DCPP VS. Z.S. AND A.A., IN THE MATTER OF H.A., S.A., N.A. AND L.A. (FN-02-0155-14, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED)(CONSOLIDATED)

RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1132-16T4
A-1133-16T4
NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD
PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
Z.S. and A.A.,
Defendants-Appellants.
______________________________
IN THE MATTER OF H.A., S.A.,
N.A., and L.A., minors.
__________________________________
Submitted May 17, 2018 – Decided July 5, 2018
Before Judges Haas and Gooden Brown.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Bergen County,
Docket No. FN-02-0155-14.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney
for appellant Z.S. (Beth Anne Hahn, Designated
Counsel, on the briefs).
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney
for appellant A.A. (Adrienne Kalosieh,
Designated Counsel, on the briefs).
Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney
for respondent (Jason W. Rockwell, Assistant
Attorney General, of counsel; Arriel
Rubinstein, Deputy Attorney General, on the
brief).
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law
Guardian, attorney for minor H.A. (David
Valentin, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, on
the brief).
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law
Guardian, attorney for minor S.A. (Todd
Wilson, Designated Counsel, on the brief).
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law
Guardian, attorney for minors N.A. and L.A.
(Lisa M. Black, Designated Counsel, on the
brief).
PER CURIAM
In these back-to-back appeals, which we consolidate for
purposes of issuing a single opinion, defendants Z.S.1 (mother)
and A.A. (father) appeal from the Family Part's September 2, 2014
order, which became final on entry of an October 6, 2016 order
terminating the litigation. Following a fact-finding hearing, on
September 2, 2014, the trial court determined that defendants
abused and neglected their daughter, H.A., born in September,
1997, within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(3).
Specifically, the court found that A.A. sexually abused H.A. and
Z.S. failed to protect her.
1
Pursuant to Rule 1:38-3, we use initials to protect the privacy
of the family.
2 A-1132-16T4
On appeal, both defendants argue the Division of Child
Protection and Permanency (Division) failed to prove abuse and
neglect by a preponderance of the evidence. In addition, A.A.
argues that in terminating the litigation, the court unlawfully
restricted his contact with his other children despite finding no
evidence that he posed a risk to them. A.A. also argues that the
court abused its discretion in denying defendants' Rule 4:50-1
motion to vacate and reconsider the fact-finding order based on
newly discovered evidence. The Division opposes the appeal.
H.A.'s Law Guardian opposes the appeal as to her father, but "takes
no position regarding the finding of neglect against her mother
. . . ." Based on our review of the record and the applicable
legal principles, we conclude that the court applied the wrong
standard in evaluating defendants' motion to reopen the fact-
finding hearing. Accordingly, we reverse and remand.
We summarize the facts from the record developed over the
course of the six-day fact-finding hearing from June 23 to July
15, 2014, during which the Division presented eight witnesses,
including expert witnesses, and the defense presented one witness.
The court also admitted numerous documentary exhibits into
evidence. The circumstances that led to the Division filing a
verified complaint, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21 and 30:4C-12,
for custody of H.A., and care and supervision for her four
3 A-1132-16T4
siblings, Am.A., born in April 1996,2 S.A., born in October 1998,3
N.A., born in April 2007, and L.A., born in January 2009,4 began
on October 9, 2013. On that date, the Division received a referral
from the police that H.A., then a sixteen-year-old ninth-grade
classified student with a full scale IQ of 81, disclosed to her
guidance counselor that her father had sexual intercourse with her
in the living room of their home one morning in the summer of
2013. H.A. told the counselor she complained to her mother in
September 2013 but her mother did not believe her.
A Division caseworker responded to the Bergen County
Prosecutor's Office where H.A. was being interviewed. During the
interview, H.A. recanted her allegations and stated she had lied
about everything. H.A. explained that she fabricated the
allegations because she was upset about her mother slapping her
earlier that morning when her mother discovered she had lied about
visiting her best friend, C.C., the day before. H.A. had actually
spent the time with a "boy," knowing her parents disapproved.
