DCPP VS. G.P., IN THE MATTER OF T.P. (FN-16-0128-16, PASSAIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED)

RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0712-17T4
NEW JERSEY DIVISION
OF CHILD PROTECTION
AND PERMANANCY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
G.P.,
Defendant-Appellant.
IN THE MATTER OF T.P.,
a Minor.
Argued March 4, 2019 – Decided March 28, 2019
Before Judges Messano and Rose.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Passaic County,
Docket No. FN-16-0128-16.
Amy E. Vasquez, Designated Counsel, argued the cause
for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender,
attorney; Amy E. Vasquez, on the briefs).
Peter D. Alvino, Deputy Attorney General, argued the
cause for respondent (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney
General, attorney; Jason W. Rockwell, Assistant
Attorney General, of counsel; Sara M. Gregory, Deputy
Attorney General, on the brief).
Danielle Ruiz, Designated Counsel, argued the cause
for minor (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law
Guardian, attorney; Meredith A. Pollock, Deputy
Public Defender, of counsel; Danielle Ruiz, on the
brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant G.P. and his paramour, S.S., are the biological parents of one
child: T.P., born in January 2016. In March 2016, the Division of Child
Protection and Permanency (Division) filed a complaint for custody, care and
supervision of T.P.
This appeal has its genesis in defendant's stipulation to a finding of abuse
or neglect of T.P., following the conclusion of evidence presented by the
Division at a fact-finding hearing. Thereafter, a Family Part judge denied
defendant's applications to withdraw his stipulation. Defendant now appeals
from a June 28, 2016 stipulation order and an August 30, 2017 order terminating
litigation.1 He claims the judge failed to make the requisite findings of abuse or
1
Following entry of defendant's stipulation, the Division amended its finding
against S.S. from substantiated to unfounded. S.S. is not part of this appeal.
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neglect; the factual basis provided for his stipulation did not establish a finding
of abuse or neglect; and the judge abused his discretion in denying defendant's
motion to withdraw his stipulation. We affirm.
I.
We derive the salient facts from the evidence presented by the Division at
the first day of the hearing on June 27, 2016. That evidence included the
testimony of three witnesses: Dr. Medesa Espana, who qualified as an expert in
pediatric emergency medicine and child abuse and neglect; Passaic County
Prosecutor's Office (PCPO) Detective Tabitha Thompson, who interviewed
defendant; and Division caseworker Carmela Pappa. The Division also entered
into evidence, without objection, several documents, including its summary
reports, photographs, and T.P.'s medical records. Defendant and S.S. appeared
at the hearing and were represented by separate counsel.
The precipitating event that led to the Division's involvement with the
family occurred on March 4, 2016, when T.P. was admitted to the hospital with
"severe head trauma." T.P. presented with a visible "linear red mark" on his
upper eyelid and "a broken blood vessel on the surface of the globe of the eye."
T.P.'s treating physicians diagnosed the child with brain and retinal
hemorrhaging. They reported to the Division that both parents denied T.P. had
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suffered a recent fall or trauma, and the retinal hemorrhaging indicated T.P. had
been "shaken." T.P. remained on life support for approximately one week until
he was able to breathe on his own.
Dr. Espana detailed T.P.'s injuries and testified they were consistent with
Shaken Baby Syndrome (SBS), which results from "a forceful acceleration,
deceleration movement of the eyeball . . . in its socket." According to Dr.
Espana, "the presentation of the clinical manifestations indicate[d] that an injury
that occurred within a [twenty-four to forty-eight] hour time frame." Dr. Espana
specifically refuted any suggestion that T.P.'s injuries could have been caused
by a prenatal condition contracted from S.S., or trauma during childbirth. T.P.'s
lack of neck and spinal injuries had no impact on Dr. Espana's opinion that T.P.'s
brain and retinal hemorrhaging resulted from SBS.
