IN THE MATTER OF THE CIVIL COMMITMENT OF T.R., SVP-704-14 (ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)(RECORD IMPOUNDED)

RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4986-14T2
IN THE MATTER OF THE CIVIL
COMMITMENT OF T.R., SVP-704-14.
___________________________________
Submitted May 8, 2017 – Decided May 24, 2017
Before Judges Nugent and Currier.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Essex County, Docket No. SVP-
704-14.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney
for appellant (Michele C. Buckley, Designated
Counsel, on the brief).
Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General,
attorney for respondent (Melissa H. Raksa,
Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Lauren
S. Kirk, Deputy Attorney General, on the
brief).
PER CURIAM
Appellant T.R. appeals from a June 3, 2015 Law Division order
involuntarily committing him to the Special Treatment Unit (STU)
under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA), N.J.S.A. 30:4-
27.24 - 27.38. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
On October 31, 2014, the State filed a petition to civilly
commit T.R. under the SVPA. At that time, T.R. was serving a
sentence he was expected to complete the following month. The
petition enumerates the following sexual offenses: On November 30,
2011, T.R.'s pre-teenage daughter told police that her father,
T.R., sexually assaulted her by "putt[ing] his thing in my butt."
In December 2011, T.R.'s son, in his early teens, told his mother
that his father, T.R., put Vaseline on his penis and stroked him
up and down. For these offenses, a grand jury charged T.R. in an
indictment with first-degree aggravated sexual assault of a child
under thirteen years old, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(1); two counts of
second-degree sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(b); and three
counts of second-degree endangering the welfare of a child,
N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a).
On March 11, 2014, T.R. pled guilty to two counts of
endangering the welfare of a child. The State agreed to dismiss
the remaining counts. During the plea colloquy, T.R. admitted to
spanking his daughter hard enough to leave bruises. T.R. also
admitted spanking his son "too hard[,]" causing him to cry out in
pain. For these offenses, the Law Division judge imposed an
aggregate three-year custodial sentence.
The State's petition for civil commitment also recounted that
on July 2, 1995, a four-year-old child told her mother that T.R.,
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then thirty years old, physically raped her. Although T.R.
admitted he was nude in front of the child, he maintained he did
not touch her. For that offense, T.R. was indicted on two counts
of first-degree aggravated sexual assault and one count of second-
degree endangering the welfare of a child. In exchange for a
recommended 364-day county jail sentence as a condition of
probation and the dismissal of the remaining counts, T.R. pled
guilty to an amended count of third-degree endangering the welfare
of a child. At the plea hearing, T.R. admitted that he exposed
his genitals to the child and touched her breasts for sexual
gratification.1 The judge imposed the recommended sentence.
The State's petition also details T.R.'s arrest for two sexual
offenses that did not result in convictions. T.R. also has a
history of non-sexual offenses.
At the plenary commitment hearing, the State presented the
testimony of Roger Harris, M.D., and Debra Roquet, Psy.D.2 T.R.
offered no witnesses.
Following his two interviews with T.R., Dr. Harris concluded
T.R. suffers from "pedophilic disorder, boys and girls, not limited
1
During the plea colloquy, T.R. said he was born in 1965. The
State's petition states he was born in 1968.
2
Dr. Harris was qualified as an expert psychiatrist and Dr. Roquet
was qualified as an expert psychologist.
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to incest." The doctor based this diagnosis on T.R.'s "repetitive
pattern of . . . using children for his sexual gratification."
Dr. Harris also diagnosed T.R. with antisocial personality
disorder based on his "[f]ailure to plan ahead, his disregard for
the rights of others[,]" and his failure to support his twelve to
thirteen children from eight different women. Dr. Harris opined
T.R. would be highly likely to sexually re-offend if not committed
to the STU because of his pedophilic arousals, his antisocial
behaviors, and his score of six on the Static-99R scale. Dr.
Harris also noted T.R. steadfastly denied touching or committing
any sexual offenses against any child. T.R. explained to Dr.
Harris the allegations against him were false and motivated by his
numerous ex-lovers' desires to "retaliat[e] against him."
Dr. Roquet diagnosed T.R. with pedophilic disorder and
personality disorder with antisocial features. Dr. Roquet based
her diagnosis on T.R.'s sexual arousal to children stemming from
his two convictions and additional charges for sexual conduct
involving four-year-old children to adolescents. Dr. Roquet also
noted T.R. had committed sexual offenses with children between
1995 and 2011, well beyond the six-month to one-year timeframe
required to diagnose pedophilic disorder under the DSM-5. Dr.
Roquet scored T.R. a five on the Static-99R scale, rendering his
likelihood to sexually recidivate moderately high. Finally, Dr.
4 A-4986-14T2
Roquet considered T.R.'s Megan's Law violations and his "very poor
record of compliance with supervision" by having additional
contact with children.
Dr. Roquet attributed T.R.'s antisocial behaviors to his
personal irresponsibility with respect to his many sexual partners
and children, his persistent reckless behavior towards others to
gratify his own needs, his deceitfulness, and his lack of remorse
or empathy. As he did with Dr. Harris, T.R. denied nearly every
sexual allegation lodged against him, ascribing vindicate motives
to his accusers — his children and former sex partners. Regarding
the four-year-old's rape allegations, T.R. told Dr. Roquet he
"kind of remembered touching her and taking off his pants," but
believed, in his drunken state, that she was an adult woman.
