STANLEY L. NIBLACK VS. UNIVERSITY CORRECTIONAL HEALTHCARE (L-2045-15 AND L-7785-15, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

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APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
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SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0919-16T4
STANLEY L. NIBLACK,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
UNIVERSITY CORRECTIONAL HEALTHCARE,
UNIVERSITY BEHAVIORAL HEALTHCARE,
DR. JEFFREY DICKERT, MARGARET REED,
UNIVERSITY OF MEDICINE AND DENTISTRY OF
NEW JERSEY, JAMES R. GONZALEZ, DR.
JEFFREY POMERANTZ, ANN JOHNSON, ANDREA
SWEENEY, COLLEEN BLACK, BARBARA MCDONOUGH,
LAURA M. GABRYLEWICZ, JEANINE RODILOSSO,
RICARDY RICOT, DR. MICHELLE BOROWSKI,
DR. PEREIRA, FRANCES BARFI, PAULETTE
BARRINGTON, SUSAN CICALA, JANET BOATENG,
MAUREEN KMOROWSKI, CUTHIA MCCASSITY,
RHODA KUTEYI, WASIAT ADEKUNLE, VERONICA
MORENO, LINDA COLEMAN, THERESA HERNANDEZ,
VALENTIN OKPARE, ROSEILENE PROPHETE,
GTANA HIENES, NADIA JEAN-PIERRE, CELIA
CARRERO, GERALDINE KRAUSS, NICOLE CARLETT,
SUSAN MACAVOY, DEBRA LOWERY, STEPHEN
GRULEN, CHARLES R. HUGHES, KENNETH NELSON,
DR. RALPH WOODWARD, and GARY M. LANIGAN,
sued in their individual capacities for
monetary damages and official capacity for
injunctive and declaratory relief,
Defendants,
and
DR. FRANCIS MEO, DR. DEEPA
RAJIV, and KENYA COLLINS,
Defendants-Respondents.
______________________________________________
STANLEY L. NIBLACK,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
UNIVERSITY CORRECTIONAL HEALTHCARE,
UNIVERSITY BEHAVIORAL HEALTHCARE,
DR. JEFFREY DICKERT, MARGARET REED,
UNIVERSITY OF MEDICINE AND DENTISTRY OF
NEW JERSEY, JAMES R. GONZALEZ, DR. PEREIRA,
KENNETH NELSON, DR. RALPH WOODWARD,
and GARY M. LANIGAN, sued in their
individual capacities for monetary
damages and official capacity for
injunctive and declaratory relief,
Defendants,
and
DR. FRANCIS MEO, DR. DEEPA RAJIV,
and KENYA COLLINS,
Defendants-Respondents.
___________________________________________________
Submitted June 4, 2018 – Decided July 10, 2018
Before Judges Ostrer and Firko.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Essex County, Docket Nos.
L-2045-15 and L-7785-15.1
1
The trial court consolidated Docket No. L-7785-15 with Docket
No. L-2045-15, after a transfer from Monmouth County of one of the
complaints (MON-L-1061-15).
2 A-0919-16T4
Ferro and Ferro, attorneys for appellant
(Nancy C. Ferro, on the brief).
Farkas & Donohue, LLC, attorneys for
respondents Dr. Francis Meo and Dr. Deepa
Rajiv (David C. Donohue, of counsel; Meredith
T. Zaita, on the brief).
Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney
for respondent Kenya Collins (Jason W.
Rockwell, Assistant Attorney General, of
counsel; Daniel J. Harrison, Deputy Attorney
General, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Plaintiff Stanley L. Niblack, a former inmate at Northern
State Prison ("NSP"), appeals the September 22, 2016 orders
granting summary judgment in favor of defendants, Francis Meo,
M.D., Deepa Rajiv, M.D., and granting a dismissal in lieu of filing
an answer in favor of defendant, Kenya Collins, on plaintiff's
complaint for alleged deliberate indifference to his medical
condition, in violation of his constitutional rights, alleged
violations under the Federal and New Jersey Civil Rights Acts, and
his ancillary claims. We affirm.
I.
