State of New Jersey v. Julian B. Hamlett

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4399-14T2
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION
Plaintiff-Respondent, March 3, 2017
v. APPELLATE DIVISION
JULIAN B. HAMLETT,
Defendant-Appellant.
Submitted February 15, 2017 – Decided March 3, 2017
Before Judges Fuentes, Simonelli and
Carroll.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Law Division, Atlantic County,
Indictment Nos. 12-01-0168 and 12-12-2826.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney
for appellant (Lauren S. Michaels, Assistant
Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on
the brief)
Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General,
attorney for respondent (Garima Joshi,
Deputy Attorney General, of counsel and on
the brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
CARROLL, J.A.D.
On September 7, 2011, Atlantic City police charged
defendant Julian B. Hamlett with a number of drug offenses
following the warrantless search of a rental car he was driving.
After his motion to suppress the drug evidence was denied,
defendant pled guilty on April 16, 2013, to count six of
Atlantic County Indictment No. 12-01-0168 charging him with
third-degree possession with intent to distribute heroin within
1000 feet of school property, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.
In a separate incident, on August 7, 2012, Atlantic City
police stopped defendant's car and, after discovering drugs,
obtained a warrant to search his motel room in Galloway
Township, where additional drugs and a handgun were recovered.
Defendant moved to suppress the evidence found in the motel
room, which the trial court denied. On December 9, 2013,
defendant pled guilty on Atlantic County Indictment No. 12-12-
2826 to count two, second-degree possession with intent to
distribute heroin, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5a(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:35-
5b(2), and count seven, second-degree possession of a weapon by
a convicted felon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7. Defendant also pled guilty
to count four of a third, unrelated indictment, No. 12-11-2612,
charging him with second-degree possession with intent to
distribute heroin, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.1.1
On January 24, 2014, defendant was sentenced on all three
indictments to an aggregate fourteen-year prison term with an
eight-year period of parole ineligibility. In this appeal that
1
Indictment No. 12-11-2612 is not at issue in this appeal.
2 A-4399-14T2
followed, defendant challenges the denial of his two suppression
motions. With respect to the September 7, 2011 incident,
defendant argues that the officer improperly searched the center
console while looking for the vehicle's registration and rental
agreement. Defendant separately challenges the August 2012
search of his Galloway Township2 motel room on the basis that it
was improperly issued by an Atlantic City municipal court judge.
Upon our review, and in light of the record and applicable legal
standards, we affirm both orders.
I.
We glean the following facts from the record of the two
suppression hearings.
The September 7, 2011 Traffic Stop
On September 7, 2011, at approximately 4:30 p.m., Detective
Jeremy Narenberg of the Atlantic City Police Department (ACPD)
directed Officer Charles Heintz to stop a tan 2011 Chevy Malibu
with Pennsylvania license plates. Narenberg did not provide a
reason for this request. Heintz located the vehicle and
observed its driver commit two motor vehicle violations. Heintz
stopped the car and asked defendant to produce his license,
registration, and proof of insurance. Defendant explained that
2
Galloway Township is a neighboring municipality of Atlantic
City.
3 A-4399-14T2
the car was rented by his girlfriend, Ms. Boyd. He was unable
to produce his driver's credentials and instead provided Heintz
with an expired state-issued identification card. Defendant
looked in the car's glove compartment for additional
documentation, but found only an owner's manual. Heintz did not
believe defendant was under the influence, but he testified he
saw a half-empty bottle of vodka on the car's back seat, and
smelled an odor of burnt marijuana emanating from the car's
interior.
Defendant requested permission to call Boyd in an attempt
to locate the necessary documents. Heintz allowed defendant to
do so. Although defendant's cell phone was plainly visible on
the passenger seat, Heintz observed defendant quickly open and
shut the car's center console. By this time, two other officers
had arrived on the scene. The officers ordered defendant not to
make any other sudden movements.
Defendant then used his cell phone, ostensibly to call
Boyd. The officers did not listen to defendant's conversation,
and did not know who, if anyone, defendant actually spoke to.
Defendant informed the officers that Boyd was on her way, but he
did not estimate how long it would take her to arrive.
