IN THE MATTER OF THE CIVIL COMMITMENT OF H.B., SVP-252-02 AND B.L., SVP-463-07 (ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (CONSOLIDATED) (RECORD IMPOUNDED)

RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2295-16T5
A-4316-16T5
IN THE MATTER OF THE CIVIL
COMMITMENT OF H.B.,
SVP-252-02.
____________________________
IN THE MATTER OF THE CIVIL
COMMITMENT OF B.L.,
SVP-463-07.
_____________________________
Argued March 4, 2019 – Decided March 26, 2019
Before Judges Messano, Fasciale and Rose.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Essex County, Docket Nos. SVP-252-02 and
SVP-463-07.
Susan Remis Silver, Assistant Deputy Public Defender,
argued the cause for appellant H.B. and B.L. (Joseph E.
Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Susan Remis
Silver, on the briefs).
Victoria R. Ply, Deputy Attorney General, argued the
cause for respondent State of New Jersey (Gurbir S.
Grewal, Attorney General, attorney; Melissa H. Raksa,
Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Victoria R. Ply,
on the briefs).
PER CURIAM
In these back-to-back appeals, which we have consolidated for purposes
of this opinion, B.L. and H.B. appeal from orders continuing their involuntary
commitment to the Special Treatment Unit (STU) as sexually violent predators
under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA), N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.24 to -27.38.
We reject their primary contention that the State's experts rendered net opinions
and conclude that there exists sufficient credible evidence to support the judges'
findings. We therefore affirm.
I.
We begin with some general legal principles governing civil involuntary
commitments of sexually violent predators. Under the SVPA, the State may
petition the court for the involuntary commitment of an individual believed to
be a "sexually violent predator." N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.28. See also In re
Commitment of W.Z., 173 N.J. 109, 112 (2002). Under N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.26, a
"sexually violent predator" means
a person who has been convicted, adjudicated
delinquent or found not guilty by reason of insanity for
commission of a sexually violent offense, or has been
charged with a sexually violent offense but found to be
incompetent to stand trial, and suffers from a mental
abnormality or personality disorder that makes the
person likely to engage in acts of sexual violence if not
A-2295-16T5
2
confined in a secure facility for control, care and
treatment.
[(Emphasis added).]
A "mental abnormality" means "a mental condition that affects a person's
emotional, cognitive or volitional capacity in a manner that predisposes that
person to commit acts of sexual violence." Ibid. And the phrase "[l]ikely to
engage in acts of sexual violence" means "the propensity of a person to commit
acts of sexual violence is of such a degree as to pose a threat to the health and
safety of others." Ibid.Clear and convincing proof is required for an involuntary commitment.
N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.32(a). On the requisite quantum of proof, the United States
Supreme Court rejected the notion that a sex offender must be unable to control
completely his dangerous sexual behavior. See Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407,
413 (2002). Instead, the Crane Court held that substantive due process required
some lack-of-control determination. Ibid. Mathematical precision to prove
inability to control behavior is not required. Rather, there must be proof of
"serious difficulty in controlling behavior." Ibid. An "absolutist" approach is
"unworkable" and risks "barring the civil commitment of highly dangerous [sex
offenders] suffering severe mental abnormalities." Id. at 411-12.
A-2295-16T5
3
Rejecting bright-line rules to ensure constitutional safeguards of human
liberty when assessing mental illnesses, our Supreme Court noted that the State
must have "considerable leeway in defining the mental abnormalities and
personality disorders that make an individual eligible for confinement." W.Z.,
173 N.J. at 125 (quoting Crane, 534 U.S. at 413). Thus, "[a] finding of mental
abnormality that results in an impaired but not a total loss of ability to control
sexually dangerous behavior can be sufficient" to satisfy due process. Id. at 126.
A diagnosis of "sexual compulsion" is unnecessary if the State proves the
requisite "serious difficulty with control." Id. at 129. It is therefore the
"inability to control one's sexually violent behavior [that] is the very essence of
the SVPA." Ibid.
After a person is involuntarily committed, the State must house that person
in a facility separate from other types of offenders and provide "treatment
tailored to address the specific needs of sexually violent predators." Id. at 120.
Under N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.35, such a person is entitled to annual court hearings to
assess whether continued commitment or conditional discharge is appropriate.
