STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. M.E.H. (96-09-1166, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED)

RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4514-15T4
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
M.E.H.,
Defendant-Appellant.
_____________________________
Submitted May 29, 2018 – Decided March 29, 2019
Before Judges Accurso, O'Connor and Vernoia.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Union County, Indictment No. 96-09-1166.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Andrew P. Slowinski, Designated Counsel,
on the brief).
Michael A. Monahan, Acting Union County
Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Izabella M.
Wozniak, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting
Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
O'Connor, J.A.D.
Defendant appeals from an April 15, 2016 order denying his petition for
post-conviction relief (PCR). We affirm.
I
In April 1997, defendant pled guilty to one count of second-degree
sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(c)(1). In September 1997, he was sentenced
to a ten-year term of imprisonment with a four-year period of parole
ineligibility. Defendant filed a direct appeal and we affirmed. See State v.
M.E.H., No. A-7288-97 (App. Div. March 1, 2000). The Supreme Court
denied his petition for certification. State v. M.E.H., 165 N.J. 491 (2000).
In May 2006, defendant was civilly committed to the Special Treatment
Unit (STU) pursuant to the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA), N.J.S.A.
30:4-27.24 to -27.38. Defendant appealed and we affirmed that commitment.
See In re Civil Commitment of M.E.H., No. A-5923-05 (App. Div. Feb. 27,
2008). We found substantial credible evidence to support the trial court's
finding M.E.H. suffered from paraphilia not otherwise specified (NOS), and
was highly dangerous and likely to re-offend if released. The Supreme Court
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denied his petition for certification. In re Civil Commitment of M.E.H., 196
N.J. 461 (2008).
In the interim, on August 20, 2008, defendant filed his first petition for
PCR, claiming plea counsel had been ineffective because he advised defendant
to accept the plea. Defendant alleged counsel overlooked the fact that there
was no medical proof defendant had penetrated the victim, an element of the
charge to which he pled guilty. See N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(c)(1). Following an
evidentiary hearing, the PCR court denied the relief defendant sought in his
petition, entering an order on April 17, 2009.
Defendant appealed from the latter order. On appeal, defendant argued
plea counsel had been ineffective, but he also maintained the prosecutor had
failed to adhere to his duty to disclose exculpatory evidence, and that
"fundamental fairness doctrines" mandated he be permitted to retract his guilty
plea. We rejected defendant's contentions and affirmed the PCR court. See
State v. M.E.H, No. A-4690-08 (App. Div. July 25, 2011). The Supreme Court
denied defendant's petition for certification. State v. M.E.H., 209 N.J. 98(2012).
In July 2011, the trial court conducted a review hearing to determine
whether M.E.H.'s civil commitment should continue. After evaluating the
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evidence, the court found defendant had a personality disorder and, as revealed
during the previous commitment hearing, paraphilia NOS. Because defendant
suffered from a mental abnormality or personality disorder, required treatment,
had "no command over his sexual offense cycle," and was highly likely to
engage in further acts of sexual violence, the court ordered defendant's
continued commitment to the STU. Defendant appealed and we affirmed. In
re Civil Commitment of M.E.H., No. A-5872-10 (App. Div. Feb. 11, 2014).
The Supreme Court denied his petition for certification. State v. M.E.H., 219
N.J. 627 (2014).
On March 26, 2015, defendant filed his second petition for PCR, in
which he alleged there had been no valid legal basis to detain and commit him
after his sentence for sexual assault terminated in 2007. The record does not
reveal whether PCR counsel made additional arguments in his brief. On April
15, 2016, the PCR court entered an order denying defendant's application for
PCR on the grounds his second petition was time-barred, and the contentions
defendant asserted in his second petition could have been raised in the first.
Defendant appeals from the April 15, 2016 order.
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II
Defendant presents the following issues for our consideration in his
appeal:
POINT I: THE PCR COURT'S DECISION SHOULD
BE REVERSED AS DEFENDANT'S CONTINUED
INCARCERATION UNDER THE SEXUALLY
VIOLENT PREDATOR ACT CONSTITUTES THE
IMPOSITION OF AN ILLEGAL SENTENCE.
(A) DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO RELIEF
UNDER R. 3:22-2(c).
(B) DEFENDANT'S PETITION FOR PCR IS NOT
TIME BARRED BY R. 3:22-12.
