STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. GUILERMO SANTAMARIA (10-10-1436, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED)

RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2012-12T3
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
GUILERMO SANTAMARIA, a/k/a WILLIAM
SANTAMARIA, GHILERMO SANTAMARIA,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________________
Argued February 3, 2016 – Decided June 30, 2017
Before Judges Fuentes, Kennedy and Gilson.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County,
Indictment No. 10-10-1436.
Frank J. Pugliese, Assistant Deputy Public
Defender, argued the cause for appellant
(Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney;
Mr. Pugliese, of counsel and on the brief).
Nancy A. Hulett, Assistant Prosecutor, argued
the cause for respondent (Andrew C. Carey,
Middlesex County Prosecutor, attorney; Ms.
Hulett, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
On October 1, 2010, a Middlesex County grand jury returned
Indictment No. 10-10-1436, charging defendant, formerly a middle
school science teacher, with various counts of sexual assault and
misconduct in office, based upon his alleged sexual encounters
with a student between 1997 and 2002. Following a jury trial, he
was found guilty of first-degree aggravated sexual assault,
N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a), (count one), two counts of second-degree
sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(c), (counts two and three), and
two counts of second-degree official misconduct, N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2
(counts four and five). Defendant was sentenced to an aggregate
prison term of twenty years with approximately five years and
eleven months of parole ineligibility. Defendant now appeals.
For reasons set forth hereinafter, we reverse and dismiss one
of the official misconduct counts (count four), and, further, we
reverse the remainder of defendant's convictions and remand for a
new trial.
I.
The following facts are gleaned from the testimony elicited
at trial. We note at the outset that the events that formed the
basis of the charges against defendant are alleged to have occurred
between September 1, 1997, and July 4, 2004, and that the
indictment itself was handed up by the grand jury on October 1,
2010. Further, the trial record itself is devoid of any
substantive physical evidence, including text messages, DNA
evidence, or any admissions from defendant. The State's case was
2 A-2012-12T3
based primarily on the testimony of H.B., who, at the time of
trial, was twenty-seven years of age.1
In September 1997, defendant was a science teacher at a middle
school, when he met H.B., an eighth-grade student. At that time,
H.B., who was born in July 1984, was thirteen years old, and
defendant was forty-three years old. That same year, after H.B.
gave defendant a picture of herself with her phone number written
on the back, the two began speaking on the telephone "once or a
few times a week."
In the spring of 1998, H.B. joined defendant's after-school
Greek and Latin club, and H.B. and defendant began conversing
through internet chatrooms. Defendant also told H.B. around that
time that he "like[d] [her] more than just a friend." At no point
before or after H.B.'s involvement with the Greek and Latin club,
was she ever enrolled in a class he taught.
H.B. graduated from eighth grade in the spring of 1998. That
summer, defendant regularly saw H.B. outside of school. Shortly
after H.B.'s eighth grade graduation, but prior to H.B.'s
fourteenth birthday, H.B. and defendant kissed for the first time.
Around the same time, their telephone conversations became more
"intimate," and H.B. testified that she and defendant would
1
To protect privacy interests, we use initials to identify the
victim and witnesses.
3 A-2012-12T3
masturbate while on the phone. Shortly after H.B.'s fourteenth
birthday on July 5, 1998, she and defendant had sexual intercourse
for the first time. According to H.B., that encounter occurred
off school property in a park.
In September 1998, H.B. entered high school, and their
relationship continued. H.B. testified that she knew defendant
was married and that he was dating two other women, R.M. and M.E.
R.M. was also a middle school teacher in the district, while M.E.,
who lived in California, maintained an online relationship with
defendant.
In January 1999, M.E.'s husband discovered information on
their family computer that referenced defendant and H.B. He
contacted New Jersey police to inform them of defendant's apparent
"cyber-relationship" with his wife and defendant's connection with
H.B. However, he called the police again the following day
recanting his previous statement.
H.B. and defendant continued their relationship throughout
H.B.'s four years of high school. They spoke nearly every day and
saw each other at least three times per week. They kept their
relationship a secret because defendant told H.B. "people would
not understand [it]." According to H.B., they maintained a
"dominance and submissive relationship," where defendant was the
4 A-2012-12T3
dominant partner and she was the submissive partner, and she would
perform whatever sexual acts defendant requested.
In September 2001, R.M. accessed defendant's e-mail account
without permission, and she discovered a picture of H.B. wearing
a bathing suit top while seated in defendant's car. She confronted
defendant about the picture and, further, notified the police and
the Division of Youth and Family Services (DYFS)2 about her
suspicions that defendant and H.B. were having an "illicit"
relationship. R.M. also spoke with H.B., who denied any type of
relationship with defendant. DYFS contacted school officials,
defendant, and H.B.; however, both H.B. and defendant denied any
type of relationship. DYFS classified R.M.'s referral as
"unsubstantiated."3
In the spring of 2002, H.B. graduated from high school. She
turned eighteen in early July 2002, and in August 2002, she left
New Jersey to attend an out-of-state university. H.B. testified
that she and defendant planned to continue their relationship
while H.B. was at college, and to eventually marry and start a
family.
