender of his parental
rights. Division workers Jaime Rimer and Alyson Simak testified for the
Division. Rimer testified regarding the Division's initial investigation, Maya's
emergency removal, and the unsuccessful reunification attempts that led up to
the October 2017 permanency hearing. Rimer also noted J.L. does not
necessarily understand Maya's special needs, and that J.L. "felt [Maya's] delays
were the result of being premature and that she would catch up."
Simak described the Division's unsuccessful efforts to provide J.L. with
treatment and counseling, noting J.L. tested positive for marijuana right before
trial. Further, Simak related J.L. consistently visited Maya but expressed
concern that J.L. did not fully understand Maya's condition, citing J.L.'s remarks
that she would get Maya to walk and eat solid foods.
Additionally, Simak described Maya's disabilities. She stated Maya could
not walk, talk, sit up, or roll over. She further explained Maya's need for
therapy, special equipment, and services which Maya will likely need for the
rest of her life. Simak noted J.L. missed some of Maya's doctor appointments
A-1497-18T2
7
and that J.L. could not describe how she would care for Maya. Finally, Simak
indicated Nia was a suitable caretaker for Maya based on her experience caring
for children with special needs.
Studer-Haywood testified about her time as Maya's resource parent.
Studer-Haywood noted she sought early intervention for Maya when she was
about four months old due to developmental concerns. Thereafter, Maya was
provided with physical, occupational, and speech therapies. Additionally, Maya
sees multiple specialists including a gastroenterologist, ophthalmologist,
neurologist, and pediatrician. Studer-Haywood indicated Mia cannot talk other
than to say "hi" or "ouch."
Dr. Lessin testified regarding her psychological evaluations of J.L. and
the bonding evaluation of J.L. and Maya. In concluding J.L. "would not be able
to independently parent" Maya and that "termination of her rights would be
appropriate," Dr. Lessin cited J.L.'s failure to establish long-term stability, J.L.'s
relationship with L.Y., and J.L.'s lack of understanding concerning Maya's
special needs. Regarding Maya's special needs, Dr. Lessin noted such lack of
understanding "could be life threatening." Dr. Lessin also testified that the
significance of the bonding evaluation in this matter is different due t o Maya's
condition. Consequently, Dr. Lessin's bonding evaluation focused more on
A-1497-18T2
8
J.L.'s ability to care for Maya's special needs. Dr. Lessin noted the importance
of permanency for Maya who needed assurance her special needs would be met;
otherwise Maya may suffer negative reactions. Finally, Dr. Lessin testified
Maya would not suffer irreparable harm from severing her relationship with J.L.
Maya's nurse at the pediatric daycare program, Lisa Fitzpatrick, testified
about Maya's special needs. Fitzpatrick described the difficulty of feeding Maya
because she has "choking and gagging issues." Fitzpatrick noted Maya's need
for ankle and foot braces. Maya's physical therapist at the daycare program,
Kelly Ann Cary, also testified, noting Maya will likely need physical therapy
for the rest of her life.
Nia testified about her experience caring for medically fragile children for
over twelve years, and her willingness to adopt Maya. While supervising visits,
she noted J.L. would get frustrated when caring for Maya and would at times
give up. The paternal grandmother testified J.L. could not appropriately care
for Maya's special needs, citing conversations where J.L. told her Maya's
condition was not serious and only temporary. The paternal grandmother said
she intended to live in North Carolina following adoption.
Finally, J.L. testified on her own behalf. She acknowledged her relapse
after completing substance abuse treatment. She indicated she understood
A-1497-18T2
9
Maya's medical condition but believed Maya would get better. On cross-
examination she acknowledged she has never had to care for Maya on a daily
basis and has no experience meeting Maya's special needs.
The evidence at the three-day trial established Maya is diagnosed with
spastic quadriplegic cerebral palsy, agenesis of corpus callosum, failure to
thrive, strabismus, dysphagia, chronic constipation, gastroesophageal reflux
disease, and severe developmental delays, rendering her profoundly disabled
and in need of extraordinary care.
