State of New Jersey v. Michelle Toussaint

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3654-13T1
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION
Plaintiff-Appellant,
May 14, 2015
v.
APPELLATE DIVISION
MICHELLE TOUSSAINT, a/k/a
MICHELE C. TOUSSAINT
MICHELE TOUSSANT,
Defendant-Respondent.
______________________________
Submitted February 3, 2015 – Decided May 14, 2015
Before Judges Reisner, Koblitz and Higbee.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Law Division, Camden County,
Indictment No. 13—03-0915.
Mary Eva Colalillo, Camden County
Prosecutor, attorney for appellant (Jason
Magid, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and
on the briefs).
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney
for respondent (Michele E. Friedman,
Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel
and on the briefs).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
REISNER, P.J.A.D.
This appeal raises the issue whether a defendant convicted
of violating N.J.S.A. 39:3-40(e) and N.J.S.A. 39:6B-2 may be
permitted to serve her sentence in an electronic monitoring home
detention program in lieu of the county jail.1 Unlike the
sentencing statute at issue in State v. French, 437 N.J. Super.
333, 335 (App. Div. 2014), certif. denied, 220 N.J. 575 (2015),
and unlike other provisions in Title 39, N.J.S.A. 39:3-40(e) and
N.J.S.A. 39:6B-2 do not unambiguously require that a convicted
defendant serve the required imprisonment term "without parole"
or "in the county jail." Consequently, applying well
established principles of statutory construction, including the
rule of lenity, we conclude that the trial court had discretion
to permit defendant to serve her sentence in a home electronic
monitoring program rather than in the county jail. Accordingly,
we affirm the sentence imposed. We remand this matter for the
limited purpose of vacating the stay of sentence entered by the
trial court.2
1
The defense brief advises us that in Camden County, the
electronic monitoring program is operated by the County, as a
way to relieve jail overcrowding. See U.S. Bureau of Justice
Assistance Criminal Courts Technical Assistance Project, Review
of Alternative Sentencing Programs in Camden County, New Jersey
(July 2006). Thus, a defendant is sentenced to jail, but is
then interviewed to determine whether she is an appropriate
candidate for home confinement enforced through the electronic
monitoring program.
2
Defendant pled guilty to violations of N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1.2,
N.J.S.A. 39:3-40, and N.J.S.A. 39:6B-2. The State's appeal is
limited to the sentence imposed on January 24, 2014, with regard
to N.J.S.A. 39:3-40(e) and N.J.S.A. 39:6B-2. That sentence was
stayed pending appeal.
2 A-3654-13T1
I
While driving during a period of license suspension,
defendant was involved in a motor vehicle accident in which two
pedestrians were injured. Pursuant to a negotiated plea
agreement, defendant pled guilty to one count of third-degree
endangering an injured victim, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1.2, for which the
State agreed to recommend two years of probation. At a second
plea hearing, on January 24, 2014, she also pled guilty to two
motor vehicle offenses, driving while her license was suspended,
N.J.S.A. 39:3-40, and driving without insurance, N.J.S.A. 39:6B-
2.
At the initial plea hearing on December 11, 2013, the
prosecutor recited that the State would recommend an aggregate
sentence of "90 days" for the violation of N.J.S.A. 39:3-40(b)
and (e). The prosecutor told the judge that "[t]he State would
object to programs," i.e., alternatives to serving the sentence
within the county jail. The prosecutor also stated that
defendant would be subject to a fourteen-day jail term for
driving without insurance, which could be imposed concurrent to
the sentence for being involved in an accident during a period
of license suspension. The judge reminded both counsel that in
addition to the jail terms already discussed, a second
conviction for driving while suspended, N.J.S.A. 39:3-40(b),
3 A-3654-13T1
required a sentence of between one and five days which "must be
served in the county jail."
The judge explained on the record that he interpreted the
several provisions of N.J.S.A. 39:3-40 as requiring imprisonment
in the county jail when a particular section specified that the
sentence must be served "in the county jail," but as allowing
"programs such as house arrest or the CSLS program . . . when
the term of incarceration that is required is characterized
generally as imprisonment or in some other general way."3
At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel asked the judge
to permit defendant to serve her sentence in an alternative
program, because defendant was employed and supporting her son,
and was also living with and caring for her elderly mother.
