KATHLEEN D. SEERGY VS. FRANK H. RICKER (L-1244-16, MORRIS COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1412-19
KATHLEEN D. SEERGY
and MICHAEL J. SEERGY,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
v.
FRANK H. RICKER, D.D.S.,
D.M.D., and FRANK H.
RICKER, P.A.,
Defendants-Appellants.
___________________________
Argued September 13, 2021 – Decided October 15, 2021
Before Judges Fasciale and Firko.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Morris County, Docket No. L-1244-16.
Jennine DiSomma argued the cause for appellants
(Saiber, LLC, attorneys; Jennine DiSomma and Sean R.
Kelly, of counsel and on the briefs; Brian J. Frederick,
on the briefs). 1
1
Defendants' appellate counsel did not try the case.
Bruce H. Nagel argued the cause for respondents
(Nagel Rice, LLP, attorneys; Bruce H. Nagel and Susan
Fetten Connors, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendants Frank H. Ricker, D.D.S., D.M.D., and Frank H. Ricker, P.A.
(collectively defendants) appeal from an October 8, 2019 final judgment entered
after a jury trial in this dental malpractice action and a November 22, 2019 order
denying their motion for a new trial. Following our review of the record, we
reverse both orders in part and remand for a new trial on the issues of liability
and proximate cause only.2
2
On September 22, 2021, we received a motion filed by plaintiffs seeking leave
to submit a letter brief in further opposition to defendants' appeal. At the time
of oral argument, plaintiffs' counsel requested permission to submit an
additional brief opposing the appeal, which we denied. Nevertheless, the motion
was filed. In support of the motion, plaintiffs' counsel certified that additional
case law would assist us in adjudicating the issues on appeal. On September 24,
2021, we received defendants' opposition to plaintiffs' motion, both procedurally
and on the merits. By way of a separate order, we granted plaintiffs' motion.
We conclude that the legal contentions set forth in plaintiffs' motion lack
sufficient merit to warrant discussion in this written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
We add, however, that our Supreme Court's holding in Stigliano v. Connaught
Labs., Inc., 140 N.J. 305 (1995) is controlling, and we distinguish the belated
arguments raised in plaintiffs' motion herein.
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I.
We derive the following facts from the record. Plaintiff 3 Kathleen D.
Seergy, age sixty-three, sought treatment to repair her loose dental bridge, which
was inserted after tooth #29 (the lower right second bicuspid) was extracted.
Her general dentist, Dr. Donald Callahan, referred her to an oral surgeon, Dr.
Steven J. Silverman, who recommended extraction of two teeth to be replaced
with dental implants. Plaintiff sought a second opinion from Dr. Ricker, a
periodontist. On September 9, 2015, plaintiff was evaluated by Dr. Ricker in
order to determine whether tooth #30 (the lower right first molar), which was
fitted with a crown, could be replaced with an implant. X-rays showed no active
infection. Dr. Ricker ordered a CT scan of plaintiff's lower jaw, which was
taken on September 21, 2015.
At her second consultation visit on October 7, 2015, Dr. Ricker reviewed
plaintiff's CT scan, which revealed "a large" amount of space at the end of one
of the roots of tooth #30 that had been recommended for extraction. Typically,
there is a millimeter amount of space underneath the tooth area and plaintiff had
8.5 millimeters between the end of the root and nerve. Dr. Ricker testified it
3
We use the terms plaintiff and plaintiffs interchangeably in this opinion.
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was important to avoid injury to plaintiff's inferior alveolar nerve (IAN), which
is a protective covering or "tubing" that protects the nerve structure and blood
vessels. Dr. Ricker testified that this type of void is indicative of an infection
and prescribed an antibiotic. He noted that the bone surrounding the tooth root
had "integrated" or "fused" to the tooth.
Dr. Ricker's treatment plan included extracting tooth #30, placing
implants in the lower right mandible where tooth #29 had been previously
extracted and where tooth #30 was, and placing a bridge over the implants. On
October 14, 2015, plaintiff underwent an extraction of tooth #30, which lasted
over four hours. According to Dr. Ricker, he encountered difficulty because
bone surrounding the tooth was fused to its roots. The roots had fractured into
multiple pieces during the extraction and were removed individually by Dr.
Ricker after he sectioned the tooth in half. He took an intraoperative x-ray of
plaintiff's jaw "to see how the procedure was going, where the root fragments
were, and what the bone looked like around those root fragments."
Dr. Ricker testified "at one point [he] decided that there were still maybe
some fragments in there but that the procedure had gone long . . . [he] did [not]
want to stress [plaintiff] any further" and "it wasn't absolutely critical to get
those fragments out at that point." He resumed drilling, removed more bone
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from plaintiff's jaw, and placed a bone graft in the socket to "promote[] healing
of the bone" and "act[] as scaffolding for new bone cells to be able to move into
that empty space." At the conclusion of the procedure, plaintiff developed facial
numbness.
The next day, plaintiff advised Dr. Ricker 4 she had "no bleeding, minimal
swelling, minimal pain, and . . . some sense of numbness." Plaintiff described
the numbness extended from "the midline of [her] lip all the way over []" to
where the dental procedure had been performed. Dr. Ricker assured her that
some swelling and numbness may occur but "should dissipate quickly" in
"maybe six months." The numbness persisted and did not dissipate.
