JOSE VARGAS v. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS (NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1020-20
JOSE VARGAS,
Appellant,
v.
NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS,
Respondent.
___________________________
Submitted September 19, 2022 – Decided September 30, 2022
Before Judges Mawla and Marczyk.
On appeal from the New Jersey Department of
Corrections.
Jose Vargas, appellant pro se.
Matthew J. Platkin, Acting Attorney General, attorney
for respondent (Donna Arons, Assistant Attorney
General, of counsel; Suzanne Davies, Deputy Attorney
General, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Appellant Jose Vargas is imprisoned in the State's correctional system.
He appeals from a final agency decision of the New Jersey Department of
Corrections (DOC) upholding an adjudication and sanctions for committing
prohibited act *.254, "refusing to work, or to accept a program or housing unit
assignment." N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1(a)(2)(xvi). 1 Having reviewed the record in
light of the applicable legal principles, we affirm.
On October 29, 2020, Vargas alleges he was in line for his medication
when he approached an officer from his unit and advised that he had been
threatened by other inmates over the past twenty-four hours, and he wished to
transfer to another facility. Vargas claims he was handcuffed and eventually
transported to another facility. He was then charged with prohibited act *.254,
"refusing to work, or to accept a program or housing unit assignment." N.J.A.C.
10A:4-4.1(a)(2)(xvi). The matter was subsequently referred to a hearing officer.
A disciplinary hearing was held on November 4, 2020, at which time
Vargas entered a plea of not guilty. He requested the assistance of counsel
substitute, which was granted. Vargas indicated at the hearing that he had been
1
Effective May 17, 2021, prohibited act *.254 was recategorized from a
Category C offense to a Category B offense. Under both categories, infractions
"preceded by an asterisk (*) are considered the most serious and result in the
most severe sanctions. . . ." N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1(a).
A-1020-20
2
threatened and that was why he did not return to his unit. He was given an
opportunity to present witnesses, but he declined.
The hearing officer considered the testimony and evidence presented,
found Vargas guilty, and sanctioned him to sixty days in restorative housing and
fifteen days loss of recreation privileges. The hearing officer further indicated
Vargas cannot dictate where he is housed and must follow proper procedures.
She also indicated she granted leniency. On November 9, 2020, Vargas filed an
administrative appeal and advanced the same arguments he did before the
hearing officer. On November 12, 2020, the assistant superintendent upheld the
decision along with the sanctions the hearing officer imposed. This appeal
followed.
Vargas raises the following points for our consideration:
POINT I
THE HEARING OFFICER ERRED IN FINDING
APPELLANT GUILTY BECAUSE THE RIGHT TO
USE THE OFFICER AS A WITNESS WAS DENIED
AND THE RIGHT TO EXPLAIN THAT [VARGAS']
LIFE WAS BEING THREATENED SHOULD NOT
BE A MEANS TO A FINDING OF GUILT.
POINT II
THE HEARING OFFICER ERRED IN FINDING
APPELLANT GUILTY BECAUSE THERE WAS NO
INFRACTION VIOLATION.
A-1020-20
3
More particularly, Vargas appears to contend that he was not able to call
the investigating officer as a witness. Vargas further asserts the hearing officer
failed to investigate and interview witnesses.
The DOC counters its final decision should be affirmed because Vargas'
hearing comported with all due process requirements, and substantial credible
evidence supported the conclusion he was guilty. The DOC submits that Vargas
advised an officer that he would not be returning to his housing uni t. When
Vargas failed to comply with orders to return, he was handcuffed and transferred
to the infirmary for a medical evaluation.
DOC staff charged Vargas, and the Special Investigation Division
conducted an investigation. It further indicates that being threatened is not a
basis for refusing to return to a housing assignment. If an inmate feels
threatened or is in jeopardy, he can request to be placed in protective custody,
but that request must be made in writing using the appropriate form. The reasons
are then investigated by the DOC pursuant to N.J.A.C. 10A:5-5.1(b). Vargas
did not do that here. Instead, he simply refused to return to his housing unit.
Finally, Vargas declined the opportunity to call any witnesses at the hearing.
Our review of agency determinations is limited. See In re Stallworth, 208
N.J. 182, 194 (2011); Brady v. Bd. of Rev., 152 N.J. 197, 210 (1997); Figueroa
A-1020-20
4
v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 414 N.J. Super. 186, 190 (App. Div. 2010). We will not
reverse an administrative agency's decision unless it is "arbitrary, capricious, or
unreasonable, or not supported by substantial credible evidence2 in the record as
a whole." Stallworth, 208 N.J. at 194 (citation omitted); accord Jenkins v. N.J.
Dep't of Corr., 412 N.J. Super. 243, 259 (App. Div. 2010).3
In determining whether an agency action is arbitrary, capricious, or
unreasonable, we consider whether: (1) the agency followed the law; (2)
substantial evidence supports the findings; and (3) the agency "clearly erred" in
applying the "legislative policies to the facts." In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 482-
83 (2007) (quoting Mazza v. Bd. of Trs., 143 N.J. 22, 25 (1995)). In addition,
prison disciplinary hearings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full
spectrum of rights due to a criminal defendant does not apply. Avant v. Clifford,
2
"Substantial evidence has been defined alternately as 'such evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,' and
'evidence furnishing a reasonable basis for the agency's action.'" Blanchard v.
New Jersey Dep't of Corr., 461 N.J. Super. 231, 238 (App. Div. 2019) (quoting
Figueroa v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 414 N.J. Super. 186, 192 (App. Div. 2010)).
3
Although we afford deference to an administrative agency's determination, our
review is not perfunctory and "our function is not to merely rubberstamp an
agency's decision." Figueroa, 414 N.J. Super. at 191. We must "engage in a
'careful and principled consideration of the agency record and findings.'"
Williams v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 330 N.J. Super. 197, 204 (App. Div. 2000)
(quoting Mayflower Sec. Co. v. Bureau of Sec., 64 N.J. 85, 93 (1973)).
A-1020-20
5
67 N.J. 496, 522 (1975). However, when reviewing a determination of the DOC
in a matter involving prisoner discipline, we consider not only whether there is
substantial evidence that the inmate committed the prohibited act, but also
whether, in making its decision, the DOC followed regulations adopted to afford
inmates procedural due process. See McDonald v. Pinchak, 139 N.J. 188, 194-
96 (1995).
Having considered the record in view of the foregoing principles, we are
satisfied there is substantial credible evidence supporting the DOC's findings
that Vargas committed prohibited act *.254. Vargas admits he refused to return
to his cell, and the hearing officer rejected his argument as to why he refused to
return, which the DOC upheld. Vargas' other arguments are undermined by the
record. Vargas declined to call any witnesses, and the counsel substitute
confirmed the hearing officer's adjudication report was accurate where it
reflected defendant refused to call any witnesses. Moreover, the hearing officer
did not have an obligation to independently investigate this matter.
We are satisfied the hearing officer's decision was based on sufficient
credible evidence, and we find no basis to conclude the DOC's findings and
imposition of sanctions were arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. See
A-1020-20
6
Stallworth, 208 N.J. at 194; In re Carter, 191 N.J. at 482-83. We therefore affirm
the DOC's final decision.
Any remaining arguments we have not addressed directly are without
sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
A-1020-20
7