The burden of proof for continued commitment is by clear and convincing
evidence. N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.32(a). Conditional discharge is appropriate if the
court finds that
A-2295-16T5
4
the person will not be likely to engage in acts of sexual
violence because the person is amenable to and highly
likely to comply with a plan to facilitate the person's
adjustment and reintegration into the community so as
to render involuntary commitment as a sexually violent
predator unnecessary for that person[.]
[N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.32(c)(1) (emphasis added).]
In such an instance, the court may order that the person be "conditionally
discharged in accordance with such plan." Ibid.
II.
In 1994, B.L. raped a fourteen-year-old girl. He pled guilty to second-
degree sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(c), and received a five-year prison
sentence. In 1999, B.L. raped a seventeen-year old girl. He pled guilty to
second-degree sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(c), and received a nine-year
prison term. 1 In 2007, the State petitioned the court to civilly commit B.L. as a
sexually violent predator under the SVPA, and in 2008 obtained an order
involuntarily committing him to the STU. Since then, either by stipulation or
by court order, B.L. has remained involuntarily committed. B.L. appeals from
1
We affirmed the conviction. In re Civil Commitment of B.L., No. A-4036-07
(App. Div. Jan. 4, 2010). As part of the negotiated plea agreement, the State
dismissed separate charges that B.L. had raped another victim, a thirteen-year-
old girl, also in 1999.
A-2295-16T5
5
a May 3, 2017 order, which continued his commitment to the STU after the last
hearing.
It is undisputed that B.L. has been convicted of sexually violent crimes
under the SVPA. The questions at his commitment hearing were whether B.L.
suffered from a mental abnormality or personality disorder, and as a result,
whether it was highly likely that he would be unable to control his sexually
violent behavior and would re-offend. He argues primarily that the judge relied
on net opinions from the State's two experts, which he contends were not based
on any methodology or objective standards, and that the State produced
insufficient evidence to warrant continued commitment.
The judge qualified the State's first witness, Dr. Roger Harris, without
objection, as an expert psychiatrist. Before rendering his expert report, the
doctor interviewed B.L. (and had previously interviewed him in 2014); and he
reviewed and relied upon clinical certificates, reports from the treatment
progress review committee (TPRC), prior forensic evaluations, treatment notes,
and previous statements made by B.L. In addition, the doctor performed the
Static-99 actuarial test to help him estimate the probability of B.L.'s sexually
violent recidivism. And he considered B.L.'s offense history, various dynamic
factors, personality characteristics, and lack of treatment progress.
A-2295-16T5
6
Based on the interviews, his review of the documentation, and his own
testing, Dr. Harris diagnosed B.L. with "[s]exual [s]adism [d]isorder"; "[o]ther
[s]pecified [p]araphilic [d]isorder, teenage girls"; "[a]ntisocial [p]ersonality
[d]isorder [(ASPD)]"; "[a]lcohol, [c]annabis and [s]timulant [u]se [d]isorders,
in a controlled setting." The doctor said that these disorders do not
"spontaneously remit," but rather, they require treatment where one can learn
how to control impulses caused by the psychiatric disorders. Dr. Harris
determined that B.L. was unable to control his impulses.
He testified that B.L.'s fundamental core issue was his lack of "self-
regulation," which includes his inability to control his sexual drive and anger.
The doctor believed that B.L.'s anger interfered with B.L.'s treatment. Such a
belief was critical to B.L.'s continued problem controlling his violent sexual
drive. At his 2017 interview, B.L. refused to discuss his past offenses, which
led the doctor to conclude B.L. attempted to control the interview. The STU
treatment records reflect his difficulty relating to others, his attempt to
intimidate others, and his verbal altercations, which impeded his treatment
progress. The records also demonstrated that B.L. remained challenging and
difficult towards those who treated him. In Dr. Harris's opinion, B.L. remained
vulnerable, irritable, aggressive, and unable to self-regulate, even in the
A-2295-16T5
7
controlled setting of his 2017 interview, which B.L. eventually terminated on
his own.
Dr. Harris concluded that B.L. would be highly likely to re-offend
sexually if released from the STU. He reached that conclusion after performing
a structured risk assessment, which the doctor explained was a well-established
standard approach for experts assessing risk. He testified that numerous
research books show how to perform these assessments and that the method is
rigorous.