When questioned by the caseworker later that day, Z.S.
confirmed that she had slapped H.A. that morning and that H.A. had
2
Am.A. reached the age of majority during the pendency of these
proceedings and was dismissed from the litigation.
3
S.A.'s Law Guardian opposes the appeal as to both A.A. and Z.S.
4
N.A. and L.A.'s Law Guardian oppose the appeal as to A.A.
4 A-1132-16T4
disclosed A.A.'s alleged inappropriate touching in September 2013.
However, she did not believe H.A. and attributed it to the bad
influence of her friends. A.A. also denied the allegations to the
caseworker and the other children indicated no concerns. In
particular, the oldest child, Am.A., defended her father and
explained that H.A. fabricated the allegations for attention.
On November 20, 2013, when the caseworker returned to the
home to follow up with the family, H.A. told her she had recanted
because of pressure from her mother, confirmed that the sexual
abuse had, in fact, occurred, and provided additional details of
the incident. H.A. elaborated that when she awoke at approximately
6:00 a.m. one morning in June 2013, she went into the living room
where her father was watching television, and initially sat on the
couch. Later, while she was lying on the couch, A.A. turned off
the lights and the television, covered her with a blanket and
touched her vaginal area and breasts under her clothing. H.A.
denied any digital or penile penetration but stated A.A. tried to
put his tongue into her mouth, but she resisted.
According to H.A., the incident lasted approximately five
minutes, during which they both remained fully clothed.
Afterwards, A.A. went into the bathroom to smoke a cigarette. At
that point, H.A. ran out of the house with her mother's cell phone,
called her best friend C.C. and told her what happened. Meanwhile,
5 A-1132-16T4
A.A. called H.A. several times on her mother's phone but she
ignored the calls. When she finally answered the phone, A.A. told
her he was "so sorry" and asked why H.A. did not tell him to stop.
After consulting her supervisor, the caseworker transported
H.A. back to the prosecutor's office, where she reiterated the
allegations. Although H.A. stated she was telling the truth, she
did not want to give a sworn statement and she did not want her
father to go to jail. After the interview, the Division executed
an emergency removal and placed H.A. in a resource home because
H.A. did not feel safe returning home due to her mother and her
siblings denigrating and vilifying her and accusing her of
destroying the family. The Division also implemented a safety
protection plan, restricting A.A.'s contact with the other
children.
In the course of the ensuing investigation, H.A. recounted
the incident with some variances. On December 2, 2013, H.A. told
another caseworker that A.A. tried to put his "thing in her mouth,"
as well as his tongue. She also stated that A.A. put his penis
inside her vagina, but she was unsure how long it lasted or whether
he ejaculated. On December 13, 2013, during a medical examination,
H.A. told a pediatrician specializing in child abuse cases that
A.A. touched her with his hand and his penis, that no one was home
6 A-1132-16T4
at the time of the incident, and that she told C.C.'s mother when
it happened.
On December 10, 2013, H.A. underwent a psychosocial
evaluation and told the evaluator that the incident began with
A.A. removing his boxer shorts, inserting his thumbs into her
mouth to separate her jaw and "shov[ing] his penis into her mouth."
According to H.A., once A.A.'s penis was "all the way in [her]
mouth," he moved it "back and forth." H.A. also disclosed that
during the incident, A.A. removed her bra, touched her breasts
with his hands, and touched her vaginal area under her clothing
with his hand and penis. At one point, H.A. flipped over and A.A.
"got on top of [her]" and "went inside" her vagina with his penis,
but she was unsure if he ejaculated.
H.A. also told the evaluator that immediately after the
incident, she picked up a phone and tried to dial 911 but A.A.
threw the phone before she was able to hit send. When A.A. went
to smoke a cigarette, she got dressed, grabbed the phone and ran
to her friend's house, ignoring the incoming telephone calls from
A.A. When she finally answered the phone, A.A. asked her why she
ran away and begged her to come home. After she agreed, A.A.
picked her up in his car, apologized to her, and told her to stop
him in the future. H.A. told the evaluator that following the
7 A-1132-16T4
incident, she received preferential treatment from A.A. and was
relieved of her usual chores.