About seven-to-ten days later, plaintiff met her husband, Michael J.
Seergy, in Paris. While attempting to chew on a piece of bread, plaintiff heard
a cracking sound in her jawbone near the surgical site. Over the next few days,
she experienced "throbbing, shooting pains . . . from [her] jaw." After returning
home, plaintiff called Dr. Ricker's office to schedule an emergency appointment
and was referred to a covering oral surgeon, Dr. Jon Bartlett, because defendant
was on vacation.
4
Plaintiff claims she called Dr. Ricker, and he contends it was the other way
around. This is not germane to our analysis.
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On November 2, 2015, Dr. Bartlett examined plaintiff, took an x-ray, and
a Cone Beam Computed Tomography scan (CBCT), which revealed a fracture
line within her jawbone. Dr. Bartlett prescribed antibiotics and referred plaintiff
to Dr. Vincent Ziccardi, an oral and maxillofacial surgeon, to address her facial
numbness, since he was a specialist in nerve repair.
On November 19, 2015, plaintiff was examined by Dr. Ziccardi
complaining of "numbness and pain in the right jaw" from the tooth extraction.
That day, Dr. Ziccardi ordered a CT scan and performed neurosensory testing,
which confirmed a loss of sensory function and an injury to the IAN . His
treatment plan included debridement of the infected bone and a nerve
decompression or repair.
On January 8, 2016, Dr. Ziccardi performed nerve regeneration surgery
on plaintiff in an attempt to restore her sensation and function. He removed the
second molar, which was nonviable and a potential source of infection. His
surgical note stated that "[t]he inferior alveolar nerve was visualized in the
canal[,] which was unroofed by pre-existing surgical defect. The superior aspect
of the nerve was exposed . . . ." Following the procedure, plaintiff had partial
sensation to her face restored, but she continues to experience painful reactions
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to items touching her face, a kiss, or the sensation of an electrical shock. Dr.
Ziccardi followed up with plaintiff for nine or ten months.
On June 3, 2016, plaintiff filed a complaint alleging defendants were
"negligent, careless, reckless and deviated from accepted standards of dental
practice." Her husband sued per quod. Defendants filed an answer to the
complaint, and the parties exchanged discovery. During the six-day jury trial,
the trial court barred defendants from playing a portion of the videotaped
deposition of Dr. Ziccardi because the court determined that proximate cause
was not an issue in the case. Plaintiff's counsel contended Dr. Ziccardi refused
to speak to him ahead of the deposition and rendered a surprise and "extremely
prejudicial" opinion that her nerve injury resulted from an inflammation
secondary to osteomyelitis pre-dating defendants' extraction procedure.
Defendants countered by claiming: (1) Dr. Ziccardi's operative report,
which was exchanged during the discovery period, refers to osteomyelitis, or
bone infection, as part of his preoperative and postoperative diagnoses; and (2)
Dr. Ziccardi treated plaintiff after the procedure at issue, therefore, the jury was
entitled to consider information he might provide about her condition.
In its decision, the trial court highlighted that it was plaintiffs, not
defendants, who chose to conduct the videotaped deposition of Dr. Ziccardi after
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the scheduled trial date, and neither party listed him as a witness. Defense
counsel's request to redact portions of Dr. Ziccardi's deposition testimony that
included the presentation of certain photographs prompted the court to state:
I'm just saying frankly it's so late in the game . . . and
both parties want limitation placed on very brief
testimony.
If I were going to allow it at all, I'd probably allow the
whole thing as opposed to sit[ting] and spend[ing] more
time arguing about a [thirty]-minute deposition over the
limitations. You don't want the photographs. He
doesn't want the opinion. And when all is said and
done, my reaction is just not to allow it at all.
....
You know, when you're surprised at the time of trial,
it's a problem because your expert is not going to be in
a position to meet it. And that's what happened. Now,
who's to say when the osteomyelitis developed? But
for the first time Dr. Ziccardi brings it into the time that
the surgical procedure by Dr. Ricker was done.
....
He brings it in at that point, not subsequent to that point
but at that point. And it combines with, you know, a
surgical defect to create the problem that we have here.
....
And you're trying to put new material in at the tail end
of the case that you had no interest in along the way and
had no interest in in terms of calling Dr. Ziccardi as a
witness at trial. I don't know whether you tried to talk
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to him or not, but apparently[,] he's not receptive to
having conversations with counsel with respect to
anybody that he's treated, and that's unfortunately
something that happens.
In my view, treating physicians should make
themselves available to testify. We try to meet them
half-way if we can on schedule, because none of them
want to come in. But to say you won't come in, which
does happen, there are others that do the same thing and
then not even talk to counsel leaves you in a position
where surprise is going to occur if it's done at the last
minute.
This was totally a last-minute examination that we’ve
spent more time arguing about than was taken in terms
of the deposition itself, which was probably under
[thirty] minutes and only led to a question or two by
[defense counsel] about a second molar that was
removed.
So, I mean, you had no interest in this guy until then,
and when you got a favorable opinion, you now want to
bring it out. I'm saying we're not going to play it at all.
