STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. DARREN ELLIS (12-04-0584, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-5350-14T2
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
DARREN ELLIS,
Defendant-Appellant.
___________________________
Submitted September 20, 2017 – Decided October 19, 2017
Before Judges Simonelli and Haas.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Law Division, Bergen County,
Indictment No. 12-04-0584.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney
for appellant (Suzannah Brown, Designated
Counsel, on the brief).
Gurbir S. Grewal, Bergen County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Catherine A. Foddai,
Senior Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and
on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Darren Ellis appeals from the March 31, 2015 Law
Division order, which denied his petition for post-conviction
relief (PCR) without an evidentiary hearing. We affirm.
A grand jury indicted defendant and his three co-defendants
for first-degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6 and N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1
(counts one to five); (2) third-degree criminal restraint,
N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6 and N.J.S.A. 2C:13-2(a) (counts six to ten); (3)
second-degree theft of property in excess of $75,000, N.J.S.A.
2C:2-6 and N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3 (count eleven); (4) third-degree
possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6
and N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d) (count twelve); and (5) fourth-degree
unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6 and N.J.S.A.
2C:39-5(d) (count thirteen). Separately, the grand jury indicated
defendant for fourth-degree resisting arrest, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-
2(a)(2) (count nineteen); and third-degree resisting arrest,
N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a)(3)(a) (count twenty). The charges against
defendant stemmed from his involvement in the robbery of a jewelry
store. Defendant used a sledgehammer to smash a glass case
containing jewelry, with two female customers standing nearby, and
struck the glass case with such force that it broke the
sledgehammer.
Defendant pled guilty to one count of first-degree robbery
and one count of third-degree resisting arrest in exchange for the
State's agreement to recommend a twelve-year term of imprisonment
subject to the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2,
and to dismiss the remaining charges. Prior to entering his guilty
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plea, the plea judge stated there was a pending motion to dismiss
the indictment "on the basis that [the robbery] might not be a
first-degree, it might be a second[-]degree offense[.]" The judge
then warned defendant about the consequences of a guilty plea on
any motions as follows:
[PLEA JUDGE]: . . . motions, even though they
may have been filed, or could have been filed,
will not be heard by this [c]ourt, and you
can't complain about it. You can't come back
at a later date and say my attorney didn't
file this motion, you didn't do the right job,
you know, the [j]udge should have heard this
motion. You have to understand that while you
may have discussed these motions with your
attorney, they will not be heard. If they're
filed they will be withdrawn, and if they
weren't filed, they simply will not be heard.
There will be no decision. I want you to
understand this because sometimes later on
someone wakes up five or six years later and
says, you know, my attorney didn't do his job.
The bottom line is each of the attorneys have
done their job. They've gone over these
proofs. They've filed whatever applications
they have, and they're prepared to go today.
But as a result of your entering a guilty plea,
you're telling them you don't want to go any
further. Is that understood Mr. Ellis?
[DEFENDANT]: Yes, sir.
Defendant then entered his guilty plea. In his plea
allocution, he admitted that he entered the jewelry store with a
sledgehammer; two female customers were nearby when he used the
sledgehammer to break a glass case containing jewelry; and one of
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the female customers, M.M.,1 was put in fear of immediate bodily
injury when she saw the manner in which he used the sledgehammer.
Defendant also admitted that he left the store in an effort to
avoid being arrested by the police and attempted to avoid
apprehension when later stopped by the police. The following
colloquy then occurred between defendant and plea counsel about
motions:
[PLEA COUNSEL]: And consistent with the other
questions, Mr. Ellis, you had filed, prior to
my representation you had filed certain
motions that would have been heard by the
Court, correct?
[DEFENDANT]: Yes, sir.
[PLEA COUNSEL]: And included in those motions
was a motion to dismiss certain counts, and
with regard to different counts of the
indictment, correct?
[DEFENDANT]: Yes, sir.
[PLEA COUNSEL]: And do you acknowledge or
understand what [the plea judge] told you,
that this guilty plea will prevent those
motions from going forward, and they will not
be heard?
[DEFENDANT]: Yes, sir.
The plea judge found defendant entered the plea knowingly and
voluntarily and understood the charges against him and the
consequences of his plea.
1
We use initials for the victim to protect her privacy.
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Defendant was sentenced in accordance with the plea agreement
to a twelve-year term of imprisonment subject to NERA. Defendant
appealed his sentence. We heard the appeal on our Excessive
Sentence Oral Argument Calendar and affirmed. State v. Ellis, No.
A-1532-13 (App. Div. June 3, 2014).
Defendant then filed a PCR petition based on the ineffective
assistance of trial counsel. Defendant argued that trial counsel
should have requested a post-indictment probable cause hearing on
the weapons-based counts because he did not use the sledgehammer
as a deadly weapon, but rather, as a tool to break the glass case
containing the jewelry, and no reasonable person would believe he
or she was in fear of serious bodily harm.
The PCR judge adjourned to allow PCR counsel time to find
authority permitting a post-indictment probable cause challenge.
At the next hearing, PCR counsel cited to Rule 3:10-2 to argue
that trial counsel failed to file a post-indictment motion to
dismiss the weapons-based charges in the indictment based on
insufficient evidence presented to the grand jury. The PCR judge
noted that without the grand jury transcript, which PCR counsel
did not provide, he could not resolve this issue.