At the fact-finding hearing, the guidance counselor, C.C. and
C.C.'s mother testified about H.A.'s disclosures to them. The
guidance counselor, who described H.A. as attention-seeking and
academically challenged, confirmed that on October 9, 2013, on her
friends' prompting, H.A. disclosed to her that early one morning
in June 2013, her father "put his private part into her private
part," but she "clenched her legs shut," ran out and called her
friend, C.C.
C.C.'s mother testified that some time in June 2013, her
telephone rang at approximately 6:00 a.m. When she heard H.A.'s
voice on her answering machine imploring C.C. to answer her phone
calls because she "ran away from home," C.C.'s mother answered the
phone. Upon learning H.A.'s location, she arranged to pick her
up. However, when she arrived, H.A. was not there, and she later
learned from H.A. that she had run away from home because her
father molested her. C.C. also testified that H.A. told her later
that same day that her father had "raped" her and had done "things"
to her, but she did not press H.A. for details because she did not
want to upset her.
H.A. testified at the fact-finding hearing that towards the
end of June 2013, about two weeks after school ended but before
8 A-1132-16T4
Ramadan began, she was "raped" by her father. According to H.A.,
she had stayed up all night watching television on one of the
living room couches, which was typical for her on summer breaks.
Her father was also up all night and was seated on a different
living room couch, browsing social media while he charged his
phone. Her other family members were at home, but asleep. At
approximately 6:00 a.m., her father turned off the television and
the hallway light, and closed all the bedroom doors in proximity
to the living room. He then removed his underwear, used his finger
to force open her clenched teeth, inserted his erect penis into
her mouth, and proceeded to "go[] back and forth with it." H.A.
testified she was in shock and turned over on the couch, at which
point her father unstrapped her bra and "started playing with
[her] boobs" under her shirt while attempting to "get[] his penis
in [her] vagina," but failing to do so.
After the incident, when her father walked over to the window
and gazed outside, H.A. grabbed her mother's cell phone and began
dialing 911. However, her father returned the phone to the charger
before she was able to complete the call and went into the bathroom
to smoke a cigarette. At that point, H.A. changed her clothes,
took her mother's phone again, and ran out of the house. Once
outside, she frantically called C.C. repeatedly. Eventually, when
C.C.'s mother answered the phone, H.A. told her that her father
9 A-1132-16T4
had raped her and begged her for help. Although C.C.'s mother
agreed to pick H.A. up at the local post office, H.A. went to a
different location.
Meanwhile, A.A. called Z.S.' phone many times, but H.A.
ignored the calls. When H.A. finally answered the phone, he
apologized and begged her to come home. H.A. hung up but
ultimately answered the phone again when he called back repeatedly
and arranged for him to pick her up. During the car ride home,
A.A. apologized again and told her to stop him in the future. When
she arrived home, she sent a text message to C.C.'s mother telling
her she was home and everything was fine. H.A. testified that
after the incident, she received preferential treatment from her
parents by being relieved of her usual chores and allowed to go
to a water park with C.C.'s family over the summer.
To corroborate H.A.'s testimony, the Division produced phone
records of all incoming and outgoing telephone calls for Z.S.'
phone for the months of June and July 2013. The records indicated
that on June 24, 2013, between 6:11 a.m. and 6:40 a.m., there were
twelve outgoing calls to C.C.'s home phone number. Between 6:38
a.m. and 6:44 a.m., there were three incoming calls from A.A.'s
cell phone number.
According to H.A., her disclosure to her mother in September
2013 followed a heated argument about enrolling in a school program
10 A-1132-16T4
for academically challenged students and attending a school dance,
neither of which her mother would allow. She also confirmed that
her disclosure in October 2013 followed another argument during
which her mother had slapped her for lying about visiting C.C.
