State of New Jersey v. Isaac A. Young

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1857-14T4
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION
Plaintiff-Respondent,
January 9, 2017
v.
APPELLATE DIVISION
ISAAC A. YOUNG,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Argued telephonically December 29, 2016 –
Decided January 9, 2017
Before Judges Espinosa, Rothstadt, and
Currier.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Salem County, Indictment No.
13-09-00524.
Justin T. Loughry argued the cause for
appellant (Loughry and Lindsay, LLC,
attorneys; Mr. Loughry, on the briefs).
Joseph A. Glyn, Deputy Attorney General,
argued the cause for respondent (Christopher
S. Porrino, Attorney General, attorney for
respondent; Mr. Glyn, of counsel and on the
brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
ROTHSTADT, J.A.D.
Defendant Isaac A. Young appeals from a judgment of
conviction the Law Division entered after his first trial ended
in a mistrial and the jury in his retrial convicted him of
permitting or encouraging the release of a confidential child
abuse record, a fourth-degree offense, N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10b,
hindering his own apprehension or prosecution by giving a false
statement to law enforcement, a disorderly persons offense,
N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3(b)(4),1 and fourth-degree false swearing by
inconsistent statements, N.J.S.A. 2C:28-2(a). The charges
against defendant arose from his receiving copies of the
Division of Youth and Family Services' (the Division) 2
confidential child abuse reports that substantiated an
allegation of abuse against a candidate for mayor and giving
those records to a police officer for mailing to others for
political purposes.
In addition, during the ensuing investigation, defendant
gave two contradictory statements to law enforcement. In his
first statement, he denied giving copies of the documents to the
police officer, while in his second statement, he admitted to
that conduct and claimed the earlier statement was based on an
1
The September 11, 2013 indictment originally charged
defendant in the third-degree for hindering apprehension or
prosecution by giving a false statement to law enforcement,
N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3(b)(4), (count four) but this was later amended
to a disorderly persons offense.
2
On June 29, 2012, the Division of Youth and Family Services
was renamed the Division of Child Protection and Permanency. L.
2012, c. 16.
2 A-1857-14T4
incorrect assumption. According to defendant, his second
statement was a retraction of the first one.
On appeal, defendant argues that his conviction for
releasing the documents must be vacated because the statute
prohibiting the release of child abuse records does not apply to
his conduct and, as there was no offense for which he could
hinder his own apprehension, that his conviction for hindering
must also be vacated. He also contends that the court erred in
instructing the jury that his testimony from his first trial was
not to be considered in support of his retraction defense, 3 and
by providing the "false in one, false in all" instruction. The
State disagrees and argues defendant violated the prohibition
against disclosing the subject document and therefore his
conviction for that offense and hindering should stand. It also
contends that the trial court properly instructed the jury in
accordance with defendant's agreement at trial and therefore no
error was committed.
We have considered the parties' contentions in light of our
review of the record and the applicable legal principles. We
reverse defendant's conviction for encouraging the release of
3
Defendant did not testify at his second trial. His testimony
from the first trial was read into the record.
3 A-1857-14T4
the confidential document, but affirm his convictions for
hindering and false swearing.
The facts leading to defendant's conviction can be
summarized as follows. The events that gave rise to defendant's
prosecution occurred in the context of the 2012 mayoral election
in the City of Salem. At the time, defendant was the executive
director of the city's housing authority. Defendant's friend
and political ally, the incumbent-mayor Robert Davis, was
defeated by then-councilman Charles Washington, who was
eventually elected mayor.
The testimony and exhibits adduced at trial, including
portions of defendant's testimony from his first trial that were
read to the jury, established that defendant came into
possession of documents4 sent by the Division to the City's
police chief. The documents advised the chief that the Division
substantiated allegations of child abuse that had been made
against Washington. The allegations were later deemed to be
unsubstantiated by the Division. The evidence also established
that defendant showed the documents to others in his office and
4
The documents consisted of an unsigned letter addressed to
the Salem Community Center Board regarding the abuse charges
made against Washington, a letter from the Division to the
city's chief of police transmitting a Division "Confidential
Report of Substantiated Abuse / Neglect to Law Enforcement
Agencies" regarding Washington, and a city police department
prisoner log.