Following the hearing, Judge Philip Freedman rendered an oral
opinion civilly committing T.R. to the STU as a sexually violent
predator. Judge Freedman found credible the doctors'
uncontroverted testimony and determined that T.R. suffers from
pedophilia and "a personality disorder, either . . . antisocial
personality disorder or more technically personality disorder with
antisocial features." Taken together, the court found these
conditions make T.R. "have serious difficulty controlling his
sexually violent behavior if he . . . [were] released, to such a
5 A-4986-14T2
degree that he would be highly likely within the reasonably
foreseeable future to . . . engage in acts of sexual violence."
Although the State did not seek a determination that T.R.'s
1996 conviction for endangering the welfare of a child should be
considered a sexually violent offense, the court nevertheless
determined such conviction qualified. In making that
determination, the court relied on defendant's testimony at his
October 18, 1996 plea hearing where he admitted to exposing his
genitals to the four-year-old and touching her breasts for sexual
gratification. Based on these admissions and the victim's
statements contained in the police reports entered into evidence,
Judge Freedman was "satisfied by clear and convincing evidence"
that the offense should be considered a sexually violent offense
under N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.26(b). For those reasons, the judge found
the State had met its burden of proof that T.R. is in need of
civil commitment for sex offender specific treatment. T.R.
appealed from the implementing order.
On appeal, T.R. raises the following argument:
THE STATE FAILED TO PROVE BY CLEAR AND
CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT T.R. WAS SUBJECT TO
COMMITMENT AS A SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATOR
WHERE THE STATE FAILED TO SHOW THAT T.R.
COMMITTED A SEXUALLY VIOLENT OFFENSE AND THAT
HE SUFFERED FROM A MENTAL ABNORMALITY OR
PERSONALITY DISORDER WHICH MADE HIM HIGHLY
LIKELY TO RE-OFFEND IN THE REASONABLY
FORESEEABLE FUTURE.
6 A-4986-14T2
We affirm, substantially for the reasons expressed by Judge
Freedman in the thorough oral opinion he delivered from the bench
on June 3, 2015. We add only the following comments.
The SVPA authorizes "the State to involuntarily commit 'a
person who has been convicted . . . of a sexually violent offense'
who 'suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder
that makes the person likely to engage in acts of sexual violence
if not confined in a secure facility for control, care and
treatment.'" In re Civil Commitment of R.F., 217 N.J. 152, 173
(citations omitted) (2014); N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.26. To secure an
order for commitment, the State must prove by clear and convincing
evidence: "(1) that the individual has been convicted of a sexually
violent offense; (2) that he suffers from a mental abnormality or
personality disorder; and (3) that as a result of his psychiatric
abnormality or disorder, it is highly likely that the individual
will not control his or her sexually violent behavior and will
reoffend[.]" R.F., supra, 217 N.J. at 173; N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.32(a).
The decision to civilly commit an individual "is based on the
individual's danger to self and others because of his or her
present serious difficulty with control over dangerous sexual
behavior." In re Commitment of W.Z., 173 N.J. 109, 132-33 (2002).
7 A-4986-14T2
"The scope of appellate review of a commitment determination
is extremely narrow." R.F., supra, 217 N.J. at 174 (quoting In
re D.C., 146 N.J. 31, 58 (1996)). We afford "special deference"
to the expertise of judges who hear SVPA cases because they are
generally "specialists" in that field. Ibid. (citing In re Civil
Commitment of T.J.N., 390 N.J. Super. 218, 226 (App. Div. 2007)).
A trial court's decision to commit an individual should be modified
only when the record reveals "a clear mistake." Id. at 175. "The
appropriate inquiry is to canvass the significant amount of expert
testimony in the record and determine whether the lower court'[s]
findings were clearly erroneous." D.C., supra, 146 N.J. at 58-
59.
Applying those principles here, we are satisfied that Judge
Freedman's findings are amply supported by substantial credible
evidence in the record. State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 470-71
(1999).
We reject T.R.'s argument that the State failed to make an
application to the trial court requesting a finding that he was
convicted of a sexually violent offense as defined under the SVPA.
The SVPA's definition of sexually violent offense includes "any
offense for which the court makes a specific finding on the record
that, based on the circumstances of the case, the person's offense
should be considered a sexually violent offense." N.J.S.A. 30:4-
8 A-4986-14T2
27.26(b). Judge Freedman properly determined that T.R.'s 1996
conviction for endangering the welfare of a child should be
considered a sexually violent offense under this definition.3
In addition, T.R.'s arguments concerning the validity of the
experts' opinions are likewise without merit. Although T.R. argues
the experts improperly relied upon unreliable hearsay documents
in formulating their opinions, "[a]n expert is permitted to rely
on hearsay information in forming his opinion concerning the
defendant's mental state." In re Civil Commitment of J.H.M., 367
N.J. Super. 599, 612 (App. Div. 2003) (noting that the introduction
of presentence reports was proper in a civil commitment hearing
because "such evidence was of a type reasonably relied upon by
mental experts in formulating their evaluations of an individual's
mental condition), certif. denied, 179 N.J. 312 (2004). Here, the
experts properly relied upon judgments of conviction, plea and
sentencing transcripts, presentence reports, victims' statements,
police reports, and mental status examinations, all of which are
reasonably relied upon by experts evaluating an individual's
mental condition.
3
Nothing in the SVPA "suggests that the Attorney General may only
seek commitment of a person" who has "recently committed a
predicate offense." In re Commitment of P.Z.H., 377 N.J. Super.
458, 465 (App. Div. 2005).
9 A-4986-14T2
T.R.'s remaining arguments are without sufficient merit to
warrant further discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-
3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
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