She acknowledged that she had trouble dealing with her parents'
strict rules in her home and the restrictions of her Islamic
religion and culture, but insisted that she was telling the truth.
She rejected the assertion that her allegations were motivated by
retribution or rebellion. She expressed genuine concern for her
family and insisted that she would never lie about something of
this magnitude. She explained that despite the fact that her home
felt like a "jail," she would love to go home if she knew her
family supported her. When confronted with the inconsistencies
in her disclosures and her recantation, she confirmed that her
mother forced her to recant the allegations in October 2013 and
dismissed inconsistencies as inaccurate or immaterial.
During the fact-finding hearing, the Division presented
expert testimony on the Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome
(CSAAS), to describe the constellation of factors common to
sexually abused children, namely, secrecy, helplessness, coercion
or accommodation, delayed or unconvincing disclosure, and
recantation. The expert opined that neither multiple recantations
nor the absence of grooming were fatal to a finding of child sexual
11 A-1132-16T4
abuse. The Division also presented expert testimony in relation
to H.A.'s psychosocial evaluation, which found clinical support
for sexual abuse, meaning that professional treatment for H.A. was
recommended. The finding was based on H.A.'s "marked shift in
affect" when discussing the abuse, her reported feelings of
isolation, her spontaneous disclosure which was rich with
idiosyncratic detail, and her fairly consistent recitation of core
details of the incident. The expert noted H.A.'s lack of sexual
knowledge, given her characterization of any form of sexual contact
as rape, and opined that her inconsistencies were reflective of
piecemeal disclosures that were directly influenced by the level
of support she received from the adult to whom she was making the
disclosure.
The defense presented the testimony of Am.A., who maintained
her defense of her father and continued to discredit H.A.'s
account. Am.A. testified that her father was not capable of sexual
assault and attributed the allegations to H.A.'s defiance and the
negative influence of her friends. Am.A. also contradicted
peripheral details of H.A.'s account to demonstrate that her father
was never alone with H.A. in the house.
Following the hearing, the court issued a seventy-nine page
written opinion and conforming order, finding that the Division
proved by a preponderance of the evidence that defendants had
12 A-1132-16T4
abused and neglected H.A. The court found the Division's witnesses
credible, including H.A., whom the court found "to be a very
credible witness, given her demeanor, her tone, her eye contact,
and the forthright manner in which she answered questions." The
court based its finding of abuse and neglect on H.A.'s "credible
testimony, the phone records and witness testimony supporting her
story" and the uncontroverted expert testimony.
The court "note[d] that of the ten people and/or groups H.A.
told about the incident, she told six of them that her father
touched her breasts and her vagina. The remaining four individuals
. . . did not testify or otherwise document H.A.'s disclosure in
great detail." Further, "she told five of them that she left the
house to call C.C., and two of them . . . confirmed that the calls
were in fact placed. The remaining three individuals . . . did
not testify or otherwise document H.A.'s disclosure in great
detail."
In addition, the court determined that "the credible and
overwhelming testimony concerning what happened in the aftermath
of the abuse," combined with the "cold, hard record of these
frantic phone calls being made" "dispel any doubt as to whether
something terrible happened at the end of June 2013. Simply
stated, no one makes twelve consecutive phone calls to their best
friend's house phone between 6:11 a.m. and 6:40 a.m. unless they
13 A-1132-16T4
are in distress." (emphasis omitted). The court was also
"persuaded by what happened to H.A. in the days and weeks following
the abuse" in terms of the reported preferential treatment and
found it "highly credible in terms of their tendency to create an
inference of a guilty conscience."
The court rejected the defense theories that H.A.'s
disclosures were motivated by anger at her strict parents, defiance
of her Islamic practices or a desire for attention. In this
regard, the court found Am.A.'s "testimony to be not credible"
because "[a]s a parentified older sibling, she had the same biased
attitude as her parents . . . ." As to the specific attacks on
her credibility, the court determined that "H.A.'s delay in
reporting, her piecemeal disclosures, her recantations, and her
'inconsistencies' [were] not fatal to [the court's] finding[,]"
but were "quite easily explained by CSAAS." Further, the court
found the inconsistencies in H.A.'s disclosures pertained to
inconsequential peripheral facts, as opposed to "core" details.