The Division introduced a segment of Thompson's video-recorded
interview of defendant. Among other things, defendant acknowledged T.P. was
in his sole care the day before the child was admitted to the hospital. Thompson
presented defendant with an anatomically-correct doll and asked him to
demonstrate the manner in which he played with his son. Defendant "toss[ed]"
the doll in the air with "his hands . . . removed from the [doll]'s body, and then
he grasped the baby again once the baby came down[.]" Thompson "would [not]
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describe [the toss] as gentle, . . . bear[ing] in mind the baby was [two-]and[-]a
[-]half months with an unsupported neck, and [as such Thompson could not]
. . . judge how gentle that toss would have been for a baby that age." Defendant
tossed the doll "just over his head . . . several times."
Significantly, Thompson testified she filed her report and the PCPO was
preparing the matter for presentation to a grand jury. At the time of the hearing,
no formal complaints had yet been filed.
Pappa's investigation confirmed no one else resided with the family.
T.P.'s maternal grandmother had cared for the child during the week of February
21, 2016, and T.P.'s great maternal grandmother had cared for him three days
prior to his hospitalization. Notably, Pappa was not asked whether she or anyone
on behalf of the Division told the parents criminal charges would not be pursued.
At the conclusion of the Division's case, the judge determined Dr. Espana
was a "highly credible witness" and based on her testimony, T.P.'s injuries were
"not spontaneous injuries[,]" but rather "the result of severe trauma," occurring
twenty-four to forty-eight hours before they were inflicted. Citing N.J.S.A. 9:6-
8.46(a)(2),2 the judge determined the Division presented prima facie evidence
2
Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.46(a)(2):
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that T.P. suffered non-accidental injuries, and defendant and S.S. were "the only
two [people] who had access to the child" during the twenty-four to forty-eight
hour period prior to infliction of his injuries. On that basis, the judge determined
the Division satisfied its burden of production, thereby shifting the burden of
proof to the parents to prove non-culpability. See In re D.T., 229 N.J. Super.
509, 517 (App. Div. 1988) (recognizing where, as here, there is limited access
to a child in a Title Nine litigation, especially an infant, the burden shifts to
those with access to prove non-culpability); see also N.J. Div. of Youth &
Family Servs. v. S.S., 275 N.J. Super. 173, 179 (App Div. 1994).
The next day, in lieu of presenting evidence to demonstrate he was not
responsible for T.P.'s injuries, defendant submitted to the court a "voluntary
stipulation[/]admission to child abuse or neglect" form, which he signed after
reviewing the form with counsel. 3 After extensive colloquy with defendant to
ensure he understood the nature and import of his decision, defendant admitted
[P]roof of injuries sustained by a child or of the
condition of a child of such a nature as would ordinarily
not be sustained or exist except by reason of the acts or
omissions of the parent or guardian shall be prima facie
evidence that a child of, or who is the responsibility of
such person is an abused or neglected child[.]
3
Defendant did not include the form in his appendix.
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he "engaged in acts that resulted in injuries to [his] son that constituted abus e or
neglect[.]" Following the testimony, the judge held defendant's conduct was
sufficient to sustain a finding of abuse or neglect under N.J.S.A. 9:6-
8.21(c)(4)(b). A stipulation order consistent with the judge's findings was
entered that day.
In February 2017, defendant filed a motion to vacate the stipulation.
Because the motion failed to include an "affidavit[] made on personal
knowledge" pursuant to Rule 1:6-6, the judge denied the motion without
prejudice by order entered on March 6, 2017. In doing so, however, the judge
also found the record supported the factual basis for defendant's stipulation.
Noting the Division presented extensive testimony the day before defendant
entered his stipulation, the court recognized T.P.'s injuries were "fresh i n
everyone's mind" when G.P. "stipulate[d] that he handled the child in such a way
as he caused injury to the child."
On March 24, 2017, defendant filed a second motion to vacate his
stipulation, which was supported by his affidavit. 4 During the permanency
hearing conducted that date, defense counsel informed the court that he had
"learned two days [prior] that [defendant] was indicted [by a] Passaic County
4
Defendant did not include the affidavit in his appendix.