Following the phone call, Heintz inquired as to the
whereabouts of the vehicle's rental agreement. Defendant
4 A-4399-14T2
replied he was unaware of its location, or whether it included
his name. Because defendant was unable to produce a valid
driver's license, Heintz ordered him out of the car. He then
patted defendant down for weapons, found none, and placed
defendant on the curb. In an effort to avoid unnecessarily
prolonging the stop, Heintz searched for the vehicle's
credentials in the side visor and glove compartment, and in an
open compartment located near the gear shifter. Heintz then
opened the center console, where he observed 7.25 grams of
cocaine, two bricks of heroin, 98.6 grams of marijuana, and
$2,595 in cash. Defendant was arrested, and a search of his
person revealed a bag containing additional marijuana, cocaine,
and heroin.
On April 12, 2013, Judge Max A. Baker denied defendant's
motion to suppress the drugs. Citing defendant's movements in
the car, including his quick closing of the center console
without looking through it, and his inability to produce valid
credentials, Judge Baker determined that Heintz reasonably
conducted a limited search of the vehicle for documents. The
judge found:
[Heintz went] into the car and he searche[d]
those places where it's reasonable to
believe that the papers would be. He
[didn't] look underneath the seat . . .
because that's not where somebody would keep
rental papers. It seems reasonable . . .
5 A-4399-14T2
that somebody would keep rental papers in a
center console[.]
Judge Baker concluded that upon lawfully searching the console
for documents, Heintz observed the drugs in plain view, and
thereafter discovered additional contraband while validly
searching defendant incident to his arrest.
The August 2012 Motel Room Search
On August 7, 2012, ACPD Officers James Karins and Anthony
Abrams observed a grey Acura with tinted windows traveling at a
high rate of speed. Defendant was the vehicle's driver and sole
occupant. The officers pulled defendant over and noticed a
strong odor of burnt marijuana emanating from his vehicle.
Defendant was administered Miranda3 warnings and placed under
arrest.
Defendant consented to the officers' request to search the
Acura.4 This led to the discovery of marijuana,
methamphetamines, and a key to Room No. 114 at the Passport Inn
Suites, a motel in Galloway Township. Defendant then admitted
to having a firearm and a large amount of contraband in his
motel room. Abrams called the Passport Inn Suites motel and
3
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d
694 (1966).
4
Defendant does not challenge the consent search of the Acura on
appeal.
6 A-4399-14T2
confirmed defendant was staying in Room No. 114. He thereafter
obtained approval from the on-call narcotics assistant
prosecutor to apply for a warrant to search the motel room.
At approximately 4 a.m. on August 8, 2012, Abrams presented
the warrant application to the on-call municipal court judge for
Atlantic City. In his supporting affidavit, Abrams detailed his
experience in narcotics and weapons investigations, as well as
his then current assignment with the ACPD's Tactical Operations
Unit. Abrams also noted his interactions with defendant,
including defendant's statements that he had a large amount of
heroin and methamphetamines and a firearm in his Galloway
Township motel room.
Prior to the offense at issue, Atlantic County Assignment
Judge Julio L. Mendez issued an order (the cross-assignment
order) directing the cross-assignment of municipal court judges
in the event of a judge's unavailability for a matter requiring
immediate judicial action. The cross-assignment order, issued
pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2B:12-6 and Rule 1:12-3, directed that an
applicant "shall only contact an Acting Municipal Court Judge
listed on the attached Rider upon determining that the Municipal
Court Judge duly appointed for that court is disqualified from
acting, has an inability to hear the matter, or is otherwise
unavailable[.]" The cross-assignment order further instructed
7 A-4399-14T2
that an applicant "shall apply to the Acting Municipal Court
Judges in the sequence as listed on the attached Rider[]" and
that "the Acting Municipal Court Judge shall make a record of
the reason the application for judicial action is not being made
to the duly appointed Municipal Court Judge for that court[.]"
On the 2012 Rider, the Atlantic City municipal judge was listed
seventh for Galloway Township.