B.L. scored a five on the Static-99 test. Dr. Harris explained that such a
score placed him in the "category of men who were above average risk to
sexually re-offend." But the doctor did not rely solely on this test score. He
explained that the score by itself did not fully estimate B.L.'s risk to re-offend
sexually because it did not consider other relevant risk factors, such as deviant
arousal from multiple paraphilias, strong antisocial attitudes and behaviors, past
violations of conditions of release, poor self-regulation, an impulsive lifestyle,
poor cognitive problem-solving skills, and a history of sexual violence. Dr.
Harris testified that he considered other dynamic factors that the literature
identifies as empirically validated.
A-2295-16T5
8
The State's second witness, Dr. Eugene Dunaev, is a psychologist. Like
Dr. Harris, the judge admitted him as an expert without objection. In rendering
his opinion, Dr. Dunaev considered his interview and treatment of B.L., and he
reviewed and relied upon prior reports, various documentation, the Static-99R
(which is a modified Static-99), and the Stable 2007, which is a risk-assessment
tool that considers thirteen stable dynamic risk factors associated with sexual
recidivism. Like B.L.'s treatment team, Dr. Dunaev recommended that B.L.
continue in Phase 3A of his treatment, which is the beginning half of the core
phase of treatment.
Dr. Dunaev also considered B.L.'s sexual offense history. He found
significant B.L.'s sadistic themes, such as arousal from the victim's pain and
crying. The doctor also reviewed B.L.'s treatment trajectory, which according
to him, vacillated greatly. In the doctor's view, B.L. would show signs of doing
well, but then would sabotage himself with anger and substance abuse. Like Dr.
Harris, Dr. Dunaev concluded B.L. was not fully engaging in treatment. He
gave several examples, including that B.L. failed to complete a written relapse
prevention plan, and he did not complete personal maintenance or substance
abuse contracts.
A-2295-16T5
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Dr. Dunaev diagnosed B.L. with "[s]exual [s]adism"; "[o]ther [s]pecified
[p]araphilic [d]isorder (non-consent and hebephilia, provisional)"; marijuana,
alcohol, and cocaine use disorder, in a controlled environment; "[a]ntisocial
[p]ersonality [d]isorder (with borderline features)"; and "[b]orderline
[i]ntellectual [f]unctioning." Dr. Dunaev also concluded that B.L. failed to
address his continued anger problem. The doctor stated that B.L. scored a four
on the Static-99R test, which placed him in the above average category of sexual
re-offense. And on the Stable 2007, he scored a sixteen out of twenty-four,
which falls into the high level of people likely to re-offend. He also scored
twenty-eight (indicating a high range of psychopathic traits) on a PCL-R test,
which is a psychological assessment tool used to assess the presence of
psychopathy in individuals.
Dr. Barry Zakireh, a psychologist and B.L.'s expert witness, diagnosed
B.L. with other specified paraphilic disorder with features of sexual sadism,
ASPD, and several substance abuse disorders. The doctor believed that these
diagnoses should be treated more like dynamic risk factors, rather than persistent
ones. But he agreed that the paraphilic disorder predisposed B.L. to re-offending
sexually. Nevertheless, he concluded that B.L. is "less than likely" to re-offend
sexually if released with conditions.
A-2295-16T5
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The judge found by clear and convincing evidence that B.L. suffers from
disorders with sexual sadism traits that were "not going to go away." Although
the judge acknowledged that B.L. had shown some positive treatment effects,
particularly in the months before the 2017 review hearing, the judge still found
that B.L. remained unable to control his sexually violent behavior rendering him
highly likely to re-offend sexually. The judge found all of the experts credible,
but did not agree with Dr. Zakireh's opinion regarding B.L.'s likelihood of re-
offending. Moreover, the judge found that B.L. demonstrated sadistic traits and
a total disregard for his victims; and that his mental conditions continue to affect
him emotionally, cognitively, and volitionally. Consequently, the judge
concluded that B.L. would have serious difficulties controlling his sexually
violent behavior thereby rendering him highly likely to re-offend sexually.
Although the judge had accelerated B.L.'s next commitment hearing (seven
months away, instead of the usual one-year period), B.L. canceled it pending
adjudication of this appeal.
III.
