PAUL A. MITCHELL VS. MICHAEL GRAINGER(L-7440-16, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4094-16T4
PAUL A. MITCHELL and MALIKA
HAYNESWORTH,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
v.
MICHAEL GRAINGER, CITY OF
NEWARK and/or NEWARK POLICE
DEPARTMENT,
Defendants-Appellants.
_________________________________
Argued telephonically November 1, 2017 –
Decided November 16, 2017
Before Judges Sabatino and Rose.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Essex County, Docket No. L-7440-
16.
Handel T. Destinvil argued the cause for
appellants (Kenyatta K. Stewart, Acting
Corporation Counsel, City of Newark-
Department of Law, attorney; Mr. Destinvil,
on the briefs).
Andrew J. Calcagno argued the cause for
respondents (Calcagno & Associates, LLC,
attorneys; Michael J. Chelland, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendants Michael Grainger and City of Newark appeal from a
March 3, 2017 Law Division order denying their motion to dismiss
the complaint filed by plaintiffs Paul A. Mitchell and Malika
Haynesworth, and an April 13, 2017 order denying their motion for
reconsideration of the March 3, 2017 order. In both rulings, the
trial court did not sufficiently "find the facts and state its
conclusions of law" as required by Rule 1:7-4(a). For that reason,
and also because of the limited nature of the record, we vacate
the orders and remand this matter to the trial court for further
proceedings.
The record on appeal discloses the following minimal facts
and procedural history. On October 30, 2014, when walking in the
intersection near Norfolk and Orange Streets, plaintiffs were
struck by a City of Newark police vehicle operated by Michael
Grainger. On November 26, 2014, plaintiffs each filed a notice
of tort claim setting forth a general description of the accident
and a limited summary of their injuries. On December 2, 2014,
defendants advised plaintiffs that the notices of claim were
incomplete, that is, they were missing authorizations for medical
releases, photographs, itemized medical bills and records, and
automobile insurance information. The record on appeal indicates
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plaintiffs did not respond to defendants' December 2, 2014
correspondence.1
On February 13, 2017, defendants filed a motion to dismiss
plaintiffs' complaint with prejudice for failure to comply with
the notice provision of the Tort Claims Act pursuant to Rule 4:6-
2(e), N.J.S.A. 59:8-4(d) and N.J.S.A. 59:8-6. In support of their
motion, defendants provided the motion judge with a copy of the
City of Newark's specialized claim form, pursuant to N.J.S.A.
59:8-6, requiring plaintiffs to provide to defendants, "itemized
bills and records" and signed HIPPA authorizations, and proof that
plaintiffs had not complied with these requirements.
The trial court denied the purportedly unopposed motion on
the papers.2 Without finding any facts or making any legal
1
During oral argument before us, plaintiffs' counsel represented
his office forwarded to defendants "a HIPPA release form," and
records from St. Michael's Hospital and "Clinton Chiropractic"
after they filed their respective notices of claim but prior to
filing the instant lawsuit. These documents were not provided in
defendants' appendix; plaintiffs did not file an appendix.
2
The order indicates the motion was unopposed. However, during
oral argument before us, defendants stated they initially filed a
motion to dismiss the complaint solely on behalf of the City of
Newark. Plaintiffs opposed that motion. Defendants withdrew the
motion and then refiled to add defendant Michael Grainger.
Defendants acknowledge, therefore, that the instant motion was
opposed at least initially. However, defendants' merits brief
claims plaintiffs "made no argument in opposition that their
failure to comply with the requirements of the City's specialized
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conclusions, the court denied the motion, entering an order with
the following notation:
Plaintiff has substantially complied with the
requirements of N.J.S.A. 59:8-4. See Guerrero
v. Newark, 216 N.J. Super. 66 (App. Div.
1987).
On March 27, 2017, defendants filed a motion for
reconsideration of the court's March 3, 2017 order. Plaintiffs
opposed the motion. In their supporting brief, defendants argued
that the basis of their motion to dismiss was failure to comply
with the specialized notice provisions pursuant to N.J.S.A. 59:8-
6, and not N.J.S.A. 59:8-4.
On April 13, 2017, the court decided defendants' motion for
reconsideration on the papers, entering an order with the following
notation:
Moving party has failed to meet their burden
pursuant to R. 4:49-2 of presenting sufficient
evidence to warrant granting
[r]econsideration and [d]efendants' arguments
as to N.J.S.A. 59:8-6 were without sufficient
facts to have granted the requested relief.
On appeal, defendant argues the motion judge did not cite to
any caselaw, nor provide "guidance as to what additional
information . . . was necessary to sufficiently prove [p]laintiffs'
claim form . . . constituted substantial compliance with N.J.S.A.
59:8-6."
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failure to provide additional information sought by the City's
specialized claim form."
Rule 1:7-4 mandates that a trial court, "by an opinion or
memorandum decision, either written or oral, find the facts and
state its conclusions of law thereon . . . on every motion decided
by a written order that is appealable as of right[.]" The trial
court must clearly state its factual findings and correlate them
with relevant legal conclusions so the parties and appellate courts
may be informed of the rationale underlying the decision. Monte
v. Monte, 212 N.J. Super. 557, 564-65 (App. Div. 1986). "In the
absence of [adequate] reasons, we are left to conjecture as to
what the judge may have had in mind." Salch v. Salch, 240 N.J.
Super. 441, 443 (App. Div. 1990).
Furthermore, such an omission "imparts to the process an air
of capriciousness that does little to foster confidence in the
judicial system." Twp. of Parsippany-Troy Hills v. Lisbon
Contractors, Inc., 303 N.J. Super. 362, 367 (App. Div.), certif.
denied, 152 N.J. 187 (1997). The “[f]ailure to make explicit
findings and clear statements of reasoning ‘constitutes a
disservice to the litigants, the attorneys, and the appellate
court.'" Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015) (quoting Curtis
v. Finneran, 83 N.J. 563, 569-70 (1980)).
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Here, although the trial court made a conclusory written
finding of plaintiffs' "substantial compliance," it did not
explain why it reached that conclusion, given the City of Newark's
assertion that the necessary medical information had not been
furnished. The sparse record on appeal is not particularly
enlightening. For these reasons, the order dismissing the
complaint in the case before us must be vacated.
Neither the parties nor the trial court should construe our
observations as requiring the trial court to merely make findings
of fact and conclusions of law on remand. Nor do we mean to imply
how defendants' motion should be decided. We suggest only that
the trial court has broad discretion on remand.
For example, if the full documentary record presented before
the trial court is inadequate to resolve whether plaintiff
satisfied defendant's specialized notice of claim, then the court
should permit oral argument and, if necessary, conduct a plenary
hearing, thereafter. However, if the court determines the existing
record in the trial court is adequate to dispose of defendants'
motion, then it should issue an opinion that cites the appropriate
standard of review and sets forth more amplified findings of fact
and conclusions of law.
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On remand, the trial court should conduct a status conference
with counsel within thirty days to discuss and decide whether the
motion record should be supplemented and, if so, whether a hearing
is necessary. The parties shall then proceed accordingly.
The March 3, 2017 order dismissing the complaint, and the
April 13, 2017 order denying reconsideration of the March 3, 2017
order, are therefore vacated and this matter is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain
jurisdiction.
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