2
Effective June 29, 2012, DYFS was renamed the Division of Child
Protection and Permanency (DCPP). N.J.S.A. 9:3A-10.
3
We do not comment on the admissibility of this evidence, as it
was neither briefed nor argued by the parties.
5 A-2012-12T3
In the winter of 2002, however, while at college, H.B. began
dating a fellow college student. Around the same time, H.B.'s
parents received a letter from DYFS regarding R.M.'s prior
allegations. H.B.'s parents also saw e-mails from defendant when
H.B. was home during college winter break. Nevertheless, when
confronted, H.B. denied any relationship with defendant.
H.B. and defendant's relationship was "on and off" during
H.B.'s freshman and sophomore years. H.B. testified that on one
occasion, while on college recess, she returned to her former
middle school to visit her old teachers, including defendant. H.B.
recalled performing oral sex on defendant inside a room adjoining
defendant's classroom.
Thereafter, their relationship deteriorated. In the summer
of 2006, after H.B. had graduated from college, defendant sent
H.B. an e-mail ending their relationship. Almost three years
later, in the spring of 2009, H.B. told her family about her
relationship with defendant. H.B.'s mother contacted the police
and Investigator Michael Daniewicz of the Middlesex Prosecutor's
Office called H.B. H.B. declined to pursue the matter at that
time. However, H.B. had her sister contact Daniewicz a year later,
in the spring of 2010. At that time, H.B. gave a statement and
agreed to help prosecute defendant.
6 A-2012-12T3
Daniewicz obtained a 4C intercept, which authorized him to
record conversations between H.B. and defendant. H.B. called
defendant and left him several voice messages on May 17, 2010, and
May 18, 2010. Defendant returned H.B.'s calls on May 18, 2010,
and they agreed to meet for dinner that night. Daniewicz obtained
another 4C intercept and equipped H.B. with a body wire to wear
during the dinner.
During the course of his investigation, Daniewicz interviewed
H.B.'s parents; defendant's co-worker, C.G.; R.M.; M.E.; M.E.'s
husband; and defendant's ex-wife, B.S. C.G. recalled that
defendant told him that he was in a relationship with H.B. while
she was in college.
B.S., through her lawyer, provided Daniewicz with a compact
disc (CD) containing seventy-one photographs of H.B. and defendant
that she had discovered in her backyard in 2002. At trial, the
State admitted more than forty of these photographs into evidence
and presented them to the jury during B.S.'s direct examination.
All of those photographs were taken after H.B.'s eighteenth
birthday. The same photographs, along with several additional
photos, were again presented to the jury during H.B.'s testimony.4
4
The record is not clear as to exactly how many photographs were
admitted at trial. However, it is clear that more than fifty
photographs were admitted into evidence and presented to the jury,
with at least ten of those photographs shown twice.
7 A-2012-12T3
The photographs depicted H.B. naked and engaged in various sexual
acts with defendant inside defendant's marital home. Based on the
appearance of an air conditioner and a remodeled shower in the
pictures, B.S. estimated that the photographs were taken in late
July 2002. H.B. agreed that the photographs were taken after her
eighteenth birthday, but before she left for college in August
2002.
II.
Defendant now appeals his conviction and argues as follows:
POINT I
THE PHOTOGRAPHS DEPICTING DEFENDANT AND H.B.
ENGAGED IN SEXUALLY EXPLICIT ACTS AT A TIME
WHEN H.B. WAS AN ADULT WERE IRRELEVANT TO THE
CHARGES AGAINST DEFENDANT AND PURSUANT TO
[N.J.R.E.] 401 AND [] 402 SHOULD NOT HAVE
BEEN ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE. FURTHERMORE,
WHATEVER MINIMAL PROBATIVE VALUE THE
PHOTOGRAPHS MAY HAVE HAD, WAS FAR OUTWEIGHED
BY THEIR GROSSLY PREJUDICIAL IMPACT AND
PURSUANT TO [N.J.R.E.] 403 SHOULD NOT HAVE
BEEN PUBLISHED TO THE JURY. MOREOVER, THE
SAME PHOTOGRAPHS WERE AKIN TO THE ADMISSION
OF BAD ACTS AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN STRICKEN
PURSUANT TO [N.J.R.E.] 404B. THE ERROR WAS
COMPOUNDED BY THE COURT'S FAILURE TO PROVIDE
A LIMITING INSTRUCTION AND BY THE PROSECUTOR'S
SUMMATION. AS A CONSEQUENCE, DEFENDANT WAS
DENIED HIS FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND A FAIR TRIAL.
(U.S. CONST. AMENDS. V, VI AND XIV; N.J.
CONST. [], ART. [I], [¶]. 1, 9 AND 10.) (Not
Raised Below).
