ROBERT RELDAN VS. NJ STATE PAROLE BOARD (NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0265-18T4
ROBERT RELDAN,
Appellant,
v.
NEW JERSEY STATE
PAROLE BOARD,
Respondent.
_______________________
Argued September 23, 2019 – Decided December 4, 2019
Before Judges Moynihan and Mitterhoff.
On appeal from the New Jersey State Parole Board.
Robert J. Flanagan, III, argued the cause for appellant
(Greenbaum, Rowe, Smith & Davis LLP, attorneys;
Raymond M. Brown, of counsel and on the briefs;
Robert J. Flanagan, III, on the briefs).
Christopher C. Josephson, Deputy Attorney General,
argued the cause for respondent (Gurbir S. Grewal,
Attorney General, attorney; Melissa H. Raksa,
Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Christopher C.
Josephson, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Appellant Robert Reldan appeals from the New Jersey State Parole
Board's final decision, contending the Board erred in concurring with and
affirming the three-member Board panel's decision because that panel abused its
discretion when it failed to consider mitigating factors relative to appellant's
recent conduct, and placed too much weight on other factors regarding his past
behavior in both denying his parole request and setting a 120-month future
parole eligibility term (FET). We affirm.
After a two-member Board panel determined there was a substantial
likelihood appellant would commit a new crime if released on parole
supervision,1 that panel referred the matter to the three-member panel to
establish an FET in excess of that provided in the presumptive schedule . See
N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.21(a), (c), (d). In a seventeen-page narrative notice of
decision, issued after its initial denial because it reconvened to consider a post-
1
Parole for a conviction imposed on offenses committed before August 18,
1997, "is governed by the standard[s] in N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.53(a) and 30:4-
123.56(c) prior to the amendment of those statutes on that date." Williams v.
N.J. State Parole Bd., 336 N.J. Super. 1, 7 (App. Div. 2000) (citing N.J.A.C.
10A:71-3.10). The pre-amendment statute provides, "the Parole Board may
deny parole release if it appears from a preponderance of the evidence that 'there
is a substantial likelihood that the inmate will commit a crime under the laws of
this State if released on parole at such time.'" Ibid. (quoting L. 1979, c. 441, §
9).
A-0265-18T4
2
decision letter of mitigation from appellant's counsel, the three-member panel
supplemented its initial Notice of Decision checklist of fifteen reasons for denial
of parole. It also detailed reasons relating to the 120-month FET it established:
the facts and circumstances of the crimes for which appellant is incarcerated;
the extensiveness and repetitiveness of his prior record; the increasing
seriousness of that record; the number of offenses for which defendant is
incarcerated; behavior while on community supervision that resulted in
violations and termination because of offenses committed while supervised;
institutional infraction history; insufficient problem resolution; commission of
a crime while incarcerated; and counsel's letter of mitigation.
Contrary to appellant's argument, the consideration of the factors related
to his crimes complied with the requirement that "[p]arole decisions shall be
based on the aggregate of all pertinent factors, including material supplied by
the inmate and reports and material which may be submitted by any persons or
agencies which have knowledge of the inmate." N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.11(a). The
non-exhaustive list of those factors includes:
1. Commission of an offense while incarcerated.
2. Commission of serious disciplinary infractions.
3. Nature and pattern of previous convictions.
A-0265-18T4
3
4. Adjustment to previous probation, parole and
incarceration.
5. Facts and circumstances of the offense.
6. Aggravating and mitigating factors surrounding the
offense.
7. Pattern of less serious disciplinary infractions.
8. Participation in institutional programs which could
have led to the improvement of problems diagnosed at
admission or during incarceration. This includes, but is
not limited to, participation in substance abuse
programs, academic or vocational education programs,
work assignments that provide on-the-job training and
individual or group counseling.
9. Statements by institutional staff, with supporting
documentation, that the inmate is likely to commit a
crime if released; that the inmate has failed to cooperate
in his or her own rehabilitation; or that there is a
reasonable expectation that the inmate will violate
conditions of parole.
10. Documented pattern or relationships with
institutional staff or inmates.
11. Documented changes in attitude toward self or
others.
12. Documentation reflecting personal goals, personal
strengths or motivation for law-abiding behavior.
13. Mental and emotional health.
14. Parole plans and the investigation thereof.
A-0265-18T4
4
15. Status of family or marital relationships at the time
of eligibility.
16. Availability of community resources or support
services for inmates who have a demonstrated need for
same.
17. Statements by the inmate reflecting on the
likelihood that he or she will commit another crime; the
failure to cooperate in his or her own rehabilitation; or
the reasonable expectation that he or she will violate
conditions of parole.