The court granted plaintiffs' motion to preclude the use of Dr. Ziccardi's
videotaped deposition in its entirety at trial.
Plaintiff's expert, Dr. Avrum Goldstein, testified as an expert periodontist.
He detailed the anatomical periodontal structures while referencing a visual aid
and explained the relationship between the IAN and the canal protecting the
nerve. Dr. Goldstein opined plaintiff had an anatomical anomaly—at least eight
millimeters of bone between the ends of the roots of her teeth and the canal that
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protect the IAN—as compared to the two millimeters of space most individuals
have.
Dr. Goldstein also showed the jury the x-rays taken by Dr. Callahan and
the x-ray taken by Dr. Ricker during the extraction. Based upon the x-rays and
materials he reviewed, Dr. Goldstein testified that the dark area at the end of the
root, a "radiolucency," was not necessarily indicative of an infection because
plaintiff did not complain of any symptoms of an infection. He then compared
the CT scans taken by Dr. Ricker and Dr. Bartlett and stated there was "an
enormous amount of bone missing" and "significant destruction of [the] bone"
in two areas. Ultimately, Dr. Goldstein concluded Dr. Ricker perforated
plaintiff's nerve during the extraction, which caused her permanent
neurosensory injury.
Defendants planned to call Dr. Steven Scrivo, a periodontist, to testify as
their expert witness. On the third day of trial, plaintiff's counsel moved to limit
Dr. Scrivo's testimony to the issue of liability only because his two w ritten
reports arguably did not address the issue of causation. Consequently, the trial
court held a Rule 104 hearing regarding the parameters of Dr. Scrivo's two
reports. The court ruled that Dr. Scrivo's reports did not set forth an opinion on
proximate cause; rather, his opinions only addressed standard of care and
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informed consent. As a result, the trial court instructed defense counsel to limit
his questioning of Dr. Scrivo to the issue of standard of care. Specifically, the
court stated:
To the extent that you need to explain whatever it is
about standard of care and that it was proper is fine,
because the opinion is there. And then you can develop
the facts even if it's more extensive than what he said
in his report, which is really relatively brief
considering.
Dr. Scrivo testified before the jury. When asked what the standard of care
was for a periodontist treating a patient like plaintiff, Dr. Scrivo responded,
"[t]he standard of care is what a trained professional would do in a similar
situation." He also testified, consistent with one of his reports, that Dr. Ricker
did not deviate from the standard of care in the execution of the extraction
procedure.
On September 26, 2019, the jury returned a verdict finding that defendants
deviated from the standard of care and proximately caused $1,100,000 in
damages to plaintiff and awarded $233,000 to her husband for his per quod
claim. On October 8, 2019, the court entered an order of final judgment against
defendants for compensatory damages, taxed costs, and pre-judgment interest in
the amount of $1,451,499.69.
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Thereafter, defendants moved for a new trial, arguing: (1) the trial court
erroneously excluded the videotaped deposition of Dr. Ziccardi; (2) plaintiffs'
counsel made improper comments during summation by invoking "the golden
rule"; and (3) the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. The trial court
heard oral argument on defendants' motion for a new trial on November 22,
2019, and rendered an oral opinion on the same date denying the motion. A
memorializing order was entered that day. This appeal followed.
On appeal, defendant raises the following arguments for our
consideration:
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN BARRING
DR. RICKER FROM USING THE
VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITION TESTIMONY OF
PLAINTIFF'S SUBSEQUENT TREATING
PHYSICIAN, DR. ZICCARDI.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN BARRING
DEFENDANTS' EXPERT, DR. SCRIVO,
FROM TESTIFYING AS TO CAUSATION,
AND ALLOWING HIM TO TESTIFY ONLY
AS TO THE STANDARD OF CARE.
A. Dr. Scrivo's Proffered Expert
Testimony Was Admissible Because
It Was Not Designed To Mislead, It
Was No Surprise To Plaintiffs, And
Plaintiffs Would Not Have Been
Prejudiced By Its Admission Into
Evidence.
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B. The Trial Court's Exclusion Of Dr.
Scrivo's Testimony As To Causation
Was Unjust And Unreasonable, And
Constituted Reversible Error.
III. PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL'S IMPROPER
STATEMENTS IN CLOSING ARGUMENT
UNFAIRLY PREJUDICED DEFENDANTS
AND REQUIRES REVERSAL AND REMAND.
A. Plaintiff's Counsel Misstated The
Standard Of Care For Malpractice In
A Professional Sub-Specialty.
B. Plaintiff's Counsel Misstated The
Facts And Distorted The Record.
C. Plaintiff's Counsel Improperly
Invoked The "Golden Rule" In
Explaining The Calculation Of
Damages.
D. Plaintiff's Counsel Improperly
Attributed Bad Faith To Dr. Ricker
For Defending Against Plaintiff's
Claims.
II.
We first address defendant's argument that the trial court erred in barring
Dr. Ziccardi's videotaped deposition testimony. Defendants argue that "Dr.