4 A-1857-14T4
gave copies to a police officer, Sergeant Leon Daniels, so that
Daniels could distribute the documents to others for political
purposes.
According to Daniels, defendant called him into his office
where Daniels saw "10 to 20 copies" of the documents5 sitting on
defendant's desk "along with a sheet of stamps and envelopes."
Defendant gave Daniels a voter registration list and asked him
to mail the documents to the individuals whose names he had
"underlined in red." Daniels complied and, after handwriting
the addresses on the envelopes, sent the documents out that
night and called defendant to inform him.
Washington found out about the letter's distribution and
called the city's police chief to his home and showed him the
documents that had been mailed out. The chief "recognized the
handwriting on the[] envelopes" as being Daniels's, and reported
the incident to the Salem County Prosecutor's Office (SCPO).
The SCPO initiated an investigation into the release of the
confidential documents. Eventually the SCPO determined that
Terri Gross, a civilian clerk with the police department, had
obtained the documents from the department and given them to
5
The city's police department's prisoner log purportedly
established that Washington had been arrested and jailed in
connection with the allegations. As it turned out, the
individual identified in the log was Washington's relative.
5 A-1857-14T4
Mayor Davis, and that defendant "had nothing to do with" Gross's
release of the documents to Davis.6
During the investigation, defendant and Daniels initially
gave conflicting versions about what transpired between them
regarding the documents. Daniels stated that he had received
the documents from defendant and mailed them out at defendant's
instruction.
On the same day that Daniels gave his statement, defendant,
with an attorney present, gave his first sworn statement to the
SCPO. Defendant stated he had received the Division records in
an anonymous mailing and made "maybe one or two copies . . . to
show the folks at the office," and that he "may have made a
copy" to bring to a community center, where he sat on the board
of directors, but denied mailing them to anyone. He admitted
showing the documents to Daniels, but denied giving Daniels any
copies because Daniels "already had it." Defendant also denied
ever having seen the envelopes in which the mailings were sent
and giving the documents to anyone to distribute.
According to Daniels, defendant came to his house later
that day and asked him what he had told the SCPO. Daniels
6
The grand jury charged Gross under the same indictment as it
charged defendant. She was tried separately and convicted. Her
appeal from her conviction is pending. See State v. Gross, No.
A-3010-14.
6 A-1857-14T4
stated to defendant that he had told the truth and defendant
should do the same, and that defendant said he would go back to
the SCPO and "come clean."
Defendant returned to the SCPO more than a month later with
an attorney and gave another sworn statement. Defendant said
Daniels approached him "maybe three or four weeks after the
primary" to request copies of the anonymous letters that had
been sent out — not the Division records — but that he "didn't
acknowledge [Daniels's] request." He stated Daniels approached
him again "sometime in July" for copies of the Division records
and for a third time "maybe a couple weeks" later, at which
point he made "four or five" copies of the Division documents
and the prisoner log and gave them to Daniels, along with
stamps, envelopes, and the voter registration list, so Daniels
could send them to "his fellow police officers."
At defendant's first trial, he testified about his
inconsistent statements. According to his testimony, defendant
received the Division's documents in June or July 2012 in an
anonymous mailing, gave Daniels copies of the documents and
envelopes in response to a request Daniels made, but never
directed Daniels to mail them out. Regarding the discrepancies
between his two statements, he stated that when he was first
asked if he had ever given the documents to anyone he said no
7 A-1857-14T4
because he "wasn't really thinking that [the interviewing
officers were] talking about a police officer, because it was
one of their own" and that he had returned to the SCPO to
"clarify things" with his second statement.
After defendant's arrest, and before his first trial,
defendant filed a motion to dismiss the charge relating to the
unlawful release of the confidential documents. Defendant
argued that the statute he was charged with violating, N.J.S.A.