Maya has an aversion to eating, must eat a special diet, requires skilled
care, multiple therapies, and will likely never walk or talk. She cannot stand
without ankle and leg braces and cannot sit up except in a special chair. Her
vocabulary is limited to two words. She is significantly underweight and may
need a surgically emplaced feeding tube. She has severe difficulty swallowing
and is at risk of aspirating food. She is also at risk for scoliosis and hip
displacement, has no fine motor skills, and cannot pick up or hold anything. Her
hands are chronically fisted.
On November 15, 2018, the trial court issued a lengthy oral decision
recounting the testimony in detail. The court found the Division workers, Dr.
Lessin, and the daycare workers to be "entirely credible and reliable witnesses."
A-1497-18T2
10
J.L. produced no expert witnesses. Her testimony did not undermine the
Division's proofs. The court found the paternal grandmother to be a "very
impressive" regarding her experience and ability to care for Maya.
The trial court noted J.L. has struggled to be capable as a parent of a
severely disabled child. It found the evidence clearly and convincingly
demonstrated J.L. is unable to meet the child's extraordinary needs. She has
little knowledge of the multiple therapies her daughter undergoes, does not fully
understand her daughter's special needs, and is in denial that the limitations are
permanent. She mistakenly believes her daughter will grow out of it.
Additionally, it found J.L.'s history of drug abuse well documented. She
relapsed more than once after treatment, concedes she cannot care for Maya
when she is using marijuana, does not have a driver's license, and has been
homeless at times. At one point, she moved to California to live with L.Y. and
abandoned her daughter for three months.
The trial court determined the Division proved all four prongs of N.J.S.A.
30:4C-15.1(a) by clear and convincing evidence, terminated the parental rights
of J.L. and L.Y., awarded the Division guardianship of Maya, and directed it to
file its complaint for adoption "as soon as possible." This appeal followed.
J.L. raises the following points:
A-1497-18T2
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Point I
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS WERE
INCOMPLETE AND INADEQUATE TO SUSTAIN A
JUDGMENT TERMINATING [J.L.'S] PARENTAL
RIGHTS BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING
EVIDENCE AS REQUIRED BY N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15
AND 30:4C-15.1.
A. The Trial Court Erred In Finding That [The
Division] Demonstrated By Clear And
Convincing Evidence That The Child's Health
And Development Had Been Or Will Continue
To Be Endangered By The Parental Relationship
Under The First Prong.
B. The Trial Court Erred In Finding That [The
Division] Demonstrated By Clear And
Convincing Evidence That [J.L.] Was Unwilling
Or Unable To Eliminate The Harm Facing The
Child Or Is Unable Or Unwilling To Provide A
Safe And Stable Home For The Children And
The Delay Of Permanent Placement Will Add To
The Harm Under The Second Prong.
C. The Trial Court Erred By Failing To Consider
Viable Alternatives To Termination Of Parental
Rights.
D. The Trial Court Erred In Finding That [The
Division] Demonstrated By Clear And
Convincing Evidence That Termination Of
[J.L.'s] Parental Rights Will Not Do More Harm
Than Good Under The Fourth Prong.
A-1497-18T2
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Point II
THE DECISION TO TERMINATE [J.L.'S]
PARENTAL RIGHTS MUST BE REVERSED
BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY
APPLIED A "BETTER" INTEREST OF THE CHILD
STANDARD RATHER THAN THE "BEST"
INTEREST OF THE CHILD STANDARD
GOVERNING TITLE 30 GUARDIANSHIP CASES.
(Not Raised Below)
II.
"The scope of appellate review of a trial court's fact-finding function is
limited." Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411 (1998). In general, a trial court's
findings "are binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial,
credible evidence." Id. at 412 (citing Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv'rs Ins. Co.
of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)). "Particular deference is afforded to family
court fact-finding because of the family courts' special jurisdiction and expertise
in family matters." N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency . v. N.C.M., 438 N.J.