8 A-2012-12T3
POINT II
THE CONVICTION OF OFFICIAL MISCONDUCT STEMMING
FROM COUNT FOUR MUST BE VACATED AND THE CHARGE
DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION. INASMUCH
AS SOME OF THE DATES ALLEGED IN THE OFFICIAL
MISCONDUCT CHARGE CONTAINED IN COUNT FIVE ARE
JURISDICTIONALLY INFIRM AS WELL, THE
CONVICTION STEMMING THEREFROM MUST ALSO BE
VACATED AND THE CHARGE DISMISSED. (Not
Raised Below).
POINT III
ABSENT A QUID PRO QUO AND NOTWITHSTANDING THAT
ONE OR BOTH OF THE PARTICIPANTS IS A PUBLIC
SERVANT, CONSENSUAL SEXUAL CONDUCT BY TWO
ADULTS ON SCHOOL PROPERTY DOES NOT CONSTITUTE
THE CRIME OF OFFICIAL MISCONDUCT FOR WHICH A
POTENTIAL MAXIMUM SENTENCE OF TEN YEARS WITH
A FIVE YEAR PAROLE BAR COULD BE IMPOSED.
(Partially Raised Below).
POINT IV
THE STATE COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY
COMMENTING IN SUMMATION ON DEFENDANT'S SILENCE
WHEN H.B., ACTING AS AN AGENT OF THE POLICE,
CONFRONTED HIM WITH HER ACCUSATIONS DURING
THEIR RECORDED DINNER CONVERSATION. U.S.
CONST., AMENDS. V, XIV. (Not Raised Below).
POINT V
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTION TO THE JURY REGARDING
THE DESTRUCTION OF POLICE NOTES BY M.D. WAS
INFIRM AND THEREFORE VIOLATED DEFENDANT'S
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS AND A
FAIR TRIAL.
We first consider the statute of limitations as it relates
to count four, charging defendant with official misconduct.
Because all the allegations in that count relate to activity that
9 A-2012-12T3
took place on or before July 4, 2002, and the indictment in this
matter was handed up on October 1, 2010, we conclude that the
applicable seven-year statute of limitations requires the
dismissal of that charge. Next, we consider the State's
introduction of more than fifty sexually graphic photographs,
taken after H.B. turned eighteen, for the alleged purpose of
establishing the existence of a sexual relationship between them
when she was a minor. We conclude that the admission of such a
large number of sexually graphic photographs was substantially
more prejudicial than probative. Accordingly, we are compelled
to reverse the remainder of defendant's convictions and remand for
a new trial. Consequently, defendant's remaining arguments are
moot in light of our holding; however, we do add some commentary
to guide the new trial.
A. The Statute of Limitations for Official Misconduct.
Defendant argues that count four of the indictment, charging
him with official misconduct, was barred by the statute of
limitations. We agree.
A criminal statute of limitations "balances the right of the
public to have persons who commit criminal offenses charged, tried,
and sanctioned with the right of the defendant to a prompt
prosecution." State v. Diorio, 216 N.J. 598, 612 (2014) (citing
State v. Zarinsky, 75 N.J. 101, 106-07 (1977)). "The statute of
10 A-2012-12T3
limitations for a criminal offense is an absolute bar to
prosecution." Id. at 613 (citing State v. Short, 131 N.J. 47, 55
(1993)).
The statute of limitations for official misconduct is seven
years. N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(b)(3). "Time starts to run on the day
after the offense is committed . . . ." N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(c). Count
four charged defendant with official misconduct from the time H.B.
started eighth grade, September 1, 1997, until the day before she
turned eighteen, in July 2002. Defendant was indicted on October
1, 2010. Consequently, none of the acts alleged in count four
occurred within seven years of the indictment.
Prosecution for official misconduct "must be commenced within
seven years after the commission of the offense . . . ." N.J.S.A.
2C:1-6(b)(3).
An offense is committed either when every
element occurs or, if a legislative purpose
to prohibit a continuing course of conduct
plainly appears, at the time when the course
of conduct or the defendant's complicity
therein is terminated. Time starts to run on
the day after the offense is committed
. . . .
[N.J.S.A. 2C:6(c).]
Criminal offenses can either be "discrete acts" or
"continuing offenses." Diorio, supra, 216 N.J. at 614. A discrete
act is "one that occurs at a single point in time" while a
continuing offense "involves conduct spanning an extended period
11 A-2012-12T3
of time and generates harm that continues uninterrupted until the
course of conduct ceases." Ibid. "An offense should not be
considered a continuing offense 'unless the explicit language of
the substantive offense compels such a conclusion, or the nature
of the crime involved is such that [the legislative body] must
have assuredly have intended that it be treated as a continuing
one.'" Ibid. (quoting Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112,
114-16, 90 S. Ct. 858, 860-61, 25 L. Ed. 2d 156, 161-62 (1970)).