(C) DEFENDANT'S PETITION FOR PCR IS NOT
BARRED BY R. 3:22-4.
POINT II: THE SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATOR
ACT BURDENS THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
OF DEFENDANT TO SUCH A DEGREE THAT THE
CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THAT BURDEN IS
SUFFICIENT TO REQUIRE JUDICIAL RELIEF
(NOT RAISED BELOW).
(A) THE SVPA INFRINGES ON THE EX POST
FACTO CLAUSES OF THE UNITED STATES AND
NEW JERSEY CONSTITUTIONS. (U.S. CONST.
ART. I, § 10; N.J. CONST. ART. IV, § 7, ¶ 3).
(B) THE SVPA INFRINGES ON DOUBLE
JEOPARDY PROTECTIONS UNDER THE UNITED
STATES AND NEW JERSEY CONSTITUTIONS.
(U.S. CONST. AMEND. V; N.J. CONST. ART. I, ¶
11).
A-4514-15T4
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(C) THE SVPA INFRINGES ON THE
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE OF THE SIXTH
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, ¶ 10 OF THE
NEW JERSEY CONSTITUTION. (U.S. CONST.
AMEND. VI; N.J. CONST. ART. I, ¶ 10).
(D) THE SVPA INFRINGES ON THE RIGHT TO
TRIAL BY JURY OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT
TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND
ARTICLE I, ¶ 10 OF THE NEW JERSEY
CONSTITUTION. (U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI; N.J.
CONST. ART. I, ¶ 10).
(E) THE SVPA INFRINGES ON THE
PROTECTION AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION, AS WELL AS NEW
JERSEY STATUTORY AND COMMON LAW.
(U.S. CONST. AMEND. V; N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-19;
N.J.R.E. 503).
(F) THE SVPA INFRINGES ON THE
PROTECTION AGAINST CRUEL AND UNUSUAL
PUNISHMENT IN THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT TO
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND
ARTICLE I, ¶ 12 OF THE NEW JERSEY
CONSTITUTION. (U.S. CONST. AMEND. VIII;
N.J. CONST. ART. I, ¶ 12).
(G) THE SVPA INFRINGES ON DEFENDANT'S
RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, ¶ 1 OF
THE NEW JERSEY CONSTITUTION. (U.S.
CONST. AMEND. XIV, N.J. CONST. ART. I, ¶ 11).
A-4514-15T4
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(H) THE SVPA INFRINGES ON DEFENDANT'S
RIGHT TO SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS UNDER
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE
I, ¶ 11 OF THE NEW JERSEY CONSTITUTION.
(U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV, N.J. CONST. ART. I, ¶
11).
(I) THE SVPA INFRINGES ON DEFENDANT'S
RIGHT TO PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS UNDER
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE
I, ¶ 1 OF THE NEW JERSEY CONSTITUTION.
(U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV, N.J. CONST. ART. I, ¶
11).
[J] THE SVPA INFRINGES ON DEFENDANT'S
RIGHT TO FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS UNDER
THE NEW JERSEY CONSTITUTION.
Defendant filed a supplemental brief as a self-represented litigant, in
which he asserts the following point:
POINT I: ACCORDING TO CRIMINAL
PROCEDURES AND DUE PROCESS, THE NJ
LEGISLATORS FAILED TO WRITE IN THE SVP
ACT, "FIRST" GETTING PERMISSION BY THE
ORIGINAL CRIMINAL SENTENCING JUDGE TO
EVALUATE THE PRISONER FOR COMMITMENT
WHILE HE/SHE IS SERVING THEIR CRIMINAL
SENTENCE.
We reject the contentions advanced by both defendant and his counsel as
unsupported by law.
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Defendant's second petition for PCR is time-barred. Rule 3:22-12(a)(2)
provides that a second petition for PCR shall not be filed more than one year
after the latest of:
(A) the date on which the constitutional right asserted
was initially recognized by the United States Supreme
Court or the Supreme Court of New Jersey, if that
right has been newly recognized by either of those
Courts and made retroactive by either of those Courts
to cases on collateral review; or
(B) the date on which the factual predicate for the
relief sought was discovered, if that factual predicate
could not have been discovered earlier through the
exercise of reasonable diligence; or
(C) the date of the denial of the first or subsequent
application for post-conviction relief where ineffective
assistance of counsel that represented the defendant on
the first or subsequent application for post-conviction
relief is being alleged.