There is no dispute as to most of the facts developed in
plaintiff's brief, considering them in the light most favorable
to him. See Robinson v. Vivirito, 217 N.J. 199, 203 (2014)
(citation omitted). At the relevant times, plaintiff was
incarcerated at NSP in Delmont. Plaintiff suffers from
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hypoglycemia, diabetic peripheral neuropathy, and degenerative
joint disease. As a result, he was prescribed medications when
he was previously incarcerated at Southern State Correctional
Facility ("Southern State"). Specifically, he was prescribed
Neurontin for his diabetic peripheral neuropathy, and Mobic for
his degenerative joint disease. When he was transferred to NSP
on May 1, 2014, he was taking his "preferred" pain medication,
Neurontin, which was switched at NSP to Naproxen and aspirin,
which he contended did not alleviate his pain. Plaintiff asserts
that Neurontin is a "non-formulary" drug, which is not on an
approved "list" but, nonetheless, could have been prescribed, as
opposed to a "formulary" drug, which a doctor could have readily
prescribed to him. Movants contend that Neurontin has been
"abused" amongst inmates. Consequently, inmates prescribed
Neurontin are often switched to a "formulary" medication to test
their efficacy. If the formulary drug proves ineffective, then a
request to the New Jersey Department of Corrections ("DOC") Medical
Director can be submitted to reinstate the non-formulary
medication.
On May 6, 2014, Dr. Meo examined plaintiff and prescribed
Metformin 500 mg, a 2400 calorie American Diabetes Association
("ADA") diet, which included an afternoon snack, and finger sticks
to monitor his hypoglycemia. On May 6, 2014, plaintiff filed a
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grievance on the grounds that his healthcare concerns were
"unsatisfactorily answered" by healthcare personnel and NSP
Assistant Collins, a non-medical employee.
According to his medical chart, Dr. Meo evaluated plaintiff
again on May 13, 2014. His A1c level (an indicator of the
effectiveness of the diabetes management plan) was 12.0,
indicating an elevated glucose level. In response, Dr. Meo
adjusted plaintiff's medications and continued glucose monitoring.
On May 20, 2014, plaintiff submitted an Inmate Remedy System
Form ("IRSF"), complaining that his medications were changed
without his knowledge or the benefit of an examination by a
physician.
A second IRSF was submitted by plaintiff on May 22, 2014,
stating as follows:
I am in excruciating diabetic nerve pain.
I've been taking Neurontin for many years
prescribed by a doctor. Since coming to this
facility and having to endure the incompetency
of this [medical] staff I am now gravely
suffering for it. I've been without the
[medication] for two weeks or so and [have]
been in constant pain without it ever since.
I believe it's a Dr. Pereira that has refused
to renew this medication--someone I have never
ever seen. This is clearly a deliberate
indifference to my medical needs. [Dr. Meo]
has taken me off [C]olyburide and lowered my
medications drastically on MGR only twice a
day. This has drastically shot my sugar to
over [200] placing me at risk of harm or even
death due to this.
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On May 30, 2014, Dr. Meo again reviewed plaintiff's glucose
levels and found them elevated. In response, Dr. Meo increased
plaintiff's dosage of Metformin and ordered more finger stick
testing.
Dr. Meo prescribed another diabetes medication called
"Glipizide" on June 4, 2014. Plaintiff's medical status was
evaluated again by Dr. Meo on June 16, 2014, who renewed the 2400
ADA diet but discontinued the afternoon snack as "medically
unnecessary" because plaintiff's "glycemia ha[d] been generally
well controlled" and "[h]is A1c ha[d] always been above the desired
proportion for a diabetic person (under 7%) without clinical
compromise" according to his medical chart. Plaintiff continued
to assert that Naproxen was ineffective in treating his
"excruciating" diabetic peripheral neuropathy pain, and that he
wanted to resume taking Neurontin.