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[grand jury] for two counts of cruelty and neglect of children." Apparently, the
indictment had been returned in January 2017. Defense counsel told the judge
he would not have permitted defendant to stipulate to a finding of abuse or
neglect had he known defendant was facing criminal charges. He further
claimed the Division misled defendant to believe criminal charges would not be
pursued. On the return date for the motion, the judge rejected defendant's
argument, citing Thompson's testimony, which clearly indicated the PCPO was
preparing the case for presentation to a grand jury. An order was entered on
July 14, 2017.
On August 30, 2017, the judge denied defendant's ensuing motion for
reconsideration, recognizing defendant's motions to withdraw his stipulation
were motivated by his criminal charges, and his factual basis was legally
sufficient. The court also terminated the litigation, and the family was reunified.
This appeal followed.
II.
Our standard of review is well settled. We are bound by the family court's
factual findings if supported by sufficient credible evidence. N.J. Div. of Youth
& Family Servs. v. I.H.C., 415 N.J. Super. 551, 577-78 (App. Div. 2010). We
accord particular deference to the family court's fact-finding because of the
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court's "special expertise" in family matters, its "feel of the case," and its
opportunity to assess credibility based on witnesses' demeanor. N.J. Div. of
Youth & Family Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 104 (2008); Cesare v. Cesare, 154
N.J. 394, 412-13 (1998).
Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4), an abused or neglected child includes:
[A] child whose physical, mental, or emotional
condition has been impaired or is in imminent danger
of becoming impaired as the result of the failure of his
parent . . . to exercise a minimum degree of care . . . (b)
in providing the child with proper supervision or
guardianship, by unreasonably inflicting or allowing to
be inflicted harm, or substantial risk thereof[.]
The Division "must prove that the child is 'abused or neglected' by a
preponderance of the evidence, and only through the admission of 'competent,
material and relevant evidence.'" N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. P.W.R.,
205 N.J. 17, 32 (2011) (quoting N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.46(b)). The statute requires a
court to consider harm or risk of harm to the child, as opposed to the intent of
the abuser, because "[t]he main goal of Title [Nine] is to protect children 'from
acts or conditions which threaten their welfare.'" G.S. v. Dep't of Human Servs.,
157 N.J. 161, 176 (1999) (citation omitted). Further, the phrase "minimum
degree of care," as used in N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4)(b), means conduct that is not
"grossly or wantonly negligent." Id. at 178. Therefore, to show a failure to
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exercise a minimum degree of care, negligence is not sufficient, but intentional
behavior is not essential. Id. at 178-79.
In New Jersey Division of Youth & Family Services v. J.Y., 352 N.J.
Super. 245, 265-66 (App. Div. 2002), we held that a
stipulation must be definite and certain in its terms and
the consent of the parties to be bound by it must be
clearly established. A factual stipulation in an abuse or
neglect case must conform to these same standards.
That is, the judge must be satisfied that there is a factual
basis from which to conclude that defendants have
committed some specific act or acts which constitute
abuse or neglect as defined in N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c) and
that the parents willingly, knowingly and voluntarily
agree that they have committed these acts.
[(Citations omitted).]
In considering defendant's contentions in light of the controlling authority,
we begin with a review of the process by which his stipulation was obtained. At
the onset of the June 28, 2016 proceeding, defendant advised the judge he
wished to enter a stipulation in lieu of presenting evidence to rebut the
presumption that T.P. only could have been injured while in his custody. At that
point in the proceedings, the Division had presented all of its evidence.
Prior to accepting defendant's stipulation, the judge engaged in extensive
questioning and explanatory discussions with defendant, ensuring he understood
the nature of his decision to stipulate. At the conclusion of the judge's inquiry,
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defendant acknowledged he was "prepared to provide the [c]ourt with [a] factual
basis for [his] admission of abuse or neglect." Clearly, at that point in the
proceedings, defendant was well aware of the Division's complaint alleging
abuse or neglect for the injuries sustained by T.P. in March 2016, which led to
the child's hospitalization. Having heard the testimony of Dr. Espana the
previous day, defendant was fully aware of the extent of T.P.'s injuries.
Defendant also had the opportunity to view his video-recorded statement and
hear Thompson's testimony concerning his incredible demonstration.