In State v. Weleck, our Supreme Court recognized that an
indictment for official misconduct "may allege a series of acts
spread across a considerable period of time." 10 N.J. 355, 374
(1952). Because the statute of limitations at that time was two
years, the Court held that "[i]f any of the acts fall within the
two years next preceding the return of the indictment, prosecution
is not barred." Ibid.In Weleck, a borough attorney entered into an illegal
agreement with a private citizen on March 2, 1949. Id. at 364.
The attorney agreed to use his influence and office to help enact
a particular ordinance in exchange for $15,000. Id. at 365. After
the ordinance passed, the attorney made two demands on the citizen
for payment. Ibid. The first demand occurred on July 7, 1949,
and the second on July 14, 1949. Ibid. An indictment returned
12 A-2012-12T3
on June 26, 1951, charged defendant with official misconduct. Id.
at 364-65.
Though the official misconduct charge encompassed acts that
took place outside the statute of limitations, i.e., the March
2, 1949 agreement, the Court held that prosecution was not
barred. The Court stated:
When the defendant demanded money of Lubben
and entered into a corrupt agreement with him,
it constituted a breach of those duties and
the breach continued so long as the defendant
held office and persisted in his efforts to
obtain the money from him. Since the
indictment alleges that the defendant while
still borough attorney made a demand upon
Lubben on July 7, 1949, and again on July 14,
1949, it is readily apparent that the
defendant was charged with acts of misconduct
within two years of the return of the
indictment on June 26, 1951, and, accordingly,
that the statute of limitations does not
preclude prosecution of the offense.
[Id. at 374.]
The indictment in this case, as we have noted, was returned
on October 1, 2010. Count four charged defendant with official
misconduct from the time H.B. started eighth grade, September 1,
1997, until the day before she turned eighteen, in July 2002.
Because none of the acts alleged in count four could have occurred
within the seven years preceding the return of the indictment –
October 1, 2003, to October 1, 2010 – it is barred by the statute
of limitations.
13 A-2012-12T3
Count five, in contrast, is not barred by the statute of
limitations. Count five charged defendant with official
misconduct for engaging in sexual relations with H.B. in a room
adjoining his science classroom at the middle school during her
freshman or sophomore year of college. H.B. entered college in
2002, thus she was a freshman during the 2002-2003 academic year
and a sophomore during the 2003-2004 academic year. Since the act
alleged in count five could have occurred within the seven years
preceding the return of the indictment – October 1, 2003 to October
1, 2010 – prosecution is not barred by the statute of limitations.
Though count five is not barred by the statute of limitations, the
trial court erred in denying defendant's motion for a judgment of
acquittal on count four.
B. Introduction of Photographs
Defendant contends that the admission of over fifty sexually
explicit photographs of H.B. and defendant, taken after H.B. turned
eighteen years old, denied him a fair trial. He argues the trial
court should have sua sponte excluded the photographs under
N.J.R.E. 401 and N.J.R.E. 402 as irrelevant. Alternatively,
defendant asserts that, even if the photographs were relevant,
they should have been excluded under N.J.R.E. 404(b) or under
N.J.R.E. 403. Defendant also argues that this error was compounded
by the absence of a limiting instruction at the time the
14 A-2012-12T3
photographs were admitted into evidence and during the court's
final charge to the jury.
We examine this issue pursuant to the plain error standard
because appellant did not raise an objection before the trial
court. Under this standard, we reverse only if the unchallenged
error was "clearly capable of producing an unjust result." R.
2:10-2.
As we explain hereinafter, we find the admission of over
fifty sexually explicit photographs of defendant and H.B. had
minimal probative value that was substantially outweighed by the
risk of undue prejudice and further, constituted the needless
presentation of cumulative evidence under N.J.R.E. 403 and
N.J.R.E. 404(b). In addition, the failure of the court to give
to the jury clear instructions on the limits of such evidence
compounded the undue prejudice to defendant and requires a reversal
of defendant's convictions and a remand for a new trial.
N.J.R.E. 401 defines "relevant evidence" as evidence "having
a tendency in reason to prove or disprove any fact of consequence
to the determination of the action." To be relevant, evidence
must (1) have a tendency to prove or disprove a fact, and (2) the
fact to be proved or disproved must be a fact of consequence in
the matter. Biunno, Weissbard & Zegas, Current N.J. Rules of
Evidence, comment 1 on N.J.R.E. 401 (2015). "Probative value 'is
15 A-2012-12T3
the tendency of the evidence to establish the proposition that it
is offered to prove.'" State v. Buckley, 216 N.J. 249, 261 (2013)
(quoting State v. Wilson, 135 N.J. 4, 13 (1994)). The second
element refers to materiality. "A material fact is one which is
really in issue in the case." Ibid. (quoting State v. Hutchins,
241 N.J. Super. 353, 359 (App. Div. 1990)). Thus, a relevancy
determination focuses on "the logical connection between the
proffered evidence and a fact in issue, i.e., whether the thing
sought to be established is more logical with the evidence than
without it." Hutchins, supra, 241 N.J. Super. at 358 (citing
Manieri v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 151 N.J. Super. 422, 429-30 (App.
