IN THE MATTER OF RAMON CAMILO, ETC. (NEW JERSEY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
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SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4150-17T1
IN THE MATTER OF RAMON
CAMILO, POLICE OFFICER
(S9999R), CITY OF JERSEY CITY.
_______________________________
Argued October 2, 2019 - Decided November 26, 2019
Before Judges Ostrer and Susswein.
On appeal from the New Jersey Civil Service
Commission, Docket No. 2017-1441.
Robert K. Chewning argued the cause for appellant
Ramon Camilo (Mc Laughlin & Nardi, LLC, attorneys;
Maurice W. Mc Laughlin and Robert K. Chewning, on
the briefs).
Chaunelle Christine Robinson, Assistant Corporation
Counsel, argued the cause for respondent City of Jersey
City (Peter J. Baker, Corporation Counsel, attorney;
Chaunelle Christine Robinson and Scott William
Carbone, Assistant Corporation Counsel, on the brief).
Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for
respondent Civil Service Commission (Pamela N.
Ullman, Deputy Attorney General, on the statement in
lieu of brief).
PER CURIAM
Petitioner, Ramon Camilo, appeals from a final agency decision of the
Civil Service Commission (Commission) upholding his removal from a list of
persons eligible for the position of Jersey City police officer. That decision was
based on petitioner's "unsatisfactory background for the subject title." In view
of the deferential standard of review that applies to this appeal, we affirm the
Commission's decision.
Petitioner applied for employment as a police officer in Jersey City and
was ranked on the list of eligible candidates. Jersey City requested that the
Commission remove petitioner's name from the list based on past incidents
detailed in a background investigation report. The Commission acceded to the
municipality's request. Petitioner pursued an administrative appeal to the
Commission, which upheld the decision to remove petitioner's name.1 Petitioner
appeals to us from that final agency decision.
1
Petitioner contends for the first time in this appeal that the Commission should
have referred the matter to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL) for a hearing
before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). We reject petitioner’s untimely
request. Even if he had made a timely request to the Commission, that request
would have been denied absent a demonstration that a “material and controlling
dispute of fact exists that can only be resolved by a hearing.” N.J.A.C. 4A:2-
1.1(d). An evidentiary hearing before an ALJ was not necessary to resolve
disputed facts. Rather, this case turns on a subjective evaluation of the weight
to be given to historical facts that petitioner does not dispute.
A-4150-17T1
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We begin our analysis by acknowledging the legal principles governing
this appeal, including the standard of review that applies. A final decision by
the Commission cannot be overturned on appeal unless it is affirmatively shown
to be arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or unless it is not supported by
substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole. Karins v. City of Atl.
City, 152 N.J. 532, 540 (1998); P.F. v. N.J. Div. of Developmental Disabilities,
139 N.J. 522, 529–30 (1995). Courts presume agency actions are valid and
reasonable, and the burden is on petitioner to overcome those presumptions.
Bergen Pines Cty. Hosp. v. N.J. Dep't of Human Servs., 96 N.J. 456, 477 (1984).
We must affirm the decision if the evidence in the record supports it, even if we
might have reached a different result in evaluating the evidence. Campbell v.
N.J. Racing Comm'n, 169 N.J. 579, 587 (2001) (citing Clowes v. Terminix Int'l,
Inc., 109 N.J. 575, 588 (1988)).
Under the arbitrary and capricious standard, the scope of judicial review
is restricted. Generally,
courts can intervene only in those rare circumstances in
which an agency action is clearly inconsistent with its
statutory mission or other state policy. Although
sometimes phrased in terms of a search for arbitrary or
unreasonable action, the judicial role is generally
restricted to three inquiries: (1) whether the agency's
action violates express or implied legislative policies,
that is, did the agency follow the law; (2) whether the
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record contains substantial evidence to support the
findings on which the agency bases its action; and (3)
whether, in applying the legislative policies to the facts,
the agency clearly erred in reaching a conclusion that
could not reasonably have been made on a showing of
the relevant factors.
[In re Musick, 143 N.J. 206, 216 (1996) (citing
Campbell v. Dep't of Civil Serv., 39 N.J. 556, 562
(1963))].
The Commission is authorized to remove an individual from an eligible
list based on his or her background and its adverse relationship to the nature of
the position. See N.J.A.C. 4A:4-4.7(a)(1) (permitting removal of an eligible
[candidate] "from an eligible list for any of the . . . causes for disqualification
listed in N.J.A.C. 4A:4-6.1"); N.J.A.C. 4A:4-6.1(a)(9) (permitting the denial of
a person from examination eligibility or appointment for a sufficient reason). It
is a long-established policy of this State, moreover, that municipal police
officers are held to a high standard of integrity and public trust and confidence.
As we stated in Moorestown v. Armstrong,
[i]t must be recognized that a police officer is a special
kind of public employee. His primary duty is to enforce
and uphold the law. He carries a service revolver on
his person and is constantly called upon to exercise tact,
restraint and good judgment in his relationship with the
public. He represents law and order to the citizenry and
must present an image of personal integrity and
dependability in order to have the respect of the public.
A-4150-17T1
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[89 N.J. Super. 560, 566 (App. Div. 1965).]
We next briefly summarize the series of relevant incidents and
circumstances in petitioner's background that are documented in the record. In
2007, petitioner failed to appear in court to answer charges for failing to exhibit
documents to a police officer in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:3-29, and he was
arrested pursuant to the warrant that was issued when he did not appear. He was
eventually convicted of that offense. His driving record further shows that he
was involved in three separate motor vehicle accidents occurring in 2005, 2007,
and 2013. His driver's license was suspended from July to August 2007.
In 2010, a court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) pursuant to
the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (PDVA) based on three separate police
reports alleging harassment and terroristic threats. The court eventually vacated
the TRO, and the court did not issue a final restraining order.
In May 2012, petitioner was convicted and fined for urinating in public.
The Commission considered, and ultimately rejected, petitioner's arguments that
attempted to explain and mitigate the negative incidents in his history.
Petitioner argued that these incidents were youthful indiscretions, and he learned
from these mistakes and has since matured. He argued that he has paid his debt
to society for his municipal court convictions, which were resolved by paying
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fines. He noted that the court vacated the TRO and that his driving privileges
were restored and are currently in good standing. He also argued that his service
as an EMT shows that he can safely operate an emergency vehicle.
The Commission found that petitioner was an adult at the time of these
incidents and concluded that not enough time has elapsed to show that he has
been rehabilitated. The Commission further concluded that petitioner's driving
record shows a lack of respect for the laws of this State. Based on his arrest
record and motor vehicle history, the Commission denied his administrative
appeal and upheld the decision to remove his name from the eligible list. 2
As we have already noted, we are constrained by the governing principles
of law to affirm a final agency decision even if we were to question that decision
and might have reached a different result. Campbell, 169 N.J. at 587 (citing
Clowes, 109 N.J. at 588). We are precluded, in other words, from substituting
our own judgment in place of the agency's judgment. In re Stallworth, 208 N.J.
182, 194 (2011) (citing In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 483 (2007)). The record
before us shows that the Commission duly considered the substantial credible
evidence regarding petitioner's past conduct with respect to his arrest and
2
Jersey City also relied on other aspects of petitioner's background, upon which
the Commission did not rely. Therefore, we do not address them.
A-4150-17T1
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driving history. In doing so, the Commission also considered and responded to
petitioner's arguments. In these circumstances, petitioner has failed to show that
the Commission's decision is not supported by sufficient credible evidence in
the record or otherwise is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.
Affirmed.
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