Ziccardi is the only non-party medical or dental professional" who examined
plaintiff, his testimony is critical because it is not influenced by bias or motive ,
and he is "arguably the most important potential witness in this case." Plaintiff
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contends the trial court properly barred Dr. Ziccardi's testimony because it
contained surprising and highly prejudicial causation opinions.
"A trial court's evidentiary rulings are 'entitled to deference absent a
showing of an abuse of discretion, i.e., there has been a clear error of judgment.'"
Belmont Condo. Ass'n v. Geibel, 432 N.J. Super. 52, 95 (App. Div. 2013)
(quoting State v. Marrero, 148 N.J. 469, 484 (1997)). "On appellate review, a
trial court's evidentiary ruling must be upheld 'unless it can be shown that the
trial court palpably abused its discretion, that is, that its finding was so wide off
the mark that a manifest denial of justice resulted.'" Id. at 95-96 (quoting Green
v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 160 N.J. 480, 492 (1999)). "However, [w]hen the trial
court fails to apply the proper test in analyzing the admissibility of proffered
evidence, [appellate] review is de novo." Konop v. Rosen, 425 N.J. Super. 391,
401 (App. Div. 2012) (first alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
"As fact witnesses, . . . treating doctors may testify about their diagnosis
and treatment of [a plaintiff's] disorder, including their determination of that
disorder's cause." Stigliano, 140 N.J. at 314. "Because the determination of the
cause of a patient's illness is an essential part of diagnosis and treatment, a
treating physician may testify about the cause of a patient's disease or injury."
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Ibid. Once a patient's injury or disease is "in issue," a treating physician may
"testify about the diagnosis and treatment of that injury or disease." Ibid.
A treating healthcare provider may testify as a fact witness about any
subject relevant to the patient's evaluation and treatment if the testimony is
within the provider's personal knowledge and the information that forms the
basis of the testimony is obtained from the patient in the course of the treatment
pursuant to Rule 701. The offering party must provide notice to the opposing
party and comply with discovery requests. Delvecchio v. Twp. of Bridgewater,
224 N.J. 559, 577-80 (2016) (citing Stigliano, 140 N.J. at 314); Carchidi v.
Iavicoli, 412 N.J. Super. 374, 381 (App. Div. 2010); Ginsberg v. St. Michael's
Hosp., 292 N.J. Super. 21, 32 (App. Div. 1996) (holding "[i]t is well settled that
treating physicians may testify as to any subject relevant to the evaluation and
treatment of their patients"). We see "'no reason to distinguish the doctor['s]
testimony as to causation and [the doctor's] testimony as to diagnoses and
prognoses' because '[a]ll arise out of and are inextricably linked to [the
plaintiff]'s treatment.'" Carchidi, 412 N.J. Super. at 381-82 (third and fourth
alterations in original) (quoting Stigliano v. Connaught Labs., Inc., 270 N.J.
Super. 373, 379 (App. Div. 1994)).
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Stigliano was a medical practice and product liability action wherein the
parents of an infant alleged their child developed a seizure disorder after being
immunized against diphtheria, pertussis, and tetanus. 140 N.J. at 307-08. The
defendants sought to introduce videotaped depositions of the infant's treating
physicians, which addressed their opinions on the cause of the seizure disorder.
Id. at 309. The Court held a treating physician may testify about "diagnosis and
treatment," including the physician's determination of the cause of the patient's
malady. Id. at 314. A treating healthcare provider is not inherently an expert
witness, ibid., and "testimony about the likely and unlikely causes of [the
plaintiff's] [diagnosis and treatment] is factual information, albeit in the form of
[an] opinion." Ibid. (citing N.J.R.E. 701). A treating healthcare provider,
however, "is limited to issues relevant to the diagnosis and treatment of [his or
her] patient" unless retained and designated as an expert witness. Delvecchio,
224 N.J. at 579.
In Graham v. Gielchinsky, where the defendant-physician used the
favorable opinion of an expert witness who was originally consulted by the
plaintiff, our Supreme Court held "absent exceptional circumstances, courts
should not admit the opinion testimony of an expert that an adversary consulted
but did not intend to call at trial." Stigliano, 140 N.J. at 312-13 (citing Graham,
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126 N.J. 361, 373 (1995)). However, the Court in Stigliano distinguished a
treating physician from an expert consulted without the intent to call at trial:
In Graham, we were concerned that trial attorneys
might consult fewer experts because of the fear that
"countless claims of malpractice would be leveled
against attorneys who put unfavorable expert evidence
in as part of their clients' case-in-chief." Here,
plaintiffs consulted the treating doctors not for the
purpose of obtaining expert testimony to support their
cause of action, but for treatment. Allowing defendants
to introduce the treating doctors' testimony concerning
causation will not affect either [a plaintiff's] medical
treatment or counsel's search for experts.
....
The treating doctors did not examine [plaintiff] in
anticipation of litigation or in preparation for trial, but
for the purpose of treatment. Unlike an expert retained
to testify at trial, the treating doctors gained no
confidential information about plaintiffs' trial strategy.
[Id. at 313-14 (internal citations omitted).]
Similarly, our Court was "unpersuaded by [the] plaintiff's reliance on
Piller, 194 N.J. Super. 392 (Law Div. 1984), and Serrano v. Levitsky, 215 N.J.