Div. 1977), certif. denied, 75 N.J. 594 (1978); State v. Coruzzi,
189 N.J. Super. 273, 302 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 94 N.J. 531(1983)). The test for relevance is broad and favors admissibility;
evidence does not have to be dispositive or even strongly probative
to be relevant. Buckley, supra, 216 N.J. at 261; State v. Deatore,
70 N.J. 100, 116 (1976).
Under this broad test, the photographs - considered
individually - have some probative value in showing a sexual
relationship existed between H.B. and defendant at some point near
the time-frame alleged in the indictment. Buckley, supra, 216
N.J. at 261. The material facts at issue in this case were whether
defendant committed any acts of sexual penetration with H.B. when
16 A-2012-12T3
she was fourteen, fifteen, sixteen, or seventeen. The photographs
depicting H.B. and defendant's sexual relationship when she was
eighteen were logically connected to whether they also had a sexual
relationship when H.B. was underage. It is "more logical" that
defendant engaged in acts of sexual penetration with H.B. when she
was fourteen, fifteen, sixteen, or seventeen, if they also had a
sexual relationship when she was eighteen. Hutchins, supra, 241
N.J. Super. at 359.
Nevertheless, the trial judge should not have permitted the
State to introduce over fifty of these photographs under the
circumstances of this case; their minimal probative value was
substantially outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice and
constituted the needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
"[R]elevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the risk of (a) undue prejudice,
confusion of issues, or misleading the jury or (b) undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."
N.J.R.E. 403. There is a presumption in favor of admitting
relevant evidence, so the factors favoring exclusion under
N.J.R.E. 403 must substantially outweigh the probative value of
the contested evidence. State v. E.B., 348 N.J. Super. 336, 345
(App. Div.), certif. denied, 174 N.J. 192 (2002).
17 A-2012-12T3
"The 'more attenuated and the less probative the evidence,
the more appropriate it is for a judge to exclude it under N.J.R.E.
403.'" State v. Covell, 157 N.J. 554, 569 (1999) (quoting State
v. Medina, 201 N.J. Super. 565, 580 (App. Div.), certif. denied,
102 N.J. 298 (1985)). "[A] court must also consider the
availability of other evidence that can be used to prove the same
point." Ibid. While proffered evidence's probative value is
enhanced by the absence of other evidence, proffered evidence
loses some of its probative value if there is other non-
inflammatory evidence available to prove the same point. Ibid.The photographs have minimal probative value due to their
attenuation. Both H.B. and defendant's wife, B.S., testified that
the photographs were taken in late July or early August 2002,
after H.B. turned eighteen. Since defendant was charged with
engaging in acts of sexual penetration with H.B. when she was
underage, the photographs were taken at least several weeks, if
not years, after the alleged crimes occurred. Further, the State
had other patently less inflammatory evidence to establish the
facts the State now points to as justifying their admission.
Here, there was a wealth of other evidence to prove that H.B.
and defendant had a sexual relationship after H.B. turned eighteen.
First and foremost, defendant conceded the relationship and
defense counsel mentioned it multiple times in his opening
18 A-2012-12T3
statement.5 ("He made a mistake, and his mistake was having a
legal, consensual relationship with the alleged victim, [H.B.]");
("[H.B.'s] allegations come out only after, after she's already
in college, when admittedly they were having a legal consensual
relationship . . . ."); ("You got to understand that those
pictures, those are not a crime, because at that point in time it
was a legal consensual relationship that they were involved in.
[H.B.] . . . was [eighteen]."). Further, H.B. testified that her
sexual relationship with defendant continued after she turned
eighteen and went off to college. C.G. also testified that
defendant told him that he had a relationship with H.B. while she
was in college. In light of the wealth of other, non-inflammatory
evidence available to prove that H.B. and defendant had a sexual
relationship after H.B. turned eighteen, the introduction of more
than fifty sexually explicit photographs was a needless
5
Since defendant conceded having a sexual relationship with H.B.
after she turned eighteen, the State cannot justify the
introduction of the photographs as rebutting defendant's trial
strategy or defense. C.f. State v. Jenkins, 356 N.J. Super. 413,
431 (App. Div. 2003) (if defendant stipulated to the contents of
the murder victim's testimony there would be no need to show the
potentially prejudicial videotape of the testimony), aff'd on
other grounds, 178 N.J. 347 (2004); State v. L.P., 352 N.J. Super.
369, 378 (App. Div.) (defendant could have avoided any prejudicial
impact caused by the admission of nude photographs of his body by
stipulating that the victim's description of his body features was
accurate), certif. denied, 174 N.J. 546 (2002).
