State of New Jersey in the Interest of N.H., a Juvenile

RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0433-14T2
STATE OF NEW JERSEY APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE INTEREST OF N.H., July 6, 2015
APPELLATE DIVISION
A Juvenile.
_____________________________________________
Argued April 21, 2015 – Decided July 6, 2015
Before Judges Fisher, Accurso and Manahan.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part,
Essex County, Docket No. FJ-07-2832-14.
Frank J. Ducoat, Special Deputy Attorney
General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, argued
the cause for appellant State of New Jersey
(Carolyn A. Murray, Acting Essex County
Prosecutor, attorney; Mr. Ducoat, of counsel
and on the brief).
Jacqueline E. Turner, Assistant Deputy
Public Defender, argued the cause for
respondent N.H. (Joseph E. Krakora, Public
Defender, attorney; Ms. Turner, of counsel
and on the brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
MANAHAN, J.S.C. (temporarily assigned)
On leave granted, the State appeals an order granting N.H.
"full and complete" discovery of the State's "entire file."
N.H. was charged in a juvenile complaint with offenses which, if
committed by an adult, would constitute purposeful and knowing
murder and unlawful possession of a weapon. After the complaint
was filed, the State moved to waive jurisdiction pursuant to
N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26e. We affirm.
The underlying facts which gave rise to the complaint
involve a fistfight among high school students. N.H., a
participant in the fight, is alleged to have used a handgun
taken from a friend's waistband to shoot the decedent four
times, including a shot to the back of decedent's head. N.H.
later admitted to possessing and firing the handgun, but claimed
he shot at the ground.
In her oral decision on the motion, Judge Wasserman held
that New Jersey's "open discovery" policy per Rule 3:13-3(a) and
the Supreme Court's decision in State ex rel. P.M.P., 200 N.J.
166 (2009), required the State to provide N.H. with the
discovery sought.
On appeal, the State argues that given the preliminary
stage of the case as pre-waiver and pre-indictment, N.H. is not
entitled to full and complete discovery. Rather, the State
argues required discovery is only that which is exculpatory and
upon which the State will rely to meet its probable cause burden
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at the waiver hearing. In this, the State would serve as the
arbiter of what discovery was requisite.1
In opposition, N.H. argues that the right to full discovery
is triggered upon the filing of the complaint which is the
"functional equivalent" of an indictment. N.H. further argues
that the State's position that it may unilaterally determine
what constitutes relevant discovery is antithetical to
controlling decisions of law and "common sense."
We commence our analysis with that which has been agreed
upon by both parties. That is, neither the Juvenile Code,
N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-20 to -48, nor Part V of the Court Rules,
explicitly addresses discovery in juvenile cases. In State in
Interest of K.A.W., 104 N.J. 112, 121 (1986), our Supreme Court
noted the "practice" for the provision of discovery:
Even though the Juvenile Code contains
no provision for discovery, the custom
almost invariable in matters such as this is
for the State to open its file to the
juvenile, and hence at no time has there
been a recommendation from the appropriate
Supreme Court committee for us to amend our
Rules to structure discovery procedures in
juvenile delinquency actions similar to
those embodied in our Rules governing
criminal practice, Rules 3:13-1 to -4, nor
does it appear that any question has ever
1
During oral argument, the State expanded its argument to
include a "flood gate" concern if the State was required to
provide full discovery prior to a waiver hearing. We reject
this argument as well for the reasons expressed herein.
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arisen in that regard. The process has
become, commendably, self-regulating. We
see no need to intrude at this juncture.
Given the issue in dispute, we find the "practice," almost
thirty years after K.A.W., is no longer "self-regulating" and
that we are now required to "intrude." Without our intrusion,
the discovery practice governing juvenile actions may be guided
by a prior disfavored practice of "discovery by grace"2 or
discovery provided by the prosecutor although not compelled by
statute, rule or decision.
In the absence of a specific rule, discovery in juvenile
cases has been guided by resort to the rules that govern the
practice and procedure in adult criminal proceedings.3 Rule 3:1-
1 provides:
The rules in Part III govern the
practice and procedure in all indictable and
non-indictable proceedings in the Superior
Court Law Division and, insofar as they are
applicable, the practice and procedure on
indictable offenses in all other courts,
including . . . the practice and procedure
in juvenile delinquency proceedings in the
2
For a discussion of this practice see, Stephen A. Saltzburg,
American Criminal Procedure 709 (2nd ed. 1983).
3
In accord with Rule 3:13-3(b)(1), upon the return of an
indictment, the State is required to provide full and complete
discovery to a defendant named in the indictment within seven
days.
