STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. TATRONE R. WATERSÂ (12-12-1129, CUMBERLAND COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2815-14T1
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
TATRONE R. WATERS,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________________
Argued September 19, 2017 – Decided October 3, 2017
Before Judges Fisher, Fasciale and Moynihan.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Cumberland County, Indictment
No. 12-12-1129.
Stephen P. Hunter, Assistant Deputy Public
Defender, argued the cause for appellant
(Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney;
Mr. Hunter, of counsel and on the brief).
Kim L. Barfield, Assistant Prosecutor, argued
the cause for respondent (Jennifer Webb-McRae,
Cumberland County Prosecutor, attorney; Ms.
Barfield, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant, who was seventeen years old, appeals from his
convictions for first-degree murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) and
(2) (Count One); second-degree possession of a firearm for an
unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a)(1) (Count Two); second-
degree unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b) (Count
Three); and fourth-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-
1(b)(4) (Count Four). The judge gave a flawed jury charge and
improperly excluded certain testimony from a key witness, which
deprived defendant of a fair trial. We therefore reverse and
remand for a new trial.
Brock Gould (co-defendant) testified that defendant had
threatened to kill the victim if the victim did not return an item
in the victim's possession. After defendant allegedly threatened
the victim, the police responded to a shooting at a trailer park.
When an officer arrived at the scene, he found the victim lying
down with a gunshot wound to the back. The victim died later that
day.
There was conflicting testimony about how many guns were at
the scene and who had used them. The shooting of the victim
occurred while co-defendant's friend, who was a key witness at
trial, drove defendant and co-defendant through the trailer park.
The friend, defendant, and co-defendant remained in the car during
the shooting of the victim. Co-defendant testified that the victim
possessed a gun, admitted he himself possessed a gun, and stated
that the victim pulled out his gun first. At trial, the friend
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equivocated about whether the victim possessed a gun, and testified
inconsistently as to whether defendant had fired a weapon at the
victim.
Co-defendant initially told the police he was not involved
in the shooting. After co-defendant pled guilty to second-degree
possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, however, he
testified that he and defendant fired weapons at the victim.
According to co-defendant, defendant shot the victim before the
victim could use his own weapon.
The judge sentenced defendant on Count One to sixty years in
prison subject to the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-
7.2(a). The judge merged Count Two and Count Four into Count One.
The judge also sentenced defendant on Count Three to eight years
in prison with four years of parole ineligibility, to run
concurrently with Count One.
On appeal, defendant argues:
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO CHARGE
PASSION/PROVOCATION MANSLAUGHTER AS A LESSER-
INCLUDED OFFENSE OF MURDER WAS PLAIN ERROR
BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE CLEARLY INDICATED A
QUICK, SUDDEN REACTION TO [THE VICTIM] PULLING
OUT A GUN FIRST. U.S. Const. [a]mend. XIV;
N.J. Const. [a]rt. I, [¶]¶ 1, 10. (Not Raised
Below).
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO INSTRUCT THE JURY
ON THE LAW OF SELF-DEFENSE WAS PLAIN ERROR
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BECAUSE IT WAS CLEARLY INDICATED BY THE
EVIDENCE THAT [THE VICTIM] PULLED OUT A GUN
FIRST. U.S. Const. [a]mend. XIV; N.J. Const.
[a]rt. I, [¶]¶ 1, 10. (Not Raised Below).
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT'S REPEATED USE OF THE
AMBIGUOUS PHRASE "AND/OR" IN THE JURY
INSTRUCTION ON ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY WAS PLAIN
ERROR BECAUSE IT "GENERATED NUMEROUS WAYS IN
WHICH THE JURY COULD HAVE CONVICTED WITHOUT A
SHARED VISION OF WHAT DEFENDANT DID." STATE
V. GONZALEZ, [444] N.J. SUPER. [62], [77]
(App. Div. 2016), [] U.S. Const. [a]mend. VI,
XIV; N.J. Const. [a]rt. I, [¶]¶ 1, 9, 10. (Not
Raised Below).
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT'S IMPROPER EXCLUSION OF
EVIDENCE THAT CO-DEFENDANT TOLD [THE FRIEND]
WHAT TO SAY IN HIS POLICE STATEMENT DENIED
DEFENDANT A FAIR TRIAL. U.S. Const. [a]mend.
XIV; N.J. Const. [a]rt. I, [¶]¶ 1, 10.
POINT V
SINCE THIS JUVENILE-DEFENDANT RECEIVED A DE
FACTO SENTENCE OF LIFE IMPRISONMENT WITHOUT
THE POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE, THIS MATTER MUST
BE REMANDED FOR A NEW SENTENCING HEARING AT
WHICH THE COURT MUST "TAKE INTO ACCOUNT HOW
CHILDREN ARE DIFFERENT, AND HOW THOSE
DIFFERENCES COUNSEL AGAINST IRREVOCABLY
SENTENCING THEM TO A LIFETIME IN PRISON."