19 A-2012-12T3
presentation of cumulative, inflammatory evidence. Davis, supra,
116 N.J. at 366.
The photographs were also unduly prejudicial. Although
graphic or sexually explicit photographs are not per se
inadmissible, State v. Micheliche, 220 N.J. Super. 532, 544 (App.
Div.), certif. denied, 109 N.J. 40 (1987), they should be excluded
when "their probative value is so significantly outweighed by
their inflammatory potential as to have a probable capacity to
divert the minds of the jurors from a reasonable and fair
evaluation of the basic issue of guilt or innocence." State v.
Abdullah, 372 N.J. Super. 252, 270-71 (App. Div. 2004) (quoting
State v. Sanchez, 224 N.J. Super. 231, 249-50 (App. Div.), certif.
denied, 111 N.J. 653 (1988)), aff'd in part rev'd in part on other
grounds, 184 N.J. 497 (2005).
In State v. Taylor, we found a videotape of a homicide victim
to be cumulative and redundant, but also that "[t]he probative
value of such cumulative evidence was far exceeded by its
prejudicial effect." 350 N.J. Super. 20, 36 (App. Div.), certif.
denied, 174 N.J. 190 (2002). We explained, "the potentially
prejudicial effect of observing the victim struggling for life is
enormous and substantially outweighs whatever residual or
collateral evidential value there remained to the tape's depiction
of [the victim's] last words." Id. at 37. The first three minutes
20 A-2012-12T3
of the tape "lacked any intrinsic relevance whatsoever," causing
the dramatic effect of the last few seconds to further inflame the
jury's passion. Id. at 38. We also noted that the prosecutor
described the tape as "compelling," the trial judge found it to
be "graphic" and depicting the victim in the "throes of death,"
and at least one or two members of the jury were moved to tears.
Id. at 36. "And lest any of them forget the impression made during
the State's case-in-chief, the tape was again played for the jurors
in summation . . . ." Ibid.
In State v. Slattery, we considered a case analogous to this
case. 239 N.J. Super. 534 (App. Div. 1990). In Slattery, the
defendant was charged with aggravated sexual assault for
committing acts of sexual penetration on a child less than thirteen
years old. Id. at 537. The child testified that after her
thirteenth birthday, the defendant had forced her to perform oral
sex on him approximately fifty times. Id. at 540. Because the
evidence showed that defendant's acts of sexual penetration
occurred after the child turned thirteen, the trial court reduced
the charge and instructed the jury to ignore that portion of the
child's testimony. Id. at 537. On appeal, we found plain error
in the admission of "a substantial quantity of inadmissible and
highly prejudicial evidence," which could not have be cured by the
trial court's instruction. Ibid.21 A-2012-12T3
In this case, the State introduced over forty of the
photographs during defendant's wife's testimony. Since the
photographs were taken in the home defendant shared with B.S., the
State asked her to identify items in each of the photographs and
estimate when they were taken. During H.B.'s testimony the next
day, the State introduced the remainder of the photographs, many
of them for a second time. H.B. was asked to identify herself and
defendant in each of the pictures. Many of the pictures were of
H.B. naked, while others were of H.B. and defendant engaged in
various sexual acts. H.B. was asked to identify defendant's penis
and her vagina in some of the pictures.
Clearly, the photographs were extremely prejudicial. The
jury was shown over fifty sexually explicit pictures, many of them
two days in a row. The photographs showed an eighteen-year-old
H.B. naked and engaged in various sexual acts with defendant, a
man thirty years her senior. Though the record does not indicate
the jury's reaction to the photographs, the trial judge recalled
the photographs at defendant's sentencing five months after the
trial. The judge stated:
Oh my God, those pictures. I can't get one
of those pictures out of my head. For the
rest of my life I will have to die with one
of those pictures that was done in your
bedroom. I'll never forget your wife's face,
I'll never forget it, when she identified her
own bedroom that she was in. Oh the bathroom
that had just been finished, and she had to
22 A-2012-12T3
say that's the bathroom we just finished.
That's physical evidence of something, it's
not just out of thin air. There's something
there.
The photographs' inflammatory potential undoubtedly had the
"probable capacity to divert the minds of the jurors from a
reasonable and fair evaluation of the basic issue of guilt or
innocence." Abdullah, supra, 372 N.J. Super. at 270-71; accord
State v. Thompson, 59 N.J. 396, 421 (1971). As the photographs'
probative value was substantially outweighed by the risk of undue
prejudice, their introduction by the State was improper under
N.J.R.E. 403.
Though the totality of the photographs should have been
excluded under N.J.R.E. 403 as cumulative and unduly prejudicial,
they could have also been excluded under N.J.R.E. 404(b) as
evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts. N.J.R.E. 404(b) states:
Except as otherwise provided by [N.J.R.E.]
608(b) evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or
acts is not admissible to prove the
disposition of a person in order to show that
such person acted in conformity therewith.
Such evidence may be admitted for other
purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or
accident when such matters are relevant to a
material issue in dispute.