On June 9, 2014, plaintiff wrote to Margaret Reed, a prison
liaison, renewing his complaint and explaining the medical history
delineated previously. He also conferred with several nurses, and
the patient advocate, and sent letters in support of his requests
to various NSP personnel. A "sick call" slip was also submitted
by plaintiff on this date with a complaint of "poor vision" and
not raising diabetic pain issues. Dr. Meo evaluated plaintiff on
June 9, 2014, and plaintiff requested a prescription for Neurontin.
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Dr. Meo obliged, and issued a "Non-Formulary Drug Request Form"
for Neurontin on that date.
The form inadvertently did not state that plaintiff had been
taking Neurontin when he was transferred to NSP. Consequently,
Dr. Rajiv, the Medical Director at NSP, denied Dr. Meo's request
for Neurontin on July 8, 2014, and she suggested that a formulary
medication be prescribed instead.
Reed advised plaintiff that snacks are only ordered for
patients who require daily insulin, which was not his medical
status at that time.
Another IRSF was filed by plaintiff on June 19, 2014,
reiterating his prior complaints. He also confirmed that he
submitted two sick call slips, as instructed by NSP
representatives, for failure to have his preferred medication
(Neurontin) renewed. Dr. Meo renewed an order for finger sticks
on July 1, 2014.
On July 16, 2014, plaintiff wrote to Collins, objecting to
her upholding the decisions of the medical professionals in respect
of his being denied the medical treatment he sought.
Thereafter, on August 8, 2014, Michelle Borowski, D.O.,
issued a second Non-Formulary Drug Request Form for Neurontin,
which did not specify a dosage or indicate that it was previously
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prescribed for plaintiff. Consequently, Dr. Rajiv denied the
request on August 14, 2014.
On August 22, 2014, Dr. Meo evaluated plaintiff again and
assessed his cardiac and metabolic status. Dr. Meo informed
plaintiff at that time that Dr. Rajiv denied the request for
Neurontin, without performing a consultation or examination.
Since plaintiff was not insulin-dependent on August 22, 2014,
he was denied his request for an afternoon snack, in accordance
with DOC guidelines. Dr. Meo prescribed him Glutose Gel (a non-
prescription medication) to be taken, as needed, if plaintiff felt
his blood sugar level was too low. The medical record also states
that on this date, Sharmalie Perera, M.D., revised Dr. Borowski's
previous Request Form to state that 300 daily mg of Neurontin was
being requested for 365 days, and that plaintiff was "currently"
being prescribed this medication. There is no dispute that
plaintiff was taking Neurontin as of August 22, 2014.
During the period in question, only patients prescribed
regular insulin injections were provided an afternoon snack,
according to the DOC dietician. Notwithstanding this protocol,
plaintiff was provided afternoon snacks as far back as May 16,
2014, even though he did not become insulin dependent until March
12, 2015.
8 A-0919-16T4
As to Mobic, plaintiff was prescribed this drug on an "as
needed" basis while incarcerated at Southern State. On August 8,
2014, Dr. Meo renewed a prescription for Mobic, and discontinued
Naproxen, in response to plaintiff's sick call on August 8, 2014.
The prescription for Mobic continued to be renewed thereafter.
At his deposition, plaintiff testified that during his
Administrative Segregation, he was given afternoon snacks
periodically, even though not medically indicated. This was in
response to his persistence on this issue. He testified "at times
I was receiving a snack" . . . "when I was actually taking finger
sticks."
It was noted in the medical record on January 21, 2015, that
plaintiff "refuse[d] a diet tray because in the past they wouldn't
give him a snack." Another entry dated February 12, 2015, noted
that plaintiff "is non [-] compliant with diet," and despite
admonitions to the contrary by the doctors, "he will refuse all
of the recommended interventions to control his disease" unless
"he can have the snack he wants." Ostensibly, there was a lack
of motivation on the part of plaintiff "to control his disease"
as stated in his medical chart. In plaintiff's opinion, at NSP,
"the food is not as high of a level, acceptable level, to bring
my sugar to an acceptable level." At his deposition, plaintiff
testified that "an apple or orange is not sufficient for a
9 A-0919-16T4
diabetic" and that he should have been [given] "something with
meat on it or peanut butter and jelly" or a "cheese sandwich."