Between 1987 and 1988, H.B. raped his nine-year-old daughter at least six
times. He pled guilty, in 1989, to second-degree sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-
2(a)(1); and third-degree endangering the welfare of a child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4.
A-2295-16T5
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He received an aggregate five-year prison term. H.B. also admitted to raping
three or four other victims, for which he was never charged. In 1993, H.B. raped
a woman whom he was in a romantic relationship with. For that incident, he
pled guilty to three counts of sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(c)(1); and
possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d). As to the
weapons offense, he had used a knife while he sexually assaulted her. For the
1993 convictions, he received an aggregate ten-year prison term with five years
of parole ineligibility. While imprisoned, he received at least six institutional
charges, including assault on a police officer.
In 2001, H.B. was involuntarily committed to the STU. But he was then
transferred to administrative segregation at East Jersey State Prison for
assaulting an officer. Thereafter, he received another charge for assaulting an
officer. H.B. has had a history of incarcerations followed by involuntary
commitments.2 He has had multiple commitment hearings under the SVPA, and
he has remained confined to the STU. Now, H.B. appeals from a December 20,
2016 order, which continued his involuntary commitment to the STU after the
last hearing.
2
We affirmed an April 2, 2012 order continuing his involuntary commitment.
In re Civil Commitment of H.B., No. A-6154-11 (App. Div. Nov. 13, 2012).
A-2295-16T5
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It is undisputed that H.B. has been convicted of sexually violent crimes
under the SVPA. The questions at his commitment hearing were whether H.B.
suffered from a mental abnormality or personality disorder, and as a result,
whether it was highly likely that he would be unable to control his sexually
violent behavior and would re-offend. He argues primarily, like B.L., that the
judge relied on net opinions from the State's two experts, which he also contends
were not based on any methodology or objective standards, and that the State
produced insufficient evidence to warrant continued commitment.
The judge qualified the first witness, Dr. Roger Harris, as a psychiatrist.
He examined H.B., reviewed a multitude of documentation customarily relied
on by similar experts performing risk assessments, and then arrived at his own
diagnosis and conclusions. The doctor diagnosed him with pedophilic disorder
(incest); paraphilic disorder (coercion); multiple substance abuse disorders;
recurrent major depressive disorder; and a personality disorder with antisocial
features.
Dr. Harris opined that these disorders predisposed H.B. to committing
sexually violent offenses. They have affected him emotionally and cognitively,
and have caused volitional deficits. He has a history of poor self-regulation and
engaging in self-harm, such as cutting his anus and inserting a bottle into his
A-2295-16T5
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rectum. H.B. told the doctor that he still fantasizes about his daughter, which
led Dr. Harris to conclude that H.B.'s arousal to children remains a risk. H.B.'s
personality disorder manifested itself in poor problem-solving skills,
impulsivity, and recklessness.
H.B. scored a two on the Static-99R test. Dr. Harris concluded that this
score underestimated H.B.'s risk. The doctor utilized the test as one factor
among many in his evaluations. Although Dr. Harris has used the actuarial tool
because it is part of accepted standard practices in his field, he stated that the
test is limited in its ability to measure an individual's risk to re-offend. For
example, it does not include dynamic or protective factors that may affect risk
assessment.
The doctor considered the presence of other risk factors, which
empirically have been shown to increase risk of sexual re-offending. He
explained that H.B. has comorbid paraphilias, which empirically demonstrate an
increase risk of re-offending. And H.B.'s substance abuse disorders increase the
risk of re-offending because substance abuse plays a role in H.B.'s offending
dynamics and further compromises his ability to self-regulate. Dr. Harris stated
that his risk assessments also include his clinical judgment.
A-2295-16T5
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The judge qualified the State's second witness, Dr. Christine Zavalis, as a
psychologist. The TPRC gave H.B. multiple opportunities to interview, but he
declined. Dr. Zavalis evaluated H.B. as part of the TPRC's annual review, but
because he would not appear for interviews, she did so based on documentary
evidence, which comprised those documents customarily relied on by experts in
her field.