"[T]he underlying danger of admitting other-crime [or bad-act]
evidence is that the jury may convict the defendant because he is
a bad person in general." State v. Skinner, 218 N.J. 496, 514
23 A-2012-12T3
(2014) (quoting State v. Cofield, 127 N.J. 328, 336 (1992)) (second
alteration in original).
In Cofield, our Supreme Court established a four-part test
to "avoid the over-use of extrinsic evidence of other crimes or
wrongs" pursuant to N.J.R.E. 404(b). Supra, 127 N.J. at 338. The
four-part test requires that:
1. The evidence of the other crime must be
admissible as relevant to a material issue;
2. It must be similar in kind and reasonably
close in time to the offense charged;
3. The evidence of the other crime must be
clear and convincing; and
4. The probative value of the evidence must
not be outweighed by its apparent prejudice.
[Ibid. (quoting Abraham P. Ordover, Balancing
The Presumptions Of Guilt And Innocence: Rules
404(b), 608(b), And 609(a), 38 Emory L.J. 135,
160 (1989) (footnote omitted).]
Though the photographs arguably satisfy the first three prongs of
the Cofield test, they fail the fourth prong.
The fourth prong of the Cofield test incorporates the
balancing of prejudice versus probative value as required by
N.J.R.E. 403. State v. Hernandez, 170 N.J. 106, 127 (2001).
However, it does not require, as does N.J.R.E. 403 that the
prejudice substantially outweigh the probative value of the
evidence before it is excluded. The risk of undue prejudice must
simply outweigh the probative value. Biunno, Weissbard & Zegas,
24 A-2012-12T3
supra, comment 8 on N.J.R.E. 404(b) (citing State v. Rose, 206
N.J. 141, 161-62 (2011)). As discussed in further detail above,
the photographs' probative value was substantially outweighed by
the risk of undue prejudice. Since the photographs should have
been excluded under the higher standard of N.J.R.E. 403, it follows
that they also fail to meet the more lenient fourth prong of the
Cofield test.
If N.J.R.E. 404(b) evidence is found to be admissible, "the
court must instruct the jury on the limited use of the evidence."
Cofield, supra, 127 N.J. at 340-41. "[T]he court's instruction
'should be formulated carefully to explain precisely the permitted
and prohibited purposes of the evidence, with sufficient reference
to the factual context of the case to enable the jury to comprehend
and appreciate the fine distinction to which it is required to
adhere.'" Id. at 341 (quoting Stevens, supra, 115 N.J. at 304).
Appellate review gives "great deference" to a trial judge's
determination on the admissibility of "other bad conduct"
evidence. State v. Goodman, 415 N.J. Super. 210, 228 (App. Div.
2008) (citing State v. Foglia, 415 N.J. Super. 106, 122 (App.
Div.), certif. denied, 205 N.J. 15 (2010)), certif. denied, 205
N.J. 78 (2011). Thus, there must be a "clear error of judgment"
to overturn the trial court's determination. State v. Castagna,
25 A-2012-12T3
400 N.J. Super. 164, 183 (App. Div. 2008), certif. denied, 217
N.J. 286 (2014).
Initially, it is important to recognize that the photographs
in this case were not evidence of the crimes for which defendant
was charged and convicted. The evidence established that the
photographs were all taken after H.B. turned eighteen and, thus,
she was a consenting adult. The State argues that it introduced
the photographs for the purpose of establishing the existence of
an ongoing sexual relationship between defendant and H.B., and
further argues that under a N.J.R.E. 404(b) framework, the
photographs were "intrinsically" relevant to the charged crime.
Rose, supra, 206 N.J. at 176-77.
Evidence is intrinsic if it directly proves the crime charged
or if the acts in question are performed contemporaneously with,
and facilitate, the commission of the crime charged. Id. at 180(adopted the test in United States v. Green, 617 F.3d 233, 248-49
(3d Cir.), (internal quotations omitted), cert. denied, 562 U.S.
942, 131 S. Ct. 363, 178 L. Ed. 2d 234 (2010)). Courts use a
case-by-case approach in making an intrinsic determination. Id.
at 179.
Here, the photographs depict acts that occurred after H.B.'s
eighteenth birthday. Thus, the photographs do not directly prove
that defendant had sex with H.B. when she was a minor. The
26 A-2012-12T3
photographs also do not depict acts that were performed
contemporaneously with, nor did they facilitate, defendant's
alleged prior sex with H.B. Consequently, the photographs were
not admissible as intrinsic evidence.
Instead, the photographs were only admissible as other bad
acts under N.J.R.E. 404(b). In that regard, as we have already
explained, the photographs were marginally relevant to the
material issue of whether defendant sexually assaulted H.B. when
she was a minor. They have a tendency to prove that a sexual
relationship existed between H.B. and defendant, thereby
constituting evidence of opportunity. Buckley, supra, 216 N.J.
at 261; see also Hutchins, supra, 241 N.J. Super. at 358 (stating
that a relevancy determination focuses on "the logical connection
between the proffered evidence and a fact in issue, i.e., whether
the thing sought to be established is more logical with the
evidence than without it") (citing Manieri, supra, 151 N.J. Super.
at 429-30). Accordingly, prong one of the Cofield test was
satisfied.