Defendant also agreed to pay restitution to the two injured
pedestrians. After finding that the mitigating factors
outweighed the aggravating factors, the judge sentenced
defendant to two years of probation for leaving an injured
victim. For the motor vehicle violations, the judge sentenced
defendant to five days in the county jail, which was subsumed by
five days of jail credit, plus eighty-five days "imprisonment"
3
We understand the judge was referring to the electronic
monitoring program and the Correctional Supplemental Labor
Service program. See N.J.S.A. 2B:19-5 (authorizing the creation
of labor assistance programs).
4 A-3654-13T1
as to which "programs" would be "permissible." That is,
defendant could serve the eighty-five days in home confinement
with electronic monitoring.
II
Our review of the trial court's statutory interpretation is
de novo. State v. Vargas, 213 N.J. 301, 327 (2013); State v.
Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161, 176 (2010). In construing the statutes at
issue, we consider their plain language, and if we find the
language ambiguous we consider the legislative history and
purpose of the enactments. Gandhi, supra, 201 N.J. at 176-77;
DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492-93 (2005).
We begin with the statutory language. N.J.S.A. 39:6B-2
provides that upon a second or subsequent conviction for driving
without insurance, the defendant "shall be subject to a fine of
up to $5,000 and shall be subject to imprisonment for a term of
14 days." N.J.S.A. 39:3-40(e) specifies that if a defendant
drives during a period of license suspension and is involved in
an accident in which another person is injured, "the court shall
impose a period of imprisonment for not less than 45 days or
more than 180 days." Both statutes refer to "imprisonment" but
neither statute specifies whether the sentencing court has the
discretion it would normally have to permit alternatives to
incarceration in the county jail. See R. 7:9-1; N.J.S.A. 39:5-
5 A-3654-13T1
7; N.J.S.A. 2C:44-2(b). As will be further discussed below,
that is significant, because in other sections of Title 39, and
in cognate provisions of Title 2C concerning automobile-related
offenses, the Legislature has specified when a term of
imprisonment must be served "in the county jail" or "without
parole."
Because the statutory language does not answer the question
presented in this case, we consider the legislative history.
State v. Gelman, 195 N.J. 475, 482 (2008); DiProspero, supra,
183 N.J. at 492-93. While our research reveals no relevant
history for N.J.S.A. 39:6B-2, the history of N.J.S.A. 39:3-40 is
helpful. Prior to its amendment in 1982, the statute consisted
of three unnumbered paragraphs. Only the first and third
paragraphs are relevant here:
No person to whom a driver's license
has been refused or whose driver's license
. . . has been suspended or revoked, or who
has been prohibited from obtaining a
driver's license, shall personally operate a
motor vehicle during the period of refusal,
suspension, revocation, or prohibition.
. . . .
A person violating any provision of
this section shall be fined not less than
$200.00 nor more than $1000.00, or be
imprisoned in the county jail for not more
than 6 months, or both, provided, that if
while operating a vehicle in violation of
this section, such person is involved in an
accident resulting in personal injury, the
6 A-3654-13T1
punishment shall include imprisonment for
not less than 45 days.
[L. 1981, c. 38, § 1 (current version at
N.J.S.A. 39:3-40).]
In 1982, the statute was amended to "increase[] the general
penalties" for "driving on the revoked list." Senate Law,
Public Safety and Defense Committee Statement, Senate, No. 904 —
L. 1982, c. 45; Assembly Judiciary, Law, Public Safety and
Defense Committee, Senate, No. 904 — L. 1982, c. 45. In
amending the statute, the Legislature divided section 40 into
several separate sections, corresponding to different types of
violations. As amended, N.J.S.A. 39:3-40 provided that a person
in violation of its provisions would be subject to:
a. Upon conviction for a first offense, a
fine of $500.00;
b. Upon conviction for a second offense, a
fine of $750.00 and imprisonment in the
county jail for not more than 5 days;
c. Upon conviction for a third offense, a
fine of $1,000.00 and imprisonment in the
county jail for 10 days;
d. Upon conviction, the court shall impose
or extend a period of suspension not to
exceed 6 months;
e. Upon conviction, the court shall impose a
period of imprisonment for not less than 45
days if while operating a vehicle in
violation of this section a person is
involved in an accident resulting in
personal injury.
