STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. HOWARD C. WOODS, JR. (10-12-1299, 11-03-0326, 11-05-0630 AND 11-05-0631, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1574-17T1
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
HOWARD C. WOODS, JR., a/k/a
HOWARD C. BRYANT, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
_____________________________
Submitted September 10, 2019 – Decided September 17, 2019
Before Judges Accurso and Gilson.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Union County, Indictment Nos. 10-12-1299
and 11-03-0326, and Accusation Nos. 11-05-0630 and
11-05-0631.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Monique D. Moyse, Designated Counsel, on
the brief).
Lyndsay V. Ruotolo, Acting Union County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Carlos P. Morrow, Special
Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor,
of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Howard Woods, Jr. appeals from a July 28, 2017 order denying
his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) after an evidentiary hearing. We
affirm.
I.
In 2010 and 2011, defendant was charged under two indictments and two
accusations with numerous crimes. In May 2011, defendant pled guilty to
second-degree eluding, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(b); two counts of second-degree
aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(6); two counts of third-degree
distribution of cocaine within 1000 feet of school property, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7(a);
third-degree possession of heroin with intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35 -
5(a)(1); and various motor vehicle violations. On April 5, 2012, he was
sentenced to an aggregate prison term of thirteen years, with over eight years of
parole ineligibility as prescribed by the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A.
2C:43-7.2. No direct appeal was filed.
Two years later, in April 2014, defendant filed a PCR petition claiming he
directed his trial counsel to file a direct appeal and his trial counsel was
ineffective in other ways. Defendant was assigned PCR counsel and, in 2015,
the PCR court denied his petition after hearing oral argument, but without an
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evidentiary hearing. That initial order was entered on March 20, 2015, together
with a written opinion.
Defendant appealed and we reversed the March 20, 2015 order and
remanded the matter for an evidentiary hearing to address defendant's claim that
he had requested his trial counsel to file a direct appeal. We also stated that if
the petition was denied after the evidentiary hearing, defendant could appeal that
order, as well as the "other PCR issues" defendant had raised in his initial appeal.
State v. Woods, No. A-4716-14 (Mar. 21, 2017) (slip op. at 9.).
On July 28, 2017, the PCR court held an evidentiary hearing. At that
hearing, trial counsel and defendant testified. Defendant testified that he
directed his trial counsel to file a direct appeal and she said she would. Trial
counsel, in contrast, testified that she recalled defendant's case and was
confident that he did not ask her to file a direct appeal. The PCR court found
trial counsel's testimony to be credible and denied defendant's PCR petition.
The court explained the reasons for its decision on the record and on the same
day entered an order denying the petition. Defendant now appeals from the
order entered on July 28, 2017. 1
1
The July 28, 2017 order references one of the indictments, but not the other
indictment or the two accusations. As defendant and the State have both treated
A-1574-17T1
3
On this appeal, defendant makes two arguments, which he articulates as
follows:
POINT ONE – MR. WOODS IS ENTITLED TO
RELIEF ON HIS CLAIM THAT COUNSEL FAILED
TO FILE A NOTICE OF APPEAL.
POINT TWO – MR. WOODS I[S] ENTITLED TO AN
EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON HIS CLAIM THAT
COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE BECAUSE
[COUNSEL] DID NOT EXPLAIN TO THE
DEFENDANT THE LAW UNDERLYING THE
CHARGES OR THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE
PLEA AGREEMENT, RENDERING THE PLEAS
INVALID.
We are not persuaded by either of these arguments.
II.
To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must
satisfy the two-prong test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
687 (1984), and adopted by our Supreme Court in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42,
57-58 (1987). Under that test, a defendant must prove (1) "counsel made errors
so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the
defendant by the Sixth Amendment," and (2) "the deficient performance
the order as addressing both indictments and the accusations, we also deem the
order as covering defendant's PCR petition as it related to all of the crimes to
which he plead guilty under Indictment Nos. 10-12-1299 and 11-03-0326 and
Accusation Nos. 11-05-0630 and 11-05-0631.
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prejudiced the defense." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; see also Fritz, 105 N.J. at
58.