Notwithstanding the existence of the cross-assignment
order, the Atlantic City municipal judge did not inquire why
Abrams failed to apply to the Galloway Township judge. Instead,
the judge read Abrams's affidavit, determined that it
satisfactorily established probable cause, and approved the
warrant. The police then searched defendant's motel room where
they recovered additional drugs and a weapon.
Abrams testified at the suppression hearing that this was
his first matter involving a jurisdiction other than Atlantic
City. He explained that he felt an Atlantic City judge was the
appropriate magistrate to consider his warrant application
because the matter itself originated in Atlantic City. He
further testified he was not motivated to consult the Atlantic
City judge because of a special relationship with him; rather,
he was simply the on-call municipal court judge in Atlantic City
at the time.
8 A-4399-14T2
Judge Albert J. Garofolo denied defendant's motion on
November 22, 2013. In his cogent written opinion, the judge
found no reason to question Officer Abrams's credibility. He
noted:
[Abrams's] testimony was straight[]forward,
consistent[,] and with a demeanor that
bespoke wide-eyed innocence. His
credibility has not been attacked
extrinsically and any untoward motive he may
have had for not going to a Galloway
Township judge is only a matter of
speculation. This [c]ourt is satisfied that
Officer Abrams'[s] conduct was not motivated
by the intent to "forum shop[,"] or gain
[an] unfair advantage by going to the
Atlantic City judge. There is no evidence
that there was a need for him to seek any
advantage inasmuch as the affidavit
overwhelmingly establishes probable cause
for the issuance of the warrant.
Judge Garofolo emphasized that the warrant requirement's
underlying goal is to have a neutral and detached magistrate
determine probable cause. The judge reasoned that "an
inconsequential procedural deviation in the application process
should not invalidate a warrant issued by a municipal court
judge upon a finding of probable cause." Judge Garofolo
inferred that the cross-assignment order was designed to
maximize efficiency and provide "administrative direction"
concerning applications "which often are made on an emergent
. . . basis," and "was [not] intended to strip a judge of his
cross[-]assigned jurisdiction into other municipalities."
9 A-4399-14T2
II.
In reviewing a motion to suppress, an appellate court
defers to the trial court's factual and credibility findings,
"so long as those findings are supported by sufficient credible
evidence in the record." State v. Handy, 206 N.J. 39, 44 (2011)
(quoting State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 243 (2007)). Deference
is afforded "because the 'findings of the trial judge . . . are
substantially influenced by his [or her] opportunity to hear and
see the witnesses and to have the "feel" of the case, which a
reviewing court cannot enjoy.'" State v. Reece, 222 N.J. 154,
166 (2015) (quoting State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 471 (1999)).
"An appellate court should disregard those findings only when a
trial court's findings of fact are clearly mistaken." State v.
Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249, 262 (2015). The legal conclusions of a
trial court are reviewed de novo. Id. at 263.
"[A] search executed pursuant to a warrant is presumed to
be valid" and "a defendant challenging its validity has the
burden to prove 'that there was no probable cause supporting the
issuance of the warrant or that the search was otherwise
unreasonable.'" State v. Jones, 179 N.J. 377, 388 (2004)
(citation omitted). "Accordingly, courts 'accord substantial
deference to the discretionary determination resulting in the
10 A-4399-14T2
issuance of the [search] warrant.'" State v. Keyes, 184 N.J.
541, 554 (2005) (citation omitted).
"[A]n appellate court's role is not to determine anew
whether there was probable cause for issuance of the warrant,
but rather, whether there is evidence to support the finding
made by the warrant-issuing judge." State v. Chippero, 201 N.J.
14, 20-21 (2009). "Doubt as to the validity of the warrant
'should ordinarily be resolved by sustaining the search.'"
Keyes, supra, 184 N.J. at 554 (citations omitted).
In contrast, a warrantless search is presumed invalid
unless it falls within a recognized exception. State v. Witt,
223 N.J. 409, 422 (2015). Nonetheless, a balance must be
maintained between "individual freedom from police interference
and the legitimate and reasonable needs of law enforcement."
