STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. NATHAN CRAFT (12-03-0551, MONMOUTH COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1219-14T2
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
NATHAN CRAFT,
Defendant-Appellant.
__________________________
Submitted October 26, 2016 – Decided May 10, 2017
Before Judges Alvarez and Accurso.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Monmouth County, Indictment
No. 12-03-0551.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney
for appellant (Elizabeth C. Jarit, Assistant
Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on
the brief).
Christopher J. Gramiccioni, Monmouth County
Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Mary R.
Juliano, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel
and on the brief; Kristen M. Pridgen, Legal
Assistant, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Following the denial of his motion to suppress evidence
seized in a warrantless search, defendant Nathan Craft pled
guilty to second-degree possession with intent to distribute
cocaine, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5b(2), and was sentenced in accordance
with an agreement negotiated pursuant to the Brimage Guidelines.
As authorized by Rule 3:5-7(d), defendant appeals from the
denial of his motion to suppress the drugs found in his car,
raising only one issue:
BECAUSE THE STATE FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT
CRAFT'S CONSENT TO SEARCH WAS KNOWING AND
VOLUNTARY, THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING HIS
MOTION TO SUPPRESS.
Finding no basis to disturb Judge Oxley's factual findings or
legal conclusions, we affirm.
Defendant did not testify or present any witnesses at the
suppression hearing. The arresting officer testified he was
driving south on Hope Road in Tinton Falls when he noticed a tan
Buick with tinted windows traveling in the same direction. The
officer checked the Buick's license plate and learned the
registered owner had a suspended license. The officer pulled
the car over and approached the driver, later identified as
defendant Nathan Craft.
In the course of speaking to the driver, the officer
noticed the smell of marijuana, and asked defendant whether he
had been smoking the drug. Defendant admitted he had smoked
marijuana an hour or two earlier. The officer asked defendant
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to step out of the car and radioed his sergeant. The officer
asked defendant whether he was armed, and if the officer could
pat him down. Defendant said he was not armed and consented to
a pat down. Noticing a bulge in one of defendant's pockets, the
officer discovered a large wad of cash but no weapon. In
response to the officer's question as to why he was carrying so
much cash, defendant told the officer it was about $8000, which
he had to pay bills. The officer returned the cash to
defendant, and spoke to the sergeant who had arrived on the
scene.
The officer approached defendant with a consent to search
form, reviewed it with him and requested defendant's consent to
search the car. The officer testified defendant refused to sign
the form but told him he could search the car. The officer
testified he spoke to defendant for about three to five minutes,
making sure he had defendant's consent to search the car and
trying to understand why, if defendant was consenting to the
search, he was unwilling to sign the form.
The officer testified defendant took issue with the
language of the form authorizing the police "to remove and
retain any items of evidential value which they consider
pertinent to their investigation." Specifically, defendant told
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the officer he had no objection to the officer searching his
car, he just did not want the police to take his money.
After confirming with defendant that he understood he had
the right to refuse the search, and that he was consenting to
the search but would not sign the form, the officer signed and
dated the form, noting that defendant "[r]efused to sign 11-1-11
5:54pm." Underneath the space provided for defendant's
signature, the officer wrote, "gave permission[;] verbal
consent[;] didn't want us to take money." The sergeant also
signed and dated the form. On cross-examination, the officer
conceded that although he was without basis to seize the cash
when he handed it back to defendant after the pat-down, he knew
if drugs were discovered in the car, he would seize the cash for
forfeiture.
Following completion of the form, the officer searched the
car and found part of a plastic bag sticking up between the
cushions of the backseat. Inside was eighty-five grams of
cocaine packaged in smaller bags. Defendant was arrested, his
cash was seized, and he was transported to the police station
where he was processed and released on his own recognizance
after giving a statement.
The detective who took defendant's videotaped statement
also testified at the suppression hearing. He explained he was
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directed to conduct the interview, "because it's not every day
that you . . . have somebody say hey, search my car but I'm not
going to sign the consent."1 After defendant executed the
Miranda2 form, the detective asked him what had occurred during
the course of the stop, whether he had consented to have his car
searched, and why he refused to sign the form.
On the videotape, which was played in court and
authenticated by the detective, defendant described the stop
very similarly to the way the officer had described it in his
testimony. Defendant several times conceded he gave the officer
permission to search his car. He explained he refused to sign
the form, which he reviewed with the detective, because he "[did
not] know the law," and the language of the form "was subject to
interpretation." Defendant told the detective he did not
understand the full ramifications of the clause that allowed the
police to seize evidence, and he did not want the officer to
take his $8000.
1 Although the detective testified he was not aware the stop had
not been recorded at the time he was directed to take
defendant's statement, the arresting officer testified he was
driving a canine unit, which was not equipped with video or
audio equipment in 2011 when the stop occurred.
2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d
694 (1966).
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When the detective pressed defendant as to why then had he
consented to the search, knowing he had a right to refuse,
defendant expressed the view that the officer was going to
search no matter what defendant said.3 When the detective asked
whether the Tinton Falls officer had said or done anything
during the stop to indicate he was going to search defendant's
car regardless of whether he got consent, defendant explained he
based his belief on his and others' prior experiences. That
comment led to an exchange in which the detective stressed that
officers have to stop a voluntary search upon request and
defendant expressing skepticism that any officer would ever do
so. Defendant, who is black, told the detective, who is white,
that their views on whether the police respected the rights of
people pulled over in traffic stops likely differed because "we
walk two different lives."