Super. 356, 367 (App. Div. 2014) (citing Cesare, 154 N.J. at 413). "We will not
overturn a family court's factfindings unless they are so 'wide of the mark' that
our intervention is necessary to correct an injustice." N.J. Div. of Youth &
Family Servs. v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420, 448 (2012) (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth &
Family Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 104 (2008)).
A-1497-18T2
13
To terminate parental rights on the grounds of the "best interests of the
child," the Division must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, the following
four prongs under N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a):
(1) The child's safety, health, or development has been
or will continue to be endangered by the parental
relationship;
(2) The parent is unwilling or unable to eliminate the
harm facing the child or is unable or unwilling to
provide a safe and stable home for the child and the
delay of permanent placement will add to the harm.
Such harm may include evidence that separating the
child from his resource family parents would cause
serious and enduring emotional or psychological harm
to the child;
(3) The [D]ivision has made reasonable efforts to
provide services to help the parent correct the
circumstances which led to the child's placement
outside the home and the court has considered
alternatives to termination of parental rights; and
(4) Termination of parental rights will not do more
harm than good.
[N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a); see also N.J. Div. of Youth &
Family Servs. v. A.W., 103 N.J. 591, 604-11 (1986)
(reciting the four standards later codified in Title 30).]
The four statutory prongs "are neither discrete nor separate. They overlap
to provide a composite picture of what may be necessary to advance the best
interests of the children." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J.
A-1497-18T2
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261, 280 (2007) (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. F.M., 375 N.J.
Super. 235, 258 (App. Div. 2005)).
Under prong one, the Division must demonstrate harm "that threatens the
child's health and will likely have continuing deleterious effects on the child."
In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337, 352 (1999). The Division need not
demonstrate actual harm. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.G., 344 N.J.
Super. 418, 440 (App. Div. 2001). That is, courts consider whether the child's
safety, health, or development will be endangered in the future. Ibid. Moreover,
"[c]ourts need not wait to act until a child is actually irreparably impaired by
parental inattention or neglect." In re Guardianship of D.M.H., 161 N.J. 365,
383 (1999) (citing A.W., 103 N.J. at 616 n.14).
In addition, a parent's failure to provide "a permanent, safe, and stable
home" engenders significant harm to the child. Ibid. Likewise, a parent's failure
to provide "solicitude, nurture, and care for an extended period of time is in
itself a harm that endangers the health and development of the child." Id. at 379.
"The second prong, in many ways, addresses considerations touched on in
prong one." F.M., 211 N.J. at 451. The focus is on "parental unfitness." K.H.O.,
161 N.J. at 352.
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Under prong three, the Division must prove it "made reasonable efforts to
provide services to help the parent correct the circumstances which led to the
child's placement outside the home." N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(3). Reasonable
efforts is defined as "attempts by an agency authorized by the [D]ivision to assist
the parents in remedying the circumstances and conditions that led to the
placement of the child and in reinforcing the family structure." N.J.S.A. 30:4C-
15.1(c). The record must also establish "the court has considered alternatives to
termination of parental rights." N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(3).
Under the fourth prong, the Division must demonstrate that "[t]ermination
of parental rights will not do more harm than good." N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15(a)(4).
The fourth prong serves as a "'fail safe' inquiry guarding against an inappropriate
or premature termination of parental rights." F.M., 211 N.J. at 453.
III.
A.
We affirm the trial court's decision with respect to prongs one and two of
the statute substantially for the reasons expressed in the trial court's extensive
oral decision issued on November 15, 2018. We add the following comments.
The trial court's factual findings and conclusions as to prongs one and two
are fully supported by the record. The record clearly established J.L. is unable
A-1497-18T2
16
to care for Maya's significant special needs. J.L.'s limitations engender
significant harm to Maya as J.L. is unable to provide a "permanent, safe, and
stable home." D.M.H., 161 N.J. at 383.
