THE PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA VS. ANTHONY B. PUE (L-2084-14, MERCER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0580-18T1
THE PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE
COMPANY OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
ANTHONY B. PUE, individually and
as natural guardian of CAMERON
PUE, a minor, CAMERON PUE,
and ALEXIS PUE,
Defendants-Appellants.
_______________________________
Submitted November 19, 2019 - Decided December 9, 2019
Before Judges Fisher and Accurso.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Mercer County, Docket No. L-2084-14.
Anthony B. Pue, appellant pro se.
Respondent has not filed a brief.
PER CURIAM
This is an interpleader action by Prudential Insurance Company over
group life benefits provided to its insured, State employee Kathy Pue. While
Pue was an active employee, her husband and two children were listed as the
beneficiaries of her group life insurance policy. When she applied for a
disability retirement on June 20, 2013, she made her husband, defendant
Anthony Pue, the sole beneficiary. A week later, however, she submitted
another beneficiary designation making defendant and their son joint
beneficiaries.
After her death the following year, defendant objected to sharing the
death benefit with his minor son. When defendant failed to provide documents
in support of his claim, Prudential paid one half of the death benefit,
$36,927.84, to him and advised him of the documents necessary to process
payment of the remainder to his minor son.
Defendant renewed his objection to sharing the benefit with his son,
claiming his wife was incompetent when she last changed the beneficiary
form. Prudential's medical director reviewed the decedent's medical records
and determined she may well not have been competent at the time she last
changed the beneficiary designation in June 2013. That determination,
however, also called into question whether she was competent the week before
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when she applied for a disability retirement and designated defendant her sole
beneficiary. Prudential thereafter advised defendant it considered both June
2013 beneficiary designations to be invalid, and would, instead, rely on the
prior designation, which divided the benefit equally among defendant and the
couple's two children. In light of its decision, the company sought
reimbursement of $12,309.28 of the sum previously paid to defendant.
Defendant thereafter advised Prudential for the first time that he actually
submitted his wife's disability retirement application as her attorney-in-fact.
When Prudential could not confirm that the June 20, 2013 designation was
submitted via a power of attorney or that defendant had a power of attorney
granting him the authority to change the beneficiary designation to himself, it
filed this action, depositing the remaining $36,927.84 due on the policy into
court.
The court appointed a guardian ad litem for defendant's minor son, who
filed a report with the court recommending that counsel be appointed for the
minor. The court thereafter appointed counsel for defendant's son in
September 2015. Although defendant failed to include that order in his
appendix, the record makes clear the order provided for payment of fees from
the proceeds of the policy on deposit with the court. Defendant thereafter
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aggressively litigated the matter, including taking an interlocutory appeal on a
procedural issue, which is not relevant here.
When defendant's son turned eighteen in December 2017, his counsel
moved to be relieved and applied for an award of fees in accordance with the
order appointing him. Defendant objected, claiming this court reversed the
order appointing counsel for his son on defendant's interlocutory appeal. Upon
review of counsel's certification of services, the judge awarded fees of $10,875
from the $36,927.84 it had permitted Prudential to deposit with the court.
Defendant thereafter renewed an earlier motion to have the remaining
funds released to him, which was opposed by both his children. On the return
date, the court again explained to defendant that this court did not overturn the
order appointing counsel for his son. She also noted the counsel fee awarded
was reasonable and less than the amount counsel had requested. Defendant
thereafter agreed to settle the case with his children by dividing the $26,052.84
remaining, with each child receiving $10,000 and defendant receiving
$6,052.84. The court entered an order directing distribution among counsel,
defendant and his children accordingly.
Defendant thereafter filed a motion "to stay proceeding for attorney's
fees," claiming, again erroneously, that the order appointing counsel had been
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reversed by this court. He also argued he was not provided an adequate
opportunity to object to the amount of the fees. The court denied the motion
as moot, as the fees had already been disbursed.
On appeal, defendant argues that Prudential should have respected the
power of attorney and awarded his wife's entire death benefit to him. He seeks
reversal of the order permitting Prudential to deposit the policy proceeds into
court, relieving it of any further liability and a remand to permit him to recover
his "damages." He raises the following issues:
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING
VERIFIED COMPLAINT TO PLAINTIFF
BECAUSE PLAINTIFF BREACHED THEIR
DUTY OF CARE TO DEFENDANT WHO WAS
THE "POWER OF ATTORNEY" AT THE TIME
DEFENDANT MADE THE CHANGE OF
BENEFICIARIES.
II. EVEN IF MY PLAINTIFF WAS UNAWARE OF
THE CHANGE OF BENEFICIARIES CHANGE
AND THE VALIDITY OF KATHY PUE
HEALTH, WHAT PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE
SHOULD HAVE DONE IS HONOR AND
RESPECT THE DEFENDANT POWER OF
ATTORNEY.
CONCLUSION:
DEFENDANT THEREFORE RESPECTFULLY
ASK THIS COURT TO REVERSE THE TRIAL
COURT'S ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT TO PLAINTIFF, HOLD THAT THE
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DEFENDANT IS THE POWER OF ATTORNEY
IN THIS MATTER WHO IS OWED A DUTY OF
CARE, AND REMAND THE MATTER FOR A
TRIAL ON THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES.
ALTERNATIVELY, EVEN IF THIS COURT
UPHOLDS THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION
THAT DEFENDANTS IS RESPONSIBLE FOR
ATTORNEY FEES, THIS COURT SHOULD
ADOPT THE FACT THAT THE DEFENDANT
WAS EXERCISING HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE
POWER OF ATTORNEY AT THE TIME OF THE
BENEFICIARIES CHANGE, AND ALSO
EXERCISING HIS RIGHTS IN ACCORDANCE
TO N.J.S.A. 46:2B-8.3, DOCTRINE AND
REMAND THE MATTER FOR A TRIAL SO
THAT DEFENDANT CAN BE COMPENSATED
FOR HIS LOSSES.
Having reviewed the record, we reject defendant's arguments, to the
extent we understand them, as entirely without merit, not warranting
discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). Defendant limited his
appeal to three orders entered in 2018: awarding fees to court appointed
counsel for the minor; distributing the sums on deposit with the court; and
denying his request to stay. None of those orders implicates Prudential's
decision to reject the beneficiary designations filed in June 2013.
Defendant makes no argument that the order appointing counsel for his
minor son was improper or that counsel failed to render the services the court
found necessary. Absent any argument from defendant that appointment of
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counsel was an abuse of discretion or the fees unwarranted, we decline to
address the issue. See 700 Highway 33 LLC v. Pollio, 421 N.J. Super. 231,
238 (App. Div. 2011) (noting the requirement that parties make "an adequate
legal argument" in support of their claims).
Affirmed.
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