Prongs two and three of the Cofield test were also satisfied.
The photographs were taken just after H.B. turned eighteen and,
thus, were close in time to the offenses charged. The photographs
were also clear and convincing because they were authenticated by
H.B.
27 A-2012-12T3
The introduction of such a large number of photographs,
however, fails the fourth prong of the Cofield test. While the
photographs had a tendency to prove that a sexual relationship
existed between H.B. and defendant, one or even a few photographs
would have established that relationship. The introduction of
more than fifty sexually graphic photographs outweighed their
probative value. Indeed, introducing so many photographs had the
probable effect of inflaming the jurors.
In final analysis, while these photographs had some small
degree of relevancy to show the presence of an ongoing sexual
relationship between defendant and H.B., the high risk of prejudice
to defendant substantially outweighed any limited probative value,
and therefore they should have been sua sponte excluded by the
trial judge.
This error was further compounded by the lack of a limiting
instruction. Accordingly, the jury was not given any guidance on
how they could and how they could not use this other bad-conduct
evidence. See Stevens, supra, 115 N.J. at 304 ("[A] limiting
instruction addressed to the use of other-crime evidence . . .
should be formulated carefully to explain precisely the permitted
and prohibited purposes of the evidence, with sufficient reference
to the factual context of the case to enable the jury to comprehend
28 A-2012-12T3
and appreciate the fine distinction to which it is required to
adhere.").
In summation, the prosecutor implied that the graphic
photographs provided proof that defendant and H.B. maintained a
sexual relationship prior to her eighteenth birthday, despite them
being taken in late July 2002, commenting:
[I]f this relationship didn't happen until it
was legal, do you think that [H.B.] would be
that comfortable - - those pictures, if you
recall, I think you saw them twice, that she
would be that comfortable in the way she's
posing and that sexual, if this relationship
- - you don't go from zero to sixty in a month,
ladies and gentlemen. That's just not
reasonable. That's not rational.
What's more credible? That this relationship
started well before that, well before [H.B.]
hits that certain number, before he knew when
he couldn't cross the line.
In just this short passage, the prosecutor opened the door for the
jury to view and evaluate the photographs in the exact manner a
N.J.R.E. 404(b) limiting instruction would have warranted, had one
been given by the trial judge.
Again, the wholesale introduction of all the photographs
clearly carried with it the potential to divert the minds of the
jurors from a reasoned and fair evaluation of the basic issue of
guilt or innocence. The emphasis of the salacious aspect of this
evidence also supports our conclusion that their admission, in the
context of this case, constituted reversible error and therefore
29 A-2012-12T3
the use of all these photographs should have been excluded under
both N.J.R.E. 404(b) and 403.
C. Defendant's Other Arguments
In light of our decision to reverse and remand for a new
trial, defendant's remaining arguments are moot. We do, however,
offer the following guidance for the new trial.
First, we observe that our opinion regarding the undue
influence caused by the admission of all the photographs does not
address the State's proffer of one or two of the photographs at a
new trial. The question of whether the State can, in the future,
introduce one or two of the less lurid photographs subject to a
limiting instruction by the court, is left to the sound discretion
of the trial judge.
Defendant also contends that the State committed prejudicial
error by commenting in summation on defendant's silence when
confronted by H.B. during their audio-recorded dinner
conversation. We add this comment to guide the court on retrial.
The prosecutor's obligation is to ensure that justice is
done. State v. Smith, 167 N.J. 158, 177 (2004); State v. Land,
435 N.J. Super. 249, 272 (App. Div. 2014). "[A] prosecutor must
refrain from improper methods that result in wrongful conviction,
and is obligated to use legitimate means to bring about a just
conviction." State v. Ingram, 196 N.J. 23, 43 (2008) (quoting
30 A-2012-12T3
State v. Jenewicz, 193 N.J. 440, 471 (2008)). The prosecutor in
a criminal case is expected to make vigorous and forceful closing
arguments to a jury. Nevertheless, a prosecutor must avoid
comments that invade the rights bestowed on defendants, including
the right to remain silent. State v. Muhammad, 182 N.J. 551, 568-
69 (2005) (holding that a prosecutor may not use at trial a
defendant's silence when that silence arises "at or near" the time
of arrest, during official interrogation, or while in police
custody). Prosecutorial "[r]emarks that 'skirt the edges' of
impermissible comment are neither desirable nor worth the risk."
State v. Engel, 249 N.J. Super. 336, 382 (App. Div.), certif.
denied, 130 N.J. 393 (1991).
III.
The conviction on count four is reversed and that count is
dismissed. Defendant's convictions on the other counts are
reversed and the matter is remanded for a new trial.
Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.
31 A-2012-12T3