9:6-8.10b, did not apply to his conduct. The court denied that
motion, stating that:
The defense reading of the statute would
narrow it to such a point that it would
basically become ineffective to anyone but a
person, in this case [the person] in the
police department who did it, even if that
person had multiple co-conspirators that
were outside the department that assisted or
that encouraged or that caused it to happen.
After defendant's conviction, the court sentenced defendant
to concurrent terms of probation and entered the judgment of
conviction. This appeal followed.
In his appeal, defendant presents three arguments:
POINT I
THE COURT'S DEFINITION OF
"RELEASE" AND ITS JURY
INSTRUCTIONS CREATED A NEW CRIME;
THE WORDS OF THE STATUTE DO NOT
PENALIZE THE CONDUCT FOR WHICH THE
STATE CHARGED MR. YOUNG AND FOR
WHICH THE JURY CONVICTED, AS MR.
8 A-1857-14T4
YOUNG DID NOT RELEASE THE
DOCUMENTS WITHIN THE MEANING OF
THE STATUTE AND THE STATUTE DOES
NOT CREATE ANY GENERAL DUTY OF
CONFIDENTIALITY APPLICABLE TO A
CITIZEN WHO DID NOT RECEIVE THE
DOCUMENT FROM THE "DEPARTMENT" SO
THAT MR[.] YOUNG WAS NOT UNDER ANY
LEGAL OBLIGATON TO KEEP THE
DOCUMENTS CONFIDENTIAL. (Raised
Below).
POINT II
WITH MR. YOUNG COMMITTING NO
CONDUCT CONSTITUTING AN OFFENSE
UN[D]ER TITLE 9:10A AND 10B, THERE
CAN BE NO CONVICTION FOR
"HINDERING APPREHENSION." (Not
Raised Below).
POINT III
THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS THAT PERTAIN
TO OR AFFECT THE RETRACTION
DEFENSE PLACED TOO MANY STRICTURES
ON ITS APPLICATION, INCLUDING
REQUIRING THE JURY TO IGNORE ANY
ADDITIONAL "RETRACTIVE" ASPECTS OF
THE DEFENDNAT'S [SIC] IN COURT
TESTIMONY AT THE FIRST (MIS)
TRIAL, AND INCLUDING A "FALSE IN
ONE" CHARGE THAT WAS PARTICULARLY
INAPPOSITE IN THE CONTEXT OF A
RETRACTION DEFENSE. (Not Raised
Below).
We first address defendant's contention that his conduct
did not violate the prohibition against the release of Division
records because he did not receive them "from the department."
He argues the trial court erred initially in denying his motion
to dismiss the indictment for that offense and later in its
9 A-1857-14T4
instruction to the jury regarding the definition of "release."
According to defendant, the court's definition of release — "to
permit to be issued, shown and published or equivalent terms" —
"defined [the term] so broadly as to permit the criminal
condemnation of conduct that did not offend [N.J.S.A. 9:6-
8.10b]." He contends the court's actions violated due process
by imposing a previously-nonexistent obligation upon all
individuals to maintain the confidentiality of Division records,
and that the doctrine of lenity applies to limit the expansion
of this obligation to those outside the Division.
The State counters and contends that the obligation to
maintain the confidentiality of Division records is not limited
to the Division alone. It relies upon the language in N.J.S.A.
9:6-8.10b, which prohibits the release of records by "[a]ny
person," and N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10a, which provides that Division
records "may be disclosed only under circumstances expressly
authorized under" the statute, and the purpose and history of
the relevant legislation.