Dr. Zavalis diagnosed H.B. with other specified paraphilic disorder (non-
consent); other specified personality disorder with antisocial and schizoid traits;
intermittent explosive disorder; several substance abuse disorders; and post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Additionally, she provisionally diagnosed
him with pedophilic disorder and sexual sadism disorder because she had
sufficient information to suggest these disorders and not enough to rule them
out. Dr. Zavalis testified that H.B.'s paraphilic and personality disorders
predisposed him to re-offend.
H.B. scored a three on the Static-99, which placed him in a category of
offenders who sexually re-offend at an average rate. Although he showed some
signs of improvement on other dynamic risk factors, Dr. Zavalis identified signs
of negative emotionality, anger, paranoia, and depression, for which he was
medicated. Dr. Zavalis said that according to the Static-99 manual, evaluators
A-2295-16T5
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must consider information outside that test to perform a full assessment of risk.
Dr. Zavalis described this as a "clinically adjusted actuarial approach" to risk
assessment.
H.B. has been in Phase 3A treatment, which is the core phase of treatment.
Although H.B. had showed some signs of improvement, he still had incidents of
lashing out verbally. Dr. Zavalis emphasized that H.B. needed greater insight
into his arousal. She stated that H.B. must spend time in the Therapeutic
Community, which includes intense scrutiny and responsibility, before he is
released from the STU. Dr. Zavalis opined that H.B. was highly likely to re-
offend sexually. She based that opinion on risk factors—from the Static-99 and
the Stable-2007—and other factors not mentioned in those measures, such as
medical mitigation and treatment effect.
Finally, Dr. Gianni Pirelli, a psychologist, testified for H.B. He
interviewed H.B. and diagnosed him with paraphilic disorder for non -consent
("not active"); a mood disorder (that might be bipolar disorder); and a history of
substance abuse disorders. Dr. Pirelli does not use the Static-99, and places no
significance on the PCL-R assessment tool. But as to the PCL-R, he admitted
that it addresses antisocial traits, which are a risk factor, especially when
combined with a paraphilic arousal. He concluded "there's probably [not] much
A-2295-16T5
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disagreement between me and the treatment team and Dr. Zavalis other than the
fact that I think we just need to be much more refined and focused" by giving
H.B. tasks in his treatment. And he testified that H.B. should remain at the STU
for at least nine additional months.
The judge found by clear and convincing evidence that H.B. had been
convicted of sexually violent offenses, he suffers from mental abnormalities and
a personality disorder that predispose him to commit sexually violent offenses,
and that he is highly likely to engage in future acts of sexual violence if not
confined to the STU. In rendering his opinion, the judge remarked that none of
the experts was required to predict the future, only to give his or her best
estimates about an individual's risk.
IV.
On appeal, B.L. raises the following arguments:
POINT I
B.L.'S COMMITMENT IS IMPROPERLY BASED
ON THE STATE EXPERTS' INADMISSIBLE NET
OPINION.
A. Neither State Expert Could Provide Any
Probability Basis for Finding that B.L. Is
"Highly Likely" to Re[-]offend.
A-2295-16T5
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B. The Static-99 Risk Assessment Tool
Demonstrated B.L.'s Risk of Sexually
Re[-]offending Was Below [Fifty Percent].
C. The State Experts Could Not Point to
Any Methodology or Objective Standards
Used to Reach Their Finding.
D. The Hanson and Mann Article
Demonstrates that Empirical Data Does
Not Support Using the State's List of
Dynamic Risk Factors to Adjust Upward
B.L.'s Risk of Re[-]offending.
E. Both State Experts Ignored Base Rate
Data that Was Relevant to Determine
B.L.'s Risk of Re[-]offending.
F. The State Experts Failed to Correlate
B.L.'s PCL-R Score with Finding He Was
Highly Likely to Re[-]offend.
G. The State Experts Failed to Correlate
Any STABLE-2007 Score with Finding
B.L. Highly Likely to Re[-]offend.
H. Both State Experts Based Their Risk
Assessment on "Facts" They
Acknowledged Were Inaccurate or
Outdated.
I. Dr. Zakireh, B.L.'s Expert, Was the Only
Witness Who Used Empirically Validated
Risk Assessment.
A-2295-16T5
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POINT II
REVERSAL IS REQUIRED BECAUSE THE STATE
INTRODUCED NO EVIDENCE THAT B.L. HAS A
CURRENT MENTAL ABNORMALITY OR
PERSONALITY DISORDER THAT MAKES HIM A
CURRENT RISK OF BEING HIGHLY LIKELY TO
SEXUALLY RE[-]OFFEND.
