STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. ARMANDO RAMOSÂ (0027-15, ATLANTIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0548-16T3
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ARMANDO RAMOS,
Defendant-Respondent.
___________________________________________________
Argued April 25, 2017 – Decided June 26, 2017
Before Judges Fisher, Vernoia and Moynihan.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Law Division, Atlantic County,
Municipal Appeal No. 0027-15.
John J. Lafferty, IV, Assistant Prosecutor,
argued the cause for appellant (Damon G.
Tyner, Atlantic County Prosecutor, attorney;
Mr. Lafferty, of counsel and on the brief).
Louis M. Barbone argued the cause for
respondent (Jacobs & Barbone, P.A.,
attorneys; Mr. Barbone and John R. Stein, on
the brief).
PER CURIAM
In this appeal, the State challenges an order suppressing
evidence – derived from a motor vehicle stop – to support a
charge that the driver was intoxicated, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50. We
reverse because defendant's abnormal operation of his vehicle,
as he maneuvered around barrels and a road-closed sign barring
his lane of travel, justified the officer's utilization of the
community caretaker exception to the warrant requirement.
Defendant was charged with driving while intoxicated,
N.J.S.A. 39:4-50, and other motor vehicle violations. He moved
in municipal court for suppression of evidence gathered during
the motor vehicle stop; the judge considered that question at a
suppression hearing. The only witness – the police officer who
conducted the motor vehicle stop – testified that, around
midnight on June 24, 2014, he was on duty and assigned to
traffic detail concerning road construction on Route 54.
Specifically, he was stationed at what is depicted in the
diagram below as Intersection A:
2 A-0548-16T3
Route 54
- - - - - - - - - - - A - - - - - - - - - B - -
E
N S
First Chew
W Road Road
His aim was to ensure that no northbound vehicles on Route 54
traveled further north from Intersection B, or by turning north
from either direction on Chew Road onto Route 54. In addition,
vehicles traveling on First Road into Intersection A were either
directed into the southbound lane of Route 54 or were permitted
to stay on First Road as they traveled east or west on First
Road.
Around 2 a.m., the officer's attention was drawn to a
vehicle traveling east on Chew Road that entered Intersection B,
turning left onto Route 54 by traversing around the two barrels1
that impeded any vehicles attempting to travel north from
1
The barrels were accompanied by a Department of Transportation
(DOT) approved road closure sign.
3 A-0548-16T3
Intersection B toward Intersection A. This observed vehicle was
driven by defendant; his path is designated by the line that
starts at Chew Road at the bottom of the diagram and ends with
the depicted vehicle stopped at Intersection A.
The officer testified that, as the vehicle moved toward
Intersection A, he walked into the intersection and motioned for
defendant to stop his vehicle. As with prior motorists that
night,2 the officer walked to the driver side window and inquired
about defendant's intentions in conformity with his mission to
keep vehicles from traveling north through that intersection on
Route 54. The officer testified that he "could smell an odor of
an alcoholic beverage coming from the vehicle" as he spoke with
defendant. The officer asked for credentials; defendant was slow
to comply and fumbled with his documentation. Eventually,
defendant was charged with driving while intoxicated and other
motor vehicle offenses.
The municipal judge found from this undisputed testimony a
reasonable and articulable suspicion of a motor vehicle
violation and, also, that the stop and inquiry of defendant was
2
During the first two hours of his tour of duty, the officer
observed five or six other vehicles enter the barricaded area.
He testified that each vehicle was stopped and each given
directions helpful to their intended course. The officer
testified Intersection B was sufficiently lit, and all drivers
entering Intersection B would have had a clear view of the
barrels and the road-closed sign.
4 A-0548-16T3
permitted by the community caretaker exception. Consequently,
the municipal judge denied defendant's suppression motion.
Defendant unsuccessfully moved in the Law Division for
leave to appeal the order denying his suppression motion, and
thereafter entered a conditional guilty plea. This was not
defendant's first DWI conviction. He was sentenced to 180 days
in the county jail, and a ten-year license suspension and other
monetary penalties were imposed. The municipal judge, however,
stayed the incarceration portion of the judgment, pending
disposition of defendant's appeal to the Law Division.
In the Law Division, defendant challenged only the denial
of his motion to suppress, arguing: (1) the circumstances did
not support employment of the community caretaker exception; and
(2) the officer lacked a reasonable and articulable suspicion
that defendant violated N.J.S.A. 39:4-94.2(b) (driving on a
closed road).
Upon de novo review, the Law Division judge found the
officer "overstepped his bounds" in performing the vehicle stop
because the State acknowledged the wrong moving violation was
issued,3 thereby conceding defendant "wasn’t in a place he wasn't
3
As noted above, defendant was charged with driving on a closed
road, N.J.S.A. 39:4-94.2(b). During the proceedings regarding
the suppression motion, the State recognized this charge could
not be sustained, apparently because the required governmental
(continued)
5 A-0548-16T3
supposed to be." Further elaborating, the judge stated that
defendant's particular route into Intersection B – eastbound on
Chew Road instead of northbound on Route 54 – meant he would not
"necessarily see [the road-closed] sign." The judge surmised
that a driver could have assumed the barriers were placed to
cover or block "a pothole," or signal something other than the
roadway's closure in that direction. And, because the judge
found defendant had a right to reasonably assume the road was
not closed, there was – in the Law Division judge's view – no
ground upon which the officer's utilization of the community
caretaker exception could rest.
