State of New Jersey v. Dqwan A. Taylor

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1883-13T4
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION
Plaintiff-Respondent,
May 12, 2015
v.
APPELLATE DIVISION
DQWAN A. TAYLOR,
Defendant-Appellant.
__________________________________________
Argued January 6, 2015 – Decided May 12, 2015
Before Judges Fisher, Accurso and Manahan.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County,
Indictment No. 12-09-1420.
Alyssa Aiello, Assistant Deputy Public
Defender, argued the cause for appellant
(Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender,
attorney; Ms. Aiello, of counsel and on the
brief).
Steven A. Yomtov, Deputy Attorney General,
argued the cause for respondent (John J.
Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney;
Mr. Yomtov, of counsel and on the brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
MANAHAN, J.S.C. (temporarily assigned)
Defendant, Dqwan A. Taylor, appeals the trial court's
denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized by police
officers after a warrantless search of a stolen motor vehicle in
which he was a passenger. Because the issue presented relative
to defendant's knowledge of the motor vehicle's status was
unanswered by the record, we are constrained to remand for
further proceedings.
On April 18, 2012, at approximately 1:28 a.m., New Jersey
State Troopers Goncalves and Brown were on routine patrol on the
New Jersey Turnpike when they observed a white Lexus ES 350
bearing New York license plates weaving in the left lane and
traveling at a high rate of speed.
The troopers activated the overhead lights of the patrol
vehicle to initiate a motor vehicle stop. The motor vehicle
pulled over to the shoulder of the highway and came to a
complete stop. Three individuals were inside the motor vehicle;
Lastacia Harmon, the driver, Louis Bailey, the front seat
passenger, and defendant, the rear seat passenger.
Trooper Goncalves approached the motor vehicle from the
passenger side, identified himself, and requested from Harmon
her driver's license and registration. Harmon provided a
driver's license but was unable to produce the registration.
Harmon informed the trooper that the car did not belong to her
and that she did not know the whereabouts of the paperwork for
the motor vehicle.
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The trooper inquired about the motor vehicle's ownership
and the whereabouts of the occupants. Bailey responded the car
belonged to "a friend" and was borrowed for the day. No other
details were provided regarding the "friend." Harmon informed
the trooper they had been in New York visiting friends and were
on their way back to Atlantic City. While Trooper Goncalves
spoke with Harmon and Bailey, defendant appeared to be asleep in
the rear seat.
Trooper Goncalves returned to his patrol vehicle and
contacted dispatch. The troopers were informed that the license
plate on the Lexus was registered to a black 2011 Kia Optima.
While Goncalves returned to the motor vehicle to speak with the
occupants, Trooper Brown checked the motor vehicle
identification number (VIN) on the Lexus and contacted dispatch
for verification. The VIN number came back to a Lexus reported
stolen five months earlier in Atlantic City.
After additional troopers arrived, Harmon, Bailey and
defendant were ordered out of the car, placed under arrest,
searched and given Miranda warnings. The troopers then
conducted a search of the motor vehicle's trunk and passenger
compartment. The search revealed two handguns, one located
under the driver's seat and one located in the trunk.
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All three occupants were transported to the barracks. At
the barracks, the suspects were searched again. The second
search produced two white, rock-like substances in the small
pocket above the right front pocket of Bailey's jeans that was
suspected to be crack cocaine.
After again being advised of their Miranda rights, an
interview was conducted of each occupant. None of them
acknowledged ownership of the weapons.
The motor vehicle was impounded and towed to a private
yard. Several days thereafter at the impound lot, an attendant
entered the motor vehicle to search for the keys so he could
move the car. In the course of the search, the attendant
discovered a gun magazine.
Defendant filed a motion to suppress which was joined by
Harmon and Bailey. The motion was opposed by the State. After
oral argument, the court denied the motion. The court found the
defendants did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy as
they were occupants of a stolen vehicle. The court cited this
court's decision in State v. Lugo, 249 N.J. Super. 565 (App.
Div. 1991) and employed the analysis set forth by the Supreme
Court in State v. Hempele, 120 N.J. 182 (1990).
The court held:
Now, I'd like to note initially that
the defendant operating an automobile known
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by him to have been stolen has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in its contents.
State v. Bohuk, 269 N.J. Super. 581, [(App.
Div. 1994)].
But in State v. Lugo . . ., the Appellate
Division admitted evidence found in a stolen
vehicle after relying on cases in which - -
a case it cited in which the defendant had
knowledge that the car was stolen.
However, in the court's opinion, the facts
relied on by the court did not note whether
the defendant in that case was aware that
the car was stolen or not stolen. So, it
was not relevant to the analysis in Lugo
whether a defendant had knowledge that the
car had been stolen or not.
