STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. REGINA WOODS (12-09-2397 AND 14-05-1372, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0905-17T4
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
REGINA WOODS, a/k/a REGINA
BUTLER, JOEL E. CONTRERAS,
REGINA DAVIS, SINCLAIR DAVIS,
REGINA O. HUNTER, RHONDA
KATES, REGINA LANIER, REGINA
PETTIS, PETTIS R. REGINA, REGINA
O. SINCLAIR, LYNETTE O. WALKER,
GINA WOODS, LANER WOODS, and
REGINA W. WOODS,
Defendant-Appellant.
__________________________________
Submitted November 8, 2018 – Decided August 27, 2019
Before Judges Fuentes and Moynihan.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Camden County, Accusation Nos. 12-09-
2397 and 14-05-1372.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Frank M. Gennaro, Designated Counsel, on
the brief).
Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for
respondent (Adam David Klein, Deputy Attorney
General, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Regina Woods appeals from the order of the Criminal Part
denying her post-conviction relief (PCR) petition without conducting an
evidentiary hearing. Defendant argues the PCR judge erred in denying her
request for an evidentiary hearing because she presented sufficient evidence to
establish a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel based on her
attorney's failure to present evidence of her history of mental illness. According
to defendant, her defense counsel should have argued her mental illness
constituted evidence of diminished capacity on the issue of culpability or as a
mitigating factor at sentencing. After reviewing the record developed by the
parties, we affirm.
On September 12, 2012, defendant waived her right to grand jury review
and pled guilty to an accusation charging her with third degree tampering with
public records, N.J.S.A. 2C:28-7(a)(2). Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement,
the State recommended that the court sentence defendant to a five-year term of
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probation. On June 14, 2013, the court sentenced defendant to a five-year term
of probation in accordance with the plea agreement. On September 27, 2013,
nearly three and one half months after she was placed on probation, defendant
pled guilty to violation of probation (VOP). The court sentenced defendant that
same day to continued probation, conditioned on serving 364 days in the
Camden County Jail.
On September 28, 2013, the day after defendant was sentenced on the
VOP, officers from the Camden County Police Department responded to a fire
at a residential building. A man identified as Lawyer Glenn informed the police
officers that "he was in the bed . . . when his girlfriend, Regina Woods, came
into the 2nd floor rear bedroom and began to douse him and the sheets in lighter
fluid." When Mr. Glenn asked defendant: "What are you doing?" He said
defendant responded: "Nobody cared about her and lit a match and threw it
towards Mr. Glenn causing a fire to erupt."
Mr. Glenn was able to remove and discard the sheet by throwing it off the
balcony, and run out of the building as the fire raged. He was not physically
injured and was able to alert the remaining residents. He told the police officers
at the scene that defendant ran out of the building while wearing a b ackpack.
The police saw defendant at the scene of the fire accompanied by a friend named
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Stephanie Green. The officers transported both women to the police station for
questioning. At 1:36 a.m., on September 29, 2013, defendant waived her
constitutional rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and
admitted to setting the fire.
On May 2, 2014, defendant, represented by counsel, entered into a
negotiated agreement with the State through which she pled guilty to an
accusation that charged her with committing second degree arson under N.J.S.A.
2C:17-1(a). In return, the State agreed to recommend the court sentence
defendant to a term of ten years, with an eighty-five percent period of parole
ineligibility and five years of parole supervision, as mandated by the No Early
Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. The State further agreed to
recommend that this sentence run concurrent to a five-year custodial term for
violating the terms of her probation.
The judge who presided over the plea hearing noted the ten-year sentence
subject to NERA was the maximum sentence that can be imposed for this type
of second degree crime. In response, the prosecutor noted for the record that
under the plea agreement, the State was forgoing its right to present evidence to
a grand jury to charge defendant with attempted murder of Mr. Glenn.
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Furthermore, based on her criminal history, defendant was eligible for a
discretionary extended term. The plea agreement also eliminated this risk.
Defendant provided the following factual basis in support of her guilty
plea to second degree arson:
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Regina, on September 28th,
2013 you were in the City of Camden, correct?
DEFENDANT: Yes.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: And at that time you started a
fire inside [a residential building at] Danenhower
Street, correct?
DEFENDANT: Yes.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: And you did that by spreading
some lighter fluid in that apartment and lighting it on
fire, right?
DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: And in doing so, you knew that
you were placing another person in danger, specifically
Lawyer Glenn, right?
DEFENDANT: Yes.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: In danger of death or bodily
injury?
DEFENDANT: Yes.
....
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THE PROSECUTOR: Ms. Woods, you knew that
Lawyer Glenn was present in the room where you
squirted that lighter fluid, is that correct?
DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE PROSECUTOR: And in fact, you squirted that
lighter fluid on the bed where he was in the bed at the
time, correct?
DEFENDANT: Yes.