18. History of employment, education and military
service.
19. Family and marital history.
20. Statement by the court reflecting the reasons for
the sentence imposed.
21. Statements or evidence presented by the
appropriate prosecutor's office, the Office of the
Attorney General, or any other criminal justice agency.
22. Statement or testimony of any victim or the nearest
relative(s) of a murder/manslaughter victim.
23. The results of the objective risk assessment
instrument.
[N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.11(b).]
The three-member panel properly considered the circumstances that
resulted in appellant's State prison sentences: in 1986, to life consecutive to
A-0265-18T4
5
thirty years for two murders committed in 1975; 2 in 1978, to twenty to twenty-
five-year concurrent terms for four counts of advocate homicidal death and one
count of conspiracy to commit murder, committed while appellant was an inmate
in State prison; in 1981, to an aggregate twenty-two-year term for escape,
possession of an implement of escape, aggravated assault of a police officer,
robbery and theft committed during an escape during his first murder trial in
October 1979; in 1987, to an aggregate fifteen-year term with seven and one-
half years of parole ineligibility for conspiracy to commit escape and possession
of a weapon for an unlawful purpose committed in 1981 while a State prison
inmate.3 All sentences ran consecutive to those terms already imposed.
We detailed the circumstances of each of the crimes for which appellant
was sentenced in our previous decisions, State v. Reldan, 185 N.J. Super. 494(App. Div. 1982) (regarding the two murders); Reldan v. N.J. State Parole Bd.,
No. A-6039-10 (App. Div. July 9, 2012) (slip op. at 1); Reldan v. N.J. State
Parole Bd., No. A-1786-13 (App. Div. Apr. 24, 2015) (slip op. at 1), and need
not recount them here. Suffice it to say the crimes involved violence or the
2
Appellant's 1979 convictions for those murders were reversed, and he was
sentenced again after he was found guilty at a 1986 retrial.
3
Appellant's 1983 sentences for those and other related crimes were reversed,
and he was resentenced in 1987.
A-0265-18T4
6
extreme threat thereof; we note the sentencing judge's comments about the two
murders:
Words are inadequate to describe the abject evil of
these depraved acts of murder. He ended the lives of
two you[ng] women in a state of horror, degradation
and pain. This defendant should never again be allowed
the opportunity to inflict his evil propensities on
society. In view of defendant's outrageous record,
[noted as "a substantial juvenile record" and "sixteen
known arrests and fifteen convictions"], the complete
lack of any mitigating circumstances, this especially
heinous, cruel and depraved manner of defendant's acts
that resulted in two . . . murders, the certainty of further
criminal activity and the absolute need to deter requires
lengthy incarceration.
The three-member panel appropriately considered other N.J.A.C. 10A:71-
3.11(b) factors: appellant committed crimes while incarcerated and reoffended
numerous times while on probation and parole, including the two murders; his
extensive, repetitive and increasingly serious record that resulted in multiple
prison terms; and his institutional infraction record of twenty-nine infractions
committed over thirty-nine years, seven of which were asterisk offenses, 4 that
4
Prohibited acts that are subject to disciplinary action in State prison are
classified into categories. Those preceded by an asterisk "are considered the
most serious and result in the most severe sanctions." N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1(a).
A-0265-18T4
7
resulted in detention, administrative segregation and loss of 1270 days
commutation credit.
The three-member panel specifically noted appellant was infraction-free
since his last parole hearing, with the last infraction taking place in 2009. Other
mitigating factors found by the panel were appellant's participation in behavior-
specific programs, institutional programs and attempts to enroll in programs to
which he was not admitted, and that institutional reports reflected favorably on
appellant's adjustment.
The panel's reasons for denying parole included appellant's denial of parts
of offenses and minimization of others. The reasons for parole denial dovetailed
with the reasons the panel set a 120-month FET.
Notwithstanding institutional reports of a favorable adjustment, the panel
extensively reviewed appellant's responses to questions posed during a panel
hearing and concluded he exhibited insufficient problem resolution. Although
appellant argues the three-member panel did not specify which questions and
answers justified its finding, it comprehensively reviewed appellant's
dichotomous answers about how the murders occurred, at one point saying they
were "spur of the moment," then denying there was any compulsion to commit
the crimes and that "nothing [appellant] ever did . . . was on impulse, it was
A-0265-18T4
8
thought out . . . the thinking was twisted and wrong, but it wasn't impulsive or
compulsive." The panel found appellant's answers to be "contradictory and
incongruous." The panel continued:
You maintained throughout the lengthy hearing that
your multiple criminal acts and anti-social conduct
were not compulsive or impulsive. You steadfastly
stated that all of the negative decision making on your
part was "thought out" and you knowingly chose to
behave in such a manner. However, comments and
statements by you during the hearing were replete with
you noting that crimes were done by you "on the spur
of the moment."