MILLER V. ALABAMA, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2468-69
(2010).
I.
We begin by addressing defendant's contention that the judge
committed plain error when the judge failed to charge
passion/provocation manslaughter as a lesser-included offense of
murder.
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Defense counsel did not object to the jury charge even though
defendant had the obligation "to challenge instructions at the
time of trial." State v. Morais, 359 N.J. Super. 123, 134 (App.
Div.) (citing R. 1:7–2), certif. denied, 177 N.J. 572 (2003).
Failure to object creates a "presum[ption] that the instructions
were adequate." Id. at 134-35 (citing State v. Macon, 57 N.J.
325, 333 (1971)). Thus, we review defendant's contention for
plain error. R. 2:10-2.
It is undisputed that "[a]ppropriate and proper charges to a
jury are essential for a fair trial." State v. Green, 86 N.J.
281, 287 (1981). The trial judge must guarantee that jurors
receive accurate instructions on the law as it pertains to the
facts and issues of each case. Id. at 287-88. We read the charge
as a whole to determine whether there was any error. State v.
Adams, 194 N.J. 186, 207 (2008).
"When the parties to a criminal proceeding do not request
that a lesser-included offense such as attempted
passion/provocation manslaughter be charged, the charge should be
delivered to the jury only when there is 'obvious record support
for such [a] charge[.]'" State v. Funderburg, 225 N.J. 66, 81
(2016) (first alteration in original) (quoting State v. Powell,
84 N.J. 305, 319 (1980)). "A trial court should deliver the
instruction sua sponte 'only where the facts in evidence clearly
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indicate the appropriateness of that charge.'" Ibid. (quoting
State v. Savage, 172 N.J. 374, 397 (2002)). This also applies
when, like here, defense counsel specifically asked the judge not
to include any lesser-included offenses for murder.
"For a trial court to be required to charge a jury sua sponte
on attempted passion/provocation manslaughter, the court 'must
find first that the two objective elements of [the offense] are
clearly indicated by the evidence.'" Id. at 82 (alteration in
original and emphasis omitted) (quoting State v. Robinson, 136
N.J. 476, 491 (1994)). There are four elements to
passion/provocation manslaughter: "[1] the provocation must be
adequate; [2] the defendant must not have had time to cool off
between the provocation and the slaying; [3] the provocation must
have actually impassioned the defendant; and [4] the defendant
must not have actually cooled off before the slaying." State v.
Mauricio, 117 N.J. 402, 411 (1990). The first two elements are
objective while the last two are subjective. Ibid.Here, clear evidence exists as to the elements of
passion/provocation manslaughter. The friend drove defendant and
co-defendant to the trailer park and they searched for the victim.
As they approached, the victim pulled out his gun before defendant
and co-defendant fired their weapons. We conclude that the victim
pulling out his gun first objectively constitutes adequate
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provocation and, under the circumstances of this case, inadequate
cooling-off time. Although defendant was predisposed to kill the
victim before arriving at the trailer park, the victim brandishing
his gun impassioned defendant's conduct. Such a sequencing of
events demonstrates defendant did not "cool[] off before the
slaying." Ibid. We therefore conclude it was plain error not to
include the charge.
II.
Defendant contends that the judge failed to sua sponte charge
self-defense. Defense counsel did not request a self-defense
charge. We therefore review this argument for plain error. R.
2:10-2; State v. O'Carroll, 385 N.J. Super. 211, 235 (App. Div.),
certif. denied, 188 N.J. 489 (2006).
"A person may justifiably use force against another if he
'reasonably believes that such force is immediately necessary for
the purpose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful
force by such other person on the present occasion.'" State v.
Galicia, 210 N.J. 364, 389 (2012) (quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4(a)).
"The use of deadly force is not justifiable . . . unless the actor
reasonably believes that such force is necessary to protect himself
against death or serious bodily harm[.]" N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4(b)(2).
Moreover, the use of deadly force is not justifiable if "[t]he
actor knows that he can avoid the necessity of using such force
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with complete safety by retreating . . . ." N.J.S.A. 2C:3-
4(b)(2)(b).
"A trial judge must sua sponte charge self-defense in the
absence of a request 'if there exists evidence in either the
State's or the defendant's case sufficient to provide a rational
basis for its applicability.'" Galicia, supra, 210 N.J. at 390
(quoting O'Carroll, supra, 385 N.J. Super. at 236). "The evidence
must 'clearly indicate[]' such a defense to call for such an
instruction in the absence of a request to charge." Id. at 390-
91 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Perry, 124 N.J. 128,
161 (1991)). Such is the case here.