7 A-3654-13T1
Notwithstanding paragraphs a. through e.,
any person violating this section while
under a suspension issued pursuant to R.S.
39:4-50 shall be subject upon conviction to
a fine of $500.00, imprisonment in the
county jail for 90 days, and an additional
suspension of the license to operate a motor
vehicle for a period of 5 years.
[L. 1982, c. 45, § 2 (emphasis added)
(current version at N.J.S.A. 39:3-40).]
As the emphasized portions illustrate, all of the other
amended sections providing for imprisonment specified that the
sentence was to be served "in the county jail," while section
(e) only provided for "imprisonment." The legislative history
does not reveal the reasons for this difference in wording.
Statements on the bill that became subsection (e) indicate that
if a person is involved in an accident where personal injury
occurs, he or she will "be imprisoned for not less than 45
days." Senate Law, Public Safety and Defense Committee
Statement, Senate, No. 904 — L. 1982, c. 45; Assembly Judiciary,
Law, Public Safety and Defense Committee, Senate, No. 904 — L.
1982, c. 45.
The legislative statements do not address whether the
imprisonment mandated by subsection (e) must be a traditional
county jail sentence or whether some variation is permitted.
However, the sentences in section 40 for which the Legislature
specified incarceration "in the county jail" were all either
8 A-3654-13T1
very short terms of a few days, or related to driving during a
license suspension for driving while intoxicated (DWI), an
offense the Legislature has treated as particularly egregious.
See N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(c) (requiring 180 days imprisonment
without parole for a second or subsequent conviction for driving
while suspended for DWI); French, supra, 437 N.J. Super. at 336-
37.
In 1986, N.J.S.A. 39:3-40(e) was amended to apply only when
the personal injury was to another person. L. 1986, c. 38. The
statute had been interpreted as increasing the penalty even if
the injury was only to the defendant driver. See State v.
Graney, 174 N.J. Super. 455, 459 (App. Div. 1980). Apparently,
that construction was not what the Legislature intended, and
accordingly, the Legislature clarified the statute to specify
that imprisonment shall be imposed only if someone other than
the defendant was injured in the accident. See Senate Law,
Public Safety and Defense Committee Statement, Senate, No. 1207
— L. 1986, c. 38; Assembly Law, Public Safety, Defense and
Corrections Committee Statement, Senate, No. 1207 — L. 1986, c. 38.
In 2001, N.J.S.A. 39:3-40(e) was amended to provide that
upon conviction, a defendant was to be imprisoned for not "more
than 180 days." L. 2001, c. 213. However, again, the language
"in the county jail," which already appeared in the other
9 A-3654-13T1
subsections, was not added. In this same time frame, the
Legislature enacted N.J.S.A. 2C:40-22, which made it a crime for
a defendant, while driving with a suspended license, to be
involved in an accident causing death or serious bodily injury
to another person. See Senate Law and Public Safety Committee
Statement, Senate, No. 1108 — L. 2001, c. 213; Assembly Law and
Public Safety Committee Statement, Senate, No. 1108 — L. 2001,
c. 213. However, this amendment did not specify a particular
sentence; rather, it simply defined the crime as of the third
degree if the accident caused death, or fourth degree if the
victim was seriously injured. See N.J.S.A. 2C:40-22(a), (b).
By contrast, in 2004, the Legislature amended the penalties
for repeat DWI offenders, by requiring third-time offenders to
spend at least 90 days in the county jail:
For a third or subsequent violation,
a person shall be subject to a fine
of $1,000.00, and shall be sentenced to
imprisonment for a term of not less than 180
days in a county jail or workhouse, except
that the court may lower such term for each
day, not exceeding 90 days, served
participating in a drug or alcohol inpatient
rehabilitation program approved by the
Intoxicated Driver Resource Center.