Super. 454 (Law Div. 1986)." Id. at 314. In Piller, where the defendant-
physician called the plaintiff's treating physician as an expert witness regarding
the defendant-physician's negligence, we "held that the physician-patient
relationship precluded a treating physician from testifying that defendant -
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doctors had not deviated from accepted medical standards." Ibid. (citing Piller,
194 N.J. Super. at 399). In Serrano, where the treating physician "insisted on
stating gratuitously that the defendant-doctor was not negligent in this treatment
of the plaintiff," we "found it 'unfair' to admit an unsolicited statement in the
treating physician's report to plaintiff's counsel." Ibid. (citing Serrano, 215 N.J.
Super. at 460). In Stigliano, however, the Court noted that both:
Piller and Serrano differ significantly on the facts. In
those cases, the defendant-doctors sought to ask the
treating physicians not about their treatment of the
plaintiffs, but about the defendant's alleged
malpractice. Here, in contrast, defendants seek to call
the treating doctors to testify about those doctors'
treatment of the . . . plaintiff, including their
determination of the cause of [the patient's] condition
. . . . As distinguished from the doctors in Piller and
Serrano, the treating doctors needed to determine the
cause of [plaintiff's] problems so they could treat [the
plaintiff]. Accordingly, Piller and Serrano do not
prevent the treating doctors from offering their
opinions on the cause of [a plaintiff's] disorder.
[Id. at 315.]
In Stigliano, the Court specifically distinguished a treating healthcare
provider's opinion testimony from Graham, Piller, and Serrano, which
exclusively delt with the use of a treating healthcare provider as an expert
witness. See Graham, 126 N.J. at 362 (reviewing the "use of the opinion
evidence of an expert consulted by an adversary"); Piller, 194 N.J. Super. at 394
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(reviewing "whether the defense should be permitted to call a treating physician
as a liability expert witness at trial"); and Serrano, 215 N.J. Super. at 458(reviewing whether plaintiff is bound by the entire report of his treating
physician's expert report). Therefore, we disagree with plaintiffs' counsel that
Stigliano and its progeny are inapplicable here.
In the matter under review, plaintiff was referred to Dr. Ziccardi "for
evaluation and management of a right [IAN] injury, status post[-]surgical
removal of tooth #30" and continued to follow up with him on "multiple
occasions for nerve monitoring." Dr. Ziccardi evaluated the IAN using a
microscope and removed scar tissue as well as inflamed tissue encompassing the
nerve. Therefore, Stigliano is controlling because plaintiff was evaluated,
treated, and monitored by Dr. Ziccardi relative to a previously identified injury.
Therefore, this matter clearly falls within the Stigliano framework because Dr.
Ziccardi is a subsequent treating healthcare provider. We are unpersuaded by
plaintiff's argument that her expert, Dr. Goldstein, had already testified before
the jury prior to Dr. Ziccardi's videotaped deposition since it was plaintiff's
counsel who arranged for and scheduled Dr. Ziccardi's videotaped deposition.
Here, the evidence showed that the CT scan taken by Dr. Ziccardi revealed
abnormal findings—osteomyelitis—which caused plaintiff's lower right
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jawbone to erode. She also sustained a nerve injury, and Dr. Ziccardi noted "the
nerve was exposed" in that area. When asked by plaintiff's counsel if Dr.
Ricker's surgical procedure contributed to plaintiff's injuries, Dr. Ziccardi
responded, "I can't say for sure because . . . it's several months later." He
testified that the inflammatory tissue was a result of the infectious process.
According to Dr. Ziccardi, plaintiff had approximately a fifty-percent sensory
improvement following his surgery. This is precisely the scenario contemplated
by the holding in Stigliano and its progeny.
Based upon our careful review of the record, we conclude the trial court
erred by barring Dr. Ziccardi's videotaped deposition testimony at trial. Defense
counsel sought to introduce a partially redacted version of Dr. Ziccardi's
testimony, which was brief—only about thirty minutes total in duration. Dr.
Ziccardi's testimony included his independent assessment of the cause of
plaintiff's infectious process, her injuries, and prognosis for the purpose of
diagnosing and addressing her dental issues as her subsequent treating oral and
maxillofacial surgeon. Stigliano, 140 N.J. at 314. Moreover, even without the
videotaped deposition taken by plaintiff's counsel, Dr. Ricker's counsel could
have subpoenaed Dr. Ziccardi to testify at trial under Stigliano, and his opinions
regarding his evaluation, diagnoses, and treatment of plaintiff would have been
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presented to the jury. Since the deposition was taken after the date set for trial,
there was no resulting prejudice to plaintiff because her counsel knew exactly
what Dr. Ziccardi would say, and plaintiff's expert had the benefit of his treating
records. Therefore, we reverse the trial court's ruling barring Dr. Ziccardi's
videotaped deposition. On remand, either party may file a motion or request a
Rule 104 hearing to address any issues potentially involving the presentation of
Dr. Ziccardi's videotaped deposition to the jury consistent with our opinion.
III.