Here, assuming these defendants had an
expectation of privacy, [that they were]
unaware . . . that the vehicle had been
stolen, even though Harmon . . . was unable
to turn over the vehicle registration and
ownership documents, and the defendants were
unable to articulate from whom they obtained
the Lexus, the Lexus that they were in at
the time, I conclude that there is no
reasonable expectation of privacy.
And I emphasize the word "reasonable"
expectation of privacy in a stolen car as a
matter of law. Therefore, this court
concludes that since there is no reasonable
expectation . . . in a stolen motor vehicle,
the search . . . conducted by the State
Troopers without a warrant was lawful, and
therefore, defendants' motion to suppress
the evidence must be denied.
The court then added:
And the reason . . . I'm making this
decision . . . and not conducting an
evidentiary hearing is because there are a
certain set of limited facts that are not in
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dispute, and because I'm making a
determination that as a matter of law, it is
unreasonable for there to exist an
expectation of privacy, that it is - - it is
an expectation that I conclude that society
will never recognize as legitimate.
On appeal, the defendant raises the following argument:
POINT I
BASED ON A FLAWED INTERPRETATION OF STATE v.
LUGO . . ., THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY
REACHED THE UNSOUND CONCLUSION THAT A
PASSENGER HAS NO EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN A
STOLEN CAR, EVEN IF HE HAD NO KNOWLEDGE THAT
THE CAR WAS STOLEN AND REASONABLY BELIEVED
THAT THE DRIVER WAS IN LAWFUL POSSESSION OF
IT.
The State argues that defendant had no reasonable
expectation of privacy in the motor vehicle, and therefore, the
police did not need a warrant to search.1
Although we accept the trial court's findings of fact that
are "supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record,"
State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412, 424 (2014) (citing State v.
Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 243 (2007)), we need not defer to the
trial court's legal conclusions reached from the established
1
The State raised an alternative argument of inevitable-
discovery during oral argument on the motion which the court
rejected. No evidence of a police inventory policy was adduced
at the hearing. The exception's applicability requires the
finding that, notwithstanding that the police violated the law,
the State "would have pursued established investigatory
procedures that would have inevitably resulted in the discovery
of the controverted evidence . . . ." State v. Sugar, 100 N.J.
214, 240 (1985).
6 A-1883-13T4
facts. State v. Jefferson, 413 N.J. Super. 344, 352 (App. Div.
2010). "'If the trial court acts under a misconception of the
applicable law,' we need not defer to its ruling." Ibid.(quoting State v. Brown, 118 N.J. 595, 604 (1990)).
We first address defendant's argument he had a reasonable
expectation of privacy. The Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution and Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey
Constitution protect against "unreasonable searches and
seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 7. A
search triggering constitutional scrutiny occurs when government
agents intrude into an area where an individual has "a
reasonable 'expectation of privacy[.]'" See Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 9, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1873, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 899 (1968)
(citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361, 88 S. Ct. 507,
516, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576, 587-88 (1967) (Harlan J., concurring));
see also State v. Hinton, 216 N.J. 211, 229 (2013).
Absent a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place or
thing searched, an individual is not entitled to protection
under either the Fourth Amendment or Article I, Paragraph 7 of
the New Jersey Constitution. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128,
148-49, 99 S. Ct. 421, 433, 58 L. Ed. 2d 387, 404-05 (1978);
Hinton, supra, 216 N.J. at 239-40 (holding that because
defendant lacked an objectively reasonable expectation of
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privacy in the apartment police searched, the "police action in
his apartment was not a 'search' for purposes of either the
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution or Article I,
Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution").
Our Supreme Court has held that individuals have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage placed in opaque
bags, Hempele, supra, 120 N.J. at 255, and bank records
maintained by third parties. State v. McAllister, 184 N.J. 17,
30-33 (2005). On the other hand, a defendant has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in a vacant building with an opened and
unlocked front door, State v. Perry, 124 N.J. 128, 149-50
(1991), or in a known stolen vehicle, Lugo, supra, 249 N.J.
Super. at 568.
Whether an individual has an expectation of privacy
requires a fact-sensitive analysis. For Fourth Amendment
purposes, to determine whether a person has a reasonable
expectation of privacy in a place or object, courts must make "a
two-part inquiry: first, has the individual manifested a
subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the
challenged search? Second, is society willing to recognize that
expectation as reasonable?" Cal. v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211
106 S. Ct. 1809, 1811, 90 L. Ed. 2d 210, 215 (1986). Unlike the
federal two-part inquiry, the New Jersey constitutional standard
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does not require the defendant to prove a subjective expectation
of privacy. Hinton, supra, 216 N.J. at 236. Rather, "Article
I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution 'requires only
that an expectation of privacy be reasonable.'" Ibid. (citing
Hempele, supra, 120 N.J. at 200).