The court sentenced defendant on June 6, 2014 to a ten-year term of
imprisonment subject to NERA on the charge of second degree arson, and a
concurrent five-year term on the VOP, in accordance with the terms of the plea
agreement. Defendant appealed the sentence through the summary procedural
process codified in Rule 2:9-11. In these proceedings, defendant's appellate
counsel urged this court to remand the matter for resentencing because the
sentencing judge did not consider that defendant "was on anti-psychotic and
anti-depressant medication" at the time she committed second degree arson.
Appellate counsel argued that these factors were not considered by the
sentencing judge "principally because there's absolutely no argument on her
behalf by her attorney at sentencing[,]" in violation of State v. Hess, 207 N.J.
123 (2011). When viewed in this context, appellate counsel claimed that
defendant's history of psychiatric problems, together with the medication she
was taking at the time, would have supported a finding of mitigating factor
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N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(4), which allows the court to consider whether: "There
were substantial grounds tending to excuse or justify the defendant’s conduct,
though failing to establish a defense[.]"
This court rejected defendant's argument and affirmed the sentence
imposed by the trial court. State v. Woods, No. A-3945-14 (October 28, 2015).
We cited State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57 (2014), and held that the trial judge "gave
detailed reasons to support the sentence in accordance with the plea agreement."
Although not expressly stated, we also implicitly distinguished the facts in this
case from the salient facts the Court found violated the defendant's right to
effective assistance of counsel in Hess. 207 N.J. at 123.
Specifically, in Hess, the terms of the plea agreement required the
defendant "to concede that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating
factors; and to agree that neither she nor her attorney would seek a lesser term
of imprisonment." Id. at 129. Thus, despite possessing evidence that the
defendant "suffered from Battered Women's Syndrome when she killed her
husband, [defense] counsel offered no mitigating evidence in support of a lesser
sentence." Ibid. Based on these facts, the Court held:
[T]he constraints embedded in the terms of the plea
agreement--drafted by the State and accepted by
defense counsel--denied the court of arguments that
may have shed light on relevant sentencing factors and
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how they should be weighed. The terms of that plea
agreement were incompatible with our holding in State
v. Warren, 115 N.J. 433 (1989), and the decision in
State v. Briggs, 349 N.J. Super. 496 (App. Div. 2002),
and impinged not only on the role of counsel at
sentencing, but also on the role of our courts as
independent arbiters of justice.
[Id. at 129-30.]
Here, the record of the plea hearing shows the plea agreement negotiated
by the parties did not impose any restraints on defendant's right to argue for a
lesser sentence at the time of sentencing. The record of the sentencing hearing
shows the judge apprised defendant of her rights to appeal and asked her whether
there were any corrections or misstatements in the Presentence Investigation
Report. The judge also expressly asked defense counsel if he had "anything
further before I proceed with sentencing?" Defense counsel responded: "No,
Judge."
On May 24, 2016, defendant filed this PCR petition pro se. The court
assigned counsel to represent defendant in the prosecution of the petition and
the matter came for oral argument before Judge Kathleen M. Delaney on August
17, 2017. After considering the argument of counsel, Judge Delaney denied
defendant's petition. The judge applied the relevant legal standard and found no
factual or legal grounds to warrant conducting an evidentiary hearing.
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Defendant raises the following arguments in this appeal.
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING POST-
CONVICTION RELIEF WITHOUT AFFORDING
DEFENDANT AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING.
A. Failure to Investigate Defendant's
Mental Health.
B. The Failure to File a Miranda Motion.
C. Ineffective Assistance at Sentencing.
We review a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under the two-
prong test established by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and subsequently adopted by our Supreme
Court in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987). First, defendant must demonstrate
that defense counsel's performance was deficient. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
Second, he must show there exists "a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different." Id. at 694. In determining a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
in a case in which a defendant pleads guilty, "the issue is whether it is ineffective
assistance of counsel for counsel to provide misleading, material information
that results in an uninformed plea, and whether that occurred here." State v.
Nunez-Valdez, 200 N.J. 129, 139-40 (2009).
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Here, defendant was fully informed of the terms of the plea agreement and
confirmed her understanding of those terms. Defendant's history of psychiatric
issues and whether that fact should have been brought to the sentencing judge's
attention as a mitigating factor was raised on direct appeal and rejected by this
court. Defendant is thus barred from re-litigating this issue in a PCR petition.
R. 3:22-4. Furthermore, in rejecting defendant's petition, Judge Delaney
correctly noted:
In this petition Ms. Woods fails to show a prima facie
evidence of a possible defense that was available to her
before she pleaded guilty. Petitioner’s expert report is
solely based on the petitioner’s statements from one
interview and from her medical records. The expert did
not conduct any independent investigation to verify her
statements or discuss her mental health with her current
treating physician.
We discern no legal or factual basis to disturb Judge Delaney's carefully
reasoned oral opinion denying defendant's PCR petition.
Affirmed.
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