DCPP VS. C.M., R.A., AND J.G., IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF P.M. AND J.G. (FG-02-0034-18, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED)

RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3544-18T1
NEW JERSEY DIVISION
OF CHILD PROTECTION
AND PERMANENCY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
C.M.,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
R.A. and J.G.,
Defendants.
____________________________
IN THE MATTER OF THE
GUARDIANSHIP OF P.M.
and J.G.,
Minors.
____________________________
Submitted October 28, 2019 – Decided December 11, 2019
Before Judges Sumners and Natali.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Bergen County,
Docket No. FG-02-0034-18.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Robyn A. Veasey, Deputy Public Defender,
of counsel; Stephania Saienni-Albert, Designated
Counsel, on the briefs).
Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for
respondent (Sookie Bae, Assistant Attorney General, of
counsel; Sara M. Gregory, Deputy Attorney General,
on the brief).
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian,
attorney for minors (Joseph Hector Ruiz, Designated
Counsel, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant C.M. (Chloe)1 appeals from an April 1, 2019 Family Part order
terminating her parental rights to her daughters P.M. (Piper) and J.G. (Jasmine),
who were ages four and three, respectively, at the time of the guardianship trial.
The order also terminated the parental rights of Piper's father, R.A. (Roman),
and Jasmine's father, J.G. (Jude), who both did not participate in the
guardianship trial and chose not to appeal. Defendant argues the Division of
Child Protection and Permanency (Division) did not prove by clear and
1
Initials and pseudonyms are used to protect the privacy of the parties and for
ease of reference. R. 1:38-3(d)(12).
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convincing evidence the required statutory factors to terminate her parental
rights. See N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a). The Law Guardian supports the
termination. After reviewing the record and considering the contentions
advanced on appeal, we affirm substantially for the cogent reasons set forth by
Judge Magali M. Francois in her oral opinion issued with the order.
The history and evidence are set forth at length in Judge Francois' opinion
and need not be repeated here. A brief summary will suffice. Defendant has a
history of lacking stable housing and resources to care for Piper and Jasmine.
In 2016, Chloe was homeless and left her daughters with S.V. (Serena) who
agreed to care for them in her home. Both Chloe and Serena told the Division
that they had known each other for two years. The Division was initially
concerned about Serena's inability to contact Chloe, but later determined this
was a proper arrangement given Chloe's homelessness. The Division also
concluded Serena was appropriate because she properly cared for the girls.
Several months later, however, the Division removed the girls from
Serena's care because of its concerns that Serena was struggling to care for her
own children; one who had health issues. Because there was no availability in
the area's homeless shelters, the Division helped Chloe make arrangements for
her and her daughters to stay the night at the home of Jude's uncle. The Division
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provided transportation to the uncle's home and planned to pick them up the next
day to look for other arrangements. When a Division caseworker arrived to
transport Chloe and her daughters to social services in order to apply for benefits
and shelter assistance, Jude's uncle stated Chloe had left the girls in the basement
alone during the night and he did not want them to stay at his home. Chloe
admitted to leaving the children alone in the basement to go to a convenience
store to buy a drink but claimed it was only for five minutes. To further
complicate the situation, Chloe submitted a urine screen that day which was
positive for THC,2 and the Division learned that Chloe had an active warrant for
trespassing.
The Division subsequently substantiated an allegation that Chloe failed to
supervise her daughters while at the home of Jude's uncle. Because Jude was
unable to take care of Piper and Jasmine, the Division executed a Dodd removal3
of the girls and placed them with resource parents willing to care for them for
2
Tetrahydrocannabinol, the active chemical in marijuana.
3
A "Dodd removal" refers to the emergency removal of a child from the home
without a court order pursuant to N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21 to -8.82, known as the Dodd
Act. N.J. Div. of Youth and Family Servs. v. P.W.R., 205 N.J. 17, 26 n.11
(2011).
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an extended amount of time but were not willing to adopt them. Chloe was
ordered to submit to random urine screens, a substance abuse evaluation, attend
parenting classes, attend therapy and counseling, and was entitled to visitation
with her children.