State v. Coles, 218 N.J. 322, 343 (2014). The State bears the
burden, by a preponderance of the evidence, to establish that
the warrantless search or seizure of an individual was justified
in light of the totality of the circumstances. State v. Mann,
203 N.J. 328, 337-38 (2010).
III.
A.
With the above principles in mind, we first address
defendant's challenge to the warrantless search of the center
11 A-4399-14T2
console of the rental car he was driving on September 7, 2011,
which formed the basis for the crimes charged in Indictment No.
12-01-0168. Defendant argues that the police improperly
searched the center console for credentials, and that the drug
evidence found there, along with the evidence discovered after
he was arrested and searched, must be suppressed as a result of
the improper credentials search.5 We disagree.
The Court has recognized that in certain situations, police
officers have the authority to conduct limited warrantless
searches of a vehicle in order to produce proof of ownership and
insurance. In State v. Pena-Flores, 198 N.J. 6, 31 (2009), for
example, the Court held that after stopping the defendant for a
traffic violation and finding discrepancies between information
from a computer lookup of the license plate and the actual car,
police were "entitled, separate and apart from the automobile
exception, to look into the areas in the vehicle in which
evidence of ownership might be expected to be found." In State
v. Patino, 83 N.J. 1, 12 (1980), the Court recognized that
5
With respect to both this search and the subsequent August 2012
search, defendant does not challenge the initial police stop of
the vehicle he was operating. We note "'[i]t is firmly
established that a police officer is justified in stopping a
motor vehicle when he has an articulable and reasonable
suspicion that the driver has committed a motor vehicle
offense.'" Locurto, supra, 157 N.J. at 470 (quoting State v.
Smith, 306 N.J. Super. 370, 380 (App. Div. 1997)).
12 A-4399-14T2
following a traffic violation, "a search of the vehicle for
evidence connected with that violation" was permissible if
"reasonable in scope and tailored to the degree of the
violation." In State v. Boykins, 50 N.J. 73, 77 (1967), the
Court noted that "if the operator is unable to produce proof of
registration, the officer may search the car for evidence of
ownership . . . ."
Undoubtedly, we have cautioned against an overly-broad
reading of Boykins. In State v. Lark, 319 N.J. Super. 618, 621-
22 (App. Div. 1999), aff'd 163 N.J. 294 (2000), the defendant
was stopped for a minor traffic offense and provided a valid
registration for the car, but could not produce his driver's
license. The defendant was ordered out of the car and searched;
he had no identification on his person. Id. at 622. The police
officer then opened the car door to search for the defendant's
license or identification and observed a bag containing drug
paraphernalia, which he seized. Ibid. He then returned to the
car to continue the search, ultimately finding a significant
amount of cocaine. Ibid.
We reversed the trial judge's denial of the defendant's
motion to suppress. Id. at 624. We noted that "[s]ince
Boykins, no Supreme Court ha[d] allowed a search based solely on
a driver's inability to present driving credentials. In every
13 A-4399-14T2
case we examined, the facts supported probable cause to search
or arrest." Id. at 625. We further observed that "the search
in Boykins itself was based on probable cause." Id. at 626
(citing Boykins, supra, 50 N.J. at 78). Lastly, we noted that
"because this case does not involve a registration search, we
need not determine the full import of the Boykins dictum here."
Ibid. We held:
New Jersey law prescribes exactly what an
officer should do when, during a traffic
stop, a driver fails to present his license
and then lies about his identity. The
officer may either detain the driver for
further questioning until he satisfies
himself as to the driver's true identity, or
arrest the driver for operating a vehicle
without a license. The officer may not,
however, absent probable cause to believe
that a further offense has been committed,
enter the vehicle to look for
identification.
[Id. at 627 (citations omitted).]
Our cases have recognized, however, that even absent
probable cause, police may conduct a limited warrantless search
of a car for documentation if a defendant is unwilling or unable
to produce it. See, e.g., State v. Gammons, 113 N.J. Super.
434, 437 (App. Div.), aff'd 59 N.J. 541 (1971) ("When defendant
could not produce his registration certificate . . . [the
officer] made the perfectly logical deduction that it might
still be in the damaged car which the police had the right to
14 A-4399-14T2
search for evidence of ownership in view of defendant's failure
to produce the certificate.").