"[E]xpectations of privacy are established by general
social norms," and must align with the "aims of a free and open
society." Hempele, supra, 120 N.J. at 200-01 (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted). Under federal law,
defendants have the burden of proving they had a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the place or object searched.
Rawlings v. Ky., 448 U.S. 98, 104-05, 100 S. Ct. 2556, 2561, 65
L. Ed. 2d 633, 641 (1980). "Under state law, a 'defendant must
show that a reasonable or legitimate expectation of privacy was
trammeled by government authorities.'" Hinton, supra, 216 N.J.
at 233 (quoting State v. Evers, 175 N.J. 355, 368-69 (2003)).
In the case before us, we conclude that the question of
whether defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
motor vehicle cannot be solely determined as a matter of law,
but requires a fact-sensitive inquiry. Such an inquiry is
required since we decline the State's invitation to formulate a
bright—line rule, as a matter of law, that an individual
operating or occupying a stolen motor vehicle, regardless of
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their knowledge of its status, does not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy.
In State v. Pace, 171 N.J. Super. 240, 244-45 (App. Div.
1979), certif. denied, 84 N.J. 384 (1980), the defendant was
operating a motor vehicle later determined through a records
check to be stolen. After the defendant was arrested, the
police conducted an inventory search of the motor vehicle for
evidence of ownership. Id. at 245. The police located, forced
open, and searched a locked attaché case found in the trunk.
Ibid. The defendant later pled guilty to receiving stolen
property, i.e., the motor vehicle. Id. at 250.
On appeal, the court noted the State's argument that
defendant had no reasonable expectation of a right to privacy in
any article placed in the stolen motor vehicle. Id. at 247. We
noted, "[W]ere we approaching this issue as one of first
impression, we might be persuaded that this position has merit."
Ibid. However, citing United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 97
S. Ct. 2476, 53 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1977) and Arkansas v. Sanders,
442 U.S. 753, 99 S. Ct. 2586, 61 L. Ed. 2d 235 (1979), we found
the search of the attaché case violated the defendant's
reasonable expectation of privacy. Pace, supra, 171 N.J. Super.
at 247-50.
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In Lugo, the defendant was stopped by police and arrested
after they learned he was operating a stolen motor vehicle.
Lugo, supra, 249 N.J. Super. at 567. The police impounded the
motor vehicle. Ibid. Two days later, while the motor vehicle
remained impounded, police received an anonymous tip that
contraband would be found in the motor vehicle. Ibid. Acting
thereupon, the police located a brown paper bag under the
passenger seat containing heroin. Ibid. We determined, based
upon the United States Supreme Court decision in Cal. v.
Acededo, 500 U.S. 565, 111 S. Ct. 1982, 114 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1991)
which overruled Chadwick and Sanders, we "need not reach the
result we were required to reach in Pace." Lugo, supra, 249
N.J. Super. at 568. We added that "a defendant operating an
automobile known by him to have been stolen has no reasonable
expectation of privacy respecting contraband he had hidden in it
. . . ." Ibid.2
In State v. Bohuk, 269 N.J. Super. 581, 595 (App. Div.
1994), a case cited by the motion judge, we cited Lugo and noted
that "a defendant operating an automobile known by him to have
2
Defendant was not charged with "Receiving Stolen Property"
which requires proof of knowledge or belief the property has
been stolen. N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7(a). None of the statutory
requisites supporting presumption of knowledge would apply
herein. N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7(b).
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been stolen has no reasonable expectation of privacy in its
contents."
In view of our reading of Pace, Lugo and Bohuk, which
specifically address the issue of knowledge, we reject the
State's "strict liability" argument that knowledge of the motor
vehicle's status is irrelevant to a determination of a
reasonable expectation of privacy. To be sure, one can envision
other settings where an "unknowing occupier" of a stolen motor
vehicle would have a reasonable expectation of privacy that
would not offend societal norms.
The State also argues it was defendant's burden to
demonstrate, at the time of the motion, that he had a reasonable
or legitimate expectation of privacy. Evers, supra, 175 N.J. at
369. Without further consideration of that issue, we reject the
State's argument that defendant "waived" his opportunity to
present evidence to meet his burden as the motion was determined
after oral argument based upon the agreement of the parties and
the court. Therefore, no facts were developed on the issue of
defendant's knowledge.3 In light of the agreed upon procedure,
3
We are mindful that, after the motion was denied, defendant
entered a guilty plea to second-degree unlawful possession of a
firearm. During the plea colloquy, defendant admitted he knew
the vehicle was stolen. Whether, or to what extent, that
admission may be used at the hearing now required by today's
(continued)
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it would be fundamentally unfair to conclude defendant waived
the opportunity to present such evidence.
Remanded in conformity with this decision. We do not
retain jurisdiction.
(continued)
decision should be considered in the first instance by the trial
judge.
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