Our resolution of the parties' dispute requires us at the
outset to turn to the language of the applicable statutes. In
order to determine if a person, like defendant, who obtains a
confidential document from sources other than the Division, and
who did not encourage their original release, can be subject to
10 A-1857-14T4
the statute's prohibitions, we apply our "well-settled"
"principles governing statutory interpretation[:]"
We begin with the statutory language. [In
re Kollman, 210 N.J. 557, 568 (2012)]. "We
ascribe to the statutory words their
ordinary meaning and significance, and read
them in context with related provisions so
as to give sense to the legislation as a
whole." DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477,
492 (2005) (citations omitted). "When that
language 'clearly reveals the meaning of the
statute, the court's sole function is to
enforce the statute in accordance with those
terms.'" State v. Olivero, 221 N.J. 632,
639 (2015) (quoting McCann v. Clerk of
Jersey City, 167 N.J. 311, 320 (2001)).
[State v. Walters, 445 N.J. Super. 596, 601
(App. Div. 2016).]
See also State v. Shelley, 205 N.J. 320, 323 (2011). "We will
not 'rewrite a plainly-written enactment of the Legislature [or]
presume that the Legislature intended something other than that
expressed by way of the plain language.'" Marino v. Marino, 200
N.J. 315, 329 (2009) (alteration in original) (quoting O'Connell
v. State, 171 N.J. 484, 488 (2002)).
Where it is not clear whether something is permitted under
a criminal statute, the benefit of this lack of clarity should
accrue to the defendant. If an ambiguity in a criminal statute
is not resolved by reviewing the text and extrinsic sources, the
rule of lenity dictates that the ambiguities must be interpreted
in favor of the defendant. State v. Sumulikoski, 221 N.J. 93,
11 A-1857-14T4
110 (2015). Thus, "all penal statutes are to be strictly
construed." State v. Twiggs, 445 N.J. Super. 23, 36 (App. Div.
2016) (citing State v. D.A., 191 N.J. 158, 164 (2007)).
Also, when the language does not yield an unambiguous
interpretation, we continue the process to discern legislative
intent, interpreting statutory language "in accordance with
common sense" and may "consider the entire legislative scheme of
which a particular provision is but a part." Morristown Assocs.
v. Grant Oil Co., 220 N.J. 360, 380 (2015). "[W]e may [also]
turn to extrinsic evidence, 'including legislative history,
committee reports, and contemporaneous construction.'"
DiProspero, supra, 183 N.J. at 492-93 (citation omitted); see
also Burnett v. Cty. of Bergen, 198 N.J. 408, 421 (2009). There
are many tools available for our analysis, but only one goal.
"Regardless of the materials relied upon and the analytical
tools employed, in the final analysis, courts should seek to
effectuate the fundamental purpose for which the legislation was
enacted." In re Young, 202 N.J. 50, 64 (2010) (citation
omitted).
The plain language of N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10a requires that the
Division and any person or entity to which the Division lawfully
releases information, maintain the confidentiality of reports of
child abuse, including information gathered during investigation
12 A-1857-14T4
of those reports. New Jersey's child welfare laws impose an
obligation that "[a]ny person having reasonable cause to believe
that a child has been subjected to child abuse or acts of child
abuse [to] report the same immediately to the Division . . . ."
N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10. Reports of abuse made to the Division and
"all information obtained by [the Division] in investigating
such reports" must be kept confidential. N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10a(a).
That information, however, "may be disclosed[, but] only under
the circumstances expressly authorized" by the statute. Ibid.
The statute specifies various entities and people to whom
disclosure can be made under various conditions. N.J.S.A. 9:6-
8.10a(b)7-(g). Among them is "[a] police or other law
enforcement agency investigating a report of child abuse or
neglect." N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10a(b)(2).
The statute imposes a similar duty upon authorized
recipients to maintain the confidentiality of the information
disclosed to them by the Division. The prohibition against
disclosure is included in subsection b of the statute,
immediately after it delineates the twenty–three agencies and
entities to which the Division may disclose the information. It
states:
7
N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10a(b)(1)-(23) sets forth exceptions to the
confidentiality requirements of N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10a(a).
13 A-1857-14T4
Any individual, agency, board, court, grand
jury, legislative committee, or other entity
which receives from the department the
records and reports referred to in
subsection a., shall keep the records and
reports, or parts thereof, confidential and
shall not disclose the records and reports
or parts thereof except as authorized by
law.
