ASHAAN WROTEN VS. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS (NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3052-19
ASHAAN WROTEN,
Appellant,
v.
NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS,
Respondent.
__________________________
Submitted November 1, 2021 – Decided November 15, 2021
Before Judges Sabatino and Natali.
On appeal from the New Jersey Department of
Corrections.
Ashaan Wroten, appellant pro se.
Andrew J. Bruck, Acting Attorney General, attorney for
respondent (Jane C. Schuster, Assistant Attorney
General, of counsel; Christopher C. Josephson, Deputy
Attorney General, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Ashaan Wroten is presently incarcerated at Mountainview
Youth Correctional Facility. He appeals from a final decision of the New Jersey
Department of Corrections (Department), which found that he committed
prohibited act *.005, threatening another with bodily harm or with an offense
against his or her person or property, and .256, refusing to obey an order of any
staff member, in violation of N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1(a). We affirm.
On January 10, 2020, while Wroten and other inmates were in the
recreation room, a "Code 33" was sent, signifying the existence of an emergency
in the prison facility requiring officer assistance. In response, prison guards
ordered all inmates to lay on the floor. According to the administrative record,
Wroten refused to lay still and repeatedly raised his head, prompting Sergeant
E. Cascarelli 1 to issue numerous oral commands for him to cease moving and to
keep his head down. According to Sergeant Cascarelli, Wroten refused to
comply, and instead stated "fuck you, you spic bitch, I'll fuck you up."
As a result, Wroten was charged with the aforementioned two prohibited
acts, and a third, *.306, conduct that disrupts or interferes with the security or
orderly operation of a correctional facility. Wroten was served with the charges,
and after an internal investigation a referral was made to a hearing officer. The
1
Sergeant Cascarelli's first name does not appear in the record.
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Department also obtained a mental health evaluation to assess, among other
issues, Wroten's mental state at the time of the January 10, 2020 incident, his
competency to participate in the disciplinary proceedings, and the effect any
imposed penalty would have on his mental health. Wroten denied the charges,
and he was provided with the assistance of counsel-substitute at the disciplinary
hearing.
Wroten, who declined the opportunity to submit a written statement
detailing his version of the January 10, 2020 events, denied through his counsel-
substitute that he threatened Sergeant Cascarelli and claimed he simply told her
that he was not looking at her. His counsel-substitute also informed the hearing
officer that he had no previous disciplinary infractions and requested leniency.
Wroten requested witness statements from two fellow inmates, Zaire
Batista and Theddues West. Batista summarily reported that Wroten "did not
make any threats," and West failed to support Wroten's version of events
claiming he saw "nothing at all."
The hearing officer reviewed Wroten's confidential mental health
evaluation, and also offered Wroten the opportunity to confront adverse
witnesses, which he declined. In addition, the court evaluated Sergeant
Cascarelli's statement that during the Code 33, Wroten was given several direct
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orders to which he failed to comply, called her the previously noted vulgar,
vituperative epithet, and threatened to "fuck [her] up."
After considering all of the aforementioned documentary evidence, the
hearing officer concluded Wroten committed prohibited acts *.005 and .256 and
imposed the following sanctions: one hundred and twenty-five days of
administrative segregation, loss of ninety-five days of commutation time, and
fifteen days of recreation privileges. The hearing officer dismissed the *.306
charge, concluding it was repetitive of the *.005 and .256 offenses.
Wroten filed an administrative appeal in which he continued to maintain
his innocence, contended the hearing officer misinterpreted the facts, and
repeated that he had an unblemished disciplinary history adding that he "keeps
to himself." He also sought leniency and a stay of all sanctions pending appeal.
On January 16, 2020, the Department upheld the hearing officer's decision and
concluded after reviewing the evidence submitted that the charges were
"credible and the sanctions appropriate."
This appeal followed in which Wroten raises two points. First, he appears
to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence presented at the disciplinary hearing
arguing he would never threaten a "custody official" and certainly not a sergeant.
Relatedly, he contends the proofs relied upon by the hearing officer are missing
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"important elements" rendering the final decision arbitrary, capricious, and
unreasonable.
Second, he raises three procedural challenges to the disciplinary
proceedings. He questions why the disciplinary report related to the *.005
offense initially included the word "dismissed," which was then crossed out on
the report. He also objects to the hearing officer's consideration of documents
"AA1" and "C1," as he was not provided a copy of those documents. Finally,
he contends he was denied the opportunity to confront adverse witnesses. We
disagree with all of these arguments.
"Our role in reviewing the decision of an administrative agency is
limited." Figueroa v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 414 N.J. Super. 186, 190 (App. Div.
2010). "We defer to an agency decision and do not reverse unless it is arbitrary,
capricious or unreasonable[,] or not supported by substantial credible evidence
in the record." Jenkins v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 412 N.J. Super. 243, 259 (App.