We reached a different result on the facts presented in
State v. Jones, 195 N.J. Super. 119 (1984). There, the
defendant suffered minor injuries when his car overturned. Id.
at 121. When police extricated the defendant from the vehicle,
he was only able to produce his driver's license, the
registration and insurance still being in the overturned car.
Ibid. When the car was righted, the investigating officer
entered the vehicle to get the credentials for his report. Id.
at 121-22. In this process, he saw an unzipped travel bag on
the backseat that contained drug paraphernalia and what appeared
to be cocaine. Id. at 122.
We recognized the vitality of the credentials exception to
the warrant requirement. "[W]here there has been a traffic
violation and the operator of the motor vehicle is unable to
produce proof of registration, a police officer may search the
car for evidence of ownership." Ibid. (citing Boykins, supra,
50 N.J. at 77). That search "must be 'confined to the glove
compartment or other area where a registration might normally be
kept in a vehicle[.]'" Id. at 122-23 (quoting Patino, supra, 83
N.J. at 12). However, we suppressed the evidence, noting: "We
read Boykin and Patino as requiring a showing that [the]
15 A-4399-14T2
defendant was either unable or unwilling to produce the
[credentials]." Id. at 123.
More recently, in State v. Keaton, 222 N.J. 438, 442-43
(2015), the Court considered whether the warrantless entry of
the defendant's overturned vehicle to obtain motor vehicle
credentials, without providing the defendant with an opportunity
to consent to the entry or present those credentials beforehand,
was unlawful. In Keaton, when police arrived at the scene of
the one-car accident, the defendant had been removed from the
vehicle and was receiving treatment from emergency medical
personnel. Id. at 443. The trooper never asked the defendant
for his credentials or for permission to enter the vehicle. Id.
at 444. After crawling in a rear window, the trooper saw an
open backpack containing a handgun and a small amount of
marijuana on the dashboard. Ibid.
Citing extensively to our decision in Jones, supra, 195
N.J. Super. at 122, the Court said that "under settled law, the
warrantless search of a vehicle is only permissible after the
driver has been provided the opportunity to produce his
credentials and is either unable or unwilling to do so."
Keaton, supra, 222 N.J. at 450 (emphasis added) (citing State v.
Bruzzese, 94 N.J. 210, 236 (1983), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1030,
104 S. Ct. 1295, 79 L. Ed. 2d 695 (1984)). The Court continued:
16 A-4399-14T2
Here, defendant was never provided such an
opportunity. The trooper did not speak to
defendant at the scene of the accident. The
trooper never asked the EMTs for help in
determining whether defendant was able to
provide his credentials. Moreover, the
trooper never asked defendant for his
credentials once his injuries were tended to
at the hospital. Instead, the trooper made
the decision to search defendant's car for
credentials only for the trooper's
convenience and expediency, without ever
providing defendant the opportunity to
present them. Accordingly, we find that the
items discovered in defendant's car do not
fall within the plain view doctrine, and
were illegally seized, because the trooper
was not lawfully within the viewing area at
the time of the contraband's discovery.
[Ibid. (citing Bruzzese, supra, 94 N.J. at
236).]
The Court affirmed our judgment suppressing the evidence. Id.
at 443. We conclude that this case is both factually and
legally distinguishable from Keaton.
Unlike Keaton, where the responding officer never attempted
to speak to the defendant who was conscious and being treated at
the scene for minor injuries, here Officer Heintz gave defendant
an opportunity to produce his license, registration, proof of
insurance, and the car rental agreement. Defendant was unable
to provide Heintz with these credentials and instead produced
only an expired state-issued identification card and an owner's
manual. Defendant's failure to produce the documents required
under N.J.S.A. 39:3-29 triggered the "documents" exception to
17 A-4399-14T2
the warrant requirement as articulated in Keaton, supra, 222
N.J. at 442–43. While defendant ostensibly was willing to
acquire the necessary documents, his phone call to his
girlfriend nevertheless failed to establish that he was able to
produce them. No evidence in the record suggests that Boyd ever
responded or that the car's rental agreement or registration
were ever produced. Therefore, Heintz was justified in
initiating a search for defendant's credentials.