[N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10a(b) (emphasis added).]
Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10a(e), where the Division has
substantiated an allegation of child abuse, it is required to
"forward to the police or law enforcement agency in whose
jurisdiction the child named in the report resides," specific
information about the incident including "the identity of
persons alleged to have committed child abuse or neglect and of
victims of child abuse or neglect, . . . the nature of the
allegations, and other relevant information . . . ." The
statute requires that once received, "[t]he police or law
enforcement agency shall keep such information confidential."
Ibid.
The statute, therefore, prohibits the Division or anyone
who receives confidential documents in accordance with the
statutes from failing to maintain the documents'
confidentiality. The next statute, N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10b, imposes
a penalty upon "[a]ny person who willfully permits or encourages
the release of the contents of any record or report in
14 A-1857-14T4
contravention of this act . . . ." N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10b (emphasis
added). That statute makes a release "a misdemeanor . . .
subject[ing a violator] to a fine of not more than $1,000.00, or
to imprisonment for not more than 3 years, or both." Ibid. See
also N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.R., 314 N.J. Super.
390, 400 (App. Div. 1998) ("Violation of the confidentiality of
this information is said to be a 'misdemeanor.'").8
We conclude that because the Legislature specifically
limited culpability under the statute to authorized individuals
or entities that receive confidential documents from the
Division but then fail to maintain their confidentiality or
anyone who encourages their improper release, there was no
evidence adduced at defendant's trial that he violated the plain
language of N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10b. It was undisputed that he did
not receive any documents from the Division or from Gross, or
that he encouraged Gross to release the documents to him or
anyone else.9 Defendant claimed he received the documents in an
8
"[A] crime defined by any statute of this State other than
[the criminal] code and designated as a misdemeanor shall
constitute for the purpose of sentence a crime of the fourth
degree." N.J.S.A. 2C:43-1(b). Therefore, imprisonment for a
violation of N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10b is limited to eighteen months.
See N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(a)(4).
9
According to Gross, she gave the documents to Davis, but
there was no direct evidence that Davis gave them to defendant.
15 A-1857-14T4
anonymous mailing sent to him and there was no evidence to the
contrary.
Therefore, applying the statute's clear language, the trial
court erred by not dismissing on its own motion the charge that
defendant violated N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10a(b). See R. 3:18-1 ("At
the close of . . . evidence . . . , the court shall, on
defendant's motion or its own initiative, order the entry of a
judgment of acquittal of one or more offenses charged in the
indictment or accusation if the evidence is insufficient to
warrant a conviction. . . .")(emphasis added).10 While we do not
take issue with the court's denial of defendant's motion to
dismiss his indictment before trial because of the court's
belief there was evidence presented to the grand jury that
defendant somehow conspired with Gross or others for the release
of the documents, we find no support in the record for the court
allowing the matter to go to the jury in the absence of any
evidence to support a conviction on the charge of releasing
confidential documents. Accordingly, defendant's conviction for
that offense must be vacated.
10
Because we reach the conclusion that the conviction must be
vacated and the indictment dismissed, we choose not to address
defendant's argument regarding the trial court's jury charge as
to the definition of the offense and the meaning of the word
"release."
16 A-1857-14T4
Despite our conclusion that defendant's conduct did not
constitute a violation of N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10a(b)'s prohibition
against disclosure, we disagree with defendant that his
conviction for hindering by making a false statement to police
should have been dismissed as well. We agree with the State's
contention that N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3(b)(4) "does not require that
defendant actually be charged with an offense or that a
conviction be successful" for a defendant to be criminally
liable for hindering an investigation or prosecution for
committing the underlying offense in order to be guilty.
As defendant did not raise this challenge to his hindering
conviction before the trial court, we review his claim for
"plain error." R. 2:10-2 (any error will be disregarded unless
it was "clearly capable of producing an unjust result . . . .").