As to prong one, the trial court emphasized Maya "needs extraordinary,
unusual, virtually around the clock care." The court found the testimony
consistently and "strongly indicate[d] that [J.L.] is unable . . . to meet the
extraordinary needs" of Maya. The court noted J.L. missed doctor appointments
and cited credible testimony about J.L. not fully comprehending the nature of
Maya's medical condition. The court also credited Dr. Lessin's opinion that J.L.
could not independently parent Maya and that termination would be appropriate
in this matter. Additionally, the court considered J.L.'s absence for three
months, her marijuana use, recent relapse, and her relationship with L.Y. Based
on these findings, the court determined reunification with Jen would "pose a
substantial risk" to Maya.
As to the second prong, the trial court again credited Dr. Lessin's opinion
concerning J.L.'s inability to prioritize her parental responsibilities and her lack
of understanding of Maya's special needs. The court gave weight to Dr. Lessin's
testimony that J.L. had not shown any progress, suggesting an ability to
independently parent Maya now or in the future. The court noted Dr. Lessin's
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testimony regarding the importance of permanency to a child in Maya's position;
otherwise Maya is subject to fear and anxiety. The court found a delay in
permanent placement would add to Maya's harm.
B.
Turning to prong three, we are satisfied the record fully supports the trial
court's finding that the Division made "reasonable efforts" to provide
appropriate services to both parents. The Division engaged in such efforts for
almost two years—assisting J.L. with her substance abuse, providing
counseling, and arranging visitation—to reunite Maya with J.L. As we have
noted, the parents participated in many of those services, albeit inconsistently
and without success.
The last clause of prong three addresses whether "the court has considered
alternatives to termination of parental rights." N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(3). The
trial court noted Nia has fostered sixty-four children, including thirty-five
medically fragile children, and has special training in how to do so. It concluded
that given Nia's "experience, history and capability," "her willingness to adopt"
Maya, and "her willingness to allow contact to continue between" J.L. and Maya,
"there really is no alternative . . . other than termination of parental rights
A-1497-18T2
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followed by adoption." The trial court approved the Division's plan to have Nia
adopt Maya.
That said, our review of the record reveals the Division did not show Nia
was informed about the KLG option. Rimer testified she did not "believe" any
discussions arose concerning KLG. Nor did the trial court address KLG in its
decision.3
J.L. argues the trial court erred by "overlook[ing] the viable alternative of
fashioning a kinship legal guardianship arrangement that would allow [Maya]
to receive the trained care of her paternal grandmother while allowing her legal
relationship with her mother to remain intact." Citing M.M., J.L. contends the
Division should have informed Nia about the KLG option before receiving her
"unequivocal" decision to adopt Maya. Because the Division failed to do so,
J.L. argues it did not satisfy prong three.
The purpose of KLG "is to address the needs of children who cannot reside
with their parents due to their parents' incapacity or inability to raise them and
when adoption is neither feasible nor likely." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family
Servs. v. S.F., 392 N.J. Super. 201, 209 (2007). KLG is a potential alternative
3
We recognize that the trial court's decision was issued several months before
our opinion in M.M. was published.
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to termination of parental rights. M.M., 459 N.J. Super. at 259. In that regard,
the Legislature declared, "[i]n considering kinship legal guardianship, the State
is seeking to add another, alternative, permanent placement option, beyond
custody, without rising to the level of termination of parental rights, for
caregivers in relationships where adoption is neither feasible nor likely."
N.J.S.A. 3B:12A-1(c). As we explained in M.M.:
The Legislature has made it clear that relative
caretakers who might be candidates for KLG must be
adequately informed of the nature of such arrangements
and the financial and other services for which they may
be eligible. To achieve that objective, the Legislature
enacted in 2005 the Kinship Legal Guardianship
Notification Act ("Notification Act"), N.J.S.A. 30:4C-
89 to -92. In the Act, the Legislature imposed a
responsibility upon the State "to ensure that individuals
who may be eligible to become kinship legal guardians
are aware of the eligibility requirements for, and the
responsibilities of, kinship legal guardianship and . . .