The panel also viewed appellant's answers that he did not intend to kill the
murder victims but they died as an unintended consequence of robbery from the
type of hold he placed around their necks, as "minimizing" his conduct,
"demonstrating a lack of empathy and remorse." The panel concluded appellant
was "unsure of [his] motivations for [his] anti-social conduct," and that he was
"currently . . . unable to recognize the severity of the violence involved in [his]
criminal behavior." The panel also viewed appellant's answers regarding his
incarceration as being a "waste of [the panel's] time" without any benefit to
society and that "you should have killed me, if you wanted to get rid of me," as
"concerning, in regards to [appellant's] current mental state of mind." The panel
found "more work needs to be done on [appellant's] part to gain a better
A-0265-18T4
9
understanding how [he] need[s] to adequately process, recognize and cope with
situations involving stress, confrontation and making appropriate behavioral
decisions."
In specifying a 120-month FET, the three-member panel echoed some of
its prior finding that in appellant's thirty-nine years of incarceration, he
[p]resent[s] as not possessing an appropriate
understanding of [his] criminal thinking. At the present
hearing, [appellant] wavered between commenting that
[his] crimes were "thought out" and that [he] "chose" to
commit them, to [him] offering that certain crimes were
"spur of the moment." Regarding the possibility that
[his] negative decision-making was influenced by a
level of impulsivity on [appellant's] part, [he]
maintained that [he has] never had an issue with acting
on impulse. The Board panel does not agree with this
assessment on [appellant's] part and is concerned by
[his] failure to recognize or acknowledge the
complexities to [his] anti-social thinking. As to motive
for [appellant's] past actions, [he] offered personal gain
and an effort to appease [his] father. These possible
contributory factors do not explain the level of violence
and manipulative behavior that [he has] exhibited.
More work needs to be done on [his] part to gain a
better understanding as to the depths of [his] anti-social
conduct; and
[Appellant] [p]resents as not acknowledging the
seriousness or extent of violence [he has] exhibited.
[He] continue[s] to place a great empha[sis] on [his]
belief that the two asphyxiation murders [he]
committed were not intentional and infer[s] that the
legal definition of murder (premeditation) does not
apply to [his] actions. By putting forth such a stance,
A-0265-18T4
10
[he] minimize[s] [his] violent actions and distance[s]
[himself] from taking full responsibility for the victim's
deaths, thus showing an inappropriate level of empathy
or remorse.
In considering appellant's contentions that the Board erred in finding that
the three-member panel did not abuse its discretion in denying parole and in
establishing a 120-month FET, we utilize the same standard of review applicable
to other administrative agency decisions. Trantino v. N.J. State Parole Bd.
(Trantino IV), 154 N.J. 19, 24-25 (1998). "We may overturn the . . . Board's
decisions only if they are arbitrary and capricious." Trantino v. N.J. State Parole
Bd. (Trantino V), 166 N.J. 113, 201 (2001). Because the parole eligibility
statute creates a presumption that an inmate should be released on the inmate's
eligibility date, N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.53(a), decisions against release must be
considered arbitrary if they are not supported by a preponderance of the evidence
in the record. Kosmin v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 363 N.J. Super. 28, 42 (App.
Div. 2003).
"The decision of a parole board involves 'discretionary assessment[s] of a
multiplicity of imponderables . . . .'" Trantino V, 166 N.J. at 201 (first alteration
in original) (quoting Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and Corr. Complex,
442 U.S. 1, 10 (1979)). "To a greater degree than is the case with other
administrative agencies, the Parole Board's decision-making function involves
A-0265-18T4
11
individualized discretionary appraisals." Ibid. (citing Beckworth v. N.J. State
Parole Bd., 62 N.J. 348, 358-59 (1973)). We will not second-guess the Board's
application of its considerable expertise in sustaining the panel's determinations.
See, e.g., In re Vey, 272 N.J. Super. 199, 205-06 (App. Div. 1993), aff’d, 135
N.J. 306 (1994).
We accord that deference here in light of the record evidence. The Board
panel measured appellant's entire record. Even considering, as the Board
acknowledged, appellant "has made some progress," and his Level of Service
Inventory – Revised (LSI-R) score has improved to nineteen which categorizes
appellant as a "low-moderate" risk for recidivism, there is sufficient evidence in
the record to support the denial of parole.