Applying that standard, we conclude the trial court did not
commit any error even though defendant was improperly convicted
of releasing confidential child abuse records.
The hindering statute under which defendant was charged
provides in pertinent part: "A person commits an offense if,
with purpose to hinder his own detention, apprehension,
investigation, prosecution, conviction or punishment . . . for
17 A-1857-14T4
an offense[11] . . . he . . . [g]ives false information to a law
enforcement officer . . . ." N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3(b)(4) (emphasis
added).12 At trial, the jury had sufficient evidence to support
its finding that when defendant gave his first statement to law
enforcement he committed a violation of the hindering statute.
Daniels testified to the fact that defendant gave him the
documents and defendant himself admitted as much in his second
11
The New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice defines an "offense"
as "a crime, a disorderly persons offense or a petty disorderly
persons offense unless a particular section in this code is
intended to apply to less than all three." N.J.S.A. 2C:1-14(k).
Thus, the underlying offense with which defendant was
charged — the release of confidential Division records —
constitutes an offense for purposes of the hindering statute.
See N.J.S.A. 2C:1-14(k); N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10b ("Any person who
willfully permits or encourages the release of the contents of
any record or report in contravention of this act shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor . . . .").
12
The grading of the offense is dependent upon a defendant's
conduct and the nature of the underlying charge. The statute
states in relevant part:
[T]he offense under subsection b. of this
section is a crime of the third degree if
the conduct which the actor knows has been
charged or is liable to be charged against
him would constitute a crime of the second
degree or greater. The offense is a crime
of the fourth degree if such conduct would
constitute a crime of the third degree.
Otherwise it is a disorderly persons
offense.
[N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3(b)(emphasis added).]
18 A-1857-14T4
statement, after giving an earlier sworn statement to the
contrary.
The evidence presented at trial required the court to allow
the jury to determine whether defendant was guilty of the
offense. Once the jury made its determination, the court did
not commit any error, let alone plain error, by not dismissing
defendant's conviction on the hindering charge. Regardless of
whether defendant actually committed the offense for which he
was under investigation at the time he spoke to police, he
violated the statute by giving a false statement to the police
during the course of their investigation. We have no reason to
disturb his conviction.
We also reject defendant's contention that his conviction
for false swearing should be vacated because the court erred in
its instructions to the jury. According to defendant, "[t]he
court did not instruct the jury to examine [defendant's first
trial's] in court testimony as a potential part of [his]
retraction [defense], but rather only to look at the in court
testimony . . . as it might bear on [defendant's] credibility."
He argues the jury should have been permitted to consider his
testimony at his first trial only as evidence in support of his
retraction defense, as it explained why his second statement to
police was inconsistent with his first one.
19 A-1857-14T4
In response, the State argues that defendant invited any
purported error in the court's instruction regarding the
retraction defense by repeatedly agreeing to the court's
proposed instruction, thereby barring his claim of error on
appeal. The State urges, however, that the court properly
instructed the jury that it could consider defendant's testimony
at his first trial only for purposes of determining credibility
— not as evidence of retraction — because his testimony did not
retract his prior statements and was not made "in the course of
the same proceeding or matter" as his earlier statements. The
State also argues the instruction was necessary because
instructing the jury otherwise would have risked the jury
convicting defendant of false swearing based on inconsistencies
between his statements and his testimony, which was not charged
in the indictment, and would have violated due process.
We review defendant's argument under the plain error
standard, R. 2:10-2, as defendant also never raised this
contention before the trial court. In the context of a
challenge to a court's jury instructions, "plain error requires
demonstration of 'legal impropriety in the charge prejudicially
affecting the substantial rights of the defendant and
sufficiently grievous to justify notice by the reviewing court
and to convince the court that of itself the error possessed a
20 A-1857-14T4
clear capacity to bring about an unjust result.'" State v.
