AMELIA MANYA EMILY ORT VS. ABRAHAM ORT (FM-15-0990-00, OCEAN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0909-17T2
AMELIA MANYA EMILY ORT,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
ABRAHAM ORT,
Defendant-Appellant.
__________________________
Argued February 13, 2019 – Decided March 11, 2019
Before Judges Koblitz, Currier and Mayer.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Ocean County, Docket
No. FM-15-0990-00.
David Perry Davis argued the cause for appellant.
John P. Paone, Jr. argued the cause for respondent (Law
Offices of Paone, Zaleski & Murray, attorneys; John P.
Paone, Jr., of counsel and on the brief; John P. Paone,
III, and Andrew J. Economos, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Abraham Ort appeals from a September 15, 2017 order denying
his motion seeking relief with regard to past-due support for his now-
emancipated children. The parties were married in 1977, had thirteen children
and divorced in 2003, agreeing to binding arbitration with regard to all financial
divorce issues. Defendant relocated without the children to Israel in 2007, after
the final arbitration decision was entered as a judgment.1 A child-support bench
warrant2 has been outstanding since 2008. Although defendant has
unsuccessfully litigated in New Jersey courts for many years without the
imposition of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine, 3 we do so now and dismiss
this appeal.
1
The three-member arbitration panel stated: "Defendant's (husband's) testimony
was not credible . . . . We have considered [d]efendant's efforts in subverting
our orders and believe it will continue."
2
The support was not collected by the Probation Division and the warrant was
thus issued by the court without probation involvement. See Pasqua v. Council,
186 N.J. 127, 141 n.2 (2006) (discussing child support enforcement procedures
utilized by the Probation Division).
3
Ort v. Ort, No. A-5406-12 (App. Div. Jan. 14, 2015); Ort v. Ort, No. A-1431-
07(App. Div. Apr. 28, 2009); Ort v. Ort, No. A-3535-06 (App. Div. June 17,
2008); Ort v. Ort, No. A-6140-02 (App. Div. May 13, 2005); Ort v. Ort, No. A-
3388-02 (App. Div. Dec. 16, 2003), certif. denied Ort v. Ort, 179 N.J. 311(2004); see also Ort v. Ort, 428 N.J. Super. 290 (Ch. Div. 2012) (emancipating
daughter at her request).
A-0909-17T2
2
In the litigation prior to the current motion, on May 31, 2013, when
defendant's child support arrears amounted to approximately $561,595, the
judge reduced the purge amount to $100,000, upon payment of which
defendant's arrest warrant would be vacated. The judge denied without
prejudice defendant's motion to reduce ongoing child support. The judge also
denied without prejudice plaintiff's motion to apply the fugitive disentitlement
doctrine. He noted that he had adjusted the purge figure significantly, and "[i]f
[defendant] doesn't pay the purge figure and he comes back to this [c]ourt again
asking for more relief and [plaintiff's counsel] re-raises the issue of the Fugitive
Act, this may be a case where it's applied, quite frankly."
Nonetheless, when defendant did file another motion before a different
judge, without having paid the purge amount, that doctrine was not specifically
invoked by the judge hearing the motion. Defendant filed a motion in March
2017 seeking (1) a final determination of his child support arrears; (2) the
emancipation of the minor children at age eighteen; (3) the removal of his
obligation to maintain life insurance; (4) an accounting from plaintiff of the
children's custodial accounts; (5) funding by plaintiff of the custodial accounts;
(6) an adjustment of defendant's child support obligation as of 2007, discharge
of the bench warrant for his arrest, and a judgment against plaintiff; (7) a
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judgment against plaintiff for more than $800,000 in favor of the Regina Ort
Trust; (8) plaintiff's case information statement; (9) a restraint on plaintiff from
dissipating assets; and (10) counsel fees.
On September 15, 2017, defendant remained in Jerusalem while his
motion was heard. At the request of a prior judge, the parties had previously
briefed the issue of the applicability of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine to
defendant. The court, while not expressly ruling on fugitive disentitlement,
stated:
I've read this entire file. . . . in view of everything I 've
read here, I don 't think there 's a single thing that I can
believe that [defendant] has ever said. . . . it 's one of the
most amazing cases I 've ever seen. Why [defendant]
was not prosecuted for criminal contempt of court is
probably because it 's so hard to do.