On appeal, H.B. makes the following arguments, which we have
renumbered:
POINT III
THE STATE EXPERTS' TESTIMONY LACKED AN
EMPIRICAL BASIS AND CONSTITUTED
INADMISSIBLE NET OPINION.
A. The State Experts Could Not Define
What They Meant When They Said H.B.
Was Highly Likely to Sexually
Re[-]offend.
B. The State Experts Could Not Point to
Any Methodology or Objective Standards
Used to Reach Their Finding.
C. The State Experts Used No Objective
Peer-reviewed Guidelines to Reach Their
Conclusion.
D. Both State Experts Ignored Base Rate
Data that Was Relevant to Determine
H.B.'s Risk of Re[-]offending.
A-2295-16T5
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E. The State Experts Failed to Correlate
H.B.'s Static-99 Score with Finding That
He Is Highly Likely to Re[-]offend.
F. The State Experts Failed to Correlate
H.B.'s PCL-R Score with Finding He Was
Highly Likely to Re[-]offend.
G. The State Experts Failed to Correlate
Any Stable-2000 Score with Finding H.B.
[Was] Highly Likely to Re[-]offend.
POINT IV
THIS COURT MUST REVERSE H.B.'S
COMMITMENT ORDER SINCE IT WAS BASED ON
STATE EXPERTS' TESTIMONY THAT FAILS TO
MEET ADMISSIBILITY REQUIREMENTS OF NEW
JERSEY EVIDENCE RULE 702.
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION TO COMMIT H.B.
WAS BASED ON "FACTS" UNSUPPORTED BY
THE RECORD.
A. The Trial Court Erred in Finding that
Dr. Pirelli Concluded that H.B. Is "Highly
Likely" to Re[-]offend.
B. The Trial Court Falsely Assumed that
Dr. Pirelli Found That H.[B]. Was Clearly
Predisposed to Sexual Violence.
C. The Trial Court Falsely Assumed that
H.B. Had No Family History of Incest and
Improperly Dismissed Dr. Pirelli's
Rejection of a Pedophilia Diagnosis.
A-2295-16T5
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D. The Trial Court Falsely Assumed that
H.B. Engaged in Multiple Sexual Assaults
Against His Daughter, Including Physical
Force, Threats and Penetration.
E. The Trial Court Mischaracterized Dr.
Zavalis on the Predictability of Her
Methodology.
F. The Trial Court Erred in Concluding that
H.B. Has Been in Sex Offender Treatment
for Only [Three to Four] Years.
POINT VI
REVERSAL IS REQUIRED BECAUSE THE STATE
INTRODUCED NO EVIDENCE THAT H.B. HAS A
CURRENT MENTAL ABNORMALITY OR
PERSONALITY DISORDER THAT MAKES HIM A
CURRENT RISK OF BEING HIGHLY LIKELY TO
SEXUALLY RE[-]OFFEND.
V.
"The scope of appellate review of a commitment determination is
extremely narrow." In re Civil Commitment of R.F., 217 N.J. 152, 174 (2014)
(quoting In re D.C., 146 N.J. 31, 58 (1996)). "The judges who hear SVPA cases
generally are 'specialists' and 'their expertise in the subject' is entitled to 'special
deference.'" Ibid. (quoting In re Civil Commitment of T.J.N., 390 N.J. Super.
218, 226 (App. Div. 2007)). Where a trial judge's findings are supported by
A-2295-16T5
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sufficient credible evidence in the record, they should not be disturbed. Id. at
175.
In commitment hearings, the judge makes the final determination about
whether an individual is highly likely to re-offend sexually. Id. at 174. That is
because courts must balance "society's interest in protection from harmful
conduct against the individual's interest in personal liberty and autonomy." Ibid.
The ultimate determination is a legal one, not a medical one. Ibid.
Moreover, we give deference to findings by judges because they have the
"opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the 'feel' of the case,
which a reviewing court cannot enjoy." Ibid. (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J.