The Division's efforts to find a stable placement for Piper and Jasmine
were difficult. Serena was ruled out because of a pending Division case with
her daughters. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's inter-state placement
assessment of Chloe's aunt resulted in a denial that was confirmed on appeal.
The Division also ruled out Chloe's grandmother because of her medical issues
and inappropriate housing. Eventually, the girls were placed in an approved pre-
adoptive foster home with J.G. and P.G. (collectively the Gaines).
Two Division caseworkers assigned to Chloe's family gave
uncontroverted testimony detailing their interactions with Chloe during the two
years after the Dodd removal, including: (1) their efforts to provide Chloe with
assistance in obtaining documents for social services, employment,
transportation, and housing; (2) Chloe's inconsistent visitation with her
daughters, which was attributed to her transient living situation; and (3) Chloe's
continued positive drug test results, her failure to complete any of the multiple
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substance abuse treatment programs she was referred to, and her rejection of in-
patient treatment recommendations.
Judge Francois summarized testimony from the Division's expert
psychologist, Dr. Robert Miller, as follows:
Based on the pattern of [Chole's] . . . parental behavior
with [the] children, missed visitation, continued
substance abuse, unwillingness or inability to
participate in services, underlying psychological and
emotional problems that would impact negatively,
significantly negative on her parenting capacity to
provide safety, care, emotional nurturance[,] [s]he's
demonstrating severe parenting deficits, the repetition
of the kind of parenting she experienced as a child and
placement of the children in her care and custody would
result in significant risk to their psychological
development.
Further, Dr. Miller provided uncontroverted testimony that Piper and Jasmine
viewed their foster parents as a primary source of care, emotional nurturance,
and comfort. He believed they developed a strong secure emotional bond with
the Gaines, whereas they had no emotional bond with Chloe. He thus
recommended the girls remain with their foster parents with a plan of adoption.
In short, Dr. Miller opined Chloe would not be able to adequately parent
in the foreseeable future. He believed Jasmine and Piper would not suffer harm
if their relationship with Chloe was severed because they did not have an
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emotional bond with her. Dr. Miller believed termination of Chloe's parental
rights, followed by adoption, would be in the girl's best interests.
Chloe only appeared at the first day of the three-day guardianship trial.
She neither testified nor presented any witnesses.
Following the trial's conclusion, Judge Francois detailed in her oral
opinion that the Division had proven by clear and convincing evidence all four
prongs of the best interests test, N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a).
On appeal, defendant presents the following arguments:
THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGEMENT
TERMINATING [CHLOE]'S PARENTAL RIGHTS
MUST BE REVERSED AS THE COURT ERRED IN
FINDING THAT DCPP'S EVIDENCE SUPPORTED
THE FOUR PRONGS OF N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) BY
CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE.
I. THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO
SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S LEGAL
CONCLUSION THAT [PIPER]'S AND
[JASMINE]'S SAFETY, HEALTH OR
DEVELOPMENT HAS BEEN OR WILL
CONTINUE TO BE ENDANGERED BY THEIR
PARENTAL RELATIONSHIP WITH [CHLOE].
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING
THAT [CHLOE] WAS UNWILLING OR
UNABLE TO ELIMINATE THE HARM OR
PROVIDE A SAFE AND STABLE HOME TO
[PIPER] AND [JASMINE].
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III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING
THAT DCPP PROVIDED [CHLOE]
REASONABLE EFFORTS TO REUNIFY HER
WITH [PIPER] AND [JASMINE].
IV. DCPP FAILED TO PROVE THAT
TERMINATION OF [CHLOE]'S PARENTAL
RIGHTS WOULD NOT DO MORE HARM
THAN GOOD TO [PIPER] AND [JASMINE].
These arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a
written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). Judge Francois' oral decision is supported
by substantial credible evidence. See N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v.
F.M., 211 N.J. 420, 448 (2012).
Affirmed.
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