Nero, 195 N.J. 397, 407 (2008) (quoting State v. Chapland, 187
N.J. 275, 288-89 (2006)). We view "[t]he alleged error . . . in
the totality of the entire charge, not in isolation." Nero,
supra, 195 N.J. at 407 (quoting Chapland, supra, 187 N.J. at
288-89). Where no objection is raised at trial, we will
"presum[e] that the charge was not error and was unlikely to
prejudice the defendant's case," State v. Singleton, 211 N.J.
157, 182 (2012), and any error will be disregarded unless it
constitutes plain error, in that it was "clearly capable of
producing an unjust result . . . ." R. 2:10-2.
When a defendant "invites" the error, a more stringent
standard applies, and "relief will not be forthcoming on a claim
of error by that defendant." State v. Jenkins, 178 N.J. 347,
358 (2004). "The [invited-error] doctrine prevents litigants
from 'playing fast and loose' with, or otherwise manipulating,
the judicial process." Id. at 359 (quoting State v. Gonzalez,
142 N.J. 618, 632 (1995)). A "defendant cannot beseech and
request the trial court to take a certain course of action, and
upon adoption by the court, take his chance on the outcome of
the trial, and if unfavorable, then condemn the very procedure
he sought and urged, claiming it to be error and prejudicial."
Id. at 358 (quoting State v. Pontery, 19 N.J. 457, 471 (1955)).
21 A-1857-14T4
"In other words, if a party has 'invited' the error, he is
barred from raising an objection for the first time on appeal."
State v. A.R., 213 N.J. 542, 561 (2013).
Applying these standards, we conclude the court did not
commit any error in its instruction to the jury about using
defendant's testimony from his first trial only for credibility
purposes, rather than as evidence of a false statement or his
retraction. In any event, even if the court committed an error
in its charge, it was clearly invited and certainly not plain
error.
N.J.S.A. 2C:28-2(a) provides "A person who makes a false
statement under oath or equivalent affirmation, or swears or
affirms the truth of such a statement previously made, when he
does not believe the statement to be true, is guilty of a crime
of the fourth degree." It also addresses situations where a
defendant made inconsistent statements. The statute states:
Where the defendant made inconsistent
statements under oath or equivalent
affirmation, both having been made within
the period of the statute of limitations,
the prosecution may proceed by setting forth
the inconsistent statements in a single
count alleging in the alternative that one
or the other was false and not believed by
the defendant. In such case it shall not be
necessary for the prosecution to prove which
statement was false but only that one or the
other was false and not believed by the
defendant to be true.
22 A-1857-14T4
[N.J.S.A. 2C:28-2(c).]
The statute also permits a defendant to assert a defense of
retraction as set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:28-1(d). That statute
states "[i]t is an affirmative defense . . . that the actor
retracted the falsification in the course of the proceeding or
matter in which it was made prior to the termination of the
proceeding or matter without having caused irreparable harm to
any party." N.J.S.A. 2C:28-1(d). "To retract means to take
back what was said; to recant." Model Jury Charge (Criminal),
N.J.S.A. 2C:28-2(a) "Affirmative Defense of Retraction" (2002) ;
Model Jury Charge (Criminal), N.J.S.A. 2C:28-2(c) "Affirmative
Defense of Retraction" (2003).
The indictment against defendant charged him with false
swearing as a result of his giving two inconsistent statements
to law enforcement while under oath. The charge had nothing to
do with his testimony from his first trial that was read to the
jury at his second trial. As noted, in one he denied giving the
Division report to Daniels, and in the other he admitted that he
did. At his first trial, he attempted to explain why he gave a
different statement from the first. The jury determined
defendant was guilty of committing the offense of false swearing
under subsection c of the statute.
23 A-1857-14T4
Defendant's challenge to the court's charge about the
limited use of his first trial's testimony is undermined by the
record, which reveals that the charge about which defendant
complains was given in response to concerns he raised and with
his agreement. During the charge conference, defense counsel
agreed that defendant's first trial testimony was not intended
to retract either statement he gave to law enforcement. Also,
counsel raised a concern that the jury might think his first
trial's testimony could be used as a basis for convicting him of
making a false statement if the jury believed that his trial
testimony was not truthful. He expressly agreed with the court
that the jury could "use [the first trial's testimony] to
determine whether [defendant] was truthful in giving statements
[he gave to law enforcement], but not to giving a false
statement" as charged in the indictment.