We next address defendants' argument that the trial court erred in barring
defense expert Dr. Scrivo from testifying at trial as to causation and limiting his
testimony to the standard of care. Defense counsel contends Dr. Scrivo's two
written reports contained his opinions relative to the proximate cause of
plaintiff's injury, thereby obviating any prejudice to plaintiff. In response,
plaintiff asserts the trial court properly barred Dr. Scrivo's causation op inions
because his reports only addressed the issue of deviation from the standard of
care and did not render any opinion as to plaintiff's permanent nerve injury.
And, plaintiff contends Dr. Scrivo "never offered any opinion as to whether or
how the nerve was damaged during the procedure." No discovery deposition
was taken of Dr. Scrivo.
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Two rules of evidence govern the admissibility of expert testimony. Rule
702 allows a party to enter opinion testimony from experts qualified in their
fields into evidence, and Rule 703 articulates the requisite foundation for expert
testimony. N.J.R.E. 702, 703. To be admissible, expert opinions must "be
grounded in 'facts or data derived from (1) the expert's personal observations, or
(2) evidence admitted at the trial, or (3) data relied upon by the expert which is
not necessarily admissible in evidence[,] but which is the type of data normally
relied upon by experts.'" Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 53 (2015) (quoting
Polzo v. Cnty. of Essex, 196 N.J. 569, 583 (2008)).
A trial court may preclude expert testimony if a party seeks to introduce
"expert testimony on a subject not covered in the written reports furnished by
an adversary." Congiusti v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 306 N.J. Super. 126, 131 (App.
Div. 1997). However, because the trial court's decision to exclude testimony is
akin to a discovery sanction, Velaquez v. Portadin, 321 N.J. Super. 558, 576
(App. Div. 1999), rev'd on other grounds, 163 N.J. 677 (2000), a trial court may
not automatically exclude testimony crucial to a case without engaging in a
careful review of the following factors: "(1) the absence of a design to mislead,
(2) absence of the element of surprise if the evidence is admitted, and (3)
absence of prejudice which would result from the admission of the evidence."
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Ratner v. General Motors Corp., 241 N.J. Super. 197, 202 (App. Div. 1990)
(quoting Westphal v. Guarino, 163 N.J. Super. 139, 146 (App. Div. 1978)). If
"the testimony in question is 'pivotal' to the case of the party offering the
testimony," then "a court should seek to avoid exclusion where possible."
Wymbs v. Twp. of Wayne, 163 N.J. 523, 544 (2000) (citations omitted).
When the admissibility of evidence such as expert testimony is at issue,
the trial court should conduct a hearing in order to have fuller context in which
to address admissibility issues. See Townsend, 221 N.J. at 54 n.5 ("When [a
trial court] decides a motion to strike an expert report, [it] may conduct a hearing
under [Rule] 104(a)."). Rule 104(a) permits a judge to "hear and determine"
matters relating to the qualification of a person to be a witness, or the
admissibility of evidence outside the presence of the jury. N.J.R.E. 1 04(a).
While the decision to conduct a Rule 104 hearing rests within the discretion of
the trial court, "the sounder practice is to afford the proponent of the expert's
opinion an opportunity to prove its admissibility at a Rule 104 hearing." Kemp
v. State, 174 N.J. 412, 432-33 (2002).
Here, after considering argument on the issue from both parties, the trial
court conducted a Rule 104 hearing in order to clarify what, if any, portion of
Dr. Scrivo's reports set forth his opinions on proximate cause. The trial court
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undertook the bulk of the questioning during the Rule 104 hearing. During the
court's questioning, Dr. Scrivo acknowledged that his opinion on causation
could be construed as ambiguous:
It was in my report. That the . . . infection . . . that was
the whole reason why they take a tooth out, is because
it's infected. I said in the first paragraph it was infected
tooth [#30], and then at the end I said there's pathology
on the roots which extended beyond the roots.
And . . . to me, it's just so obvious when I said there's
pathology on the roots, that's where it is. And it's on
the x-ray. And it's on the CAT scan. And it's [even in]
Dr. Ricker's notes. He said there's significant . . .
periapical pathology. That's why he gave [plaintiff]
amoxicillin ahead of time. That was in his notes. So,
to me, I'm just reading—as a dentist, I'm just reading
something that's just so obvious to me. Maybe I didn't
spell it out, but that's what . . . But I think everything's
there.
[(emphasis added).]
Counsel then had the opportunity to question Dr. Scrivo. At the
conclusion of the Rule 104 hearing, the trial court determined:
Now, there is no opinion here on proximate cause.
There's none. Absolutely none that I [can] see. The
opinions relate to standard of care and informed
consent. Informed consent is out of the case[,] which
leaves only standard of care.
And . . . [Dr. Scrivo] can talk about that to the degree
that he wants to, and I'm not saying he has to use the
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exact words in the report. That opinion is there and the
plaintiff could prepare for it.
You can't prepare for a causation opinion after reading
this report because it's absolutely, totally unclear.
Now, if [plaintiffs' counsel] had chosen to take his
deposition, maybe all of this might have been
elaborated on, but he doesn't have to take the
deposition. He doesn't have to do the work for the
expert or for defense counsel. And nothing was ever
updated to indicate anything about an opinion on
standard of care.