In appealing the suppression order to this court, the State
argues the Law Division judge "erred in concluding that there
was no basis for stopping the defendant's vehicle under the
community caretaker exception." Specifically, the State claims
that the Law Division judge erred by "considering the reasonable
objective basis for the stop from the perspective of the
defendant instead of from the perspective of the officer" and
failed to adhere to our decisions in State v. Martinez, 260 N.J.
(continued)
action necessary to close a road within the meaning of this
statute could not be demonstrated. That fact, however, is not
conclusive on the question of whether defendant was driving
abnormally or in some way that warranted the officer's
conducting a stop for community caretaking reasons.
6 A-0548-16T3
Super. 75, 78 (App. Div. 1992) and State v. Washington, 296 N.J.
Super. 569, 572 (App. Div. 1997). In reversing, we agree there
was "sufficient evidence on the record that [the officer]
observed the defendant operating his vehicle in an abnormal
manner – driving in the southbound lane and around the barricade
and sign, in the northbound lane – and was therefore justified
in conducting a motor vehicle stop."
To explain, we start by invoking the Supreme Court's
description of the dual roles performed by police officers in
today's society:
On the one hand, they carry out traditional
law enforcement functions, such as
investigating crimes and arresting perpetra-
tors. On the other hand, police officers
perform a wide range of social services,
such as aiding those in danger of harm,
preserving property, and creating and main-
taining a feeling of security in the
community.
[State v. Bogan, 200 N.J. 61, 73 (2009).]
Differentiating between these two functions requires
consideration of the officer’s underlying motives. State v.
Diloreto, 180 N.J. 264, 276 (2004). When motivated by a desire
to "detect or solve a specific crime, such as making arrests,
interrogating suspects, and searching for evidence," an officer
acts in accord with the law enforcement function. Ibid."Conversely, when motivated by a desire to 'ensure the safety
7 A-0548-16T3
and welfare of the citizenry,' the officer acts pursuant to the
community caretaking function." Ibid. "That function has its
source in the ubiquity of the automobile and the dynamic,
differential situations police officers are confronted with to
promote driver safety." Washington, supra, 296 N.J. Super. at
572. This function "finds support in the premise that abnormal
operation of a motor vehicle establishes a reasonably objective
basis to justify a motor vehicle stop." Ibid. "What is
reasonably objective is measured by the dynamics or totality of
the circumstances from the perspective of the officer on duty at
the time and not from the esoteric perspective of the
courtroom." Ibid.
We have applied this community caretaking exception in
various similar situations. For example, in State v. Goetaski,
209 N.J. Super. 362, 364-65 (App. Div. 1986), we held that a
defendant driving slowly on a rural highway's shoulder, with a
flashing left-turn indicator, as the vehicle traveled for a
tenth of a mile justified a stop. In Martinez, supra, 260 N.J.
Super. at 77-78, we found "that operation of a motor vehicle in
the middle of the night on a residential street at a snail's
pace between five and ten m.p.h. is indeed 'abnormal'" and
justified a community-caretaker stop. It is enough that the
abnormal conduct "engenders reasonable grounds to conclude that
8 A-0548-16T3
the vehicle is a potential safety hazard to other vehicles and
that there is either something wrong with the driver, with the
car, or both." Washington, supra, 296 N.J. Super. at 572.
In examining the Law Division judge's decision, we only
consider "whether the motion to suppress was properly decided
based on the evidence presented at that time." State v. Jordan,
115 N.J. Super. 73, 76 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 59 N.J. 293(1971). If there is sufficient credible evidence in the record,
we defer to the judge's findings. See State v. Elders, 192 N.J.
224, 243 (2007). The judge's legal conclusion as to the meaning
of undisputed facts, however, is not entitled to deference.
State v. Handy, 206 N.J. 39, 45 (2011).
We reverse because we are satisfied that the judge's
factual suppositions about what defendant might have thought –
defendant, as mentioned earlier, never testified – are
inconsistent with the police officer's unrebutted testimony and,
also, because the judge misapplied the community caretaker
exception. The undisputed facts reveal the officer's stop of
defendant's vehicle occurred late at night and was based on his
observation of defendant's vehicle as it entered the wrong lane
of traffic on Route 54 by driving around barrels and a road-
closed sign that cautioned against such a movement. Defendant's
vehicle was headed toward Intersection A, where he would be
9 A-0548-16T3
unable to travel further on Route 54. From the officer's
perspective – regardless of whether defendant's operation of the
vehicle constituted a motor vehicle violation – the vehicle was
being abnormally operated and justified the stop and the
officer's approach toward the driver to inquire about where
defendant intended to go. In this setting, application of the
community caretaker exception required no more.
We reverse the Law Division's order of August 29, 2016,
which granted defendant's motion to suppress. We also vacate the
stay of the incarceration portion of the sentence imposed.4
4
In granting suppression of evidence, the Law Division judge
took no further action with respect to the municipal court
judgment. For example, the Law Division judge's order did not
vacate the municipal court judgment or dismiss the charges.
Consequently, by operation of our reversal of the Law Division
order granting suppression, we assume that the municipal court
judgment remains in place and that the sentence and penalties
imposed will continue to have effect. We remand to the Law
Division judge to ensure that our mandate is carried out.
10 A-0548-16T3