DCPP VS. G.E. AND J.S., IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF L.A. AND A.E. (FG-18-0115-16, SOMERSET COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED)

RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0580-17T3
NEW JERSEY DIVISION
OF CHILD PROTECTION
AND PERMANENCY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
G.E.
Defendant-Appellant,
and
J.S.,1
Defendant.
_____________________________
IN THE MATTER OF THE
GUARDIANSHIP OF L.A.
and A.E.,
Minors.
_____________________________
1
The whereabouts of J.S., the father of the younger child is unknown. The
identity of the older child's father is also unknown.
Submitted March 6, 2019 – Decided March 27, 2019
Before Judges Koblitz, Currier and Mayer.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Somerset County,
Docket No. FG-18-0115-16.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Ruth A. Harrigan, Designated Counsel, on
the briefs).
Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for
respondent (Jason W. Rockwell, Assistant Attorney
General, of counsel; Tara B. LeFurge, Deputy Attorney
General, on the brief).
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian,
attorney for minors (David B. Valentin, Assistant
Deputy Public Defender, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant G.E. appeals from a September 15, 2017 Family Part order
terminating her parental rights to her sons L.A., born in 2005, and A.E., born in
2008. We affirm, substantially for the reasons stated by Judge Anthony F.
Picheca, Jr. in his sixty-nine-page written opinion issued with the order.
The evidence is outlined in detail in the judge's opinion. A summary will
suffice here. The Division of Child Protection and Permanency (Division) first
removed the children in 2012 based on their mother's substantiated neglect.
Reunification was achieved sixteen months later, after defendant had engaged
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in rehabilitative services, including substance abuse treatment offered by the
Division. She regularly visited her children. The children were removed again
in April 2015 when they were living in a hotel room where defendant and her
partner both engaged in drunken violent behavior in the presence of the children
requiring police intervention. She had also failed to fill the prescriptions for
medications required by her special needs son, A.E.
Defendant has a long-standing problem with drug and alcohol abuse. She
failed to successfully attend the programs recommended by the Division. She
visited the children only sporadically since their 2015 removal, although the
Division provided train passes so G.E. could visit with her children. The
children's behavioral problems improved when their mother did not visit.
At the time of trial, the children had been in their resource home for over
two years and were doing well. Unfortunately, although their resource mother
is willing to assist in the children's transition, this is not an adoptive home. The
Division intends to find an adoptive home for the two boys together through
select home adoption. 2 Although the children loved their mother, they were also
bonded to their foster mother and their caseworker. Judge Picheca credited
2
"'[S]elect home adoption' [is] a process that includes looking for an adoptive
home in New Jersey and registering the child on the national adoption
exchange." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 98 (2008).
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expert testimony that the boys were adoptable, their bond with their mother was
insecure, and termination of her parental rights would not do more harm than
good. One of the Division's experienced experts, Dr. Frank J. Dyer, testified
that permanency was the most important need of these children. Even
defendant's expert opined that reunification would not be appropriate until
defendant maintained sobriety and freedom from drug use. She also required
therapy for an extended period of time. Permanency is long overdue for these
children. See 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C), (E) (mandating efforts to achieve
permanency expeditiously); N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.R.G., 361
N.J. Super. 46, 86 (App. Div. 2003).
In his comprehensive opinion, the trial judge found that the Division had
proven all four prongs of the best interests test, N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a). Since
the 2004 amendments to the statute, "[t]he emphasis has shifted from protracted
efforts for reunification with a birth parent to an expeditious, permanent
placement to promote the child's well-being." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family
Servs. v. C.S., 367 N.J. Super. 76, 111 (App. Div. 2004).
Our review of the trial judge's decision is limited. We defer to his
expertise as a Family Part judge, Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 412 (1998),
and we are bound by his factual findings so long as they are supported by
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sufficient credible evidence. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M., 189
N.J. 261, 279 (2007). After reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial
judge's factual findings are fully supported by the record and, in light of those
facts, his legal conclusions are unassailable.
Defendant contends that the Division did not properly customize services,
failing to diagnose or treat her underlying mental illness, which interfered with
her ability to comply with the services provided. These arguments are without
sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
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