And I've tried to be as clear as I can be even though I'm
not a dental expert. But with respect to this bone loss,
it was either there before the procedure done by Dr.
Ricker, occurred during the procedure, or within two
weeks after the procedure up to and including I guess
the time that Dr. Bartlett did whatever he did, but not
after that.
And if you're saying it didn't occur during the
procedure, fine. That's your position. Then it was
either before or after. But if it's before, there is no
indication that Dr. Ricker treated the patient based on
what . . . was shown to him before that was serious bone
loss that I know of.
....
I'm always reluctant to bar an expert from saying
something. But I see no basis for the opinion that he
apparently wants to give with respect to causation.
Consequently, the trial court ruled that Dr. Scrivo's testimony would be limited
to his opinions on Dr. Ricker's compliance with the standard of care.
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We disagree with the trial court's conclusion that Dr. Scrivo did not opine
as to proximate cause. The content of Dr. Scrivo's first report, served on May
15, 2018, references plaintiff's dental records, which refer to the infection of
tooth #30 prior to the extraction procedure. And Dr. Scrivo stated in his first
report: "If there is pathology on the roots, as was the case, there is no bone past
the apex and there is little bone above the canal." Therefore, we are convinced
that plaintiff had a reasonable expectation Dr. Scrivo would testify at trial she
had a preexisting infection in her jaw unrelated to Dr. Ricker's surgery, which
arguably was a proximate cause of her resulting injuries.
Moreover, the record shows Dr. Scrivo disagreed with plaintiff's expert,
Dr. Goldstein, who opined that Dr. Ricker damaged the nerve while drilling. Dr.
Scrivo explained Dr. Ziccardi's records made no mention of nerve severance ,
and based upon that observation, Dr. Scrivo opined an infectious process most
likely caused the nerve canal damage. In addition, Dr. Scrivo pointed out that
Dr. Callahan's records stated tooth #30 was infected. In his supplemental expert
report, Dr. Scrivo again addressed the issue of proximate cause.
In light of these evidentiary errors, we are compelled to reverse the trial
court's determination barring Dr. Scrivo from testifying as to the issue of
proximate cause. Defendants have shown that the trial court's decision
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regarding the admission of the proffered evidence was "made without a rational
explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, [and] rested on an
impermissible basis." Milne v. Goldenberg, 428 N.J. Super. 184, 197 (App. Div.
2012) (quoting Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002)).
Compounding the error, the trial court should have allowed Dr. Scrivo to rely
upon Dr. Ziccardi's records as the subsequent treating surgeon. Therefore, on
remand, Dr. Scrivo shall be permitted to testify on the issue of proximate cause
consistent with the four corners of his two reports and his Rule 104 testimony.
IV.
Lastly, defendants argue that the trial court permitted plaintiffs' counsel
to make several improper statements during summation, warranting a new trial.
Specifically, defendants claim plaintiffs' counsel: (1) misstated the standard of
care for malpractice in a professional sub-specialty; (2) distorted the record by
stating defendants claimed Dr. Ricker complied with the standard of care;
prescribed antibiotics prophylactically; and knew he did something wrong due
to plaintiff's bleeding during the procedure; (3) wrongly invoked the "golden
rule"; and (4) improperly attributed bad faith to Dr. Ricker for defending against
plaintiffs' claims.
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Generally, "[c]ounsel is to be given 'broad latitude' in summation."
Diakamopoulos v. Monmouth Med. Ctr., 312 N.J. Super. 20, 32 (App. Div.
1998) (citation omitted). Counsel may urge the jury to "draw conclusions even
if the inferences that the jury is asked to make are improbable, perhaps illogical,
erroneous or even absurd, unless they are couched in language transcending the
bounds of legitimate argument, or there are no grounds for them in evidence."
Spedick v. Murphy, 266 N.J. Super. 573, 590-91 (App. Div. 1993) (citations
omitted). Counsel's latitude, however, is not without limit because
"[s]ummation commentary . . . must be based in truth, and counsel may not
'misstate the evidence nor distort the factual picture.'" Bender v. Adelson, 187
N.J. 411, 431 (2006) (quoting Colucci v. Oppenheim, 326 N.J. Super. 166, 177
(App. Div. 1999)). Furthermore, counsel's comments "must be restrained within
the facts shown or reasonably suggested by the evidence adduced."
Diakamopoulos, 312 N.J. Super. at 32 (quoting Condella v. Cumberland Farms,
Inc., 298 N.J. Super. 531, 534 (1996)).
Defendants contend plaintiffs' counsel distorted the standard of care,
highlighting the following portion of plaintiffs' summation:
Today, you will decide what good and acceptable
medicine is. Good, and acceptable dentistry is, for our
community. The standard of care, as defined by the
experts, is good and acceptable dentistry, which is
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applicable in our community. So you will decide
whether the treatment that Dr. Ricker rendered in the
extraction of the tooth, you will decide whether that is
good and acceptable, and whether you want that for
your friends, your neighbors, your family.
You will decide whether he committed malpractice.
You will decide whether or not a dental procedure to
remove a single tooth, and then put a post in the bone,
and do an implant, which resulted in permanent nerve
injury, and permanent destruction of [plaintiff]'s jaw, is
good and acceptable medicine, and good and acceptable
dental care. That's what you're going to decide.