Despite plaintiff's contention that Doctors Meo and Rajiv
failed to "consult with or examine [him] prior to denying or
discontinuing pain medications", no permanent injuries were
sustained by plaintiff emanating from his allegations of not
receiving Neurontin or "adequate snacks."
In an oral decision on defendants' summary judgment motion,
Judge Dennis F. Carey, III determined that "there's nothing in the
record that suggests that the doctors and their assistants did
anything . . . that would rise to the level . . . [of] intentional
or culpable mistreatment of this plaintiff." In doing so, the
judge found:
The mere disagreement between the prisoner and
the treating physicians over medical treatment
does not rise to the level . . . of deliberate
indifference. Then, if we give [plaintiff]
the benefit of every inference, certainly the
mere disagreement . . . is the best that [he]
can prove.
With respect to Collins, the judge aptly concluded "that clearly
non-medical officials could not be liable under the facts of this
case for decisions that were medical in nature."
As to Dr. Meo, Dr. Rajiv, and Collins, Judge Carey also found
that "there's nothing in the records that suggest[s] that the
doctors and their assistants did anything that would . . . rise
10 A-0919-16T4
to the level . . . [of] intentional or culpable mistreatment of
this plaintiff."
As to the civil rights claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983and N.J.S.A. 10:6-1, the judge determined that Dr. Meo, Dr. Rajiv,
and Collins are not "person[s]" as defined by the Code or statute,
and he dismissed those allegations with prejudice. Judge Carey
also dismissed, with prejudice, plaintiff's claims pled generally
under the New Jersey Administrative Code; the Americans with
Disabilities Act pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12101; and the federal
Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794.
On appeal, plaintiff argues that Dr. Meo and Dr. Rajiv
wrongfully failed to provide him prescribed chronic pain
medications and snacks in order to maintain his hypoglycemic
condition; and that they failed to consult with or examine him
prior to modifying his medications, resulting in his excruciating
pain and potentially exposing him to a risk of harm. As to
Collins, plaintiff contends that she failed to adequately staff
the medical department; failed to provide an effective sick call
processing system for prisoners in Administrative Segregation; and
that she failed to remedy his medical concerns in a prompt fashion.
Dr. Meo, Dr. Rajiv, and Collins urge us to affirm the court's
orders.
11 A-0919-16T4
II.
Claims against Dr. Meo and Dr. Rajiv
This court reviews a ruling on summary judgment de novo,
applying the same legal standard as the trial court. Conley v.
Guerrero, 228 N.J. 339, 346 (2017); Templo Fuente De Vida Corp.
v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 224 N.J. 189, 199 (2016). Thus,
this court considers, as the trial judge did, "whether the evidence
presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury
or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a
matter of law," Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp. v. Nowell Amoroso,
P.A., 189 N.J. 436, 445-46 (2007) (quoting Brill v. Guardian Life
Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 536 (1995)). Summary judgment must
be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to
a judgment or order as a matter of law." Templo Fuente, 224 N.J.
at 179 (quoting R. 4:46-2(c)).
As our Supreme Court has instructed: a determination whether
there exists a "genuine issue" of material fact that preludes
summary judgment requires the motion judge to consider whether the
competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit
12 A-0919-16T4
a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in
favor of the non-moving party. Brill, 142 N.J. at 540. "To defeat
a motion for summary judgment, the opponent must 'come forward
with evidence that creates a genuine issue of material fact.'"
Cortez v. Gindhart, 435 N.J. Super. 589, 605 (App. Div. 2014)
(quoting Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of N.J. v. State, 425 N.J.
Super. 1, 32 (App. Div. 2012)). "[C]onclusory and self-serving
assertions by one of the parties are insufficient to overcome the
motion." Puder v. Buechel, 183 N.J. 428, 440-41 (2005) (citations
omitted). If there is no genuine issue of material fact, this
court must then "decide whether the trial court correctly
interpreted the law." DepoLink Court Reporting & Litig. Support
Servs. v. Rochman, 430 N.J. Super. 325, 333 (App. Div. 2013)
(citation omitted). "When no issue of fact exists, and only a
question of law remains, [this court] affords no special deference
to the legal determinations of the trial court." Templo Fuente,
224 N.J. at 199 (citing Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of
Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)).