If a defendant instructs his counsel to file an appeal, and counsel fails to
file the appeal, that failure is ineffective assistance. Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528
U.S. 470, 477 (2000). Moreover, the failure to file the appeal creates a
presumption of prejudice. Id. at 484. "As a result, 'when counsel's
constitutionally deficient performance deprives a defendant of an appeal that he
otherwise would have taken, the defendant has made out a successful ineffective
assistance of counsel claim entitling him to an appeal.'" State v. Carson, 227
N.J. 353, 354 (2006) (quoting Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 484). Furthermore, "a
defendant who has requested an appeal is not required to show he 'might have
prevailed' in his forfeited appeal." State v. Jones, 446 N.J. Super. 28, 33 (App.
Div. 2016) (quoting Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 484).
A.
Following our remand of this matter, the PCR court conducted an
evidentiary hearing on defendant's claim that his trial counsel did not follow his
direction to file a direct appeal. We use a deferential standard of review on an
appeal of a denial of a PCR petition following an evidentiary hearing. Pierre,
223 N.J. at 576 (quoting State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 540 (2013)). The factual
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5
findings made by a PCR court following an evidentiary hearing will be accepted
if they are based on "sufficient credible evidence in the record." Ibid. (quoting
Nash, 212 N.J. at 540). In contrast, interpretations of the law "are reviewed de
novo." Id. at 576-77 (quoting Nash, 212 N.J. at 540-41).
Here, we reject defendant's first argument because of the factual findings
and credibility findings made by the PCR court. After conducting an evidentiary
hearing, the PCR court found trial counsel to be credible when she testified that
she was confident defendant did not request her to file a direct appeal. That
finding is supported by substantial credible evidence. We discern no basis for
rejecting that credibility finding and the finding of fact underlying it; that is, that
defendant did not request his trial counsel to file a direct appeal. We note
moreover, that defendant has not claimed that he was not aware of his right to
file an appeal. Thus, this is not a situation where counsel or the trial court failed
to inform defendant of his right to appeal.
B.
A PCR court should grant evidentiary hearings only if a defendant has
presented a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. State v.
Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 462-63 (1992). To do so, defendant "must allege facts
sufficient to demonstrate counsel's alleged substandard performance[,]" State v.
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Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 170 (App. Div. 1999), and "must demonstrate
a reasonable likelihood that his or her claim will ultimately succeed on the
merits." State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 158 (1997) (citing Preciose, 129 N.J. at
463). Moreover, "[i]f the court perceives that holding an evidentiary hearing
will not aid the court's analysis of whether the defendant is entitled to post -
conviction relief, . . . or that the defendant's allegations are too vague,
conclusory, or speculative to warrant an evidentiary hearing, . . . then an
evidentiary hearing need not be granted." Ibid. (citations omitted); see also R.
3:22-10(e).
"[W]here the [PCR] court does not hold an evidentiary hearing, we may
exercise de novo review over the factual inferences the trial court has drawn
from the documentary record." State v. O'Donnell, 435 N.J. Super. 351, 373
(App. Div. 2014) (citing State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 420-21 (2004)). Thus, if
warranted, we may "conduct a de novo review of both the factual finding s and
legal conclusions of the PCR court." Harris, 181 N.J. at 419. Having reviewed
the record de novo, we discern no basis to require an evidentiary hearing on
defendant's additional claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
In his initial petition and the supplemental papers, defendant asserted that
his trial counsel was ineffective in not fully explaining the law regarding the
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charges against defendant or the consequences of his guilty pleas. In that regard,
defendant claimed that he did not understand (1) that a conviction for aggravated
assault under N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(6) does not require a showing of serious
bodily injury, as compared to proof of bodily injury; (2) the amount of drugs,
that is, the weight and quantity, necessary to support his third-degree drug-
related convictions; (3) the application of NERA; or (4) his exposure to an
extended term for his drug convictions. All of those contentions were made in
a general manner and without specific factual support.
Moreover, defendant's bald assertions are rebutted by the record. At his
plea hearing, defendant acknowledged he understood the charges against him
and the recommended sentences. The judge taking the pleas reviewed with
defendant the plea agreements that defendant had signed. Defendant confirmed
that he had reviewed all four plea agreements, understood each of the crimes to
which he was pleading guilty, and understood the recommended sentences,
including NERA and that he faced periods of parole ineligibility. Defendant
also testified that he had reviewed the plea agreements with his plea counsel and
counsel had answered all his questions. In pleading guilty, defendant admitted
to the facts establishing the basis for the charges of eluding, aggravated assault,
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distribution of cocaine within 1000 feet of school property, and possession of
heroin with intent to distribute.
Affirmed.
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