DCPP VS. K.M.P. AND F.R., IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF J.N.R. (FG-04-0167-18, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED)

RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1720-18T2
NEW JERSEY DIVISION
OF CHILD PROTECTION
AND PERMANENCY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
K.M.P.,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
F.R.,
Defendant.
______________________________
IN THE MATTER OF THE
GUARDIANSHIP OF J.N.R.,
a Minor.
______________________________
Submitted December 3, 2019 – Decided December 19, 2019
Before Judges Fisher and Gilson.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Camden County,
Docket No. FG-04-0167-18.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Ruth Ann Harrigan, Designated Counsel, on
the briefs).
Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for
respondent (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney
General, of counsel; Laura Ann Dwyer, Deputy
Attorney General, on the brief).
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian,
attorney for minor (Rachel E. Seidman, Assistant
Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
K.M.P. (Karen) appeals from a judgment terminating her parental rights
to her daughter J.N.R. (Judy), and granting the Division of Child Protection and
Permanency (Division) guardianship of Judy, with the plan that the child be
adopted.1 Karen argues that the Division failed to prove the four prongs of the
best-interests standard necessary for the termination of parental rights. N.J.S.A.
30:4C-15.1(a). The Division urges that we affirm the judgment and allow the
adoption to proceed. Having reviewed the record in light of the parties'
contentions and applicable law, we affirm substantially for the reasons explained
1
We use initials and fictitious names for the parents and child to protect their
privacy and the confidentiality of the record. See R. 1:38-3(d)(12).
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by Judge Francine I. Axelrad in her comprehensive opinion read into the record
on November 28, 2018.
The facts and evidence are detailed in Judge Axelrad's opinion, which she
rendered after a three-day trial. Accordingly, we only summarize some of the
facts.
Karen and F.R. (Fred) are the biological parents of Judy, who was born in
August 2014. Fred is no longer in a relationship with Karen and he voluntarily
surrendered his parental rights to Judy.
At the time of the guardianship trial, Karen was in a relationship with
V.M. (Vincent) and she and Vincent had one child together, M.M. (Mark), who
was born in May 2018. Mark is in the custody of the Division, but he was not
the subject of this guardianship matter.
The Division became increasingly concerned about the safety of Judy
when she sustained several suspicious injuries, including bruises and subdural
hematomas. Suspecting that Vincent might be physically abusing Judy, the
Division implemented a safety protection plan under which Vincent and two
other individuals, who are not parties to this case, could not care for Judy or be
with her when they were not supervised.
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In December 2016, the Division removed Judy from Karen's care when
Judy was observed to have a bruise under her eye and Karen refused to promptly
take Judy to the hospital that had treated Judy's other injuries. Judy was placed
with her maternal grandfather and step-grandmother and has been in their care
for the past three years. They want to adopt Judy.
Following Judy's removal, Karen admitted that she had violated the safety
protection plan by allowing Vincent to have unsupervised contact with Judy and
she stipulated to a finding of abuse or neglect under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(2).
The Division provided her with a series of services, which included
psychological evaluations, therapy, counseling for parenting and domestic
violence, and substance abuse evaluations. Her evaluators diagnosed Karen
with parent-child relational problems, adjustment disorder, relationship
problems, including a history of domestic violence by Fred, and other
personality disorders. Her therapist noted that Karen had anger management
issues and she lacked insights into her circumstances and the needs of Judy.
The guardianship trial was conducted in October and November 2018, and
three witnesses testified: a Division worker, Dr. Linda Jeffrey, an expert called
by the Division, and Karen. The Division also submitted numerous documents
into evidence.
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Judge Axelrad found the Division worker and Dr. Jeffrey credible, but
found Karen largely incredible. Based on the testimony and exhibits, Judge
Axelrad then found that the Division presented clear and convincing evidence
of each of the four prongs necessary to terminate Karen's parental rights.
Evaluating prong one, Judge Axelrad found that Karen had not provided
Judy with a safe and stable home and failed to protect Judy from repeated
injuries. The judge also found that Karen failed to attend to Judy's medic al
needs and demonstrated a "lackadaisical" attitude towards Judy's safety and who
provided care for Judy.
Turning to the second prong, Judge Axelrad found that Karen is unwilling
and unable to eliminate the harm facing Judy. In that regard, Judge Axelrad
relied on the unrebutted testimony of Dr. Jeffrey that Karen was not prepared to
provide a minimum level of safe parenting and that Judy would be at risk of
further harm in Karen's care. Moreover, the judge found that Karen consistently
placed the needs of Vincent over the needs of Judy. Relying on reports of
Karen's outbursts of anger and erratic conduct, Judge Axelrad also found that it
was not likely that Karen would develop the skills to parent Judy in the
foreseeable future.
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Addressing the third prong, Judge Axelrad found that the Division had
provided Karen with a myriad of services, including individual counselling,
therapeutic visits, housing assistance, and psychological evaluations. Karen,
however, failed to fully avail herself of those services and her parenting abilities
had not improved. Judge Axelrad also found that the Division had reviewed
several potential family placements for Judy and had appropriately placed Judy
with her maternal grandfather and step-grandmother.
Finally, as to the fourth prong, Judge Axelrad relied on the credible and
unrebutted testimony of Dr. Jeffrey. Dr. Jeffrey had conducted psychological
evaluations of both Karen and Vincent. The doctor had also conducted bonding
evaluations of Karen and the maternal grandfather and step-grandmother. Judge
Axelrad noted that Karen loved Judy and that they had a warm relationship.
Judge Axelrad also found that Judy had a much stronger and more stable
relationship with her maternal grandfather and step-grandmother and that Judy
would suffer "greater harm" if her relationship with those caregivers was
severed. Thus, the judge found that termination of Karen's parental rights would
not do more harm than good.
Karen argues that Judge Axelrad erred in finding each of the four prongs
under the best-interests standard. In particular, she challenges the third prong,
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contending that the Division failed to provide services that were reasonable
under all of the circumstances and it did not consider alternatives to termination
of Karen's parental rights. We are not persuaded by any of those arguments.
Each of Judge Axelrad's findings concerning the four prongs is supported
by substantial, credible evidence. See N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v.
F.M., 211 N.J. 420, 448 (2012) (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v.
M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 279 (2007)). In addition, Judge Axelrad correctly
summarized the law and correctly applied the law to her factual findings. See
N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. P.O., 456 N.J. Super. 399, 407 (App.
Div. 2018). Judge Axelrad appropriately relied on the unrebutted testimony of
Dr. Jeffrey who conducted a number of evaluations and had a factual basis for
her opinions. In that regard, our Supreme Court has noted: "In a termination of
parental rights trial, the evidence often takes the form of [expert testimony] by
psychiatrists, psychologists, and other mental health professionals." N.J. Div.
of Child Prot. & Permanency v. R.L.M., 236 N.J. 123, 146 (2018).
Finally, we note that Karen essentially argues that she should have been
given more time and better services to allow her to develop the parenting skills
necessary to reunite with Judy. Judge Axelrad was cognizant of Karen's rights.
Judge Axelrad, however, appropriately balanced Karen's rights with Judy's need
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for permanency. Judy had been removed from Karen's care when she was two
years old. For over a year, the Division provided services to Karen in an effort
to assist her to develop the parenting skills needed to safely care for Judy. The
evidence at trial established that Karen did not fully avail herself of those
services and placed her own needs and desire to continue a relationship with
Vincent over the needs of Judy. Accordingly, Judge Axelrad struck the
appropriate balance in terminating Karen's parental rights in the best interests of
Judy and her need for permanency.
Affirmed.
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