III.
We first address the violation of constitutional claims
presented by plaintiff pursuant to the Eighth Amendment, as
enforced through the Federal and State Civil Rights Acts. Through
its prohibition on "cruel and unusual punishments," the Eighth
13 A-0919-16T4
Amendment to the United States Constitution requires prison
officials to provide humane conditions of confinement, which
includes the provision of adequate medical treatment. Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). Accordingly, "deliberate
indifference to a prisoner's serious illness or injury states a
cause of action under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983." Id. at 105 (emphasis
added). We have explained the essential elements of a civil rights
action based upon a claim of cruel and unusual punishment:
[A] prison official violates the Eighth
Amendment only when two requirements are met.
First, the deprivation alleged must be,
objectively, 'sufficiently serious'; a prison
official's act or omission must result in the
denial of 'the minimal civilized measure of
life's necessities.'
. . . .
The second requirement follows from the
principle that 'only the unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain implicates the
Eighth Amendment.' To violate the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause, a prison official
must have a 'sufficiently culpable state of
mind.' In prison-conditions cases that state
of mind is one of 'deliberate indifference'
to inmate health or safety[.]
[Bernstein v. State, 411 N.J. Super. 316, 336
(App. Div. 2010) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)).]
"Deliberate indifference" consists of three components: "(1)
subjective knowledge or a risk of serious harm; (2) disregard of
that risk; (3) by conduct that is more than mere negligence."
14 A-0919-16T4
McElligott v. Foley, 182 F.3d 1248, 1255 (11th Cir. 1999). It may
be established by a showing of care so cursory as to amount to no
treatment at all. Ibid. However, a prison official cannot be
found liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate
humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and
disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the
official must both be aware of facts from which the inference
could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and
he must also draw the inference. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.
As to the first factor, plaintiff failed to sustain his burden
because Dr. Meo and Dr. Rajiv addressed his medical history,
prescribed what objectively appeared to be appropriate medications
to address his symptoms and conditions, and monitored him
frequently. This is evidenced by plaintiff's medical record that
his glycemia and A1c "had been generally well controlled."
As to the second factor, there is no evidence to suggest that
Dr. Meo or Dr. Rajiv "disregarded" any risk. Indeed, plaintiff's
assertion that Dr. Meo made [him] "vulnerable to go into a diabetic
coma or shock" is without merit.
As to the third factor, there was no conduct exhibited by Dr.
Meo or Dr. Rajiv that resulted in plaintiff suffering from a
diabetic episode or coma. Fortunately for plaintiff, there is no
competent proof he was ever compromised medically or subjected to
15 A-0919-16T4
a risk for a "real possibility of permanent injury." Spruill v.
Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004). The medical record is
replete with references to plaintiff's own non-compliance. He
advised prison officials that "he will refuse all of the
recommendations to control his disease" unless "he can have the
snack he wants." This clearly militates against a claim of
"deliberate indifference" and a culpable state of mind on the part
of the defendant doctors. Plaintiff also refused a diabetic meal
tray prescribed by a doctor.
Governed by the principles, we are satisfied that the judge
correctly found no deliberate indifference. The mere assertion
by plaintiff that Dr. Meo was deliberately indifferent to his
medical needs because he "only intermittently ordered the proper
snack" for him lacks the requisite elements to constitute an Eighth
Amendment cruel and unusual punishment violation. There is lack
of proof of even a "real possibility" of permanent injury to
sustain this cause of action. Ibid. "Mere disagreement" as to
medical judgment calls made by Dr. Meo and Dr. Rajiv does not rise
to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation, as found by the
judge. No expert opinion was presented on behalf of plaintiff.
16 A-0919-16T4
IV.