After the charge conference, the court instructed the jury
on the elements of the offense consistent with the model jury
charge and specifically identified the two statements made by
defendant to law enforcement as the basis for the charge against
him. It also explained the defense of retraction, relying again
upon the model jury charge, and told the jury that it was
defendant's position that the second statement was given in
order to retract defendant's first one. It also made clear that
24 A-1857-14T4
defendant's first trial's testimony had nothing to do with the
charge against him and should only be considered for credibility
purposes. Defendant never raised any objection to the charge.
During the course of their deliberations, the jurors raised
a question as to the false swearing charge. While conferring
with counsel, the court suggested that it would tell the jurors
that they had to decide whether the second statement was a
retraction. Defense counsel agreed. The court then re-read its
charge on false swearing, told the jurors it could only use the
first-trial's testimony for credibility purposes, and that the
jury should determine whether defendant's second statement to
law enforcement was a retraction of the first. Defendant did
not raise any objection to the court's instructions and never
requested that his first-trial's testimony be the basis of his
retraction defense.
As defendant did not object to the charge at the time, it
is "presum[ed] that the charge was not error and was unlikely to
prejudice the defendant's case." Singleton, supra, 211 N.J. at
182. Moreover, in any event, we find no merit to defendant's
contention that his trial testimony, which essentially clarified
his second statement's explanation for denying he gave Daniels
copies of the subject documents, constituted a retraction as
contemplated by the statute. His conviction is affirmed.
25 A-1857-14T4
Finally, defendant contends that the court should not have
given the jury a "false in one, false in all" instruction
because doing so "virtually instructed the jury to reject the
retraction defense." Again, because defendant did not challenge
this charge at trial we review the court's instruction for plain
error. R. 2:10-2. We find no merit to defendant's argument as
we discern no error by the court instructing the jury with this
charge either.
The "false in one, false in all" charge instructs the jury
that if the jurors find that any witness "willfully or knowingly
testified falsely to any material facts in the case, with intent
to deceive [them], [the jury] may give such weight to his or her
testimony as [they] may deem it is entitled." Model Jury Charge
(Criminal), "False in One False in All" (1991). It has been
long recognized that the issuance of a false in one, false in
all charge rests in the sound discretion of the trial judge.
See State v. Ernst, 32 N.J. 567, 583-84 (1960), cert. denied,
364 U.S. 943, 81 S. Ct. 464, 5 L. Ed. 2d 374 (1961); State v.
Fleckenstein, 60 N.J. Super. 399, 408 (App. Div.) (noting that
the evidential inference of repetitive falsity is not
mandatory), certif. denied, 33 N.J. 109 (1960).
In light of the conflicting evidence about statements made
by defendant to law enforcement officers and his first-trial's
26 A-1857-14T4
testimony attempting to explain those inconsistencies, we
discern no abuse in the trial court's discretion by its charging
the jury with this charge. Defendant's arguments to the
contrary about the charge's impact upon his retraction defense
are without sufficient merit to warrant further discussion in a
written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). Suffice it to say that
defendant's statements were not "[i]nadvertent misstatements or
immaterial falsehoods," State v. D'Ippolito, 22 N.J. 318, 324
(1956), and provided a sufficient basis for the court to include
the charge in its instructions to the jury.
Defendant's conviction for violating N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10b is
vacated and the indictment as to that charge is dismissed. His
convictions for hindering by giving a false statement, N.J.S.A.
2C:29-3(b)(4), and false swearing, N.J.S.A. 2C:28-2(a) are
affirmed. The matter is remanded to the trial court for entry
of an amended judgment of conviction consistent with our opinion
and resentencing. We do not retain jurisdiction.
27 A-1857-14T4