Our Court has stated:
[i]t is generally recognized that in the ordinary medical
malpractice case "the standard of practice to which [the
defendant-practitioner] failed to adhere must be
established by expert testimony," and that a jury
generally lacks the "requisite special knowledge,
technical training and background to be able to
determine the applicable standard of care without the
assistance of an expert."
[Rosenberg v. Cahill, 99 N.J. 318, 325 (1985) (second
alteration in original) (quoting Sanzari v. Rosenfeld, 34
N.J. 128, 134-35 (1961)).]
The trial court then charged the jury in accord with our Court's precedent
and Model Jury Charges (Civil), 5.50A "Duty and Negligence" (approved Mar.
2002), stating:
So, given what I've said, it's important for you to know
what the standard of care which a specialist i[n]
periodontics is required to observe in his treatment of a
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patient under the circumstances of this case. And based
upon common knowledge alone, and without technical
training, jurors normally cannot know what conduct
constitutes standard dental practice. Therefore, the
standard of practice by which a physician's conduct or
a dentist's conduct is to be judged must be furnished by
expert testimony.
That is to say, by the testimony of persons who again,
by reason of their knowledge, training, and experience,
are deemed qualified to testify and express opinions on
dental subjects.
You as jurors should not speculate or guess about the
standards of care by which the defendant dentist should
have conducted himself in the diagnosis and treatment
of the plaintiff. Rather, you must determine the
applicable dental standard from the testimony of the
experts that you've heard in this case.
In light of our decision to reverse and remand on the issue of liability for
a new trial, we need not address defendants' first two arguments. As to issue
three pertaining to the "golden rule" and issue four ostensibly attributing bad
faith to Dr. Ricker for defending against plaintiffs' claim, we add the following
brief remarks.
Defendants contend plaintiffs' counsel impermissibly invoked the "golden
rule" when he stated:
We all know what we love to do. Think if that's taken
away from us. . . . Think about it. Think about the
things you love to do. And if it's taken away, that's loss
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of enjoyment of life. That's the idea that you'll think
about in the jury room.
It is "improper to construct a summation that appeals to the emotions and
sympathy of the jury." State v. Black, 380 N.J. Super. 581, 594 (App. Div.
2005). An attorney may make such an appeal by invoking the "golden rule," a
principle that dictates "you should do unto others as you would wish them to do
unto you." Geler v. Akawie, 358 N.J. Super. 437, 464 (App. Div. 2003). Courts
disallow invocation of the golden rule because such arguments suggest to jurors
they should "adopt what they would want as compensation for injury, pain and
suffering," and encourage "the jury to depart from neutrality and to dec ide the
case on the basis of personal interest and bias rather than on the evidence." Id.
at 464-65 (citation omitted).
Here, defendants' argument is unpersuasive because plaintiffs' counsel's
comment during summation simply encouraged the jury to rely on their own
experience when determining the proper amount of compensation. The thrust
of counsel's statement mirrors the charge given to the jury by the trial court,
specifically,
The law doesn't provide you with any table, schedule,
or formula by which a person's pain, suffering,
disability, impairment, and loss of enjoyment of life
may be measured in terms of money. The amount of
money is left to your sound discretion. You are to use
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your discretion to attempt to make the plaintiff whole,
so far as money can do so, based upon reason and sound
judgment, without any passion, prejudice, bias, or
sympathy.
You each know from your own experience the nature of
pain and suffering, disability, impairment, and loss of
enjoyment of life. And you each know from your own
experience the nature and function of money. And the
task of equating the two, so as to arrive at a fair and
reasonable award of compensation is a high order of
human judgment. For this reason, the law can provide
no better yardstick for your guidance than your own
impartial judgment and experience.
After reviewing the record, we find nothing objectionable about the
summation presented by plaintiffs' counsel. His statements focused on the
nature of plaintiff's damages and did not violate the golden rule.
Lastly, for the first time on appeal, defendants allege plaintiffs
improvidently attributed bad faith to Dr. Ricker "for defending himself in court
rather than admitting negligence." Defense counsel did not object to this
statement at the time of summation or during argument on defendants' motion
for a new trial. We refrain from addressing issues not raised before the trial
court "unless the questions so raised on appeal go to the jurisdiction of the trial
court or concern matters of great public interest." Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins.
Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973) (quoting Reynolds Offset Co. v. Summer, 58 N.J.
Super. 542, 548 (App. Div. 1959)). We are not persuaded plaintiffs' counsel
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accused Dr. Ricker of acting in bad faith and discern no reversible error on that
point so as to necessitate a new trial on damages.
Defendants' remaining arguments—to the extent we have not addressed
them—lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-
3(e)(1)(E).
On appeal, defendants have not challenged the amount of the jury award.
The primary thrust of their contentions is that the trial court made erroneous
evidentiary rulings pertaining to liability and proximate cause. Therefore, we
need not vacate the amount of damages awarded by the jury, and remand solely
for a new trial on liability and proximate cause.
Affirmed in part; reversed in part; and remanded for a new trial on liability
and proximate cause only. We do not retain jurisdiction.
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