We recognize appellant's assertion that the three-member panel failed to
consider letters submitted on his behalf. The Board pointed to appellant's
discussion of those letters at the hearing in concluding appellant's contention
that the letters were not considered "to be without merit." We remind the Board
that, like any adjudicatory body—including the courts—findings of fact and
conclusions of law are required for due process and appellate review. The mere
mention of evidence by a party during a hearing does not suffice to prove that
the adjudicatory body considered evidence. Nonetheless, the letters are akin to
A-0265-18T4
12
the programs in which appellant participated. Although there is some indication
of progress and insight, the letters were insufficient to have a significant impact
in the Board's final decision.
We also note that appellant's psychologist's report was submitted directly
to the Board well after the conclusion of the panel hearings. As such, the report
need not have been considered. See N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.7(j) ("An inmate may
submit for consideration at a hearing to be conducted pursuant to N.J.A.C.
10A:71-3.18 [Board panel hearing] or 3.20 [Board hearing] any evaluation
report prepared in his or her case by a private psychologist or psychiatrist. Such
an evaluation shall be performed not more than 180 days prior to the parole
eligibility date of the inmate.")
Further, the psychologist concluded appellant presented a low to moderate
current and foreseeable risk of engaging in violent behavior if released on
parole. The Board was not bound to accept that opinion. In fact, the three-
member panel's conclusion to the contrary, adopted by the Board, is buttressed,
not only by the record evidence we have heretofore analyzed, but by a well -
grounded confidential report considered by the panel which we have also
reviewed. The report also provides a sufficient basis for the Board's ultimate
A-0265-18T4
13
determination that the report submitted by appellant's psychologist did "not
warrant disturbing the Board panel's decision."
We are satisfied the Board, as mandated by N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.11(a),
based its decision "on the aggregate of all pertinent factors." The record belies
all of appellant's contrary contentions. Although mitigating factors applied and
were considered, it was within the Board's discretionary power to determine that
the considerations in favor of finding that there is a substantial likelihood
appellant would commit another crime if released on parole outweigh those
mitigating considerations.
We are cognizant the FET greatly exceeds the N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.21
schedule for adult inmates, which provides that an inmate "serving a sentence
for murder . . . or serving any minimum-maximum or specific sentence in excess
of 14 years for a crime not otherwise assigned pursuant to this section shall serve
27 additional months." N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.21(a)(1). The FET "may be
increased or decreased by up to nine months when, in the opinion of the Board
panel, the severity of the crime for which the inmate was denied parole and the
prior criminal record or other characteristics of the inmate warrant such
adjustment." N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.21(c). A twenty-seven-month FET increased
by nine months would be a thirty-six-month, or three-year FET.
A-0265-18T4
14
The record, as we have explained, supports the imposition of a lengthier
FET because, based on the panel's findings, a twenty-seven-month FET is
"clearly inappropriate due to the inmate's lack of satisfactory progress in
reducing the likelihood of future criminal behavior." N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.21(d).
We have carefully considered appellant's argument that we previously
remanded, in 2012 and 2015, respectively, appellant's prior appeals of the
Board's FET decisions imposing a 240-month FET and a 228-month FET; and
that the imposition of a 120-month FET, considering appellant's age, "will
effectively leave him imprisoned for the rest of his life without the chance for
parole simply based on his history."
The three-member panel carefully considered the issues which appellant
had to address in light of its findings as delineated in its narrative notice of
decision. The established FET projects an eligibility date in August 2023. The
panel reminded appellant he was entitled to an annual parole review at which
his "progress, or lack thereof, towards rehabilitation will be monitored." The
panel "strongly encouraged" that appellant avail himself of the reviews. "If the
[p]anel determines at [appellant's] annual review that [he has] made progress
towards [his] rehabilitation, the [p]anel may reduce" the FET.
A-0265-18T4
15
We discern no reason to set aside these discretionary evaluations. The
Board applied the correct legal standard and considered the relevant factors
under N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.11(b) in deciding to deny parole and set a 120-month
FET. On the record presented, its decision was not arbitrary or capricious, see
McGowan v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 347 N.J. Super. 544, 563 (App. Div. 2002),
and we conclude that the Board did not abuse its discretion in denying
appellant's application for release on parole. We do not substitute our judgment
for that of the Board with respect to denial of parole or the setting of an FET.
See N.J. State Parole Bd. v. Cestari, 224 N.J. Super. 534, 547 (App. Div. 1988).
Affirmed.
A-0265-18T4
16