The PCR judge denied the petition without an evidentiary
hearing, concluding defendant failed to establish the two prongs
of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 104 S. Ct. 2052,
5 A-5350-14T2
2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693 (1984). The judge found that defendant
had no right to a post-indictment probable cause hearing, waived
his right to have pre-trial motions presented when he pled guilty,
and gave a sufficient factual basis to support the first-degree
robbery charge. This appeal followed.
On appeal, defendant raises the following contentions:
POINT I
THE MATTER SHOULD BE REMANDED FOR A
NEW PCR HEARING WITH NEW PCR COUNSEL
BECAUSE [DEFENDANT] RECEIVED
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF PCR
COUNSEL.
POINT II
THE PCR COURT ERRED IN DENYING
[DEFENDANT'S] CLAIM OF INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF [TRIAL] COUNSEL.
The mere raising of a claim for PCR does not entitle the
defendant to an evidentiary hearing. State v. Cummings, 321 N.J.
Super. 154, 170 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 162 N.J. 199 (1999).
Rather, trial courts should grant evidentiary hearings and make a
determination on the merits only if the defendant has presented a
prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, material
issues of disputed fact lie outside the record, and resolution of
those issues necessitates a hearing. R. 3:22-10(b); State v.
Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 355 (2013). To establish a prima facie
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant
6 A-5350-14T2
must satisfy two prongs. First, he must
demonstrate that counsel made errors so
serious that counsel was not functioning as
the counsel guaranteed the defendant by the
Sixth Amendment. An attorney's representation
is deficient when it [falls] below an
objective standard of reasonableness.
Second, a defendant must show that the
deficient performance prejudiced the defense.
A defendant will be prejudiced when counsel's
errors are sufficiently serious to deny him a
fair trial. The prejudice standard is met if
there is a reasonable probability that, but
for counsel's unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been
different. A reasonable probability simply
means a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome of the proceeding.
[State v. O'Neil, 219 N.J. 598, 611 (2014)
(citations omitted).]
To set aside a guilty plea based on ineffective assistance
of counsel, "a defendant must show that (i) counsel's assistance
was 'not within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in
criminal cases;' and (ii) 'that there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel's errors, [the defendant] would not have
pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.'" State
v. Nuñez-Valdéz, 200 N.J. 129, 138-39 (2009) (alteration in
original) (quoting State v. DiFrisco, 137 N.J. 434, 457 (1994)).
We review a judge's decision to deny a PCR petition without an
evidentiary hearing for abuse of discretion. See R. 3:22-10;
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State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 462 (1992). We discern no abuse
of discretion here.
Defendant failed to satisfy the two Strickland prongs with
respect to both trial and PCR counsel. At the plea hearing, the
plea judge advised defendant of a pending motion to dismiss the
indictment; defendant admitted that trial counsel had filed a pre-
trial motion to dismiss; and defendant acknowledged he understood
the consequences of a guilty plea on any motions. Even if trial
counsel did not file a motion to dismiss, the plea transcript
shows that defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right
with respect to any motions, regardless of whether they were filed
or not. Providing the grand jury transcript would not have changed
defendant's waiver.
Further, a motion to dismiss the indictment would have failed.
"An indictment is presumed valid and should only be dismissed if
it is 'manifestly deficient or palpably defective.'" State v.
Feliciano, 224 N.J. 351, 380 (2016) (quoting State v. Hogan, 144
N.J. 216, 229 (1996)). "A motion to dismiss is addressed to the
discretion of the trial court, and that discretion should not be
exercised except for 'the clearest and plainest ground[.]" Ibid.(citations omitted). "At the grand jury stage, the State is not
required to present enough evidence to sustain a conviction."
Ibid. (citation omitted). "As long as the State presents 'some
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evidence establishing each element of the crime to make out a
prima facie case,' a trial court should not dismiss an indictment."
Ibid. (quoting State v. Saavedra, 222 N.J. 39, 57 (2015)).
N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a)(2) provides, in pertinent part, that "[a]
person is guilty of robbery if, in the course of committing a
theft, he . . . [t]hreatens another with or purposely puts him in
fear of immediate bodily injury." "Robbery is a crime of the
. . . first-degree if in the course of committing the theft the
actor attempts to kill anyone, or purposely inflicts or attempts
to inflict serious bodily injury, or is armed with, or uses or
threatens the immediate use of a deadly weapon." N.J.S.A. 2C:15-
1(b) (emphasis added).
'Deadly weapon,' . . . is defined as 'any
firearm or other weapon, device, instrument,
material or substance, whether animate or
inanimate, which in the manner it is used or
intends to be used, is known to be capable of
producing death or serious bodily injury or
which in the manner it is fashioned would lead
the victim reasonably to believe it to be
capable of producing death or serious bodily
injury.'
[(State v. Rolon, 199 N.J. 575, 582 (2009)
(emphasis in original) (quoting N.J.S.A.
2C:11-1(c)).]
Here, there was "some evidence" that defendant was in the
course of committing a theft while armed with a deadly weapon,
which, in the manner it was used, would lead the victim to
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reasonably believe it was capable of serious bodily injury. The
indictment, therefore, would not have been dismissed.
Defendant's remaining argument, that PCR counsel violated
Rule 3:22-6(d) by failing to submit the grand jury transcript,
lacks sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion.
R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
Affirmed.
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