Furthermore, as Judge Baker aptly noted, Heintz did not
exceed the permissible scope of a search for driving credentials
when he opened the center console of the vehicle. A center
console is a relatively non-private area in which documentation
"might normally be kept." Patino, supra, 83 N.J. at 12. We
also note that the judge specifically found that defendant "did
not thoroughly search the center console." Rather, Heintz
"observed [defendant] open and immediately shut the center
console, [and] it seems, to me, if somebody was really looking
for documents, they would have opened the center console and
gone in there and moved stuff around. That's not what
[defendant] did."
Once Heintz opened the center console he visually observed
the drugs that were stored there. Those items were properly
seized under the plain view exception to the search warrant
18 A-4399-14T2
requirement. As our Supreme Court recently iterated, the plain
view doctrine allows seizures without a warrant so long as an
officer is "lawfully . . . in the area where he observed and
seized the incriminating item or contraband, and it [is]
immediately apparent that the seized item is evidence of a
crime." State v. Gonzales, 227 N.J. 77, 101 (2016).
Defendant's ensuing arrest, and the seizure of the additional
contraband from his person, were likewise unimpeachable.
B.
Defendant next argues that the warrant to search his
Galloway Township motel room was invalid because it was issued
by an Atlantic City municipal judge in contravention of the
procedures prescribed in State v. Broom-Smith, 201 N.J. 229
(2010), and the cross-assignment order. The State acknowledges
the procedural deficiency, but contends it is merely "technical"
in nature and does not warrant the drastic remedy of
suppression.
The exclusionary rule, as set forth in Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S. Ct. 341, 58 L. Ed. 652 (1914), and
extended to the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655, 81 S.
Ct. 1684, 1691, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081, 1090 (1961), requires the
suppression of evidence obtained during unreasonable searches
and seizures. State v. Gioe, 401 N.J. Super. 331, 339 (App.
19 A-4399-14T2
Div. 2008), certif. denied, 199 N.J. 129 (2009). The rule's
overarching purpose is to deny the prosecution any benefit it
would otherwise receive from illicitly-obtained evidence,
thereby deterring the police from violating civilians' Fourth
Amendment rights. State v. Williams, 192 N.J. 1, 14 (2007); see
also Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217, 80 S. Ct. 1437,
1444, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1669, 1677 (1960) ("The rule is calculated to
prevent, not to repair. Its purpose is to deter -- to compel
respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively
available way -- by removing the incentive to disregard it.").
A corollary purpose of the exclusionary rule is to "uphold
judicial integrity" by informing the public that "our courts
will not provide a forum for evidence procured by
unconstitutional means." Williams, supra, 192 N.J. at 14. The
suppression of evidence "sends the strongest possible message
that constitutional misconduct will not be tolerated and
therefore is intended to encourage fidelity to the law." Ibid.
Nevertheless, courts do not apply the exclusionary rule
indiscriminately. Gioe, supra, 401 N.J. Super. at 339. Because
the rule "generates substantial costs, which sometimes include
setting the guilty free and the dangerous at large[,]" the
United States Supreme Court has characterized the suppression of
evidence as a "last resort," rather than a "first impulse."
20 A-4399-14T2
Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2163,
165 L. Ed. 2d 56, 64 (2006) (citations omitted). Similarly, in
refusing to invalidate a warrant that misidentified the address
of the location to be searched, the New Jersey Supreme Court
noted: "When the truth is suppressed and the criminal is set
free, the pain of suppression is felt, not by the inanimate
State or by some penitent policeman, but by the offender's next
victims for whose protection we hold office." State v.
Bisaccia, 58 N.J. 586, 590 (1971).
Therefore, New Jersey courts apply the exclusionary rule
only to evidence obtained in violation of a defendant's
constitutional rights. State v. Evers, 175 N.J. 355, 378–80
(2003); State v. Hai Kim Nguyen, 419 N.J. Super. 413, 428 (App.