Against that factual and procedural backdrop, defendant admitted he
"engaged in acts that resulted in injuries to [his] son that constituted abuse or
neglect." While defendant correctly notes the stipulation does not reference the
date, time, location or specific act, there can be no doubt that his stipulation
refers to the one incident referenced in his complaint, about which substantial
testimony was adduced at the hearing the previous day. Cf. State v. Mitchell,
126 N.J. 565, 581 (1992) (where the Court recognized when considering a guilty
plea in a criminal case, trial courts are permitted to consider the "surrounding
circumstances").
Immediately after defendant acknowledged he abused or neglected T.P.,
the judge set forth his findings. In particular, the judge found defendant's
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stipulation was made knowingly, willingly, and voluntarily. The judge
elaborated:
[Defendant] understands that there is no promise
that has been made to him in exchange for the
stipulation that he [i]s offering[; t]hat he understands
his right to a fact finding. In fact, he was here. We spent
several hours going through the process of fact finding.
The Division . . . put[] on witnesses[, whom c]ounsel
cross-examined. In fact, we came to the close of the
[Division]'s case where I announced my belief that
there had been at least a prima facie showing sufficient
to shift the burden to the parents to come forward with
exculpatory evidence.
The judge ultimately determined defendant's stipulation acknowledged his
"conduct caused injury" which "constitutes abuse [or] neglect" under N.J.S.A.
9:6-8.21(c)(4)(b).
Nonetheless, defendant claims J.Y. supports his argument that the judge
failed "to make any specific factual findings" and "relied instead on an
amorphous stipulation by the parties . . . ." 352 N.J. Super. at 263. This case,
however, is unlike J.Y., where the court in an abuse or neglect fact-finding
hearing relied on the attorneys' factual representations outside their personal
knowledge, heard from unsworn witnesses not subject to cross-examination, and
relied on vague and unsupported stipulations of the parties. Id. at 264. Instead,
having heard the sworn testimony of the Division's witnesses, who were subject
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to cross-examination the day before he entered his stipulation, defendant
admitted he "engaged in acts that resulted in injuries" to T.P. "that constituted
abuse or neglect" regarding one incident alleged in the Division's verified
complaint.
Moreover, the record contains substantial credible evidence to support the
judge's finding of abuse or neglect. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. L.L.,
201 N.J. 210, 226 (2010); see also N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v.
Y.A., 437 N.J. Super. 541, 546 (App. Div. 2014). Indeed, the judge summarized
the evidence at the conclusion of the Division's case-in-chief, finding Dr. Espana
was "highly credible." Accordingly, he found persuasive her testimony that
T.P.'s "injuries occurred, within [twenty-four] to [forty-eight] hours" of his
hospitalization. Further,
The parents indicated to everyone with whom they
spoke, whether it was the P[CPO], the Division worker,
. . . the hospital personnel, Dr. Espana, that in that
critical [twenty-four] to [forty-eight] . . . hour time
period, the two of them were the only two who had
access to the child, that provided care and supervision
for the child. . . .
Here we have that limited number of caretakers,
in a very defined period of time, who were the only
caretakers for the child.
So, these injuries . . . are not spontaneous
injuries. . . . These are injuries that [Dr. Espana]
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believes are inflicted, or are non-accidental. That is to
say, the result of severe trauma, acceleration and
deceleration trauma.
At the very least, this evidence supports a finding that defendant abused
or neglected T.P. by failing "to exercise a minimum degree of care . . . in
providing the child with proper supervision or guardianship, by unreasonably
inflicting or allowing to be inflicted harm" on the child. N.J.S.A. 9:6-
8.21(c)(4)(b). We therefore see no reason to disturb the judge's finding that
defendant's conduct constituted a finding of abuse or neglect under N.J.S.A. 9:6-
8.21(c)(4)(b).
We conclude the judge complied with the controlling decisional law that
addresses stipulations in Title Nine abuse or neglect proceedings. From our
review of the record, defendant established a factual basis for his stipulation,
and the surrounding circumstances underscored the judge's conclusion that
defendant committed an act which constituted abuse or neglect.
We have considered defendant's remaining arguments and conclude they
lack sufficient merit to warrant further discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-
3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
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