The court was also persuaded that the "changing disclosures"
regarding A.A. inserting his penis into H.A.s mouth "correlated
with the level of comfort that H.A. perceived as she continued to
tell her story." Further, according to the court, the
inconsistency about whether A.A. penetrated her vagina with his
penis reflected H.A.'s "very crude understanding of human sexual
14 A-1132-16T4
behavior" and her preoccupation "with learning whether she [was]
still a virgin."
After the hearing, in March 2015, defendants moved pursuant
to Rule 4:50-1 to vacate the fact-finding order based on newly
discovered evidence. Specifically, A.A.'s counsel asserted that
on June 22, 2014, immediately prior to the commencement of the
fact-finding hearing, H.A. made similar allegations to her friend
C.C. while she was at the resource home, accusing four boys of
raping her by forcing her to perform oral sex and then recanting
the allegations. A.A.'s counsel explained that on June 23 and 24,
2014, after the fact-finding hearing was underway, both defendants
requested information from the Division regarding the new
allegation but were advised the information was not available due
to an ongoing police investigation.
However, according to A.A.'s counsel, upon recently
inspecting the file, she discovered a June 22, 2014 Special
Response Unit (SPRU) report, detailing the Division's
investigation of the new allegation, that was never provided to
defendants during the trial.5 The SPRU report concluded that H.A.
5
A.A.'s counsel's inspection of the file apparently occurred in
connection with another recantation of H.A.'s allegations against
A.A. contained in an e-mail H.A. purportedly sent to her brother
several months after the fact-finding hearing. On appeal, A.A.
15 A-1132-16T4
was safe and indicated that the Hudson County Prosecutor's Office
"declined to take the case."6 A.A.'s counsel asserted that because
the Division withheld the information, the experts were unable to
consider the new allegation and recantation in evaluating H.A.,
and the defense attorneys were unable to cross-examine H.A., whose
credibility was central to the court's finding. Defendants
therefore urged the court to vacate the fact-finding order and re-
open the fact-finding record to consider the new evidence.
On June 17, 2015, the court issued a written decision and
memorializing order denying defendants' motion, finding no basis
to vacate the September 2, 2014 fact-finding order. The court
also found no basis to conduct a plenary hearing because there was
no dispute that the SPRU report existed. After incorporating the
does not advance any arguments concerning that alleged
recantation.
6
During the June 24, 2015 colloquy with the court, the Division's
attorney objected to turning over the SPRU report, asserting that
the Division was in the middle of the investigation, and the report
was "not discoverable." When the court directed that the Division
produce the report by June 27, 2015, the Division's attorney
indicated that the investigation would probably not be completed
by that time because "[t]he prosecutor's office [was] involved"
and "[t]here [were] other interviews that need[ed] to take place
with other individuals." Ultimately, the court ordered the
Division to turn over the SPRU report immediately upon completion
or "provide to defense counsel the name of the SPRU worker
conducting the investigation" so that the worker could be
subpoenaed to testify if the report was not available. However,
the report was never produced during the fact-finding hearing and
the SPRU worker never testified.
16 A-1132-16T4
factual findings detailed in the September 2, 2014 written
decision, the court concluded that "under any of the subsections
of [Rule] 4:50-1," the SPRU report would not have "altered the
result of the trial" because "[d]efendants were given ample
opportunity to cross-examine [H.A.] during the fact finding
hearing."