146, 161 (1964)). We will not overturn a trial court's findings even if we "might
have reached a different conclusion were [we] the trial tribunal" or because "the
trial court decided all evidence or inference conflicts in favor of one side" in a
close case. Id. at 175 (quoting Johnson, 42 N.J. at 162). Therefore, we should
not change a trial judge's determination to commit or release an individual unless
"the record reveals a clear mistake." Ibid.VI.
We now address the contentions that the State's experts rendered net
opinions. An expert "may not provide an opinion at trial that constitutes 'mere
A-2295-16T5
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net opinion.'" Davis v. Brickman Landscaping, Ltd., 219 N.J. 395, 410 (2014)
(quoting Pomerantz Paper Corp. v. New Cmty. Corp., 207 N.J. 344, 372 (2011)).
Such a rule bars admission of an "expert's conclusions that are not supported by
factual evidence or other data." Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 53-54 (2015)
(quoting Polzo v. Cty. of Essex, 196 N.J. 569, 583 (2008)). Instead, it requires
an expert to provide the "why and wherefore" that supports his or her opinion.
Id. at 54. Therefore, an expert must provide the factual basis and analysis that
support the opinion. Davis, 219 N.J. at 410. Courts "may not rely on expert
testimony that lacks an appropriate factual foundation and fails to establish the
existence of any standard about which the expert testified." Ibid. (quoting
Pomerantz Paper, 207 N.J. at 373).
(1)
As to the expert testimony in B.L.'s hearing, B.L.'s counsel never argued
that Dr. Dunaev rendered net opinions and counsel did not object at the hearing
to Dr. Harris rendering net opinions. But on a limited remand to reconstruct part
of the record, B.L.'s counsel moved for the first time to strike only the testimony
of Dr. Harris along those lines, which the judge denied. We conclude that the
judge did not abuse his discretion by admitting the expert opinion testimony
A-2295-16T5
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from Dr. Harris, and that there is no plain error as to Dr. Dunaev. We reach
these conclusions because Drs. Harris and Dunaev did not render net opinions.
Drs. Harris and Dunaev provided the judge with the "why and wherefore"
of their opinions, each detailing the factual basis supporting their independent
opinions that B.L. would be highly likely to re-offend if released at this point in
his treatment. The doctors reviewed in detail B.L.'s history of sexual violence,
treatment history, diagnosis, and a multitude of other factors. They interviewed
B.L., utilized actuarial or analytical tools—Dr. Harris the Static-99, and Dr.
Dunaev the Static-99R and the Stable 2007. They diagnosed B.L. with specific
disorders that predisposed him to committing acts of sexual violence, and
explained which facts indicated that B.L. continued to have serious difficulty
controlling the harmful behavior stemming from these disorders, despite some
recent progress in treatment. Thus, neither Dr. Harris nor Dr. Dunaev gave mere
unsubstantiated conclusions that would contravene the net opinion rule.
B.L. essentially contends that the doctors should have analyzed the
available information in the same way that Dr. Zakireh did, and that they should
have come to the same conclusion as Dr. Zakireh. But "[t]he failure of an expert
to give weight to a factor thought important by an adverse party does not reduce
his testimony to an inadmissible net opinion if he otherwise offers sufficient
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reasons which logically support his opinion." Rosenberg v. Tavorath, 352 N.J.
Super. 385, 402 (App. Div. 2002). If an expert provides a sufficient factual basis
for an opinion but fails to consider other significant facts or data, that is a proper
topic for cross-examination, but it does not provide grounds to bar the opinion
as a net opinion. Ibid.(2)
At H.B.'s hearing, his counsel did not object to the testimony from Drs.
Harris and Zavalis. But in his closing statement to the judge, counsel argued
that their testimony should not be credited and they "should be entirely rejected
as inadmissible net opinion[s]." Counsel contended that "[a]bsent empirical
testable information, the State [was] using its unguided clinical judgment in
making a risk prediction." We see no plain error because the doctors' testimony
did not amount to net opinions.
Drs. Harris and Zavalis provided the judge with the "why and wherefore"
of their opinions, each detailing the factual basis supporting their independent
opinions that H.B. would be highly likely to re-offend if released without
showing more progress in treatment. They reviewed H.B.'s history of offending,
treatment history, present diagnosis, and present progress in treatment. Dr.