After listening to the officer's testimony, viewing the
video and the consent forms in evidence, and hearing the
argument of counsel, Judge Oxley denied defendant's motion to
suppress the drugs found in the car. The judge found the
officer had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant's car after
the license plate look-up revealed the owner's license was
3 Defendant also told the detective he "didn't know what was in
the car."
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suspended. See State v. Donis, 157 N.J. 44, 58 (1998). He
further found the odor of marijuana emanating from defendant's
car provided the officer with reasonable and articulable
suspicion of criminal activity, thereby justifying the officer's
request to search defendant's car. See State v. Carty, 170 N.J.
632, 647 (2002).
Based on the officer's "uncontradicted" and credible
testimony that he advised defendant of his right to refuse
consent, and that defendant thereafter consented to the search
of his car, as defendant later confirmed to the detective, the
judge found defendant's consent knowing and voluntary. See
State v. Domicz, 188 N.J. 285, 308-09 (2006). Despite
acknowledging defendant's statement to the detective that
defendant believed the officer would have searched the car
regardless of whether defendant consented, the judge noted there
was nothing in the record to suggest defendant had been
pressured or coerced. See State v. King, 44 N.J. 346, 352-53
(1965) (listing factors to consider in determining whether
consent to search was coerced). Finally, the judge rejected
defendant's argument that he had conditioned his consent on the
officer "not taking his money." Besides noting the officer had
returned defendant's money to him after the pat down, the judge
found the cash was not seized pursuant to defendant's consent to
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search his car but was instead seized in a search incident to
his lawful arrest.
Our standard of review on a motion to suppress is limited.
See State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412, 424 (2014). We defer to the
trial court's factual findings on the motion, unless they were
"clearly mistaken" or "so wide of the mark" that the interests
of justice require appellate intervention. State v. Elders, 192
N.J. 224, 245 (2007). "Deference to these factual findings is
required because those findings 'are substantially influenced by
[an] opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the
"feel" of the case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy.'"
Gamble, supra, 218 N.J. at 424-25 (quoting State v. Johnson, 42
N.J. 146, 161 (1964)). Our review of the trial court's
application of the law to the facts, of course, is plenary.
State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249, 263 (2015).
Defendant argues because he "refused to sign the consent to
search form, told the officer that he did not understand a
portion of the form, placed a limitation on the search that
would have negated any consent, and believed that the officer
would have searched his car regardless of whether consent was
obtained," the State failed to meet its burden and the court
erred in denying his motion to suppress. We do not agree.
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"Consent is . . . a factual question to be determined from
the relevant circumstances." State v. Koedatich, 112 N.J. 225,
264 (1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1017, 109 S. Ct. 813, 102 L.
Ed. 2d 803 (1989). Although the car stop was not recorded, the
trial court had the benefit of the officer's testimony and both
it and we have the benefit of defendant's videotaped interview,
in which he candidly and calmly discussed what happened on the
road and his rationale for giving consent but refusing to sign
the form. Although first-hand accounts in these situations are
often wildly divergent, here they were remarkably similar.
Counsel's argument that defendant did not understand his
right to refuse consent is completely belied by a view of the
videotape. Although defendant did not finish high school,
instead obtaining a G.E.D., he presents as an intelligent and
thoughtful individual, self-respecting and forthright in the
midst of what the detective described as "not a good time for
[him]." Indeed, the judge surmised that defendant's demeanor
was one of the chief reasons he was released on a summons. In
the interview, defendant makes clear that what he did not
understand was whether, by virtue of the language allowing the
police "to remove and retain any items of evidential value which
they consider pertinent to their investigation," he would be
9 A-1219-14T2
giving consent to the officers to seize the cash in his pocket,
which he did not wish to do.
Although there is no question but that "the scope of a
consent search is limited by the terms of its authorization,"
State v. Santana, 215 N.J. Super. 63, 72 (App. Div. 1987), we
cannot find that defendant somehow limited his unequivocal
consent to search his car by his unwillingness to surrender the
cash the detectives had already found in his pocket and returned
to him. Neither are we aware of any requirement that would have
the officer explain that if they found drugs in the car, they
could lawfully seize the cash in his pocket, as well as his car,
on the theory it was integral to or utilized in furtherance of
illegal drug distribution, see N.J.S.A. 2C:64-1a(2)-(3), even
though aware he did not want police to take his money. Although
defendant's consent ultimately led to the seizure of the cash,
the cash was not seized pursuant to defendant's unequivocal
consent to search his car.
As for defendant's statement to the detective that he only
consented because of his belief that the police would have
searched anyway, we do not find it undermined defendant's
objective acknowledgement "that he had a choice in the matter."
State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 354 (1975). We are mindful of
his concession to the detective that the Tinton Falls officers
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treated him with respect and made no attempt to coerce his
compliance. A defendant's subjective perception that his
consent was coerced will not vitiate an otherwise valid given
consent to search. State v. Binns, 222 N.J. Super. 583, 589
(App. Div.), certif. denied, 111 N.J. 624 (1988).
Because we concur with Judge Oxley's view of the law, and
find no basis to second-guess his findings of fact, we affirm
the denial of defendant's motion to suppress evidence of the
drugs seized from his car pursuant to a valid consent search.
Affirmed.
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