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Chancery Division, Family Part except as
otherwise provided for in Part V.[4]
Where no rule within Part V is applicable, courts have
referred to Part III rules for guidance. State in Interest of
J.R., 244 N.J. Super. 630, 637-39 (App. Div. 1990) (applying, in
the absence of a Part V rule on point, Rules 3:9-2 (pleas) and
3:21-4(b) (sentence) to a juvenile proceeding).
4
Prior to December 1983, R. 3:1-1 stated specifically that the
rules in Part III governed "the practice and procedure on
indictable offenses in all other courts except in juvenile
delinquency and criminal proceedings in the juvenile and
domestic relations court which are otherwise expressly provided
for in Part V." R. 3:3-1 (1982) (emphasis added). So, in
practice, the former excluded application of the Part III
discovery rules in juvenile court and left it to be "self-
regulating."
As of December 1983, Rule 3:1-1 was amended to the current
language that specifically states that the Part III discovery
rules apply in juvenile proceedings in the family part. Judge
Pressler's comment on the 1983 change was: "[t]he amendment . . .
makes clear that the trial of juvenile delinquency actions are
governed by Part III rules to the extent not otherwise provided
by Part V rules. The Part III rules also are applicable to
criminal actions tried in the Family Part." Pressler, Current
N.J. Court Rules, Special Supplement, Family Part, Special Civil
Part, comment on R. 3:1-1 (1984).
In the comments to the 1985 Rules, Judge Pressler noted that the
new rule was directly contrary to the previous source rule.
Pressler, Current N.J. Court Rules, comment on R. 3:1-1 (1984).
Judge Pressler also observed that juvenile proceedings had
"become increasingly subject to 'adult' due process
requirements," and as such, "it was clearly practicable to
effect as close a conformance as possible in the practice in
adult and juvenile actions." Pressler, Current N.J. Court
Rules, comment on R. 3:1-1 (1984). The juvenile courts were
abolished in 1983.
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The core of the State's argument in support of limited
discovery is that the waiver hearing with its less demanding
burden of persuasion of "probable cause" requires the provision
of only that discovery deemed relevant for the juvenile to
defend the State's application. The argument is also premised
on the proposition that in "preliminary" proceedings the State
may arrogate to itself the role of "architect of discovery." We
disagree.
The safeguards implicated by provision of full discovery to
N.H. after the complaint was filed are not abrogated because a
determination is pending whether the case should be transferred
to adult court per N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26. This is so since the
critical and significant consequences which flow from the
complaint alone, filed prior to the prosecutor's referral,
implicate potential substantial deprivation of N.H.'s personal
liberty. Should N.H. be adjudicated delinquent on the charges
in the complaint, he is subject to twenty years' incarceration
on the murder charge, N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-44d(1)(a), and three years'
incarceration on the possession of a weapon charge. N.J.S.A.
2A:4A-44d(1)(d).5
5
Should N.H. be extended term eligible he could be subject to an
additional five years. N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-44d(3).
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As the judge noted in her decision, our Supreme Court has
explicitly addressed the complaint's critical stage in the
juvenile process albeit on the issue of when the right to
counsel attached in P.M.P., supra, 200 N.J. at 166. In P.M.P.,
the Court held "when the Prosecutor's Office initiates a
juvenile complaint and obtains a judicially approved arrest
warrant, a critical stage in the proceeding has been reached,
implicating the juvenile's statutory right to counsel." Id. at
178. As P.M.P. noted "when the Prosecutor's Office files a
juvenile complaint, it already has determined that it has a
prima facie case against the defendant. Consequently, because
the juvenile does not have the right to indictment, the filing
of the complaint . . . takes on added significance." Id. at
177. Here, as in P.M.P., the complaints were signed under oath
by a detective from the Essex County Prosecutor's Office.
The standard for determining the provision of discovery
must take into consideration the guiding principle that
"liberal" discovery is the rule and that "limited" discovery is
the exception. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Rainner, 69 N.J. 50, 56
(1976) (discussing "the tide flowing toward a wider scope of
discovery."). Full discovery at the earliest stage in the
proceedings promotes fairness for both the juvenile facing
charges and the State. See State in Interest of A.B., 219 N.J.
7 A-0433-14T2
542, 555-56 (2014); see also R. 3:13-3(b)(2) (providing for
discovery by the State).
In reaching our decision we do not suggest or comment on
the wisdom of an amendment to the Juvenile Code or to the Court
Rules to provide for discovery procedures in a juvenile
delinquency action. We leave that determination to the
legislature and the appropriate Supreme Court committee.
Rather, we have "intruded" on the existing "practice" to confirm
a juvenile's right to full discovery at a critical stage in the
proceeding; a right which vests upon the filing of the juvenile
complaint.
Affirmed.
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