Harris personally interviewed H.B., and Dr. Zavalis would have done so but for
A-2295-16T5
25
H.B.'s refusal. Each used the Static-99 as an actuarial tool, and separately
diagnosed H.B. with disorders that predisposed him to committing acts of sexual
violence, and they explained which facts indicated that H.B. continued to have
serious difficulty in controlling his behavior stemming from these disorders,
despite some recent progress in treatment.
(3)
We reject any suggestion that the State's experts rendered net opinions in
both appeals because—as counsel for B.L. and H.B. contends—the experts
failed to provide any probability basis for their conclusions, failed to correlate
actuarial data and test scores, ignored base rate data, used inaccurate or outdated
facts, and did not use the same methodology as Dr. Zakireh. B.L. and H.B.
essentially argue that the State's experts provided opinion testimony that used
unacceptable methodology. 3
3
We received a letter dated February 19, 2019 from counsel for the State
drawing our attention, under Rule 2:6-11(d), to our decision in In re
Commitment of A.Y., ___ N.J. ___ (App. Div. 2019). In her letter, counsel
stated that in that case we addressed the Court's recent decision in In re Accutane
Litigation, 234 N.J. 340 (2018) and that we concluded that actuarial instruments
are an accepted factor, which may be considered in assessing risk of re-
offending sexually. At oral argument before us, counsel for B.L. and H.B.
contended for the first time that the methodology used by the State's experts
failed to satisfy Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
Inasmuch as there was no objection to the testimony from the State's experts
A-2295-16T5
26
As we indicated in the beginning of our opinion, the State need not prove
inability to control behavior with "mathematical precision." See Crane, 534
U.S. at 413. The Court declined to impose a precise standard to measure the
requisite "lack of control" stating "there must be proof of serious difficulty in
controlling behavior." Ibid. Contrary to B.L. and H.B.'s contentions, under the
net opinion rule, experts are not required to organize or support their opinions
in a specific manner "that opposing counsel deems preferable." Townsend, 221
N.J. at 54.
Dr. Pirelli testified that "[w]e can't predict future sexual [re-]offending
. . . with any real accuracy." He acknowledged that he defers to the judge as to
the legal question of whether an individual is "highly likely" to re-offend. And
on that question, established case law has addressed the reliability of actuarial
tests. For example, we previously recognized that the Static-99 was designed to
"predict long-range risk for sexual recidivism by combining two well
standardized risk assessment scales." In re J.P., 339 N.J. Super. 443, 451 (App.
Div. 2001). And the Static-99 is a recognized "actuarial test used to estimate
during the hearings, and there was no mention of Daubert to the judge, we
decline to address that decision here. Instead, we rely on the long-standing
precedent in SVPA cases as to the acceptability of the methodology used by the
State's experts.
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the probability of sexually violent recidivism." R.F., 217 N.J. at 164 n.9. We
have acknowledged that scientific literature has shown "the use of actuarial
concrete predictors is at least as good, if not in most cases better, in terms of
reliability and predictability than clinical interviews." In re Registrant, C.A.,
146 N.J. 71, 106 (1996). Scientific literature and expertise accords weighing
risk factors, which the Court has said is an acceptable method of predicting
future criminal sexual behavior. Id. at 105. Furthermore, actuarial instruments
are "generally accepted by professionals who assess sex offenders for risks of
re[-]offense." In re Commitment of R.S., 339 N.J. Super. 507, 538 (App. Div.
2001). Use of the instruments has been accepted in at least six other states. Id.
at 548. Finally, we concluded that actuarial instruments satisfy Frye.4 Actuarial
information is "simply a factor to consider, weigh, or even reject, when engaging
in the necessary fact[-]finding under the SVPA." R.F., 217 N.J. at 164 n.9
(quoting In re Commitment of R.S., 173 N.J. 134, 137 (2002)). As we explained
in R.S.,
[s]ince expert testimony concerning future
dangerousness based on clinical judgment alone has
been found sufficiently reliable for admission into
evidence at criminal trials, we find it logical that
testimony based upon a combination of clinical
judgment and actuarial instruments is also reliable. Not
4
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
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only does actuarial evidence provide the court with
additional relevant information, in the view of some, it
may even provide a more reliable prediction of
recidivism.
[339 N.J. Super. at 537-38.]
To the extent that we have not addressed the arguments raised by B.L. and
H.B., we conclude that they are without sufficient merit to warrant attention in
this opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
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