[N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a)(3) (emphasis added).]
In State v. Luthe, 383 N.J. Super. 512 (App. Div. 2006), we
compared the amended version of the provision to the previous
version, which had only provided for "imprisonment" with no
10 A-3654-13T1
specification as to where the imprisonment was to be served.
Addressing the amendment we concluded: "The language is clear.
Confinement, either entirely in jail or partially in jail and
partially in an inpatient facility, is required. There is no
allowance for noncustodial alternatives." Id. at 514. We also
noted legislative history that explicitly indicated the
Legislature's intent to prohibit work release:
As the mandate is clear, we need not resort
to extrinsic evidence to discern the
Legislature's intent in enacting this
amendment. But were we to do so in order to
discern the "internal sense of the law," the
result would be the same. The statement on
the amendment from the Senate Law and Public
Safety and Veterans' Affairs Committee
expressly asserts: "The [amendment] . . .
makes drunk drivers who are required to
serve the mandatory term of imprisonment
ineligible to participate in a work release
program." The Assembly Law and Public
Safety Committee Statement is comparable.
The Governor's official news release
reiterates the statements provided by both
the Assembly and Senate Committees:
"Michael's Law will keep third-time DWI
offenders off the streets, even if they
won't keep themselves off the streets. It
will guarantee they spend time in jail."
[Id. at 514 (alteration in original)
(citations omitted).]
Other provisions of the same statute, known as Michael's
Law, specifically prohibit the administrator of a county jail
from releasing a defendant who has been committed to the jail
11 A-3654-13T1
for a first or second DWI offense, unless a judge authorizes
release to a work release program. See N.J.S.A. 39:4-51.
In 2009, the Legislature enacted N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26, making
it a crime to violate N.J.S.A. 39:3-40 by driving while
suspended for a repeat DWI offense, or for a second conviction
for driving while suspended for DWI. In N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(c),
the Legislature signaled its understanding that, absent a
specific prohibition, offenders sentenced to imprisonment might
be eligible for various alternative programs:
Notwithstanding the term of imprisonment
provided under N.J.S. 2C:43-6 and the
provisions of subsection e. of N.J.S. 2C:44-
1, if a person is convicted of a crime under
this section the sentence imposed shall
include a fixed minimum sentence of not less
than 180 days during which the defendant
shall not be eligible for parole.
[N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(c) (emphasis added).]
In French, supra, we construed this provision as requiring
defendants to be incarcerated in the county jail, with no
alternative sentence permitted. In that case, we held the
defendant's sentence to a drug treatment program in lieu of jail
was an illegal sentence. We relied on the specific language
"shall not be eligible for parole." Supra, 439 N.J. Super. at
337. We reached the same conclusion in State v. Harris, 439
N.J. Super. 150 (App. Div. 2015), concluding that the "without
12 A-3654-13T1
parole" language precluded a defendant from being sentenced to
an electronic monitoring program or a labor assistance program.4
Based on the foregoing discussion, we find it clear that
when the Legislature intends that a sentence for DWI, driving
with a suspended license, or other motor vehicle related
offense, be served entirely in a county jail, with no
opportunity for alternative programs operated either under the
auspices of the court or the county correctional department, it
knows how to express that intent. N.J.S.A. 39:3-40(e) and
N.J.S.A. 39:6B-2 specify the length of the sentence for a
violation but do not contain the "without eligibility for
parole" or "in the county jail" language addressed in French and
Luthe. Moreover, N.J.S.A. 39:3-40(e) does not contain the
language even though four other subsections within section 40
do. In interpreting statutes, we "cannot insert language that
the Legislature could have included . . . but did not." Jersey
Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Melcar Utility Co., 212 N.J. 576, 596
(2013); see DiProspero, supra, 183 N.J. at 493.
4
While N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(c) is aimed at repeat offenders,
N.J.S.A. 39:3-40 addresses first offenders who drive while their
licenses are suspended for DWI. Section 40 provides for a
ninety-day sentence to be served "in the county jail." Thus,
the Legislature used similar language in requiring DWI offenders
who drive while suspended for DWI to serve their entire
sentences in a jail.