Div.), certif. denied, 208 N.J. 339 (2011); State v. Gadsden,
303 N.J. Super. 491, 503 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 152 N.J.
187 (1997) (citing State v. Hartley, 103 N.J. 252, 282–83
(1986)). In other words, so long as the objectives underlying
the warrant requirement remain intact, slight departures from
strict compliance with the rules will not invalidate a search.
State v. Valencia, 93 N.J. 126, 134 (1983). Applying the
exclusionary rule to errors of such minor and technical
significance would "debase the judicial process and breed
contempt for the deterrent thrust of the criminal law." State
21 A-4399-14T2
v. Bickham, 285 N.J. Super. 365, 368 (App. Div. 1995). Rule
3:5-7(g) substantially echoes this sentiment: "In the absence of
bad faith, no search or seizure made with a search warrant shall
be deemed unlawful because of technical insufficiencies or
irregularities in the warrant or in the papers or proceedings to
obtain it, or in its execution."
New Jersey case law is replete with instances in which
courts have declined to apply the exclusionary rule to technical
violations of the rules governing warrants. See State v.
Presley, 436 N.J. Super. 440, 453, 460 (App. Div. 2014) (holding
a judge's disqualifying conflict as to one defendant was not a
sufficient basis for co-defendants to seek invalidation of a
warrant, in part because there were no allegations of police
misconduct, judicial bias, or lack of probable cause); Nguyen,
supra, 419 N.J. Super. at 417 (holding the exclusionary rule was
inapplicable when New Jersey investigators discovered a murder
weapon in New York State, because the investigators' act of
straying beyond their statutory jurisdiction was a technical
violation that did not implicate Fourth Amendment privacy
rights); State v. McCann, 391 N.J. Super. 542, 544, 554–55
(2007) (holding suppression was not an appropriate remedy when a
municipal court judge who issued a search warrant should have
recused himself due to his "long-standing attorney-client
22 A-4399-14T2
relationship" with the defendant); Gadsden, supra, 303 N.J.
Super. at 492, 505–06 (declining to apply the exclusionary rule
when Hillside police officers violated N.J.S.A. 40A:14-152 by
traveling to Newark to execute an arrest warrant; reasoning
probable cause existed, and the jurisdictional violation was
"technical," "procedural," and "statutory" rather than
constitutional).
In Gioe, supra, 401 N.J. Super. at 341–42, we considered a
warrant's validity in light of the applicant's failure to
personally appear before the issuing judge. We held that
although the applicant violated Rule 3:5-3(a), the resulting
deficiency in the warrant did not require the trial court to
suppress the marijuana police had seized from defendant's
vehicle. Id. at 342. We evaluated the evidence establishing
probable cause and reasoned that if the applicant had appeared
before the judge, "the search warrant would undoubtedly have
been issued exactly as it was via facsimile." Id. at 343.
Moreover, we determined the applicant demonstrated "no evidence
of bad faith or deliberate disregard of Rule 3:5-3(a)[.]" Ibid.
Here, we likewise conclude that neither Officer Abrams nor
the Atlantic City municipal judge violated defendant's
constitutional rights. Because a valid search of defendant's
vehicle revealed marijuana, methamphetamines, and a motel room
23 A-4399-14T2
key, and defendant admitted to possessing additional contraband
in his motel room, Judge Garofolo correctly determined that
Abrams's affidavit "overwhelmingly establishe[d] probable
cause[.]" If Abrams had appeared before the Galloway Township
municipal court judge, that judge would undoubtedly have issued
a substantively identical warrant.
Further, there is no evidence suggesting Abrams exhibited
bad faith or acted with deliberate disregard for the law.
According to his testimony, he mistakenly thought an Atlantic
City judge was the appropriate magistrate to consider a warrant
application for a matter originating in Atlantic City. Judge
Garofolo found Abrams's testimony highly credible, and this
finding is entitled to substantial deference on appeal. See
Locurto, supra, 157 N.J. at 471 (quoting Johnson, supra, 42 N.J.
at 161–62).
Affirmed.
24 A-4399-14T2