Claims against Collins
We begin our analysis with respect to defendant Collins by
stating the applicable standard under the dismissal provision,
Rule 4:6-2(e), which is well established. When reviewing a
litigant's complaint to determine the adequacy of the pleaded
claims, the appropriate test is a liberal one. Printing Mart-
Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989)
(citation omitted). As the Supreme Court instructed, the review
must begin by determining "whether a cause of action is 'suggested'
by the facts." Ibid. (quoting Velantzas v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.,
109 N.J. 189, 192 (1988)). The Court further explained that courts
must review complaints "in depth and with liberality to ascertain
whether the fundament of a cause of action may be gleaned even
from an obscure statement of claim[.] Ibid. (quoting Di
Cristofaro v. Laurel Grove Mem'l Park, 43 N.J. Super. 244, 252
(App. Div. 1957)). The review of the complaint's allegations
should take "a generous and hospitable approach," and afford
plaintiff every "reasonable inference" from the alleged facts.
Ibid. Our inquiry is limited to examining the legal sufficiency
of the facts alleged on the face of the complaint. Rieder v.
Dep't of Transp., 221 N.J. Super. 547, 552 (App. Div. 1987)
(citation omitted).
17 A-0919-16T4
Here, Collins filed a Rule 4:6-2(e) motion to dismiss the
complaint with prejudice, or in the alternative, summary judgment.
In any event, our review is de novo.
Applying these standards, we affirm the judge's decision
finding no deliberate indifference as to Collins. In relying upon
the instructive authority in Spruill, 372 F.3d at 218, the judge
duly found plaintiff did not establish deliberate indifference.
The Spruill court differentiated between medical and non-medical
prison officials. "If a prisoner is under the care of medical
experts . . . , a non-medical prison official will generally be
justified in believing that the prisoner is in capable hands. This
follows naturally from the division of labor within a prison.
Holding a non-medical prison official liable in a case where a
prisoner was under a physician's care would strain this division
of labor." Id. at 236 (citing Durmer v. O'Carroll, 991 F.2d 64(3d Cir. 1993)). Thus, the judge properly dismissed the complaint
against Collins as it states no basis for relief.
The trial court ruled that plaintiff failed to establish a
prima facie case under Federal and State Civil Rights standards.
We agree.
Because plaintiff has not made a prima facie showing of any
constitutional violation under the Eighth Amendment or otherwise,
there is no need for us to elaborate upon issues of qualified
18 A-0919-16T4
immunity. For sake of completeness, we simply note that, even
assuming a constitutional violation existed here, defendants would
clearly enjoy immunity from liability under the circumstances
presented. In re Petition for Review of Op. 552 of Advisory Comm.
on Prof'l Ethics, 102 N.J. 194, 199 (1986) (quoting Kentucky v.
Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985)).
In his brief, plaintiff contends that movants "violated their
contracts" to provide adequate health care; that they are not
entitled to sovereign immunity; and that he was "prejudiced"
because the motions were decided prematurely as discovery was
incomplete. Here, the judge found that the medical care plaintiff
received from Dr. Meo and Dr. Rajiv was not "constitutionally"
deficient, a conclusion we have already affirmed, supra. As a
non-medical prison official, Collins is not liable for any alleged
failure to intervene in decisions relative to plaintiff's medical
care, or second-guess the doctors' judgment.
Plaintiff does not have an absolute right to a formulary
medication of his choice. An inmate does not have carte blanche
access to health care. Deliberate indifference to medical needs
does not establish an Eighth Amendment violation unless such needs
are "'serious.'" Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992).
Applying these principles, we are satisfied that plaintiff
19 A-0919-16T4
has failed to make a sufficient showing under the theories he
espouses to disturb the judge's findings.
Plaintiff is simply not entitled as an inmate to receive a
formulary drug or snack on demand. Therefore, the motions for
summary judgment and dismissal were duly granted.
As to the issue of discovery, it "need not be undertaken or
completed if it will patently not change the outcome." Minoia v.
Kushner, 365 N.J. Super. 304, 307 (App. Div. 2004). Nothing has
been presented to suggest that further discovery would change the
outcome here, especially since the issues are largely legal, and
not factual, in nature.
Plaintiff's remaining claims of a violation of the New Jersey
Administrative Code, Americans with Disabilities Act, and
Rehabilitation Act arguments lack sufficient merit to warrant
discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
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