As they approached the victim by car in the trailer park, the
victim pulled out his gun. The evidence shows that defendant, who
was not the driver and unable to himself drive away or retreat
from the scene, could reasonably have believed that force was
necessary to protect himself. There is therefore sufficient
evidence in the record, as clearly indicated by co-defendant's
testimony, providing a rational basis for the self-defense charge.
III.
Defendant contends that the judge committed plain error when
he used the term "and/or" in the jury instructions on accomplice
liability. Defense counsel did not object to the jury instruction;
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we review this contention for plain error. R. 2:10-2; O'Carroll,
supra, 385 N.J. Super. at 235.
In State v. Gonzalez, 444 N.J. Super. 62, 75-76 (App. Div.),
certif. denied, 226 N.J. 209 (2016),1 we found that the use of
"and/or" in accomplice liability jury instructions rendered the
instructions ambiguous. We explained that the "indictment
required that the jury decide whether defendant conspired in or
was an accomplice in the commission of a robbery, or an aggravated
assault, or both." Ibid.By joining (or disjoining) those
considerations with "and/or" the judge
conveyed to the jury that it could find
defendant guilty of either substantive offense
. . . but left open the possibility that some
jurors could have found defendant conspired
in or was an accomplice in the robbery but not
the assault, while other jurors could have
found he conspired in or was an accomplice in
the assault but not the robbery.
[Id. at 76.]
We further explained that because the jury was told that it could
find the defendant guilty of robbery "and/or" aggravated assault
if the State proved that co-defendant committed robbery "and/or"
1
In denying certification, the Court expressed that it "agrees
with the Appellate Division's conclusion that the use of 'and/or'
in the jury instruction in this case injected ambiguity into the
charge. The criticism of the use of 'and/or' is limited to the
circumstances in which it was used in this case." Gonzalez, supra,
226 N.J. at 209.
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aggravated assault, "the jury could have convicted defendant of
both robbery and aggravated assault even if it found [the co-
conspirator] committed only one of those offenses[.]" Ibid.
Here, the jury instruction on accomplice liability was
similar to the instruction in Gonzalez, repeatedly using the phrase
"murder and/or aggravated assault." We therefore conclude that
the judge committed plain error when he instructed the jury on
accomplice liability because it could have convicted defendant of
both murder and aggravated assault if it found co-defendant
committed only one of the offenses.
IV.
Finally, we agree with defendant that the judge abused his
discretion by excluding from evidence, as hearsay, testimony from
the friend that co-defendant had told the friend what to say in
the friend's statement to the police.
This court accords "substantial deference to a trial court's
evidentiary rulings." State v. Morton, 155 N.J. 383, 453 (1998),
cert. denied, 532 U.S. 931, 121 S. Ct. 1380, 149 L. Ed. 2d 306(2001). "[T]he decision of the trial court must stand unless it
can be shown that the trial court palpably abused its discretion,
that is, that its finding was so wide of the mark that a manifest
denial of justice resulted." State v. Goodman, 415 N.J. Super.
210, 224-25 (App. Div. 2010) (alteration in original) (quoting
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State v. Carter, 91 N.J. 86, 106 (1982)), certif. denied, 205 N.J.
78 (2011).
Hearsay is "a statement, other than one made by the declarant
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted." N.J.R.E. 801(c). "It
follows, therefore, that if evidence is not offered for the truth
of the matter asserted, the evidence is not hearsay and no
exception to the hearsay rule is necessary to introduce that
evidence at trial." State v. Long, 173 N.J. 138, 152 (2002).
"[I]f proffered evidence is hearsay, it can be admitted only
pursuant to one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule." Ibid.The friend testified that he was unsure whether defendant
fired a shot. The assistant prosecutor elicited testimony from
the friend that he had told the police that defendant had fired
one shot. On cross-examination, the friend admitted that co-
defendant had told him what to say to the police. The judge struck
from the record the friend's testimony about what co-defendant had
told him to say to the police.
Although the friend eventually admitted at trial that he was
unsure whether defendant possessed a gun, defense counsel did not
offer, for its truth, co-defendant's instructions to the friend
about what to tell the police. Rather, defense counsel attempted
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to impeach the credibility of the friend by showing that co-
defendant influenced the friend's statement to the police.
V.
Although we need not reach defendant's remaining contention
as to the sentence because we are reversing the convictions, we
make the following brief remarks.
Defendant, who was seventeen years old, received an aggregate
term of sixty years of imprisonment subject to the NERA, N.J.S.A.
2C:43-7.2(a). Unlike the fourteen-year-old defendant in Miller
v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407(2012), the judge did not sentence defendant to life imprisonment
without parole or its functional equivalent. Nevertheless, we
vacate the sentence and reverse the convictions.
Reversed and remanded for a new trial. We do not retain
jurisdiction.
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