[also] the services available to kinship legal guardians
in the State." N.J.S.A. 30:4C-90(e).
To implement this notification mandate:
The Department of Children and Families
shall, in easily understandable language:
(a) inform individuals, of whom the
department is aware, who may be eligible
to become kinship legal guardians of:
A-1497-18T2
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(1) the eligibility requirements for, and the
responsibilities of, kinship legal
guardianship; and
(2) the full-range of services for which
kinship legal guardians may be eligible and
the eligibility requirements for those
services; and
b. inform current kinship legal guardians of
the full-range of services for which kinship
legal guardians may be eligible and the
eligibility requirements for those services.
[N.J.S.A. 30:4C-91.]
[M.M., 459 N.J. Super. at 261 (alterations in original)
(footnote omitted).]
In M.M., we discussed the issue of KLG being "appropriate only if
'adoption of the child is neither feasible nor likely.'" Id. at 262 (quoting N.J.S.A.
3B:12A-6(d)(3)(b)). We concluded that "[a] logical implication of the
Notification Act is that the caregiver must be fully informed of the potential
benefits and burdens of KLG before deciding whether he or she wishes to
adopt." Id. at 263. We analogized this "paradigm" to the principles of informed
consent and informed refusal in healthcare. Ibid. "[W]e construe[d] the KLG
statute and the Notification Act to make a caregiver's preference, if any, of KLG
over adoption a relevant but not dispositive consideration." Id. at 264. We
A-1497-18T2
21
concluded that "[t]he caregiver's consent to adopt should be not only be
informed, but also unconditional, unambiguous, and unqualified." Ibid.
The record does not demonstrate that KLG was discussed with Nia. As in
M.M., we cannot determine from the present record, by a level of clear and
convincing evidence, whether Nia's consent to adopt Maya was informed and if
she is "committed unambiguously, unequivocally, and unconditionally to
adoption, regardless of the possible alternative of KLG." Id. at 273.
We therefore remand this matter "for further proceedings to develop the
record more definitively" on the KLG and adoption issue and for the trial court
to render "explicit associated findings of fact and conclusions of law." Id. at
275. The trial court shall, in its discretion, determine the appropriate forms of
proof at the remand hearing.
C.
Finally, we address the fourth prong. The trial court credited Dr. Lessin's
testimony regarding the bonding evaluation. The court noted it was not known
if Maya "will ever be able to form typical relationships in the future because of
her limitations." Dr. Lessen concluded that Maya's profound limitations
precluded conventional application of a bonding evaluation. Nevertheless, the
court noted Dr. Lessen "was not able to observe any attachment on the part of
A-1497-18T2
22
[Maya] toward [J.L.]." Dr. Lessen opined that Maya is so dependent on her day-
to-day needs, "meetings those needs is paramount with the equivalent to a bond."
The court agreed with Dr. Lessen's opinion that "termination of parental rights
in this case would not do more harm than good because of [J.L.'s] inability to
provide the day-to-day care that [Maya] needs." The court reiterated that the
paternal grandmother is willing to adopt Maya and qualified to meet her day-to-
day demands.
Subject to the outcome of the remand hearing, we conclude the trial court
provided a reasonable basis for its conclusion on prong four that the termination
of J.L.'s parental rights will not do Maya more harm than good under N.J.S.A.
30:4C-15.1(a)(4).
IV.
J.L.'s remaining argument lacks sufficient merit to warrant discussion in
a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed in part and remanded in part for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion. The remand shall be completed within ninety days, unless
that deadline is reasonably extended by the trial court with the consent of
counsel. We do not retain jurisdiction.
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