....
[O]ne thing that is very troubling to the [c]ourt is that
[] defendant continues to be in open contempt of the
court. This file is replete with every judge that has
touched this finding that he is in contempt of court, that
-- that he has intentionally thwarted the [c]ourt 's
attempts to get the children their rightful support from
their father, who apparently had certain assets at his
disposal. There were real estate assets that he had an
interest in with his brother. He was receiving rents. All
these things. There 's a long history that I 'm not going
to relitigate.
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But ultimately, a warrant was issued for his arrest. And
the judge . . . entered a $100,000 purge amount. [The
judge], apparently, did that . . . believing that the
defendant had the ability to pay that amount, and he has
not. He has not attempted to. He did not appeal it. He
has made no application except for the most recent one
now years later to set that aside. I am not going to set
that aside. The warrant will remain. The purge amount
will remain at $100,000.
....
I'm also finding that because there 's been such bad faith
and unclean hands, that the defendant, in any further
application, pay that purge amount and appear before
the [c]ourt to answer questions as to why he has not
lived up to the obligations that he 's been previously
ordered to do. . . .
I have accepted the accounting provided by the plaintiff
that from what has already been entered as arrears there
has been an additional $102,767.17 accumulated in
arrears to the end of his obligation.
The court issued an order denying defendant 's motion and granting
plaintiff 's cross-application, writing:
Defendant comes to the [c]ourt with unclean hands. He
is also subject to a [b]ench [w]arrant with a purge
amount of $100,000[] since June 13, 2013. Much of
[d]efendant 's application is an attempt to re-litigate
issues which have been long decided. The [c]ourt will
not entertain any further application by [defendant]
until such time as [d]efendant posts with the [c]ourt the
$100,000[] purge amount.
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The order granted plaintiff $10,000 in counsel fees. The order also provided
defendant relief, stating: "All of the remaining children of the marriage are
hereby emancipated and [defendant] shall have no further child support
obligation."
Defendant argues that plaintiff behaved fraudulently with regard to New
York properties and a charitable trust founded during the marriage, that the
children were well-supported by income from various marital assets, and that he
was unable to contribute to their support because his work as an unsalaried rabbi
in Israel prevented him from doing so. He further argues that because all of the
children are emancipated, child support arrears should be viewed as any other
debt and the warrant vacated. We make no assessment of the merits of these
issues.
Justice Virginia Long, writing for our Supreme Court, set forth the criteria
for invoking the discretionary fugitive disentitlement doctrine:
the party against whom the doctrine is to be invoked
must be a fugitive in a civil or criminal proceeding; his
or her fugitive status must have a significant connection
to the issue with respect to which the doctrine is sought
to be invoked; invocation of the doctrine must be
necessary to enforce the judgment of the court or to
avoid prejudice to the other party caused by the
adversary's fugitive status; and invocation of the
doctrine cannot be an excessive response.
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[Matsumoto v. Matsumoto, 171 N.J. 110, 129 (2002).]
Defendant has been litigating his obligations determined by the agreed-
upon arbitration from afar since it was first concluded. New Jersey courts have
entertained his applications. Plaintiff has had to retain counsel to oppose them.
Although provided relief through the reduction of the purge amount in 2013,
defendant still has not subjected himself to the New Jersey courts. New Jersey
has a rational system of adjudicating family disputes. We do not have debtors'
prisons. See State v. Townsend, 222 N.J. Super. 273, 277 (App. Div. 1988)
("The Fourteenth Amendment precludes a state court from automatically
revoking probation and imposing a prison term for nonpayment of restitution.") .
If defendant believes his arguments are valid, let him come to New Jersey and
demonstrate the soundness of his reasoning. A litigant cannot use our system to
his advantage without risking the ramifications of defeat. As we said in Matison
v. Lisnyansky, 443 N.J. Super. 549, 552 (App. Div. 2016), "[w]e decline to
afford [defendant] the protection of the court while he flaunts the court's
authority from overseas."
Dismissed.
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