13 A-3654-13T1
Moreover, it is well established that Title 39 motor
vehicle laws are quasi-criminal in nature, and persons
prosecuted under Title 39 are entitled to the same protections
as criminal defendants. State v. Widmaier, 157 N.J. 475, 494
(1999). Under the rule of lenity, ambiguities in a criminal
statute are resolved in favor of the defendant. State v. Grate,
220 N.J. 317, 330 (2015) (the rule of lenity applies when
interpreting a penal statute, if its meaning cannot clearly be
discerned from its plain language and extrinsic sources);
Gelman, supra, 195 N.J. at 482-83; State v. Perry, 439 N.J.
Super. 514, 529-30 (App. Div. 2015); State v. Eldakroury, 439
N.J. Super. 304, 310 (App. Div. 2015). In this case, where it
is unclear whether the Legislature intended that the sentences
imposed under N.J.S.A. 39:6B-2 and N.J.S.A. 39:3-40(e) must be
served in jail with no alternative options, we resolve the
ambiguity in favor of defendant.
The State argues that construing these statutes to permit
sentences to be served in home detention programs is contrary to
their purpose. The State contends that N.J.S.A. 39:3-40(e) and
N.J.S.A. 39:6B-2 seek to punish repeat offenders more harshly in
order to serve the purpose of deterrence. It is true that the
statutes are intended to provide more serious penalties for
repeat offenders. See Senate Law, Public Safety and Defense
14 A-3654-13T1
Committee Statement, Senate, No. 904 — L. 1982, c. 45; Assembly
Judiciary, Law, Public Safety and Defense Committee, Senate, No.
904 — L. 1982, c. 45. However, even if alternative programs are
permitted, this purpose is served, because N.J.S.A. 39:3-40(e)
and N.J.S.A. 39:6B-2 require longer sentences than the brief
jail terms imposed on less serious offenders. See N.J.S.A.
39:3-40; N.J.S.A. 39:6B-2.
The State's reliance on State v. Pickens, 124 N.J. Super.
193 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 63 N.J. 581 (1973), and State
v. Fearick, 132 N.J. Super. 165 (App. Div. 1975), aff’d, 69 N.J.
32 (1976), is misplaced. The references to a mandatory jail
sentence in those cases are tangential to the result. Pickens
rejected the defendant's argument that N.J.S.A. 39:3-40 was
unconstitutional because it imposed criminal penalties for
negligence, and also held that the statute was not
unconstitutionally vague. Pickens, supra, 124 N.J. Super. 193.
In Fearick the court rejected the argument that the enhanced
sentence for accidents resulting in personal injury only applied
when the defendant driver was at fault for the accident.
Fearick, supra, 132 N.J. Super. 165, 168-69. Neither case
addressed the issue raised on this appeal. Moreover, those
cases were decided when the pre-1982 version of N.J.S.A. 39:3-40
15 A-3654-13T1
was in effect.5 The State's citation to State v. Lima, 144 N.J.
Super. 263 (App. Div. 1976), certif. denied, 73 N.J. 64 (1977),
is equally unpersuasive, because that case addressed a charging
issue under N.J.S.A. 39:6B-2, and not the manner in which the
sentence was to be served.
In summary, we conclude that both N.J.S.A. 39:3-40(e) and
N.J.S.A. 39:6B-2 authorize the sentencing court to impose a term
of imprisonment that may be served in an alternative way such as
home confinement under electronic monitoring.
Affirmed.
5
Those cases, however, suggest possible reasons why the
Legislature might have wanted to allow trial judges some
discretion to permit sentencing alternatives under N.J.S.A.
39:3-40(e). For example, a defendant who has no driver's
license because he has a disqualifying medical condition, but
who nonetheless drives a car, is subject to a jail term if his
car is rear-ended by a drunk driver and the latter is the only
one injured in the accident. See Fearick, supra, 132 N.J.
Super. at 167; Pickens, supra, 124 N.J. Super. at 196.
16 A-3654-13T1