First, defendant does not assert any constitutional right that was initially
recognized by either the United States Supreme Court or the Supreme Court of
New Jersey within one year of the filing of his second PCR petition. See R.
3:22-12(a)(2)(A). Second, defendant became aware of the factual predicate for
the relief he seeks in his second petition when, in 2007, his commitment to the
STU continued despite the fact the sentenced imposed for the sexual assault
conviction terminated.
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Third, defendant did not file his second petition for PCR until March 26,
2015. The PCR court entered the order denying the relief he sought in his first
petition on April 17, 2009. We affirmed that order in 2011 and the Court
denied his petition for certification in 2012. Further, in his second petition,
defendant does not assert the attorney who represented him on his first petition
was ineffective.
Accordingly, because defendant does not meet any of the conditions in
Rule 3:22-12(a)(2), the PCR court appropriately dismissed the second petition
on the ground it was time-barred. See R. 3:22-4(b). In addition, the grounds
for relief defendant asserts in his second petition are barred because he could
have but did not raise them in his first one. R. 3:22-4(a)(1).
Defendant argues the ten-year term of imprisonment he served on his
conviction for sexual assault was improperly extended when he was
"sentenced" to the STU and, therefore, his commitment to the STU constitutes
an illegal sentence. To overcome the time constraints in Rule 3:22-12(a)(2),
defendant relies upon Rule 3:21-10(b)(5), which provides a defendant is not
time-barred from challenging an illegal sentence. We agree Rule 3:21-
10(b)(5) does provide that an order may be entered at any time correcting a
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sentence not authorized by law, but defendant was not sentenced to the STU.
He was civilly committed under the SVPA.
"[T]he [SVPA] is designed to protect the public from dangerous
predators and to treat sex offenders who are, by definition, suffering from a
mental abnormality." In re Civil Commitment of W.X.C., 204 N.J. 179, 188
(2010) (citing In re Civil Commitment of J.M.B., 395 N.J. Super. 69, 97, (App.
Div. 2007)). "Individuals are civilly committed under the [SVPA] because
they pose a danger to the public health and safety due to their behavior." In re
Civil Commitment of J.H.M., 367 N.J. Super. 599, 610 (App. Div. 2003). The
purposes of the SVPA are regulatory. W.X.C., 204 N.J. at 188.
"The SVPA is a civil statute . . . ." In re Commitment of J.M.B., 197
N.J. 563, 578 (2009). As our Supreme Court noted in W.X.C., "[a]s part of
our review of the SVPA . . . we have specifically emphasized that our
Legislature intended to create a civil, rather than a penal, statute." 204 N.J.
188. "[T]he SVPA is not part of the criminal code and it has been clearly
determined that civil commitment under the SVPA is not punitive." J.M.B.,
197 N.J. at 577 (citing State v. Bellamy, 178 N.J. 127, 138 (2003)). Here,
defendant's commitment to the STU was and is not a sentence; the sentence on
his conviction for sexual assault terminated in 2007 and was not extended by
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virtue of being civilly committed. Defendant's contention he is serving an
illegal sentence must be rejected. Accordingly, his second petition for PCR is
time-barred.
Notwithstanding, we considered defendant's remaining arguments. We
conclude they are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written
opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). We merely note his principal contentions are either
not supported by the SVPA or have been rejected by decisional authority. We
cite just a few examples.
Defendant's claim the SVPA violates ex post facto laws and that the
standard of proof in SVPA proceedings should be beyond a reasonable doubt
was rejected by our Supreme Court in J.M.B., 197 N.J. at 578, 600-01. The
SVPA has never required trial by jury. See J.H.M., 367 N.J. Super. at 606-07.
The Court rejected a challenge the SVPA violated double jeopardy
considerations. In re Commitment of W.Z., 173 N.J. 109, 133-34 (2002). In
the matter In re Civil Commitment of T.J.N., 390 N.J. Super. 218, 225 (App.
Div. 2007), we noted "commitment proceedings are not part of a 'criminal
prosecution' giving rise to Confrontation Clause protection under the Sixth
Amendment to the Federal Constitution or Article 1, para. 10 of the New
Jersey Constitution."
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Affirmed.
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