The court noted it was persuaded by "the Division's arguments
that the SPRU report [was] irrelevant and inadmissible at trial
because it [did] not establish that [H.A.] made false statements"
or "fabricated" the new allegations. The court elaborated further:
[t]he allegations referenced in the SPRU
report were known to the defendants at the
time of the fact[-]finding hearing and
occurred a full year after the incident which
form[ed] the basis of the fact[-]finding. The
SPRU report is not probative of the issues
presented by the fact[-]finding. Clearly,
[H.A.] is a troubled child who, the record
shows has been traumatized by the events
detailed in the court's September 2, 2014
opinion. At the time of the allegations
mentioned in the SPRU report, the child had
been in foster care for approximately nine
months. Moreover, the record made at the
fact[-]finding reflects that she was
7
experiencing psychiatric issues. . . . All of
these facts were known by the defendants at
the time of the fact[-]finding hearing.
7
Indeed, immediately prior to the commencement of the fact-
finding hearing, H.A. was hospitalized at the psychiatric unit of
the Hoboken Medical Center suffering from major depression. She
was released during the course of the trial and permitted to
testify after the court conducted a testimonial hearing to
determine whether H.A. was medically cleared to testify.
17 A-1132-16T4
This appeal followed.
On appeal, defendant A.A. asserts that evidence of H.A.'s
"pattern of alleging and recanting sexual assault casts doubt on
[her] ability to testify truthfully" that would "have affected the
result, had it been heard." (emphasis omitted). Defendant argues
that the court "abused its discretion not to vacate and reconsider
the fact-finding decision based on this newly uncovered evidence"
as permitted under Rule 4:50-1. However, given the procedural
posture of the case, we conclude that Rule 4:50-1 and its enhanced
requirement for proof of "exceptional and compelling
circumstances" to warrant relief, Baumann v. Marinaro, 95 N.J.
380, 393 (1984), was not the proper legal standard to apply in the
circumstances presented here.
It is well established that "the trial court has the inherent
power, to be exercised in its sound discretion, to review, revise,
reconsider and modify its interlocutory orders at any time prior
to the entry of final judgment." Johnson v. Cyklop Strapping
Corp., 220 N.J. Super. 250, 257 (App. Div. 1987). In Lombardi v.
Masso, 207 N.J. 517, 536-37 (2011), our Supreme Court acknowledged
that
where a litigation has not terminated, an
interlocutory order is always subject to
revision where the judge believes it would be
just to do so. The rules governing final
18 A-1132-16T4
judgments, for example, that evidence must be
newly discovered to be considered, R. 4:50-
1(b), do not apply in the interlocutory
setting. Nor is the judge constrained, as
would a reviewing court be, by the original
record.
[Id. at 536-37.]
Thus, "the stringent constraints imposed on final judgments
and orders under Rule 4:50-1 . . . are wholly inapplicable to
interlocutory orders." Id. at 534. "Indeed, '[a] significant
aspect of the interlocutory nature of an order is its amenability
to the trial court's control until entry of final judgment without
interposition of considerations appropriate to finality.'" Id.
at 534-35 (alteration in original) (quoting Pressler & Verniero,
Current N.J. Court Rules, comment 3 on R. 4:42-2 (2011)).
Thus, "[i]nterlocutory orders are always subject to revision
in the interests of justice." Id. at 536. "That entitlement to
change a prior ruling in the interests of justice is what
distinguishes an interlocutory order from a final judgment." Id.
at 537. However, "the power to reconsider an interlocutory order
should be exercised 'only for good cause shown and in the service
of the ultimate goal of substantial justice.'" Ibid. (quoting
Johnson, 220 N.J. Super. at 263-64). See Ford v. Weisman, 188
N.J. Super. 614, 619 (App. Div. 1983) (holding court "has complete
19 A-1132-16T4
power over its interlocutory orders and may revise them when it
would be consonant with the interests of justice to do so").
Here, we do not fault the court because the defense attorneys
expressly sought relief under Rule 4:50-1. Nonetheless, we are
constrained to reverse and remand for reconsideration under the
appropriate standard. Because of our conclusion, we need not
address defendants' remaining arguments and take no position on
the ultimate outcome of the case following the remand.
Reversed and remanded for reconsideration consistent with
this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
20 A-1132-16T4