Div. 2010). "'Substantial evidence' means 'such evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Figueroa, 414 N.J. Super.
at 192 (quoting In re Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 35 N.J. 358, 376 (1961)).
When reviewing a determination of the Department in a matter involving
prisoner discipline, we engage in a "careful and principled consideration of the
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agency record and findings." Williams v. Dep't of Corr., 330 N.J. Super. 197,
204 (App. Div. 2000) (quoting Mayflower Sec. Co. v. Bureau of Sec. in Div. of
Consumer Affairs of Dep't of Law & Pub. Safety, 64 N.J. 85, 93 (1973)). We
consider not only whether there is substantial evidence that the inmate
committed the prohibited act, but also whether, in making its decision, the
Department followed regulations adopted to afford inmates procedural due
process. See McDonald v. Pinchak, 139 N.J. 188, 194–96 (1995).
"Prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution,
and the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not
apply." Jenkins v. Fauver, 108 N.J. 239, 248-49 (1987) (quoting Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974)). An inmate's more limited procedural
rights, initially set forth in Avant v. Clifford, 67 N.J. 496, 525–46 (1975), are
codified in a comprehensive set of NJDOC regulations. N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.1 to
9.28.
Those rights include a right to a fair tribunal, N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.15, a
limited right to call witnesses and present documentary evidence, N.J.A.C.
10A:4-9.13, a limited right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses,
N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.14, a right to a written statement of the evidence relied upon
and the reasons for the sanctions imposed, N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.24, and, in certain
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circumstances, the assistance of counsel-substitute, N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.12. The
regulations "strike the proper balance between the security concerns of the
prison, the need for swift and fair discipline, and the due-process rights of the
inmates." Williams, 330 N.J. Super. at 203 (citing McDonald, 139 N.J. at 202).
Applying these principles, we are satisfied that there was substantial
credible evidence in the record supporting the Department's findings. In
sustaining two of the charges, the hearing officer clearly rejected Wroten's
version of events and credited Sergeant Cascarelli's statement that Wroten
continued to move while ordered to lay on the ground, repeatedly raised his head
in direct violation of oral commands, cursed, and threatened her with physical
harm.
Further, in rejecting Wroten's version, the hearing officer considered all
the evidence, including the statements from Batista and West. The hearing
officer clearly discounted those statements as West failed to support Wroten's
version in any measure and Batista's vague statement paled in comparison to
Sergeant Cascarelli's specific account, findings fully supported by the record.
In this regard, as the hearing officer noted, neither inmate directly disputed that
portion of Sergeant Cascarelli's written statement that Wroten cursed at her.
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In light of these findings, we find no abuse of the Department's
considerable discretion. As the hearing officer explained, "threats [against
correctional officers] are serious [and] put everyone at risk," and inmates are
expected to follow direct orders from the prison staff. See Jacobs v. Stephens,
139 N.J. 212, 219-22 (1995) (*.005 charge upheld when inmate yelled
profanities at corrections officer, including "Fuck you, I ain't giving you
shit . . ." "come on, come on[,] I'll fuck you up.").
We also reject Wroten's due process challenges to the disciplinary
proceedings as he was afforded all of the procedural safeguards permitted by
Avant and codified in the Department's regulations. As noted, he was timely
served with the charges, appointed a counsel-substitute who advocated on his
behalf, and his hearing was conducted by an impartial tribunal. Wroten's
counsel-substitute put forth a substantive defense, requested leniency, and
presented two witness statements, all of which the hearing officer considered.
Wroten was also offered the right to confront Sergeant Cascarelli but declined.
As to his specific challenges, we note that it is clear from the record that
the "dismissed" notation on the disciplinary report was written in error as that
word was subsequently crossed out, and the hearing officer issued a detailed
decision finding Wroten guilty of the *.005 charge and dismissed the *.306
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charge. Second, document AA1 was not a separate piece of evidence considered
by the hearing officer, but a document reflecting the inventoried evidence.
Finally, C1 is Wroten's confidential mental health evaluation. See
N.J.A.C. 10A:22-2.7. Wroten provides no substantive challenge to the
designation of that document as confidential as inconsistent with the regulation,
nor does the record indicate he requested to review the document in his
administrative appeal.
More importantly, nothing in C1 competently addresses the statements he
made to Sergeant Cascarelli on January 10, 2020, as the evaluator was not a
percipient witness to the events in the recreation room and the hearing officer
did not rely upon it for that purpose. Rather, the evaluation was considered as
it related to Wroten's mental health at the time of the incident, his competence
and attendant ability to understand the disciplinary proceedings, and the
propriety and effect of any penalty in light of his mental health issues, none of
which Wroten challenges on appeal.
To the extent we have not specifically addressed any of Wroten's other
contentions, it is because we conclude they lack sufficient merit to warrant
discussion in this opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(D) to (E).
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Affirmed.
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